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ABSTRACT
The problem of technological change in rural development in Third
World countries is approached through an examination of the question
of which factors govern the choice and adoption of new technologies.
The literature on technological change and development is reviewed
and rural development programmes in Lesotho are discussed within the
context of an analysis of the rural environment and the structure of
the economy. Two key features of the country's economy which affect
technological change are identified. Firstly, the migrant labour
system, which is a consequence of the historical development of the
regional economy being dominated by mining capital, has shaped the
attitudes of rural households towards investment in new technologies
and has constrained the development of traditional agricultural
knowledge and practices. Secondly, foreign aid has become a major
vehicle for the introduction of new technologies, but its effect on
the choice of technology is paradoxical. One effect is to skew the
choice towards imported capital-intensive technologies. But the per¬
vasive ideologies incorporated in aid policies, with their emphases
on appropriate technology and the meeting of basic needs of the rural
poor, may give rise to rural development programmes which counter the
above effect. One example, from Lesotho, is the introduction of
locally manufactured solar energy technologies. The significance of
technical knowledge transferred in rural development programmes is
indicated and the relationships between ideology, interests and
knowledge are briefly discussed. The failure of agrarian societies
to adopt technological change is attributed, in part, to the origins
and nature of the knowledge introduced through aid-directed rural
development programmes.
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The development of human societies has always been closely associated
with technological change. The introduction and adoption of new
technologies has enabled the discovery and exploitation of new
resources, increased productivity from existing resources, expanded
the level and variety of consumption, and provided greater material
welfare for the society concerned.
The differing degree to which technological change has occurred in
various societies has long been most evident between the industrial¬
ised countries, of Europe and North America, and that group of coun¬
tries, once colonies, and now commonly referred to as the Third
World. It is also evident, in spite of three decades of development
assistance to Third World countries, that disparities in technologi¬
cal capability and material welfare remain as large as ever. The
total African share in world manufacturing value added, for example,
has risen from 0.6% in 1960 to only 0.8% in 1975 [Fransman (1982a)j p
1]. Nowhere are these problems more evident than in the area of
rural development. The great majority of the population of the Third
World reside in rural areas and it is here that the greatest needs
arise for improvements in material welfare. Yet it is also in rural
development that efforts to achieve technological change have been
spectacularly unsuccessful. International aid agencies have given
much publicity to policy statements which stress their concern for
assisting the rural poor, but they are seldom able to point to pro¬
jects where aid has been successfully translated into sustained
material benefits for the recipients.
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In spite of the growth of a vast body of academic literature and
research studies in the field of development theory, many of the
problems implicit in technological change are still inadequately
understood. Again, this is, perhaps, most apparent in the area of
rural development where the inability, reluctance or refusal of poor
agrarian households to adopt new technologies continues to perplex
and frustrate government bureaucrats, aid personnel and research
workers alike.
By posing the problem in this way it is not intended to confer appro¬
val or any inherently positive value to these attempts to effect
technological change. Indeed, as will become apparent in this
thesis, many of these programmes have been misconceived in their
motives and have failed to take into account adequately the con¬
straints, views and knowledge of rural households. It may also be
argued that rural development depends less on new technology than on
changes in the structure of political and economic power, but it
remains the case, nevertheless, that technological change makes
improvements in material conditions ultimately feasible.
Technological change is a process which primarily involves the choice
and adoption of new technologies. Two overriding questions will thus
be addressed in this thesis:
[1] Which factors govern the choice of new technologies?
[2] Which factors govern the successful adoption of new technolo¬
gies?
These questions will be posed within the context of rural development
in the Third World. The term "rural development" is used in this
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thesis in the sense adopted by most international aid agencies and
may be defined as:
"
a process of socio-economic change involving the
transformation of agrarian society in order to reach a com¬
mon set of development goals based on the capacities and
needs of people. These goals include a nationally deter¬
mined growth process that gives priority to the reduction
of poverty, unemployment and inequality, and the satisfac¬
tion of minimum human needs, and stresses self-reliance and
the participation of all the people, particularly those
with the lowest standard of living" [UNDP (1979b), p 1],
These concerns have not necessarily always been given expression in
rural development programmes but, in recent years, most aid agencies,
and many Third World governments, have incorporated these notions in
their policy pronouncements on rural development. Rural development
is thus not merely a narrow sectoral approach to agricultural
development but also incorporates broader welfare objectives.
Two approaches to the study of rural development and processes of
technological change in agrarian Third World nations have been con¬
sidered by the writer. The first relies on an analysis of the inter¬
nal socio-economic conditions of rural society and examines the ways
in which traditional practices and customary modes of behaviour may
function to constrain the adoption or acceptance of technological
change. An example of such an approach is the study by Winnington
(1979) of technical innovation in a Mexican village which concluded
that the choice and adoption of new technologies by villagers was
rational within the perceived risks, potential returns and prestige
associated with the technology. Village life was based on a tradi¬
tion of survival over many centuries and villagers were understand¬
ably cautious about the abandonment of their tradition as, in so
doing, they may have been limiting their capacity to survive. He
argued further that for an innovation in production to occur spon-
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taneously it must be seen by the potential innovator not only to
offer a benefit over existing practices, but also to present a risk
not significantly greater than that associated with existing prac¬
tices. In addition, villagers were found to be naturally suspicious
of outsiders actively "selling" new ideas; in practice, villagers took
what they could without making any commitment to the development pro¬
ject.
It is interesting to note, in passing, that when this same "internal¬
ist" approach is applied to an analysis of the factors governing the
choice of technologies by aid agencies, within development pro¬
grammes, remarkably similar conclusions are arrived at concerning the
role of risk avoidance, and the reliance on established and tradi¬
tional practices. One of the very few studies of the influence of
aid agencies on the choice of technology concluded:
"Ultimately, it was the organisational requirements of the
implementing agencies, including the aid donors, that
determined the choice of tubewell technology for East Pak¬
istan. In the actual decision making, such factors as risk
avoidance, appearance of modernity, established procedures,
familiar techniques, and by no means least, control,
outweighed development policy objectives. It is in these
factors that an understanding of decisions as to choice of
technology must be sought [Thomas (1975), p 57].
Although these conclusions are no doubt valid (indeed, many of these
features will be noted in the case study in this thesis) they remain
a static explanatory account of technological change and fail to take
into account the importance of the interaction between agrarian
society, the national and international economy, and agents of change
such as foreign aid organisations.
A more dynamic explanatory analysis is adopted by political economy,
the second broad approach for understanding processes of technologi¬
cal change in rural development. Internal socio-economic structures
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in a society are related not only to productive activity, but also to
the distribution of power and knowledge at both the national and
international level. The form of analysis adopted in the political
economy approach will become clearer in the critical review of the
literature on technological change and development in Chapter Two.
One view of technology which has received much attention in develop¬
ment programmes of the last decade is that of appropriate technology.
The literature has been approached through an analysis of the dif¬
ferent interpretations of the notion of appropriate technology which
have been made by the development community; it is believed that this
is the first time that such an analysis has been related to the
broader literature on technological change and development theory.
Two main interpretations of appropriate technology are identified and
these have been related to questions such as the choice of technol¬
ogy, research and development, the relationship between science and
technology, innovation and the development of indigenous technologi¬
cal capability in Third World countries. The origins of the notion
of appropriate technology are traced and the technological determin¬
ism implied in the conception is criticised. A political economy
analysis of technological change is advocated, and this approach is
contrasted with modernisation, structural ist and dependency schools
of thought in development theory. The review of the literature thus
provides a framework which is applied to the case study on rural
development and technological change.
It should be noted here that although the relationship between indus¬
trialised countries and the Third World is often unqualified in the
general discussion in the thesis, the reader should not assume that
these are references to two homogeneous categories of countries.
- 7 -
Clearly, the historical development, economic structure and cultures
of individual countries differ widely and any generalisations must be
treated cautiously. It is this perspective which has resulted in the
major portion of this thesis being devoted to a case study of one
particular country, Lesotho in southern Africa.
The writer spent a period of 10 months, from September 1980 to June
1981, undertaking field work in Lesotho. Most of this time was spent
living in the village of Thaba Tseka which has become the site of one
of the largest rural development projects in the country. Part Two
of this thesis is thus devoted to an examination of technological
change in rural development in Lesotho. Chapter Three examines the
political and economic structure of Lesotho, including its historical
development. Chapter Four is devoted to a discussion of the rural
environment, the effect of Lesotho's political economy on agrarian
society, and the history of colonial intervention in rural develop-,
ment. The chapter provides the context in which modern post-
independence, aid-directed rural development programmes have been
undertaken. The objectives and nature of these programmes are dis¬
cussed in Chapter Five, where particular emphasis is given to the
Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme. Most of these programmes
involved attempts to introduce new agricultural technologies which
included the minimum of local research and innovation. Chapter Six,
though, is devoted to an analysis of a research and development pro¬
ject for solar energy technologies at the Thaba Tseka Rural Technol¬
ogy Unit.
The information presented in the case study is derived from project
documents, informal interviews and personal observations made during
the field trip. Where no specific references are cited it should be
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assumed that the data derives from the latter two sources.
The final part of the thesis presents conclusions as to the factors
which have determined the choice and adoption of new technologies in
Lesotho. These conclusions are widened to assess the significance of
aid in processes of technological change in poorer, agrarian Third
World nations. The ideological character of aid policies is demon¬
strated, and the nature of interests and knowledge in technical
assistance programmes, is discussed.
The failure effectively to transfer technical knowledge in rural
development programmes, to meet aspirations for material advancement,
remains a complex problem. It is hoped that this thesis will offer a




TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT:
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Concern about the appropriateness of technologies transferred from
modern industrialised countries to the Third World is not new. Since
the early 1950s, economists have been concerned as to whethe~ techno¬
logies transferred to and utilised in the Third World have used fac¬
tors of production, such as labour and capital, in proportions close
to the pattern of factor endowments found in these countries [Eckhaus
(1955)]. But, it was not until the end of the first United Nations
Development Decade (in 1970) that orthodox development experts began
to question seriously the wisdom of the unrestricted transfer of
Western science and technology to the Third World.
The optimism of the 1950s and 1960s was characterised by a view which
saw the solution to the "underdevelopment" of the Third World as
lying in part in the importation of already developed, modern techno¬
logies which would increase growth rates and hence, supposedly, speed
up the process of development. But with the increasing gap in income
per capita between the rich and the poor countries, accumulating
debts under aid programmes, increasing un- and under-employment, and
the growth of rural poverty, a more sceptical and critical analysis
has emerged of the role played by Western science and technology in
the development process (1). A burgeoning literature has begun to
(1) Members of the Institute of Development Studies and the Sci¬
ence Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex have been
influential in this critical evaluation. See for example "The
Sussex Manifesto", written for the United Nations World Plan of
Action for the Application of Science and Technology for Develop¬
ment [Institute of Development Studies (1970)].
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examine the factors which influence or determine the choice of tech¬
niques, technological innovation, the manner in which technology is
transferred to the Third World, and the kinds of science and technol¬
ogy institutions which would facilitate indigenous technological
development (2).
More recently, an awareness of a radical tradition in political econ¬
omy has grown—one which has emphasised the importance of the system
and structure of production in determining the nature of technologi¬
cal development, particularly within the continuing evolution of
world capitalism (3). Although the latter work constitutes only a
small part of the literature on the subject of technology and
development, the method of analysis employed offers, in the view of
the writer, the best opportunity for a thorough understanding of the
way in which technology is generated, and of the role it plays in the
development process.
These trends have matched, and have been influenced by, a parallel
evolution in development theory. Early work, typified by Rostow's
"stages of growth" theory, assumed that the development of the Third
World would proceed in much the same way as the industrialised capi¬
talist countries had previously experienced [Rostow (I960)].
However, in the late 1960s and 1970s, dependency theory sought to
show that:
"the socio-economic state of the developing countries is
not merely 'economic underdevelopment1, not just a sign of
(2) The bibliography at the end of this thesis provides a fairly
extensive list of titles on the general subject of technology and
development.
(3) See particularly chapters 13, 14, and 15 of Karl Marx's Capi¬
tal Volume 1; Dickson (1974), Gorz (1976), Rosenberg (1976),
Slater (1980), and Levidow and Young (1981).
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their not having participated in development, of their hav¬
ing fallen behind in progress, but it is the product of a
specific development, which is most closely connected with,
moreover derived from, the development of capitalist world
economy" [Szentes (1976), pl32].
More recently a body of literature has arisen which has been critical
of the loose neo-Marxian concepts of the dependency school, and which
employs a more rigorous analysis of the penetration of capitalism in
Third World countries [Laclau (1971); Kay (1976); Leys (1977); Taylor
(1979)]. An examination of the uneven manner in which this has
occurred, and of the co-existence of pre-capitalist modes of produc¬
tion in many of the poorer and rural regions, has provided the con¬
text within which processes of technological change and rural
development must be studied.
In this chapter an attempt is made to examine some of the more impor¬
tant trends in the theory on the relationship between technology and
development. This will be undertaken (in perhaps an unusual way) by
reviewing critically the literature on one of the more populist con¬
cepts to emerge in this area - that of the notion of appropriate
technology.
This has been done for three reasons. Firstly, the notion of
appropriate technology has become influential over the past decade,
and has become incorporated in the aid policies of all the major
donor agencies. As will become apparent as this thesis progresses,
aid programmes in the poorer Third World countries have become an
important source for the introduction of new technologies. The aid
process has determined the nature of the technologies chosen and
utilised.
Secondly, the notion of appropriate technology has been mostly asso-
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ciated with the problems of rural development, which is the area of
study of this thesis. As such, much of the fairly technical litera¬
ture on industrialisation strategies and mechanisms for regulating
the transfer of technology, will only be briefly mentioned.
And thirdly, the concept of appropriate technology often incorporates
an awareness of the social implications of the choice of technolo¬
gies. Thus a critical evaluation of the concept will deal not only
with such aspects of technological change as the choice of techniques
and technological innovation, but also with the way in which techno¬
logical development relates to social structure.
APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY
With the multitude of inchoate ideas, 1iterature,and practice that
have arisen over the past decade around the notion of appropriate
technology, has come a confusingly wide range of interpretations and
meanings that have been attached to the concept (4). Appropriate
technology has become an accepted term for a family of concepts
including the terms "intermediate", "soft", "Utopian", "ecologically
sound", "progressive", "low cost", "labour intensive", "small scale",
"inequality reducing", "village", "socially appropriate" and "alter¬
native" technology - each of which places a particular emphasis on
which kinds of technology are considered "appropriate".
Proponents of the concept of appropriate technology now vary from
major development agencies, most of which have incorporated the con¬
cept into aid policy statements (5), to those involved in radical
(4) Surveys of the literature have generally been selective and
incomplete. See for instance Jackson (1972), Ganiere (1973), Carr
(1976), French (1977), Baron (1978), and Garcia (1979).
(5) USAID (1976), World Bank (1976), UNIDO (1977), ODM (1977), WHO
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critiques of technological development in the industrialised coun¬
tries, and to transnational corporations attempting to exploit new
markets by claiming that technologies or products are in some way
appropriate to the needs of Third World countries. The relative
nature of the term "appropriate" inevitably results in a degree of
confusion, and appropriate technology has come to mean little more
than that which individuals themselves intend.
In reviewing the literature, various formulations of appropriate
technology will be classified as belonging to either a narrow or
broad conceptual interpretation (6). The narrow interpretation is a
view that is generally favoured by neo-classical economists, where
appropriate technologies are those that make efficient use of avail¬
able resources and factor endowments. In contrast, within the broad
interpretation, appropriate technologies are those that contribute to
the meeting of particular development objectives. Although these are
sometimes defined according to economic criteria, the broad interpre¬
tation often incorporates wider social, cultural and environmental
•IrCMLtofS.
(1978). Policies on appropriate technology have, however,
remained primarily at the level of rhetoric. A recent survey at
the United Nations concluded that, although nearly all agencies
have published policy statements on appropriate technology, "ac¬
tivities in the field of science and technology by various UN
agencies are not necessarily concerned with appropriate technolo¬
gy. We have based our conclusions in the light of the objectives
of employment generation and the satisfaction of basic needs"
[Floor (1979), p 157].
(6) This distinction was first made by Charles Cooper in a confer¬
ence on appropriate technology in Teheran. See a summary of his
contribution in Robinson (1979), p 403. Cooper's distinction how¬
ever is different in that he merely differentiates between in¬
terpretations of appropriate technology that are favoured by
economists and those adopted by ecologists.
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THE NARROW INTERPRETATION
Development theory, in its attempt at explaining the enormous dispar¬
ities in wealth between the industrialised and Third World countries,
and of suggesting how these gaps might be bridged, has often concen¬
trated on questions of production and technological change. The
material wealth of a country is seen to depend on the production of
goods and services through the co-ordinated use of available supplies
of human skills, capital, land, and natural resources. Economic
growth can stem from increased production through the use of more
resources, and from increased productivity through the more efficient
use of resources. Technology contributes to both, increasing the
utility of available resources through increased skills, better
methods and machines. Technology is thus one factor of change to be
integrated into the overall planning of economic development.
In this scheme, the economic constraints on development in the Third
World are seen to be:
[1] a shortage of investment resources to create infrastructure in
order to provide capital equipment for new industries, to
improve productivity in existing jobs, and above all to create
new jobs; and
[2] a shortage of foreign exchange resources to provide for the high
import content of Western-type capital investment, and for all
the necessary inputs into new productive activities.
The cost of job creation using Western technology is high - even
higher than for an identical plant in an industrialised country,
where all the necessary support facilities are closer to the con-
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struction site. Because of the scarcity of capital in most Third
World countries, this kind of investment creates very few jobs and
leaves the problems of massive underemployment and poverty untouched.
It is argued that appropriate technologies would be those which fully
reflect the abundance or scarcity of available resources [Jones
(1971); Eckhaus (1977); Robinson (1979)]. Capital intensive techno¬
logies from industrialised countries are in general regarded as inap¬
propriate to the factor endowments of Third World countries, where
capital is generally scarce and labour is relatively abundant.
Furthermore if appropriate technologies are to be utilised, all fac¬
tors of production should be valued at prices which reflect their
relative scarcities. The appropriateness of technologies are set by
shadow prices and opportunity costs and not by market prices. In many
Third World countries, the latter are seen to be distorted by
economic policies which:
[1] cheapen capital by subsidising interest rates or by offering
incentive schemes to attract investment;
[2] inflate actual wage rates in excess of the true opportunity
costs of labour through minimum wage legislation, unionisation
and various welfare measures; and
[3] overvalue the exchange rate.
Ideally, it is argued, an appropriate technology is one which makes
possible the production of a given good at a price not exceeding the
current world price when:
[1] all factors of production are valued at prices which reflect
their relative scarcities and opportunity costs and which will
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permit the full employment of all available supplies of factors;
[2] the exchange rate is such that there is a balance of payments
with this level of demand and activity, and when allowance is
made for a normal inflow or outflow of capital;
[3] the rate of interest or discount is consistent with a balance
between savings and investment at this level of near or full
employment of all factors of production.
Critique of Neo-Classical Economic Theory of the Choice of Technique
The above approach is the one favoured by major aid and donor agen¬
cies such as the United States Agency for International Development.
"In terms of available resources, appropriate technologies
are intensive in the use of the abundant factor, labor,
economical in the use of scarce factors, capital and highly
trained personnel, and intensive in the use of domestically
produced inputs" (7).
The underlying presuppositions of this view are those of neo¬
classical economics. Technology is understood to describe the rela¬
tionship between inputs, or factors of production, and outputs. The
relationship is expressed as a production function which enters
economic analysis as a datum given by technological or extra-economic
considerations.
For the production of some commodity there exists a range of tech¬
niques each of which combines the factors of production in different
(7) USAID (1976), p 11. It should be noted that this document also
contains other criteria for the appropriateness of technology: "In
terms of small production units, appropriate technologies are
small-scale but efficient, replicable in numerous units, readily
operated, maintained and repaired, low cost and accessible to low
income persons. - In terms of the people who use or benefit from
them, appropriate technologies seek to be compatible with local
cultural and social environments"[ibid, pp 11-12].
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proportions. A technique can be said to be "inferior" if some other
technique exists which either produces the same quantity of the pro¬
duct required using less of at least one of the factors of production
and not more of any other factor, or produces more of a given product
using the same quantity of inputs as it does. All techniques which
are not inferior are regarded as "technologically efficient." A pro¬
duction function consists of available technologically efficient
techniques. Furthermore a technique is "economically efficient" if
factor proportions are used according to their relative scarcities.
Conventionally, only two factors are considered: capital (K) and
labour (L). The term "technique" is mainly used to denote concrete
methods of production and refers to the ratio or proportion in which
factors are utilised (K/L). The choice of technique is thus under¬
stood to be a choice of differing labour and investment proportions,
with the relative prices of labour and investment being the deter¬
minants of this choice. This is shown in Figure 1.(8).
The isoquant (q) represents the range of efficient techniques using a
wide range of varying factor intensities for the production of a
chosen output. The entrepreneur is visualised as making his least
cost decision by putting this technological data together with
economic information derived from the market-place. In industrial¬
ised countries, for example, techniques would be chosen using rela¬
tively more capital (represented by the isocast II') and in Third
World countries, appropriate choices of technique would be those
utilising relatively less capital (TT' ).
(8) This formulation is found in most economics textbooks. See for





FIGURE 2.1 : Diagrammatic Representation of Production Function
The model assumes substitutabi 1 ity of labour and capital and a wide
variety of techniques available to produce any given output.
Ideally, the relative prices of capital and labour are presumed to
adjust to the balance of supply and demand. The choice of technique
adjusts then to the relative prices, such that full employment is
ultimately reached. Hence neo-classical free market economists would
argue that unemployment in developing countries is largely due to
inappropriate production techniques which are encouraged through dis-
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tortions in factor prices. Once these imperfections are corrected,
it is assumed that more labour intensive technologies would be
adopted.
Technical progress is introduced without altering the basic model and
is assumed to be neutral, affecting all techniques equally. It is
represented by a shift in the isoquant (q to q1).
This model of the choice of technique has been criticised by, amongst
others, Frances Stewart [1972, 1977].
[1] In picking on just two of many characteristics associated with
each technique (investment and labour), the model completely
ignores many other factors such as infrastructural requirements,
labour skills and the nature of the product. In many cases the
choice of production technique is ruled out once a choice of
product is made. Inequality of income distribution leads to a
pattern of demand for certain relatively expensive products
which are generally overspecified for the requirements of most
of the population of a Third World country. These products gen¬
erally require a more capital intensive technique than the trad¬
itional products which they substitute. Capital intensive tech¬
nologies, in turn, reinforce the disparities in income as high
profits and wages characterise the small and modern industrial
sectors.
Furthermore, the production function treats only a single output
at a time, whereas, in reality, most processes yield several
products (some desirable and some undesirable) from a given set
of inputs. Joint production cannot be readily analysed within
this framework.
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[2] The model concentrates on only one selection mechanism - the
relative price of labour and investment - which corresponds to
only one type of decision maker - the profit maximising
entrepreneur with unlimited access to investment resources.
However, there is overwhelming empirical evidence that labour
and investment are not the most significant variables in deter¬
mining, nor are relative prices the sole criterion of, technical
choice [Timmer et al (1975)]. One detailed case study on the
choice of technology noted that:
"The availability of external aid to finance new investment
in itself affects the choice of technology, for the prefer¬
ence of the aid giver then becomes an important element in
the decision-making process"[Thomas (1975), p 51].
Different groups of decision makers face different constraints, have
different objectives and therefore make different choices. The
interests of the transnational corporations predetermine (or at least
constrain) the flow of technology to the Third World. Also, the
state is not a neutral arbitrator but generally expresses the
interests of higher income groups or the national bourgeoisie. These
issues of political constraints are hardly ever discussed within the
context of the choice of techniques.
[3] The static assumption of an unlimited range of techniques of
varying labour and capital intensity does not accord with the
nature of technological development. Contrary to the neo¬
classical economic assumption that technological change is
merely an exogenous variable of the system, it can be argued
that the historical development of technology has conditioned
the availability, range and nature of technological choice fac¬
ing Third World countries.
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The production of knowledge is usually a costly activity, and so
technological alternatives representing factor combinations far
from those justified by present prices are not necessarily
known. Such technologies may be attainable theoretically but
are certainly not readily available. Movement along the iso-
quant is not always possible, and a continuous production func¬
tion represents a misleading idealisation which diminishes its
possible usefulness for analysis of real economic phenomena.
Research into new techniques is an economic activity which must
be regarded as technological change rather than mere factor sub¬
stitution [Green and Morphet (1977)].
In short, the neo-classical model oj- the choice of technique picks
out only one minor aspect of technological choice, assumes a single
type of decision maker, takes an a-historic view of the choice avail¬
able, and ignores many of the more significant factors affecting
technological change.
A caveat is perhaps necessary here. The preceding presentation of
the production function has in some senses been simplified (9).
Undifferentiated factors of labour and capital need not necessarily
be assumed. It is possible to draw distinctions between unskilled
and highly skilled labour, and management, as well as between working
capital and capital embodied in, for example, machinery and build-
(9) This is true of Stewart's presentation - although by concen¬
trating on the two factors of production (investment and labour),
the essential assumptions of the model are made clear and the
force of the criticisms are emphasised. It is certainly the case
that most economic textbooks present the model in this way and
that, in the field of policy formulation, many of the major aid
and lending agencies understand the choice of appropriate technol¬
ogy in these terms.
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ings. There have been attempts, in the so-called "embodiment
hypothesis", at emphasising the importance of technical progress
embodied in capital, differentiating between the various vintages of
machinery which incorporate different levels of technical progress
[Solow (1966), Massel (1962)]. The hypothesis states that if new
technical knowledge can be embodied in capital goods, then more
recent additions to the capital stock must be weighted. Hence
investment, supposedly, becomes the main vehicle for technological
change. However, investment acts on the absolute level of technology
and not on the rate of technological change, which, in this model,
remains largely an exogenous variable unrelated to previous invest¬
ment or to capital formation.
The introduction of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) produc¬
tion functions also allows the model to approximate reality by plac¬
ing limits on the substitutabil ity between any two inputs [Brown
(1967); Yotopoulos and Nugent (1976), ch4]. In general, however, the
gain of realism from alternative production function forms comes at
the cost of additional information requirements and computational
difficulties.
There has also been a series of case studies which have indicated
that the range of techniques available in Third World countries,
although narrower than many economists have assumed, is still wider
than that which some of the critics of the neo-classical model might
suppose [Bhalla (1975); Jenkins (1975); Baer (1976); Stewart (1977);
Ranis (1978)].
In a detailed and recent study [Pickett (1980)], whose object was to
establish the range of sub-process technologies and to identify the
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least cost case for a selected number of industrial sectors, it was
found that:
[1] for each industry there was, indeed, a range of technically
efficient technologies;
[2] in some industries the least cost option was also a labour
intensive one;
[3] in most industries the profitability variation across technolo¬
gies was narrower than for employment and investment costs, so
that the economic penalty for choosing the employment maximising
option might not be large; and
[4] even in a generically capital intensive industry (such as the
production of ammonia and urea), employment could be increased
by marginally less capital intensive (but also marginally less
profitable) methods, so releasing funds which, in theory, could
provide jobs elsewhere.
Although the above evidence would indicate the range of technologies
available, it also serves to emphasise the anomaly of inappropriate
choice of techniques in many Third World countries. Capital-
intensive technologies are frequently chosen, despite the abundance
of labour and the social desirability of reducing unemployment. The
essential deficiencies of the neo-classical economic model and its
inability to explain adequately why some techniques are chosen rather
than others, thus remain.
Ultimately the "problematique" (that is, the kinds of questions which
are posed and the answers which are sought) of this model is funda¬
mentally mistaken. Rather than questioning how technologies might be
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chosen according to appropriate factor proportions, the choice of
technique needs to be examined within the broader framework of polit¬
ical economy. Subsequent sections in this chapter will indicate the
way in which technological change is structured by the system of pro¬
duction and how the generation and choice of technology are largely
determined by issues of power, control and interest.
Research and Development
It is important to distinguish between factor substitution and tech¬
nological change. It is often assumed that a change in the relative
price of factors of production acts as a spur to innovation, of
economising the use of a factor which has become relatively expensive
(10). But the relative factor price combinations in the Third World
are unlikely to have a significant effect on the direction of techno¬
logical change. Much more important are factors of political economy
which are reflected in, for instance, the international imbalance of
technological knowledge and power. The almost exclusive concentra-
(10) See for example Hicks (1932). This work triggered a complex
debate in which, amongst others, W.E.G. Salter, C. Kennedy, W.
Fellner, and P. Samuelson participated. Hicks argued: "The real
reason for the predominance of labour-saving innovations must be
sought in the fact that a change in the relative factor price will
encourage a particular kind of invention, intended to economise in
the use of the factor which has become dearer." p 124.
Salter questioned these assumptions, arguing that the individual
firm is simply not interested in the particular factor-saving bias
of technical improvement. He argued: "If one takes Hicks' argu¬
ment to mean that new labour-saving technical designs will be ob¬
tained from the existing stock of knowledge, then this is nothing
more than factor substitution. It is merely a semantic difference
whether we call this kind of new technique 'invention' or 'substi¬
tution of capital for labour'. On the other hand, if the theory
implies that the increase in the relative cost of labour will lead
to a search for new knowledge which economises on this factor,
then this theory is subject to serious objections, since the
manufacturer is interested in reducing his total cost and not the
specific cost of one or more factor." p 43 in Salter (1960).
- 25 -
tion of organised research and development (R&D) activities in the
industrialised countries has a profound effect, not only on the
nature of technologies available to the Third World, but also on the
latter's ability to develop an indigenous technological capability.
Less than three per cent of the global R&D budget is spent by the
Third World countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Moreover,
a handful of countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, India and South
Korea, dominate this miniscule fraction, which means that most Third
World countries have practically no R&D programmes. This is particu¬
larly so in Africa where, excluding the Republic of South Africa,
only three countries - notably Libya and Nigeria (both relatively
rich from oil reserves) and Ghana (which has been host to a large
hydro-electric power and aluminium smelter complex installed by a
consortium of multi-national companies) - employ 18,000 of the 25,000
qualified scientists and engineers in the continent (11). Of these,
less than 1000 are employed in research and development activities:
this reflects the fact that in most of the Third World, and particu¬
larly in Africa, there is virtually no indigenous scientific research
capability, with most of the scientists and engineers being employed
directly in the productive or service sectors.
Global expenditure on R&D now tops $150,000 million a year and
employs some three million scientists and engineers [Norman (1979a)].
In spite of these huge sums, and the widely held perception that
investment in R&D is an essential ingredient in securing the long-
term prosperity of nations and businesses, there is scant public
(11) U.N. and UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks , and IL0, Yearbook of
1abour statisties ; see also 0ECD7 Science resources newsletfer ,
no 5, Summer 1980; and Wynne (1973).
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knowledge of the programmes on which all this money is spent. Few
governments publish accurate, up-to-date figures on the R&D conducted
within their borders, and much of the world's scientific effort is
deliberately cloaked in secrecy, either for military or commercial
reasons.
The disparity between rich and poor countries in levels of expendi¬
ture on R&D is even more striking when outlays are expressed in per
capita terms. In 1979, the United States spent roughly $200 for
every person in the country, and several European nations spent simi¬
lar amounts. In contrast, most Latin American nations spend less
than $5 per person, and the poorer countries of Africa less than $1
per person. These disparities become even more apparent when it is
noted, for example, that India spends on R&D only half of what the
Ford Motor Company, and only a third of what General Motors, spend in
any one year [Norman (1979b)]. These disparities mirror not only the
many others between rich and poor countries, but also serve to rein¬
force patterns of power and exploitation. As long as the world's R&D
capacity remains mostly concentrated in the industrialised countries,
the focus will continue to be largely on the problems of the rich
countries, and the Third World will remain dependent on imported, and
often inappropriate, technology for its economic and social develop¬
ment.
The irrelevance of much of the world's R&D to the needs of Third
World countries is most obvious in the disproportionate amounts spent
on military R&D; this amounts to roughly one quarter of the total
global R&D expenditure and, in countries like the United States, Bri¬
tain and the Soviet Union, absorbs about half their government's R&D
outlay. Basic research (carried out chiefly in universities in the
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Western world and by specialised institutes of the Academy of Sci¬
ences in the Soviet Union) and space research, absorb a further quar¬
ter of global R&D expenditure. Research areas such as health and
agriculture are also geared primarily to the needs of rich countries.
In the United States alone, about £670 million was spent in 1979 in
an attempt to raise the productivity of American farmers. This sum
far exceeds the agricultural R&D of all the Third World countries and
the international agricultural institutes put together (12).
These problems are further compounded by the observation that exist¬
ing scientific and technical activities in the Third World tend to
have a very limited role in relation to the production system, which
relies heavily on the importation of foreign technology. Further¬
more, the limited part they play is heavily oriented towards the
kinds of technology which already predominate in the economic system.
Thus what little R&D does take place in the Third World is generally
divorced from domestic needs.
This phenomenon has been termed the "marginalisation of science"
[Herrera (1973)]. Local industrialisation is influenced by an income
distribution which is skewed in favour of the urban elite; they dom¬
inate the consumer goods markets, which then tend to mirror those in
industrialised countries. As these technologies already exist,
foreign technology tends to act as a substitute for local technology.
Foreign technology is generally regarded as superior and more reli¬
able, even where local research and development capabilities exist.
So local science and R&D activities become alienated or "marginal¬
ised" from production (13). Indigenous research institutions tend to
(12) Norman (1979b), p 281. For R&D statistics in the U.S.A. see:
National Science Foundation (1981).
(13) This is an aspect of the structuralist theory of dependencej
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orientate their work towards the kinds of problem areas which
interest the scientific establishments in the industrialised coun¬
tries. The small deployment of global R&D expenditure in the Third
World makes the frequent allocation of very scarce budgetary and
human resources to essentially irrelevant activities, and reward and
value systems, particularly painful. This process has often been
reinforced by the Western training and education of many of the
scientists and engineers in the Third World. Scientific activities
in these countries tend to be a form of consumption rather than
investment.
The literature abounds with recommendations and policy proposals for
building up indigenous R&D capacity in the Third World (14). Unfor¬
tunately, many of these proposals incorporate ethnocentric assump¬
tions which obscure the historical reality of the generation or
acquisition of technologies in these countries. But the uncritical
notion, prevalent in the sixties, that the overcoming of under¬
development in the Third World required the creation of research
institutions and scientific endeavour similar to those found in the
industrialised countries, has begun to be superseded by a more ana¬
lytic and sceptical approach which attempts to understand the rela¬
tionship between science, technology and development in the Third
World [Sagasti (1978)].
The observation that the rich countries have strong science estab¬
lishments has led, in modern times, to the popular perception of
see,for example,Furtado (1967).
(14) UNESCO (19/0),(1974); Nelson (1974); Moravcsik (1975); Sagas¬
ti (1978); Fischer (1979); Parehasarathi (1979); see also the STPI
research programme of the International Development Research Cen¬
tre, Ottawa. The interesting case of INTINTEC in Peru is described
by Flit (1979).
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science and development as being inextricably tied. Conventional
wisdom on how science yields development is usually presented in the
following way: scientific knowledge produced in research activities
is translated into technical innovations, which, when applied to the
system of production, increase the productivity of factor inputs, and
which, in turn, result in the growth of real income, and thus
economic development. But this intuitive and causal relationship is,
in practice, difficult to substantiate.
The acknowledgement of the existence of a link between science and
technology is vacuous without the knowledge of the strength of this
link, of how specific scientific discoveries lead to technical inno¬
vations, and of any feedback mechanisms between technological
development and the growth of science. The popular perception of
science and technology has long been that science is concerned with
the pursuit of abstract and "pure" knowledge of the universe, whereas
technology may be regarded as "applied science". Pure science con¬
sists of theoretical constructs ordered towards knowledge, and tech¬
nology of constructs ordered towards practice and concrete applica¬
tions. In recent years, however, this understanding has given way to
an interactive model of science and technology where the two are seen
to be enmeshed in a symbiotic relationship [de S. Price (1969)].
This shift from an hierarchical conception of science and technology
has followed, firstly, from the recognition that they are forms of
culture; new science develops predominantly from old science and new
technology from old technology. Barry Barnes argues:
"In the case of science, the tendency to relate new find¬
ings solely to nature, and to give little explicit stress
to received knowledge, whether existing science or inputs
from technology, constituted an obstacle which has only
recently been overcome. In the case of technology, undue
concern with the role of science in innovation for a long
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time stifled interest in the far more important role of
existing technology" [Barnes (1982), p168].
Secondly, it has come to be recognised that scientific discoveries
have no "in-built" logical implications, which determine specific
applications. Barnes continues:
"Cognitively, there is no fundamental distinction to be
drawn between the creation of scientific theory and its
subsequent application. Just as the one is the imaginative
development and purposive reordering of existing knowledge,
so too is the other. And also, in just the same way, is
the exploitation of technological innovation in the context
of science" [ibid., pp 168,169].
It has also become exceedingly difficult, within the industrialised
countries, to construct clear divisions between science and technol¬
ogy. Major'advances in science have in the past often been responses
to the needs of production, and today, in many respects, science
itself has become industrialised [Ravetz (1971)]. The practice of
science has become both increasingly costly and important, and R&D
activities have progressively shifted under the control of industrial
and government laboratories [Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman (1959);
Mansfield (1971); Spiegel-Rosing and de S. Price (1977)]. Science
has also assumed great political importance: the success and vigour
of scientific research, and the effectiveness of technological
developments, have for many become indicators of the quality of a
nation's life. The expense and importance of science are reflected
in the extent to which major decisions concerning its development are
being taken by the state and by industry. Industry with its concern
with the production and sale of goods and services, and the state in
its protection of industry and concern with defence, growth, and pol¬
itical power, exercise extensive control over the resources which are
allocated to science and technology in R&D activities. Science now
often consists of highly capital intensive research and the use of
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complicated and sophisticated technology. The interpenetration of
science, technology and government, with the consequent blurring of
boundaries between technology and "pure" science, has meant that the
links between science and social benefits are no longer perceived as
being obvious and this, in times of economic stringency, has led to
the relative decline in government support for scientific research.
Although there are perhaps obvious parallels between figures indicat¬
ing official expenditure on organised R&D activities, and the level
of technological and industrial development in different countries,
these data should not obscure the complex relationship between R&D
and technological innovation at the level of production. It is far
from clear that technological change involves merely the production
of knowledge in R&D, followed by the diffusion of research results
and knowledge to the production system, and ultimately the consump¬
tion of knowledge in technical innovations. Rather, the evidence
presented below would indicate that these relationships are complex
and that there are important and dynamic feedback mechanisms from the
system of production, technical innovations, learning processes, and
the extension of knowledge.
Furthermore, although studies have indicated the importance of tech¬
nological change for economic growth in the rich countries, caution
should be exercised in the uncritical application of such conclusions
to the Third World countries. Statistical studies have shown that
the growth of capital accounts for less than a quarter of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) growth in the rich countries, with improved
resource allocation and technological change typically accounting for
half of the total economic growth. However, in Third World countries
capital accumulation has typically been shown to account for 40 to 50
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per cent of total growth [Chenery (1971)].
The international imbalance in technological capabilities has impor¬
tant implications for the acquisition or development of new technolo¬
gies by Third World countries, which are faced with the problem of,
firstly, the transfer of technologies, mainly from the advanced capi¬
talist countries, and, secondly, the need to generate indigenous
technological capabilities.
International Trade and Technological Change
The fact that the Third World countries derive most of their techno¬
logies from the industrialised countries has implications for the
traditional theories concerning international trade and comparative
advantage (15). These implications further undermine the neo¬
classical assumptions of the narrow interpretation of appropriate
technology, of efficient utilisation of available factor endowments.
Following the classical theories of Ricardo and Mill, economists have
subsequently been concerned to account for comparative advantages in
the context of the expansion of the capitalist system of production
at the world level and the incorporation of Third World countries
into the international division of labour.
Neo-classical trade models have taken the international differences
in resource endowments to be the main explanatory factor underlying
trade flows [Heckscher (1919); Ohlin (1933); Samuelson (1948)]. How¬
ever, it has been pointed out that the possession of highly developed
(15) For a critical review of the literature see Smith and Toye
(1979); see also Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970); and Helleiner
(1972).
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technological capabilities constitutes an additional source of com¬
parative advantage above and beyond those conferred by the physical
environment and by the relative endowment of capital and labour
resources [Johnson (1975)].
Posner introduced a model which incorporates technologically derived
advantages into a dynamic theory of international trade, demonstrat¬
ing how technological innovation could create a comparative advantage
which had not previously existed [Posner (1961)]. Trade occurs dur¬
ing the imitation time lag. Although the initial advantage would
gradually be eroded by the spread of the new technique through imita¬
tion, the lag may be artificially lengthened by the use of patents
and licences. However, the theory fails to explain why technological
innovations occur in some countries rather than others. Even when
R&D activities within firms are examined, one is still left with the
unexplained decisions to invest resources in research in some firms
and not in others.
The "product life cycle" theories attempted to answer some of these
questions [Vernon (1966); Hirsch (1967)]. According to Vernon, the
cost of production is not initially a major factor, as the innovator
has an initial monopoly and the demand for the new product is likely
to be relatively inelastic. The development of new products requires
close interaction between the innovating enterprises and the sup¬
pliers of production equipment and machinery. Thus the innovation is
likely to take place in the country for whose market it is designed.
After the introduction of a new product, international trade is pos¬
sible because of the technology gap. However, as demand expands in
other countries, there will be a tendency to transfer its production
to lower cost locations. With product standardisation, product
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competition increases the elasticity of demand, and the comparative
advantages of Third World countries becomes more important.
These theories, however, do little to explain how technology and
skill monopolies occur and how they are sustained or eroded. They
remain at the level of descriptions of possible sequences, rather
than of explanatory theory.
In practice, neo-classical theories of international trade have been
used as justifications for the pursuit of free trade policies in the
context of the expansion of the capitalist system of production.
According to this model, each country would make efficient use of its
productive resources through an international division of labour
arising out of the production and export of commodities which fully
reflect the abundance or scarcity of local production factors. The
world market would be, supposedly, a complex of reciprocally advanta¬
geous trade deals from which all countries would benefit. These
assumptions underlie the arguments of the narrow view of appropriate
technology which has been adopted by many of the major aid agencies.
However, these postulates do not accord with the historically
observed facts on the expansion of trade. While it cannot be ignored
that comparative costs play an important role in international trade,
neither can it be ignored that trade flows have been imposed and con¬
trolled by the industrialised nations to their own benefit (16). The
international expansion of capitalism has invariably led to unequal
development and to an absolute transfer of surplus from the Third
World countries to the industrialised nations [Emmanuel (1972); Amin
(16) These structurally biased gains from trade have been studied
in particular by Prebisch and the structuralist school of thought.
See Prebisch (1959).
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(1974)]. The capacity to create comparative advantage as a result of
technical innovations, and to transfer these innovations rapidly, is
used to maintain and create new opportunities to enhance monopolistic
control. Third World countries, lacking such technological capabili¬
ties, have had little alternative but to be largely exporters of pri¬
mary products. However, we should guard against the crude identifi¬
cation of primary production with poor countries and industrial and
manufacturing production with rich countries. There is growing evi¬
dence that the transfer of technology has allowed limited opportuni¬
ties for technical learning, the development of indigenous technical
innovative capabilities, and even the export of manufactures (17).
Structuralist economic development theory (with which the influential
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA/CEPAL) has been
closely identified) has prompted the formulation of policies designed
to control the transfer of technology. Most of these policies rely
on institutional devices of various kinds. Several organisations
(such as the Andean Pact and UNCTAD) have attempted to introduce pol¬
icy instruments, with varying degrees of success [Jeffries (1977)].
These efforts have served to highlight the problems of national
registers for the transfer of technology; restrictions on foreign
ownership of industrial investments; restrictions on transfer pricing
and the repatriation of profits; trademarks, and attempts at control¬
ling the commercialisation of technology; and the vulnerability of
these programmes to political change [Manser and Webley (1980)].
(17) See the section on Indigenous Technological Capability below.
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Technological Innovation
Although Third World countries acquire most of their technology from
abroad, an increasing number of these countries are beginning to
develop their own technological capabilities, albeit within certain
limits and constraints. An extensive literature on technological
change in the industrialised countries has dealt with questions of
technological innovation as one of the key processes in building
indigenous technological capability.
Within the neo-classical economic tradition, Joseph Schumpeter has
had a significant role in the development of theory concerning tech¬
nological change. He distinguished between invention, innovation,
and imitation. Simply stated, inventions are discoveries. Innova¬
tions, in contrast, are inventions which in the hands of ski Tful
entrepreneurs are made economically viable. Much of his work
focussed on the instability of capitalism and on the central role
that innovation plays in creating such instability [Schumpeter
(1934),(1961),(1964)]. For him:
"what dominates the picture of capitalistic life and is
more than anything else responsible for our impression of a
prevalence of decreasing cost, causing disequi1ibria, cut¬
throat competition and so on, is innovation, the intrusion
into the system of new production functions which increas¬
ingly shift existing cost curves" (18).
Schumpeter argued that for a firm to retain its profits it has to
innovate. Innovations entail the construction of new plant and
equipment, or the rebuilding of old plant, and innovations are always
(18) Quoted in International Development Research Centre (1980), p
12. It is interesting to note that although Schumpeter was confi¬
dent that the disturbances brought about by technological innova¬
tions would not destroy what he considered to be the inherent ins¬
tability of the capitalist system, he thought that its social im¬
plications would lead to its eventual replacement. See Schumpeter
(1928).
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associated with the rise to leadership of new men. He places a great
deal of emphasis on leadership, which he distinguishes from mere own¬
ership of the productive enterprise [Schumpeter (1964), pp 66-69].
By linking the role of the entrepreneur, the process of innovation,
and the evolution of capitalism, Schumpeter was able to advance neo¬
classical economic understanding of technological change from a
static analysis of production functions. However, many features of
his thought are misleading. Unfortunately, much of the current
economic thinking on the process of technological innovation derives
from the Schumpeterian heritage with its disjunction between inven¬
tion, innovation and imitation. Nathan Rosenberg, in particular, has
criticised this conception as an artificial separation between inno¬
vation and other linked activities which constitute part of the his¬
torical process of the generation of new technologies (19). The con¬
cepts employed do not explicitly recognise the role of patterns of
events at the technological level, and thinking about innovations is
confined to features and characteristics which are likely to be true
only of major innovations. Discontinuities are disproportionately
emphasised, such as in famous discoveries and inventions, and con¬
tinuities in the innovation process are neglected. Excessive signi¬
ficance is also attached to the early stages in the process of inven¬
tion, and later but crucial stages, such as technological develop¬
ment, are neglected.
Economics in general reveals an hierarchical conception of different
forms of knowledge. Excessive importance is given to the role of
(19) Rosenberg (1976). This book also contains a critique of the
neo-classical economic theory of the choice of technique, along
much the same lines as Stewart (1977).
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abstract and scientific knowledge, and insufficient importance is
given to more technological or engineering knowledge. Technical
change involves dealing with innumerable small increments to the
stock of knowledge. Technical knowledge deals not with the general
or universal but with the specific and the particular. Rosenberg
sees much of the present thinking on the process of technological
change as an intellectual barrier to a better understanding of the
nature of economic growth.
His critique extends to the heart of neo-classical economic theory,
which suggests that the output of an economy, at any given time, is a
function of factor inputs, with the relationship described by a pro¬
duction function. He questions these assumptions and asserts that
economic growth is not so much attributable to changes in capital and
labour inputs, as to technological change (20). This involves not
quantitative changes in inputs, but numerous qualitative alterations
in technical skills, knowledge, organisational and managerial abili¬
ties, levels of economic aspiration, and the capacity for innovation.
He sees the source of these improvements as being participation in
economic activity itself. The quality of human factors of production
is decisively affected in a variety of ways by the nature of its pro¬
duction and consumption activities, which in turn appear to change in
a fairly systematic fashion as a result of economic development.
Economic growth is in many respects a learning process where new
skills, aptitudes and aspirations are acquired.
An understanding is needed of these feedback phenomena: this is not
provided by neo-classical economics, which is interested, primarily,
(20) See the pioneering work of Solow (1957).
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in the short term, and in examining the conditions under which output
from a given volume of resources will be maximised.
Recent years have seen the publication of a number of studies which
have departed from the Schumpeterian conception of innovation by con¬
centrating on such areas as processes of technological learning; the
importance of "minor" innovations, involving changes in technological
or engineering knowledge; and the diffusion process, which is viewed
as a process of cumulative improvement and adaptation of technologies
rather than the mere adoption of an innovation by an increasing
number of firms (21).
Implicit in many of these studies is a rejection of the neo-classical
model, with its artificial and confusing distinction between techno¬
logical change (defined as an overall shift in the production func¬
tion) and factor substitution (understood as movement along the func¬
tion). Instead, it is asserted that "practically any non-trivial
change in a process or product, if there has been no previous experi¬
ence, is an innovation" [Nelson and Winter (1977), p 48].
Most studies have been carried out at the level of the firm, and have
dealt with such questions as the strategies adopted towards indus¬
trial innovation; the nature and scope of opportunities open to the
firm for enhancing its technology as part of its search for effi¬
ciency and profits; the size of the firm; the nature and degree of
market competition that the firm is facing; and the general economic
(21) For extensive reviews of the literature see: Kennedy and
Thirwall (1972); Freeman (1974); Nasbeth and Ray (1974); Kamien
and Schwartz (1975); Kelly and Kranzberg (1978). Other important
works are Stiglitz and Atki-nson (1969); Nordhaus (1973);
Binswagner (1974); David (1975); Nelson and Winter (1977); Kay
(1979).
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environment in which the firm is working.
An interesting conclusion from one survey of the literature has been
that there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that large
firms or monopolistic industries, with their greater resources for
R&D expenditure, are necessarily more dynamic and progressive as
regards technological change.
"After a certain thresh-hold size there is even evidence
that R&D activity and the number of patents issued appear
to increase less than proportionately with size. Moreover
there is some evidence that it is not always the largest
firms that innovate the quickest despite their presumably
more favourable access to resources. Large firms by no
means have a monopoly on fundamental change either. Major
technological breakthroughs come from a variety of sources"
[Kennedy and Thirwall (1972), p 61].
However, most of this work has dealt with the industrialised coun¬
tries. Empirical research and interpretative theory concerning
technical innovations in Third World countries is still in its
infancy.
Indigenous Technological Capability in Third World Countries
Recently, there have been a number of detailed micro-economic studies
on technological change in Third World countries. Jorge Katz has
co-ordinated an Inter-American Development Bank and Economic Commis¬
sion for Latin America (IDB/ECLA) research programme in science and
technology, focusing primarily on domestic technology creation in
various branches of manufacturing in different Latin American coun¬
tries (22). Katz criticises the conventional assumption that there
is a negative relationship between importing technology from abroad
(22) More than 30 working monographs have been published by the
IDB/ECLA Research Programme in Science and Technology, Oficina de
la CEPAL en Buenos Aires, Callao 67 - Piso 3 , 1022 Buenos Aires,
Argentina. See in particular Katz (1978).
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and generating it locally (23). He argues that "inadequacies" in
imported technology generate a potential demand for new complementary
adaptive technological knowledge, which may allow a relatively more
efficient use of the imported technological "blue-prints" within
changed circumstances and different engineering and economic environ¬
ments. This need for adaptation may have to do with:
[1] the type, quality and cost of the materials locally available;
[2] the relative factor price in the local market (sic);
[3] the scale of the plant;
[4] the climatic, geographical and environmental conditions in which
the product and/or process are used locally;
[5] specific characteristics and requirements of the local consumer
with regard to quality, maintenance and servicing;
[6] the nature of the by-products arising from the product manufac¬
tured or the process employed; and
[7] differences in the legal and institutional framework in the
labour field, or in the local market structure.
It is clear that local innovations to overcome the inadequacies in
imported technologies will result in a technological package with
altered blue-prints and engineering designs, which will take either
an "embodied" form in changed machinery or end products, or a "disem¬
bodied" form in terms of engineering procedures, management or
(23) Katz (1978), p 10. A number of studies have demonstrated the
complementarity between imported technology and local generation
of technological knowledge in the Japanese case. See for example
Oshima (1973).
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organisational structures. This adaptive technological activity
gives rise to the eventual appearance of a new product or process
capable of earning profits when sold in third markets [Lall (1978);
Katz (1978), pp 29-36].
Katz recognises that these demands for adaptation might not neces¬
sarily be satisfied. Adaptations and improvements require the availa¬
bility of local skilled labour capable of developing incremental
technological knowledge. He sees the lack of skilled labour as a
structural feature that can only be modified over the long term,
since the creation and maintenance of professional and technical
schools assumes an investment programme which comes to fruition only
over decades.
Other findings from this study refute the widely accepted view fol¬
lowing the work of Salter that:
"technological change [is] any modification in the produc¬
tion technique of a given product, put into practice by a
specific plant, with the aim of reducing its unit produc¬
tion cost" [Hollander (1965), p23; Salter (I960)].
The evidence indicates instead that cost reduction is only one, and
not necessarily the most important objective of technological change
which is also determined by attempts at quality improvement, diver¬
sification of the output mix, increase of the physical output of par¬
ticular machinery, and replacement of imported raw materials and
spare parts by local substitution.
There are two important features in this series of IDB/ECLA studies.
One concerns the empirical evidence which demonstrates a significant
domestic innovative capability within the manufacturing sectors in
some of the Third World countries covered by the research programme.
This has had an impact on the overall factor productivity at plant
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level within these countries, and also on their export capacity. The
other concerns the identification of minor adaptations to imported
technology, which cumulatively constitutes the major source of domes¬
tic technological innovation (24).
However, the explanatory framework presented by Katz gives rise to a
number of difficulties. Not only is an element of technological
determinism incorporated into the model, but problems of power and
the control of knowledge are ignored (25). Katz attempts to explain
the growth of indigenous manufacturing productivity by arguing that
the "inadequacies" of imported technology create the demand for adap¬
tations, and that these, in turn, require skilled labour to make the
creation of domestic technological knowledge feasible. This scheme
abstracts technology from the system of production, and, thus, evades
all the important questions as to who controls the nature and direc¬
tion of technological change, and the generation of knowledge. Even
if it is accepted that there are features of technology which, when
transferred to a new environment, require adaptations, it is legiti¬
mate to ask who controls the responses to these demands and why adap¬
tations take on a particular form.
These issues of power, control, and interests are important if one is
to understand and explain the emergence of indigenous technical inno¬
vative capability in Third World countries, in the face of effective
control and concentration of the development of scientific and techn¬
ical knowledge mainly by transnational corporations. It would seem
reasonable to ask what the limits are to this indigenous development,
(24) cf. von Mitschke-Collande's (1980) study of the engineering
sector in Tanzania.
(25) See the later section on technological determinism.
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and how the interests of those who control indigenous technological
development are, perhaps, aligned with international capital, which
in all Third World countries is still the major source of new techno¬
logies. These questions, which Katz's study effectively ignores,
will be discussed at greater length in later sections of this
chapter.
In another study, Lai 1 (1978) distinguishes between six levels of
learning processes:
[1] simple learning by doing - increasing worker efficiency through
familiarity;
[2] learning by minor adaptation - small changes made on the shop
floor by engineers and managers;
[3] learning by design - replication of imported machinery;
[4] learning by improved design - modification for different condi¬
tions;
[5] learning by setting up whole local productivity systems - thus
creating consultancy and turnkey capacity; and
[6] learning by designing new processes or products - through R&D
departments or research institutions, which may lead to impor¬
tant "minor" innovations.
Thus, Lall also dwells on the importance of utilizing imported tech¬
nology, as a source of learning, to build up local skills which can
be translated into adaptations and technological innovations. This
is something which happens primarily in the course of production,
although Lall concludes with policy recommendations to promote local
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technology by investing in basic science and research, the encourage¬
ment of in-house R&D, the judicious restriction of access to foreign
technology, and careful (not excessive) protection against both
imports and foreign enterprises to cover the phase of heavy learning
costs and skill formation in infant industries.
It has been pointed out that the development of local technological
capability aids the more selective and efficient transfer of foreign
technology. Technology is a potential source of monopoly, and
technol ogy-owning enterprises in advanced capitalist countries
exploit oligopolistic advantages in Third World countries. Terms of
technology transfer are, to a certain extent, negotiable if a company
particularly wants to operate in a specific country. But, the reci¬
pient enterprises and governments are in inherently weak bargaining
positions, if only because they cannot possibly know all about what
they are buying until they have bought it. They lack technical and
commercial information, particularly on alternatives. So transna¬
tional corporations obtain high returns on investments and maintain a
degree of control over the nature of the investment, price levels,
quantities produced, suppliers, purchases, and the allocation of pro¬
fits. Joint ventures between local firms or national governments and
subsidiaries of transnational corporations are often subject to the
constraints of major decisions still being taken in head offices
abroad. In addition, locally owned firms are often restricted
through licensing and patent agreements [Cooper (1973); Kaplinsky
(1976); Vaitsos (1976)].
It is impossible to choose imported technology wisely, to bargain
effectively, to unravel technology from investment packages, to judge
proposals, and to adapt imported technology to the concrete needs of
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a country, unless a national technological capacity exists.
Recent years have seen a growing literature which recognises the
importance of creating an indigenous technological capability (ITC)
in Third World countries. For example, Gustav Ranis writes:
"to the extent that any one dimension is key to the suc¬
cessful application of technology in the development con¬
text, it is the quality of indigenous technological
activity that counts the most" [Ranis (1982), pi].
In stressing the importance of ITC, most authors distinguish between
various types of technological capabilities:
[1] the capability to select technologies appropriate to local needs
and conditions, efficiently and on favourable terms [ Cooper and
Maxwell (1980); Dahlman and Cortez (1982); Desai (1982); Ranis
(1982); Stewart (1982)];
[2] the capability to master imported technologies, and to operate
and maintain productive processes successfully [ Dahlman (1982);
Desai (1982); Stewart (1982)];
[3] the capability to duplicate imported technologies [Desai
(1982)];
[4] the capability to adapt and improve technologies to meet local
conditions and needs [ Dahlman (1982); Katz (1978); Ranis
(1982); Stewart (1982)];
[5] the capability to introduce a degree of novelty in the produc¬
tion of products or processes [Desai (1982); Fransman (1982$];
[6] the capability to develop new technological knowledge [Dahlman
(1982); Langdon (1982)]; and
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[7] the capability to channel and diffuse new technological
knowledge across agricultural and industrial establishments
[Ranis (1982)].
Clearly, these capabilities are neither conceptually nor empirically
independent. For example, the capability to adapt and improve techno¬
logies implies a capability to introduce a degree of novelty in the
production process, which might also be essential for the efficient
selection of imported technologies.
It has been recognised that it is difficult to define ITC indepen¬
dently of an actually demonstrated occurrence of local technological
activity, and, thus, distinguishing between different technological
capabilities does have some practical importance. Unfortunately,
this recognition has all toooften led to an almost exclusive preoccu¬
pation with narrowly defined empirical data and an insistence that
the stock of indigenous technological capability can only be identi¬
fied with its actual use [Ranis (1982), p 3]. The effect of this
approach is to ignore questions of political economy, which in prac¬
tice govern and, on occasion, inhibit the expression of ITC. Stewart
recognises this point:
"In trying to explain why some societies innovate effi¬
ciently and others do not, the fundamental and underlying
explanation often seems to lie in the realm of history and
interests, rather than the particular policies" [Stewart
(1982), p 9].
This is one of the issues with which the case study, in subsequent
chapters of this thesis, is concerned.
Policies are the reflection of these deeper influences. While there
might be a measure of concurrence concerning the importance of the
different aspects of ITC, listed above, there is less agreement as to
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the policies appropriate to generating ITC. Discussion of policy
areas relevant to the creation of ITC may be divided into two main
approaches: educational, training and institutional reforms, and
economic and industrial policy measures (26). The former revolve
around issues such as educational and skill qualifications for
"blue-collar innovation", and the links between science and technol¬
ogy policy, R&D institutions, and the productive sector. Economic
and industrialisation policy measures include import substitution,
industry protection, export promotion, the creation of a capital
goods sector, the selective importation of foreign technology,
unpackaging technology purchases, controls on products and brand
names, promoting local linkages, controlling the degree of competi¬
tion and promoting an environment of continuous industrial expansion,
where technological change and learning are more likely. It has been
pointed out that:
"any successful industrial expansion is likely to be asso¬
ciated with some local technological activity, because
adaptation to local conditions is part of the process of
successful industrial activity" [Stewart (1982), p 3].
It is unfortunate that little research has been undertaken into the
problem of the generation and innovation of technologies within the
context of rural development, a vital aspect of the problems facing
most Third World countries (27). The appropriate technology litera¬
ture contains many descriptive accounts of the introduction of new
technologies into rural areas, but little serious consideration is
(26) These two approaches have been combined in the innovative
work of van Rensberg in Botswana, where education has been linked
with production in the establishment of a network of
school/production brigades [van Rensberg (1982)].
(27) Among the few studies which can be identified are Dean
(1972), Dickinson (1972; 1975), Evenson (1975), Sigurdson (1977),
Dewalt (1978), Holtermann (1979), Reddy (1979), and Herrera
(1981).
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given to the problem of innovation and of how indigenous technical
capability might be developed [e.g. Dunn (1978)].
Herrera (1981) has proposed a methodology for the endogenous genera¬
tion of technologies in rural areas, which employs a set of paradigms
appropriate to local conditions in Third World countries. He
stresses the need to link the development of technologies to the
overall direction of economic and social development, which is
desired by the mass of the people. For him, the term appropriate
technology has no meaning unless located in the frame of reference of
a clearly defined type of society. The specific type of technology a
country or region should adopt cannot be determined by a_ priori
prescription; it should emerge from the very process of generating
it.
Two of the essential elements of the proposed methodology are the
utilisation of local knowledge and the participation of local people
in the whole process. Local empirical knowledge can be used profit¬
ably as the local population have had to develop, through long
experience, methods and technologies of production, compatible with
the physical environment, as a condition for survival. The recogni¬
tion of the importance of people's participation in development pro¬
grammes is not only based on an ideological position - the admission
that people have a right to participate in their own destinies - but
also, and mainly, on pragmatic and operational considerations. It
has been shown time and again that many development projects have
failed because the opinions and ambitions of the people involved were
not taken sufficiently into account. Also, the participation of the
local population in the process of creation of the technologies will
contribute to the generation of knowledge and skills required for
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their use and production. Herrera describes five main stages in the
proposed methodology:
[1] The general socio-economic characteristics of the selected
region should be evaluated, in order to understand the dynamic
social elements in which a technological problem is always
immersed.
[2] The functions that the required technology is expected to ful¬
fill, should be determined.
[3] The solutions, which the local community have traditionally
used, should be analysed.
[4] A general survey of the natural resources of the area should be
carried out.
[5] With the information gathered in the previous steps, a set of
assumptions or paradigms will be derived, which will be the
frame of reference for the final step of developing the required
technology.
The set of assumptions, which will contain scientific^ technological,
environmental, economic, social, psychological and anthropological
information, will define a "technological space", which is the set of
requirements and constraints which the technology has to satisfy.
Herrera emphasises, finally, that the methodology of endogenous gen¬
eration of technology refers to the process through which the
characteristics, which the technology should have, are determined.
As such, "endogenous" refers specifically to the process of defini¬
tion, and not necessarily to the technology itself, which can be
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imported, provided it is "appropriate". Thus, Herrera's propositions
regarding the generation of technologies in rural areas leaves
unanswered many of the interesting problems, raised in the preceding
sections, regarding the actual activity of technology creation and
the generation of the requisite technological capability. His metho¬
dology remains at an abstract level, and, although he correctly links
the development of technology to the overall development process, his
proposals to Third World countries to devise alternative research and
development methodologies ignores the inequitable distribution of
resources and power, which make these changes unlikely. Herrera's
work, however, begins to offer a broader interpretation of appropri¬
ate technology, which will be examined below in greater detail.
Much of the preceding review of the literature has focussed on the
processes of technological change within the context of economic
development. The discussion has been set against the general back¬
ground of the problem of appropriate technology choices for Third
World countries. As we have seen, the narrow view of the concept of
appropriate technology 7#- is based on the neo-classical economic
theory of the choice of technique. Criticisms indicated the way in
which the model presents a misleading and incorrect account of the
mechanisms and determinants of this choice, as well as an inadequate
treatment of the problem of technological change and innovation. The
preceding sections have dealt at some length with the questions of
how the concentration of R&D and scientific and technical knowledge
in the industrialised countries circumscribes the availability and
generation of technologies in the Third World, what the relationships
between science, technology, innovation and development are, and how
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the development of an indigenous technological capability might be
facilitated. These issues not infrequently lead to the policy
dilemma for Third World countries being posed as a choice between
either the transfer of technologies from the industrialised coun¬
tries, or the development of technological self reliance. As the
preceding section has indicated, the two are interrelated and the
issues are merely obscured if it is argued that the former strategy
should be rejected for the latter - as did, for example, the Monro-
vian declaration of African states [Economic Commission for Africa
(1980)]. Indeed, the development of indigenous technical innovative
capability can be facilitated by the selective adaptation of foreign
technology imports, through the different learning and innovative
processes which have been described. Any theory of appropriate tech¬
nology must ultimately face these questions of how indigenous techno¬
logical capability might be developed.
THE BROAD INTERPRETATION
In contrast to the narrow interpretation of the concept of appropri¬
ate technology predicated upon neo-classical economic assumptions,
the broad interpretation introduces additional social, cultural and
often environmental, considerations. The criterion characterising
the broad interpretation - namely, that appropriate technologies are
those which contribute to specific development objectives - has been
the subject of a growing body of literature within development
theory, particularly that which has dealt with the notion of "basic
needs".
- 53 -
Basic Needs and the Choice of Technology
For many years development has, in practice, been seen to be
synonymous with growth, where the goal of development was to make
possible a cumulative and lasting increase in the production of goods
and services. However, only the most doctrinaire of development
theorists and economic policy advisors would now seek growth at any
price. The recognition of the serious problems of income disparities
and growing poverty in many Third World countries has led to an
emphasis on development policies which promote redistribution as well
as growth [Griffin and Khan (1978)].
In 1974 the World Bank, in conjunction with the Institute of Develop¬
ment Studies at the University of Sussex, published the study Redis-
tribution with Growth, which in recent years has formed the basic
philosophy of the bank [Chenery et al (1974)]. The realisation that
aggregate economic growth had done little for the poor majority in
the Third World found an even greater and more direct expression in
the formulation by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) of the
concept of Basic Needs, which was articulated at the World Employment
Conference in Geneva [ILO (1976)]. The goals of development were to
be directed towards the elimination of poverty within a short period
of time through the satisfaction of basic human needs which included:
[1] the satisfaction of basic requirements of families for private
consumption such as food, shelter and clothing; and
[2] access to essential services such as safe drinking water, sani¬
tation, health and educational facilities.
Appropriate technologies would be those aimed at meeting these basic
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needs through both employment creation and the production of commodi¬
ties and infrastructure for the poor (28). With the great majority
of the poor residing in the rural areas in Third World countries,
appropriate technologies have been seen to have particular applica¬
bility for rural development: they have, in general, been proposed as
labour-intensive, low cost alternatives to modern sector technolo¬
gies, with the latter1s privileged access to scarce capital and
skills [Singer (1977a, 1977b); Bhalla (1979)].
This development strategy has been criticised by, amongst others,
Ajit Singh, who fears that it might discourage industrial development
and the long term restructuring of Third World economies [Singh
(1979)]. Singh sees industrialisation as a necessary condition for
rising productivity and standards of living. He argues that the
current emphasis on basic needs and appropriate technologies by the
aid and donor agencies of the advanced capitalist countries, is
largely attributable to apprehension about the growing competitive¬
ness of some industrial sectors of Third World countries. He thus
does not accept the proposition that these countries should concen¬
trate on small scale industry and labour intensive projects, as such
a notion of comparative advantage reflects no more than the existing
international division of labour, which is itself a product of a cen¬
tury or more of colonial domination. Singh sees the "basic needs"
and "appropriate technology" strategies as a reformulation of the
discredited doctrine of static comparative advantage, disguised now
as a stated concern for the poor. The strategy is thus ideological,
(28) The ILO claim to have been the first to use the term "ap¬
propriate technology" [ILO (1971)]. One of the first conferences
on appropriate technology was the International Workshop: Develop¬
ment and Dissemination of Appropriate Technologies in Rural Areas,
held at Kumasi in Ghana, 17-28 July, 1972.
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and obscures the real interests of the advanced capitalist countries.
The basic needs concept has given rise to many unresolved problems,
such as: the size of national and international resources required to
meet basic needs targets, and how these resources are to be gen¬
erated; the relationship between basic needs, poverty and inequality
of income distribution; political questions concerning the commitment
of those in power to allocate resources to the meeting of basic
needs; and the problems of measuring basic needs in different
societies.
In spite of these objections, Singh argues that there can still be an
important interrelationship between the meeting of basic needs,
industrialisation and accelerated structural change. He asserts that
there need be no conflict between meeting basic needs and accelerated
industrialisation, to which importance is attached, by many Third
World countries, for the restructuring of the world economy and the
establishing of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). To meet
the basic needs of the poor in the Third World in a sustainable way
it is essential, he argues, to raise the rate of economic growth in
these countries by transforming their productive structures. This
requires the accelerated development of modern manufacturing indus¬
try, including the establishment of a capital goods sector. At the
same time, as the rate of growth of demand is likely to be an
increasingly important constraint in the future, a properly conceived
basic needs type approach which involves a larger and steadier
transfer of untied resources from rich countries, should, in general,
positively aid industrialisation in the Third World.
According to Singh, unless small scale and labour intensive projects
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are integrated into an overall development plan of industrialisation
and structural change, they are unlikely to succeed in meeting basic
needs in the long term. Accelerated industrialisation and a redis-
tributive fiscal policy must be the two pillars of any well conceived
basic needs programme.
But Singh's analysis ignores some persistent and important problems:
[1] He advocates accelerated industrialisation in Third World coun¬
tries, without anywhere enlarging on what form this industriali¬
sation should take. It would seem reasonable to assume that
what Singh means by this industrialisation is the capital-
intensive kind common in industrialised countries. Implicit in
the argument, therefore, is the rather simplistic assumption
that industrialised countries are rich because they use
capital-intensive technologies. But these countries use them
because they are rich. The fact that capital-intensive techno¬
logies are generally efficient is largely a result of the uneven
distribution of technological power and the enormous concentra¬
tion of R&D expenditure and effort found in the industrialised
countries. Any policy prescription for rapid industrialisation
has to take into account these problems of power and the control
of technical knowledge, of how the transfer of technology might
be regulated to the benefit of the recipient country, and of how
an indigenous technical innovative capability might emerge,
which is able to direct technological development along new,
different, and perhaps more appropriate paths.
[2] He attaches little importance to the uneven impact of rapid
industrialisation, and the extent to which it leaves the prob-
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lems of rural poverty and employment largely unaltered (and
perhaps even exacerbates them by diverting scarce resources such
as capital and skills to the favoured modern sector). The
economic and industrial growth of the so-called neouly industri¬
alised countries (NICs) such as India, Brazil and Mexico, when
measured by conventional indicators, might seem promising - but
the pressing problems of their growing, rural poor remain
largely untackled. It is not very helpful to talk of redistri-
butive fiscal policies when the evidence of all such attempts
points to their singular lack of success in the face of the
class interests of those in power.
[3] He does not seem to appreciate the manner in which the produc¬
tion system structures class interests, nor how the transfer of
advanced capitalist country technologies acts to reinforce posi¬
tions of power and control. Instead, Singh treats Third World
countries in an undifferentiated manner: the benefits of rapid
industrialisation supposedly accrue to the country as a whole,
rather than merely to an elite minority .
Nevertheless, Singh's analysis does serve to emphasise two important
issues:
[1] the necessity for any appropriate technology and basic needs
strategy to come to terms with the problem of meeting these
needs in the long run in a self-sustainable manner; and
[2] the ideological character of the appropriate technology and
basic needs philosophy. This is an issue which will be explored
later in this thesis in the context of the way the aid process
structures both the nature and the choice of technologies
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utilised in Third World countries, particularly within rural
development projects.
Alternative Technology
Another variant of the broad interpretation is the concept of "alter¬
native technology". This incorporates social, cultural and environ¬
mental criteria, in addition to economic factors, in judging its
appropriateness for meeting particular development goals. The con¬
ceptual and social origins of the broad view arise as much from an
awareness of the problems of technology transfer, as from a radical
critique by the environmental movement of advanced Western industrial
technology. Debate among development theorists and national policy
advisors on the wisdom of unchecked technology transfers to Third
World countries has been paralleled by debates in the industrialised
countries on the limits to growth, the ecological and energy crises,
and the need for alternative technologies which utilise renewable
resources and allow community participation and control (29).
The popularisation of the concept of alternative technology has been
likened to the emergence of a cultural movement [Jequier (1976)].
People with widely differing philosophies have been attracted to the
concept and have tended to emphasise aspects which have accorded with
their own interests. It is not proposed that the alternative tech¬
nology movement will be extensively discussed here - this has been
done elsewhere (30). Instead one representative view from the Third
(29) See for instance Harper (1973), Clark (1973); and for a crit¬
ical review Rybcynski (1980).
(30) Winner (1980). A sociological analysis of the various in¬
terest groups coalescing in the appropriate technology movement,
would probably make sense of the internal variety and tensions.
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World will be analysed.
The most comprehensive formulation of the broad interpretation of the
concept of appropriate or alternative technology, has perhaps been
made by the Indian scientist, A.K.N. Reddy (1975). The appropriate¬
ness of technology is judged primarily in relation to the objectives
of development which are environmentally and socially sustainable in
the long-run. Development is viewed as a process of change directed
towards:
[1] the satisfaction of basic human needs, starting with the needs
of the neediest in order to reduce inequalities between and
within countries;
[2] endogenous self-reliance through social participation and con¬
trol ; and
[3] harmony with the environment.
Appropriate technologies are those which advance these development
objectives. Third World countries are seen to have essentially five
sources of technologies:
[1] Western technology which is associated with a particular set of
environmental, economic, and social problems;
[2] technology from other Third World countries, which is a blurred
copy of technology from the West;
[3] naturalised technology, which was imported technology but which
has been imitated and adapted;
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[4] transformed traditional technology; and
[5] alternative technology developed according to appropriate cri¬
teria.
According to Reddy, Western technology is applicable in only a few
cases. Naturalised technology might be adapted to some aspects of
the environment, but might still be inappropriate to others. Little
work has been done on transforming traditional technologies, and
almost nothing on generating alternative technologies, as there are
no paradigms to follow. This is the key area to which attention
should be directed (31).
Scientists and engineers involved in the generation of appropriate
technologies, Reddy argues, should absorb and generate new prefer¬
ences, guidelines and paradigms. Through close contact with the end
users of technologies, they must understand the economic, social, and
environmental ramifications of these technologies. New patterns of
technological capability must evolve. Linkages with the rural poor
and traditional technology must be fostered, and those with Western
institutions, and with the demands of the elite, weakened. Reddy
considers the following to be appropriate paradigms which would allow
the development of alternative technologies (32).
(31) cf. Dickinson's (1972) differentiation of sources of ap¬
propriate technology: modifying existing practices; reviving old¬
er, well tried technology from an earlier stage of development of
a different economy; and inventing a new technology.
(32) Reddy (1979), pp 178,179. cf. Dickinson (1972), p 149: "It is
possible to describe a large number of features that may help to
identify an appropriate technology. In any practical situation it
is possible to envisage a range of alternative technologies that
could meet the immediate and near future production needs, but fi¬
nal selection would have to take into account a complex set of
economic, social, and technical relationships." Dickinson stresses
the social aspects of technological dissemination and coined the
term "socially appropriate technology".
- 61 -
Environmental preferences:
[1] a preference for energy-production technologies based on
renewable, rather than depletable, energy sources;
[2] a preference for energy-saving, rather than energy inten¬
sive technologies;
[3] a preference for technologies which produce goods that can
be recycled and re-used, and that are designed for durabil¬
ity, rather than quick obsolescence;
[4] a preference for production technologies based on raw
materials which are replenishable, rather than exhaustible;
[5] a preference for technologies of production and consumption
which inherently minimise noxious or dangerous emissions
and wastes, rather than those which require "fixes" to curb
their intrinsically polluting tendencies;
[6] a preference for technologies of production and consumption
which incorporate waste minimisation and utilisation pro¬
cedures as integral components, rather than those that
require them as appendages;
[7] a preference for technologies which blend into ecosystems
by causing them minimal disturbance, rather than those
which threaten the biosphere with major perturbations;
[8] a preference for technologies of production of housing and
transportation which foster the planned achievement of
moderately sized, manageable, secure, and congenial human
settlements, rather than the uncontrolled growth of
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gigantic, unmanageable, insecure and intolerable cities;
and
[9] a preference for technologies based on the rational sus¬
tained use, rather than indiscriminate rapid devastation,
of the environment.
Economic preferences:
[1] a preference for technologies which are consistent, rather
than incompatible, with the basic factor endowments of most
developing countries;
[2] a preference for small-scale decentralised, rather than
large-scale centralised technologies;
[3] a preference for need based, rather than demand orientated,
product technologies;
[4] a preference for the technologies of goods and services
relevant to mass consumption, rather than to individual
luxuries;
[5] a preference for technologies based on local materials,
rather than materials which have to be imported from abroad
or transported from distant parts of the country;
[6] a preference for technologies which generate employment for
under-privileged masses, rather than for privileged elites;
[7] a preference for technologies which produce for local con¬
sumption, rather than for remote markets;
- 63 -
[8] a preference for technologies which promote a symbiotic and
mutually reinforcing, rather than parasitic and destruc¬
tive, relationship between metropolises and their rural
hinterlands; and
[9] a preference for technologies which reduce, rather than
amplify, the inequalities within developing countries.
Social preferences:
[1] a preference for technologies which cater to the needs of
deprived people, rather than to the demands of the
privileged affluent;
[2] a preference for technologies which lead to an enhancement
of the quality of life, rather than merely to an increase
in the consumption of goods;
[3] a preference for production technologies which require
satisfying creative work, rather than boring routine
1abour;
[4] a preference for production technologies in which machines
are sub-ordinated to, rather than dominate, the lives of
people;
[5] a preference for technologies which lead to human settle¬
ments being designed to suit the collective and individual
lives of people, rather than the requirements of agglomera¬
tions of productive units;
[6] a preference for technologies based on communal, rather
than individual use of goods and services;
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[7] a preference for technologies which blend with, rather than
disrupt traditional technologies and the fabric of social
1 i fe;
[8] a preference for the technology of scaled-down, dispersi-
ble, miniaturised enterprises, rather than the technology
of mass-producing consumer goods in gigantic factories;
[9] a preference for technologies developed endogenously from
the local context, rather than transferred from alien set¬
tings;
[10] a preference for technologies which increase, rather than
diminish the possibility and effectiveness of social parti¬
cipation and control; and
[11] a preference for technologies which facilitate the devolu¬
tion of power to people, rather than its concentration in
the hands of the elites.
Although the above list constitutes a useful reminder of preferable ,
alternatives to accepted norms, the question arises as to how these
rather Utopian paradigms will be generated. Clearly it is unsatis¬
factory merely to exhort scientists and engineers to develop new
preferences. Reddy recognises some of the political problems of the
distribution of power and control, but deals in only an abstract and
schematic way with questions of how the decision making process might
filter the social and economic needs of the rural poor into demands
for appropriate technologies. The two key problems of technological
change - the choice of technology and technical innovation - are
inadequately dealt with. Reddy cannot explain how appropriate
- 65 -
choices of technology might ultimately be secured, other than
presenting rather idealised prescriptions; nor does he examine in any
detailed or original way the complex processes of technology genera¬
tion and innovation.
Intermediate Technology
Although the most immediate and conspicuous factors accounting for
the growth of interest in appropriate technology have been, firstly,
the disillusionment with the experience of Third World development
over the past three decades, and secondly, the minority debates in
the advanced capitalist countries concerning the effects of modern
%
industrialisation, the origins of the concept can be traced back much
further. At the turn of the century in India, the rehabilitation and
development of traditional industries was encouraged by such reform¬
ers as the Maharaja of Baroda and Rabindranath Tagore. Better known
is Mahatma Gandhi's emphasis on village technologies and the develop¬
ment of indigenous skills and knowledge [Hoda (1976)].
More recently E.F. Schumacher's much read book, Smal1 is Beautiful,
has been instrumental in the popularisation of the concept. More
than any other book on the subject, it has had a substantial impact
on the thinking of administrators and planners in aid agencies and,
to a lesser extent, in the Third World (33). For Schumacher, the
choice of technology is the most critical decision confronting any
Third World country, and he advocated an intermediate technology
(I.T.) which would be more appropriate to the needs and resources of
(33) Two recent publications have listed hundreds of organisations
which have incorporated the appropriate technology concept into
their practice [Jequier (1979a); Bundick (1979)].
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the poor people within the poorer Third World countries. In 1965,
with George Mc Robie, he formed the Intermediate Technology Develop¬
ment Group Ltd (ITDG) in London, to promote the I.T. concept and to
assist in the collection and dissemination of data on I.T (34).
Schumacher argued:
"We can call the indigenous technology of a typical
developing country - symbolically speaking - a £1 technol¬
ogy, while that of the developed countries could be called
a £1000 technology. The gap between these two technologies
is so enormous that a transition from the one to the other
is simply impossible a technology is required that
would range in some intermediate position....a £100 tech¬
nology" (35).
This proposal for an intermediate technology is based on the follow¬
ing propositions:
[1] Development cannot be simply created, ordered, bought, or
comprehensively planned, as the primary causes of poverty are
not merely the lack of natural wealth, capital or infrastruc¬
ture. The primary causes of extreme poverty lie instead in cer¬
tain deficiencies in education, organisation and discipline.
Development thus requires a process of evolution such that all
three of these immaterial factors become the property not merely
of a tiny minority, but of the whole society.
[2] Third World countries have dual economies consisting of a small
predominantly urban, modern sector where wages and the cost of
establishing each workplace are relatively high; and a large,
predominantly rural , traditional sector where employment oppor¬
tunities are poor and productivity very low.
(34) Events leading to the formation of ITDG are described in Mc
Robie (1981), pp 19-38.
(35) Schumacher (1973), p150; see especially chapters 11 and 12.
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[3] Rural unemployment produces mass migration to the cities, lead¬
ing to a rate of urban growth which would tax the resources of
even the richest countries. Development efforts should thus be
concentrated in the rural areas and small towns, where the prime
objective must be to maximise work opportunities for the un- and
under-employed, and thus to set in motion the process of evolu¬
tion.
[4] This requires the creation of new workplaces which are near to
peoples' homes, cost little, use relatively simple production
methods, and are based on locally available materials and market
outlets. These development efforts should be decentralised in
order to respond to the needs of the poor.
[5] The key to the creation of a very large number of workplaces
within a fairly short time, is the introduction of intermediate
technologies which would be immensely cheaper than the sophisti¬
cated, highly capital intensive technology of modern industry,
but also immensely more productive than indigenous, traditional
technology.
[6] Intermediate technologies to "help the poor to help themselves"
can be developed by technologists if they are put in contact
with each other in order to share knowledge and experience.
Programmes are thus needed on a national and supra-national
basis to develop intermediate technologies suitable for the pro¬
motion of full employment in developing countries.
[7] Appropriate technologies are characterised by their smallness,
simplicity, capital cheapness and non-violence.
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The most persistent and serious criticism which can be levelled at
the concept of I.T. is the absence of any thorough understanding of
the political dimension of both technological choice and innovation
within the development process (36). An examination of Schumacher's
basic argument reveals certain confusions and contradictions. He
regards the modern and non-modern sectors as separate entities, such
that activity designed to alleviate poverty in the latter, would be
unaffected by the nature and dominance of the former - or, indeed, of
the forces giving rise to an apparently dual economy in the first
place. Schumacher is thus able to argue that factors such as defi¬
ciencies in education, organisation, and discipline, are causes of
rural poverty, rather than the structural relationship between the
two sectors, which is itself a reflection of the political economy.
Intermediate technologies are then proposed which would bring about
radical social change, in the form of the alleviation of mass
poverty, without the prior alteration of the political and economic
forces which gave rise to it. Whilst recognising that technology is
not neutral with respect to its impact on society and the environ¬
ment, technology is nevertheless regarded by Schumacher as politi¬
cally neutral with respect to the factors governing its choice and
generation.
It is here that the basic contradiction within Schumacher's writings
arises. For although he concedes that the choice of industry
"will be determined by....powerful criteria, such as raw
material base, markets, entrepreneurial interests, etc"
[Schumacher (1973), pl49],
these constraints are explicitly not extended to the choice of inter¬
mediate technology, which is seen as an independent variable in the
(36) cf. Howes's (1979) critique of Schumacher.
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development process. Schumacher thus fails to consider the many and
complex factors which in reality make appropriate technology choices
difficult and unlikely, given the present relations of class, power
and control in many Third World countries. This unproblematic notion
of the choice of available intermediate technologies has been per¬
petuated by the followers of Schumacher. Thus Jequier, writing on
the trend in official development aid, states:
"The growing institutionalisation of intermediate technol¬
ogy will inevitably reflect upon the patterns of foreign
aid. Already today, many aid-giving countries and agencies
are trying to focus more of their assistance programmes on
appropriate technology In fact, in a few years time,
the "consumer" of appropriate technology will probably find
himself in the equivalent of a supermarket, with dozens of
different tools or technologies to meet every single one of
his needs" [Jequier (1976), p 111].
The language here is strikingly reminiscent of that used by the tech¬
nological optimists of the 1950s and early 1960s, who saw the solu¬
tion to underdevelopment in terms of unchecked access to Western,
modern technology. For instance, the poor countries were seen to be
in the position of being able to draw up a "shopping list" of what to
buy in "the world's well-stocked supermarket for production goods and
processes" [Blackett (1963), p 345]. The similarity of language is
significant. Supermarket shopping implies a freedom of choice. The
metaphor thus underlines the essential assumptions of both these
views - namely, the unproblematic notion of choosing technologies for
particular development objectives without giving consideration to the
factors which in reality govern the choice, and thus the nature, of
such technologies. Schumacher's thinking mirrors development think¬
ing of the 1950s. "Small" replaces "big", but, many of the neo¬
classical economic assumptions concerning the choice of technique are
retained in his analysis (37).
(37r It might be argued that, because of its neo-classical base,
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The second contradiction in Schumacher's argument also follows from
the depoliticisation of technology and concerns the problem of gen¬
erating intermediate technologies. In his analysis the poor are
viewed as a group who need to be provided with the means to sustain
their own development. Experts will be able to identify technologies
which are better than those in current use, and in so doing they will
supposedly trigger off a process of self-sustaining development. But
the non-modern sector's existing technology at the same time bears
witness to the political and economic factors which constrain
attempts to further improve the standard of living or well-being of
the poor. Thus, the important questions about indigenous innovative
capability are begged, and both the theory and practice of I.T. seem
to imply the substitution of one form of technological dependence for
another.
A further consequence of removing technology from the political
sphere, is the tendency of the practitioners of I.T. to equate tech¬
nology with hardware. Visiting I.T. organisations and examining the
literature, it is hard to avoid the impression of an overwhelming
pre-occupation with "nuts and bolts", and of a corresponding neglect
of questions about how technology is created, adapted, and introduced
within particular political environments. As a consequence, there
tends to be a plethora of ingenious ideas and devices, which either
perform well in the workshop or model village, but fail to be esta¬
blished in production, or which are only accessible to those who are
already relatively well off.
Schumacher's concept of I.T. belongs with the narrow interpreta¬
tion of appropriate technology. Schumacher, nevertheless, also in¬
corporated non-economic factors in his analysi s . which were in¬
fluential in the development of the broad interpretation of ap¬
propriate technology.
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A number of further objections have been raised against the I.T. con¬
cept. One concerns the allegation that I.T.s are inferior.
Schumacher himself attempted to refute this by arguing that I.T.s
need not be less efficient. He questions Kaldor's claim that
research has shown that most modern industry produces much more out¬
put per unit of capital invested than less sophisticated machinery
which employs more people. Instead Schumacher argues that mechanisa¬
tion and automation are introduced to increase the productivity of
labour (i.e. the worker/output ratio), and that their effect on the
capital/output ratio may just as well be negative as it may be posi¬
tive. There is no inherent reason why I.T.s should not be efficient
in terms of output produced per unit of capital. In any case he
argues, taking capital as a given quantity in an under-employed econ¬
omy reflects a static conception of development. Instead employment
is the pre-condition of development. The output of an idle man is
nil, whereas the output of even a poorly equipped man can be a posi¬
tive contribution to capital formation [Schumacher (1973) p 152].
Schumacher argues in a similar way against the criticism that I.T.s
would require the widespread use of skilled manpower, and that scarce
resources should be concentrated in modern capital-intensive indus¬
tries. This is again a static perception of development. Involve¬
ment in I.T.s will itself further skills, and those who are incapable
of acting as entrepreneurs at the level of modern technology may
nonetheless be fully capable of making a success of small-scale
enterprise set up on the basis of I.T.
In recent years it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish
between the two concepts of intermediate technology (I.T.) and
appropriate technology (A.T.). Indeed Schumacher himself wrote of
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the need for appropriate technologies, and although some would still
claim significant differences between the two concepts, in practice
they have become interchangeable.
There have been some attempts by A.T. adherents at reformulations of
the concept. For instance, Jequier talks of the political dimension
of A.T. (but without specifying what this might mean) and Mc Robie
suggests that "the real issue is not to develop hardware, but to
build up an innovation system" [Jequier (1976), p 75; Mc Robie
(1976), p 108]. Nevertheless, many adherents in the A.T. movement
never quite manage to escape the contradictions of Schumacher's ori¬
ginal formulation.
A further difficulty arises out of the wooliness and inherent flexi¬
bility of the term "appropriate" itself. All production techniques
are appropriate to someone's interest and virtually anybody can jus¬
tify something as appropriate according to some criterion or other.
This has had an important effect in the Third World, where the con¬
cept of A.T. has been criticised as coming to represent a new form of
technological imperialism [Bhagavan (1979)]. The fact that the
overwhelming majority of advocates of A.T. are from the industrial¬
ised countries and the haste with which the major aid and development
agencies of the West appropriated the concept, have understandably
aroused a certain amount of suspicion in the Third World. Concern
that developing countries should adopt appropriate technologies is
seen as a means of ensuring that the industrialised countries' mas¬
sive consumption of natural resources is maintained. It is also seen
as an attempt by the industrialised countries to develop new markets
in the Third World. The recent Brandt Commission report actually
makes this explicit and sees the major rationale for development aid
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as being the prospect of increasing the demands for capital goods
from the industrialised countries (38). ITDG in London has in the
past received substantial grants from the British Government so that
the Group might not only disseminate information and encourage the
application of appropriate technologies, but also so that it might
assist firms in Britain in the marketing of machinery and products
related to appropriate technology in the Third World. The American
aid agency (USAID) has been given a large grant from government funds
to support:
"an expanded and co-ordinated private effort to promote the
development and dissemination of technologies appropriate
to the developing countries" [Thornman (1979) p 278].
An important component of this programme has been the involvement of
U.S. businessmen in the export of "appropriate technologies".
With these emphases, it is clear that appropriate technology has come
to mean little more than that which people in A.T. organisations say
it is.
These objections, in fairness, relate mostly to certain emphases
within sections of the movement. There would no doubt be many A.T.
practitioners who would argue against these criticisms. The stated
objective of many A.T. organisations - that they should demonstrate
the range of technical and economic options that exist - is in itself
admirable, and few would wish to argue against the value of informa¬
tion centres and networks as important components of systems designed
to redress the imbalances created by current mechanisms of technolog¬
ical change.
(38) Independent Commission on International Development Issues
(1980).
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However, it remains true that the overwhelming impression derived
from the A.T. literature is one of theoretical repetition. Much
discussion remains at the level of description, with endless lists of
criteria whereby the appropriateness of technology might be judged
[Jequier (1979b)]. There is a need to move from an almost exclusive
pre-occupation with the "appropriateness" of A.T., to a more rigorous
examination of the complex relationship between technology and polit¬
ical economy.
Even when the political realities of technical choice and the prob¬
lems of generating A.T.s are acknowledged, the debate appears to
stagnate with the reduction of these problems to the single and
simplistic proposition that political and social change is a neces¬
sary precursor to the introduction of more appropriate technologies.
Or, putting it another way, the problem is one of social relations of
production, rather than of the means of production itself. However,
the acceptance of this thesis cannot absolve us from the requirement
for a thorough analysis of the way in which the nature of technology
is structured by the political economy, or of the way in which the
operation of technology might in turn reinforce specific relations of
power, control and interest within the development process.
The following questions thus arise, and will be examined in ensuing
sections:
[1] Is the nature of technology related in some broad way to the
nature and structure of society, and what are the implications
of notions of technological determinism?
[2] How is the political component of technological choice and inno¬
vation to be understood?
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Technological Determinism
In many cases, interest in the concept of appropriate technology ori¬
ginated from a concern for alleviating poverty in the Third World
countries. This concern has led, however, to the pervasive but mis¬
taken assumption, amongst many A.T. proponents, that the introduction
of more appropriate technologies will somehow radically change
society. Schumacher himself portrays this technological determinism.
"Few people deny that technological change has political
consequences; yet equally few people seem to realise that
the present "system", in the widest sense, is the product
of technology and cannot be significantly changed unless
technology is changed" [Schumacher (1976) p 8].
In a most extraordinary article, quoting extensively from Marx and
Engels, Schumacher recognises the forces which have given rise to the
capitalist mode of production, yet proceeds almost immediately as
though these have ceased to exist, by claiming:
"I know of no better way of changing the 'system' than by
putting into the world a new type of technology - technolo¬
gies by which small people can make themselves productive
and relatively independent" [Schumacher (1976) p 9].
We can perhaps concede Schumacher a degree of literary licence con¬
cerning his almost magical conception of the source of these techno¬
logies; nevertheless, our previous questions concerning how these new
technologies are to be generated and introduced, remain unanswered.
As will be shown below, the feature of all theories of technological
determinism is their a-historical treatment of the factors governing
the choice and innovation of technologies.
Even A.K.N. Reddy, when discussing the transfer of technology, incor¬
porates elements of technological determinism. In a very contentious
metaphor he argues that technology:
"is like genetic material: it carries the code of the
society in which it was produced and survived, and tries to
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replicate that society" [Reddy (1975) p 332].
The proposal for an alternative technology, as has been previously
argued, arises largely from a critical analysis of modern industrial
technology. With these critiques has come the concept of a runaway
technology, and the view that modern technology possesses some form
of inner logic or dynamic which results in certain inevitable social
consequences. Once the decision is made to opt in favour of modern
technology, the pattern of social consequences will be determined by
these imperatives of technology. The most widely read and extreme
exponents of this view are perhaps Jacques Ellul and J.K. Galbraith;
their writings have informed the cultural milieu in which the A.T.
movement has emerged, and have thus formed an important source of
these underlying assumptions of technological determinism.
Ellul argues that "technique" defines our epoch, in the way that
Catholicism defined the Middle Ages. Technique is defined as "the
totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute effi¬
ciency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human
activity". A technical operation is one "carried out in accordance
with a certain method, in order to attain a particular end" [El 1ul
pP.iVig.
(1964)(]. Technological society is created when technique becomes its
central component. Because of the unprecedented proliteration of
techniques in modern times, technology has acquired the power to
determine the ideas, beliefs, and myths of modern man to such an
extent that all activities are now situated within a technical con¬
text. "It is useless to rail against capitalism", he argues, "capi¬
talism did not create our world; the machine did" [Ellul (1964) p 5].
Technology is not an isolated factor in society - rather, it is a
total attitude or comprehensive way of being in the world. Ellul
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questions whether man can remain master in a world of means, and
whether a new civilisation can emerge which includes technique as
only one element among others.
The question that has been asked of Ellul, when he describes technol¬
ogy as "the ensemble of practices by which one uses available
resources in order to achieve certain valued ends", is: what ends?;
and how are they selected? [Leiss (1970)]. This one-sided emphasis
on the inevitable impact of technology on culture and society, must
be characterised as technological determinism. Confusion arises in
Ellul1s work from a failure to treat social consequences of techno¬
logical progress within the context of a more general phenomenon -
namely the attempt to shape behaviour according to political and
economic interests.
Technological determinism does not raise such questions, or permit an
evaluation of the two-way dialectical interaction between technology
and the political and social milieu. The result is a technological
veil (to use Herbert Marcuse's term), cast over the social processes,
which obscures both the general dynamic of advanced societies and the
specific role technology plays within that dynamic.
A similar form of technological determinism is found in the work of
Galbraith, who in his analysis of the modern industrial state, iden¬
tifies six imperatives of technology: increasing span of time;
increasing capital commitment; increasing inflexibility of commit¬
ment; specialised manpower; specialised organisation; and planning
[Galbraith (1967)]. These imperatives have removed power from the
capitalist entrepreneur and lodged it within the technostructure of
the industrial corporation. Technology appears to create a subjec-
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tive power group, the technocrats, who set the goals of the corpora¬
tion and society.
Galbraith's position can be similarly criticised. His notion of the
imperatives of technology is derived from an ahistorical and non-
comparative analysis of technological development. By encapsulating
social and economic power relations within the technostructure, he
ignores the larger struggles within capitalism. Marxian critique
emphasises that the dynamic of late capitalism is still based on the
historical division in the relations of production between the owners
of the means of production and the possessors of nothing but labour
power. The unique form of late capitalism is the corporation which
severs (and therefore mystifies) the link between capital accumula¬
tion and the owners of that capital. As Braverman pointedly states:
"The separation of the hand and brain is the most decisive
single step in the division of labour taken by the capital¬
ist mode of production. It is inherent in that mode of
production from its beginnings, and as it develops, under
capitalist management, throughout the history of capital¬
ism, but it is only during the past century that the scale
of production, the resources made available to the modern
corporation by the rapid accumulation of capital, and the
conceptual apparatus and trained personnel have become
available to institutionalise this separation in a sys¬
tematic and formal fashion" [Braverman (1974) p 126].
Technological determinists have seen technology or technological
change as the prime source of values and goals, as well as of
material change, within society. But in so doing they have ignored
the historical roots of technological change and have obscured the
relations of production which fundamentally structure the direction
and nature of the choice and innovation of technology.
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The Political Economy of Technological Change
Any simple model of technological determinism is easily undermined by
recourse to the many examples in history which do not support the
contention that "technology has become the prime source of
material change..." [Forbes (1971) p 7]. There have been many inven¬
tions which were ignored or even suppressed, some to be re-discovered
or re-invented many centuries later under different social condi¬
tions. The use of steam to drive elementary machinery, for example,
was known to the ancient Greeks (39). Yet it was almost two thousand
years later that the technology was put to a practical application.
A plentiful supply of slave labour meant that there was simply no
social or economic requirement for the ancient Greeks to exploit
steam power or even small-scale labour-saving devices [Dickson (1974)
p 47].
Joseph Needham's scholarly work on Chinese science and culture has
demonstrated that there have also been societies with technical
knowledge and skills comparable to those that existed in Europe in
the Middle Ages, but which subsequently did not develop at the same
rate [Needham(vccti<5uSciaCes)J.
The Middle Ages saw the first wide-scale use of elementary machines,
but, by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, medieval craft
technologies began to find themselves unable to cope with the growing
demands of free trade (40). As Marx and Engels wrote:
(39) The one device that is well known is Hero of Alexandria's
working model of a steam engine, which is believed to have been
first made around the year A.D.50.
(40) For detailed economic histories of the evolution of technolo¬
gy see: Mumford (1934), Ashton (1948), White (1962), Landes
(1969).
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"The feudal system of industry, under which industrial pro¬
duction was monopolised by closed guilds, now no longer
sufficed for the growing wants of new markets. The
manufacturing system took its place. The guild masters
were pushed on one side by the manufacturing middle class;
division of labour between the different corporate guilds
vanished in the face of division of labour in each single
workshop" [Marx and Engels (1952) p42].
The important fact about the beginning of the factory system, and
about capitalist production in general, is that it does not seem to
have been determined solely by technological or even economic fac¬
tors. The Industrial Revolution emerged from the class relations of
capitalism which had begun to establish themselves with the rise of
the merchant class, well before any major advances in production
technology and the emergence of manufacturing industry and the fac¬
tory system. Simply stated, the reasons for the emergence of the
factory system were because the merchants wanted:
[1] to control and market total production;
[2] to maximise the input of work by forcing workers to work longer
hours at greater speeds;
[3] to take control of all technical innovation so that it could be
applied solely for capital accumulation;
[4] and generally to organise production so that the role of the
capitalist became indispensable.
Thus, under the authoritarian and hierarchical class relations of
industrial capitalism, technological innovation was determined not
only by a concern for the efficiency of productive technology, but
also by the need for a technology which maintained authoritarian
forms of discipline, hierarchical regimentation, and fragmentation of
the labour force. There was little point in introducing machines
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capable of increasing the efficiency of production without sufficient
control over the work force to ensure that the machines were operated
to their maximum capacity. Later, with the growth of labour unions,
technological innovation took on a new role - not simply to help
create a framework within which discipline could be imposed - but a
conscious effort to reduce dependency on labour. As Andrew Ure, the
arch apologist of the factory system, wrote when discussing the inno¬
vation of the self-acting mule (in 1830) as a means of overcoming the
high wages demanded by the skilled spinners:
"This invention confirms the great doctrine already pro¬
pounded, that when capital enlists science in her service,
the refractory hand of labour will always be taught docil¬
ity" [Ure (1835) p 368].
Technical innovation thus proceeds not so much from the logic of
technology, as from the interests of capital - particularly from the
need to maintain and further a division of labour that keeps the
labour force safely under control.
It is this sharp division between mental and manual labour, rein¬
forced through the introduction of machinery, which establishes the
very basis for the reproduction of relations of power and control.
As Marx wrote:
"It is a result of the division of labour in manufactures,
that the labourer is brought face to face with the intel¬
lectual potencies of the material process of production, as
the property of another, as a ruling power. This separa¬
tion begins in simple co-operation, where the capitalist
represents to the simple workman, the oneness and the will
of the associated labour. It is developed in manufacture
which cuts down the labourer into a detailed labourer. It
is completed in modern industry, which makes science a pro¬
ductive force distinct from labour and presses it into the
service of capital" [Marx (1954) p 341].
The separation of labour from ownership of the means of production
constitutes, in Marx's analysis, the essence of the capitalist mode
of production with its antagonistic class relations.. The capitalist,
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who owns and controls the means of production, is able to purchase
workers' labour power and extract surplus value. Surplus value
arises because the capitalist compensates the worker for that frac¬
tion of the working day necessary for the maintenance and reproduc¬
tion of the labour. The rest of the working day is spent producing
surplus value for the benefit of the capitalist. Surplus value,
transformed into capital, allows the capitalist to reproduce posi¬
tions of ownership and control of the means of production and the
material conditions for the mode of production which operates to his
benefit. Capitalist relations of production thus require labour
processes in which the amount of surplus labour can be increased
through such means as extending the duration of the working day and
the intensity of work, and, because there are physical and psycholog¬
ical limits to the latter, by increasing the productivity of labour.
Thus, technical innovation is one way in which the capitalist may
increase the surplus value under his control.
But technological change and the increasing concentration of the
means of production give rise to a basic contradiction in capitalism.
The requirement for increased capital accumulation both accelerates
technological changes and at the same time hinders it. This is
because of the contradictory effect technological change has on the
rate of profit.
On the one hand, technical innovations support the process of accumu¬
lation by greatly augmenting labour productivity. Thus, the ratio of
surplus value produced per unit of labour (or variable capital)
increases, and hence also the rate of surplus value, which has the
effect of increasing the rate of profit.
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On the other hand, the increased use of machinery, equipment and
materials through mechanisation and automation implies an increase in
the technical and organic composition of capital, and greater propor¬
tions of capital are required for investment in the means of produc¬
tion. This implies a fall in the rate of profit.
There is a trend for the organic composition of capital to increase
to a greater extent than the rate of surplus value, thus producing a
decline in the profit rate (41).
One of the purposes of research and innovation is to attempt to coun¬
teract the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, and to create new
opportunities for profitable investment. Hence, capital concentrated
in transnational corporations is able to relocate production in Third
World countries with lower wage rates. The burgeoning free trade
zones in many of these countries have reinforced this trend with
their allowances for the unrestricted movement of capital and pro¬
fits, tax holidays, and restrictions on unionisation.
Innovations in technology have seldom been neutral, but have been
part of the political process itself. The capitalist division of
labour with its separation of manual and intellectual work, of execu¬
tion and decision, of production and management, is a technique of
domination as much as a technique of production. David Dickson has
argued that technology adopts a political function in society, which
is related to the distribution of power and the exercise of social
control [Dickson (1974)]. It does this both in a material and in an
ideological fashion. On the material level, technology sustains and
(41) r=s/(c+v)=s'/(q+1); where r= rate of profit, c= constant cap¬
ital, v= variable capital, s'= rate of surplus value = s/v , q =
organic composition of capital = c/v [Marx (1959), p 42].
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promotes the interests of the dominant social group; and, on the
ideological level, technology acts in a symbolic manner to support
and propagate the legitimising ideology of this society.
In Dickson's terms, the current "ideology of industrialisation" has
obscured the way in which technological innovation is intimately
related to the issues of power and control in society, by explaining
it in the apparently neutral terms of increased efficiency and pro¬
ductivity. To reveal the political and social forces at work, it is
not sufficient to look merely at the consequences of a particular
technological development, or even at the economic conditions that
made its introduction possible. Rather, the specific reasons leading
to the process of innovation have to be examined within the context
of the overall system or mode of production. As we have seen, the
nature of technology has come to reflect and legitimise the dominant
modes of instrumental and productive activity of a society. Under
the authoritarian and hierarchical class relations of industrial cap¬
italism, technological innovation was determined not only by a con¬
cern for efficiency of production technology, but also by the
requirements for a technology which maintained authoritarian forms of
discipline, hierarchical regimentation and fragmentation of the
labour force. Industrialisation has appeared to necessitate, and
hence to validate these relations.
This ideology of industrialisation is experienced as a myth. Dickson
understands the function of a myth as explaining or interpreting a
situation or set of events by providing them with an apparent social
or historical context. The form of technology and its historical
development are regarded as natural and inevitable, and hence the
myth evolves that technology is politically neutral. This myth is an
- 85 -
essential element in the general mechanistic and functionalist ideol¬
ogy of contemporary society, which gives equivalence to the concepts
of industrialisation, modernisation and technical and social develop¬
ment. Technical innovation is interpreted as objective, the logical
response to objectively defined economic conditions, and is expressed
in terms of increased efficiency, rationalisation, the need to main¬
tain a competitive position in the world market, or the technical
solution to social needs.
It is with regard to the latter that the idea of appropriate technol¬
ogy has often been associated. But when it ascribes the same politi¬
cal neutrality to technology within the development process, and
technological innovation is still held to 5e determined by supposedly
objectively assessed social and economic conditions, the concept of
appropriate technology can become little more than a sophisticated
extension of the ideology of industrialisation. Failure to take cog¬
nisance of the political environment means that social problems are
defined in technical terms. But the very way the problem is defined
must mean that important values are built into the technical solu¬
tion. This can have unfortunate consequences. For example, to be
successful, appropriate technology invariably depends on specific
types of political organisation - namely, a decentralised and
regional approach to planning. Yet political issues are explicitly
avoided by many A.T. proponents to the extent that mechanisms which
govern the choice and innovation of technology remain unaltered, and
technologies which are introduced serve merely to sustain and promote
the interests of the dominant elite, in both a material and ideologi¬
cal fashion.
Part of the problem of the broad interpretation of appropriate
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technology in general, lies in its emphasis on definitions of A.T.s
as those that facilitate the meeting of specific development ends.
Because the issue of technology in development is posed in this way,
it ignores as irrelevant questions concerning the factors which
structure its generation, choice and nature. The A.T. literature has
generally ignored these problems and has been unaware of the large
and informative literature on technological change. There has been a
corresponding lack of awareness and critical appreciation by many of
those concerned with introducing more appropriate technologies for
the development of Third World countries, of the large body of
literature on development theory.
TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPMENT THEORY
Many of the broader theories of development have incorporated per¬
spectives concerning the interrelationships between science, technol¬
ogy and development. This section will be devoted to a brief, criti¬
cal examination of some of the more important theories, and emphasis
will be given to those parts that deal specifically with the role of
technology, in order to further establish a framework against which
processes of technological change in rural development might be stu¬
died.
Rostow's Stages of Growth Theory
Rostow's concept of "stages of growth" serves as a useful starting
point for the analysis of the evolution of development theory, both
because it is representative of the assumptions of the orthodox,
modernisation theories typical of the 1960s and because of the cen¬
tral role it awards to technological change (42).
(42) Rostow (1960). Korea, for instance, based its science and
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In attempting to explain economic growth, Rostow proposed a linear
interpretation of economic history, postulating five stages through
which all societies must necessarily pass in order to arrive at the
high mass-consumption state which corresponds to the advanced capi¬
talist economies of our time.
[1] In the first, traditional (and "pre-Newtonian") stage, access to
modern scientific and technical knowledge cannot be secured in a
regular and systematic way, and thus limits exist for the level
of per capita production that can be obtained.
[2] The second stage, the precondition for take-off, is character¬
ised by acceptance of the Newtonian world-view that the physical
world is capable of being understood and manipulated in terms of
relatively few fundamental laws; and a new type of entrepreneur
emerges willing to invest in non-traditional activities such as
industry.
[3] The take-off into self-sustained growth is the third stage of
Rostow's theory. Initially he defined the take-off as:
"the interval during which the role of investment increases
in such a way that real output per capita rises and this
initial increase carries with it radical changes in produc¬
tion techniques and the disposition of income flows which
perpetuate the new scale of investment and perpetuate
thereby the rising trend in per capita output" [Rostow
(1958), p 154].
[4] The fourth stage, the drive to technological maturity, is
defined as a period, considerably longer than the take-off, dur¬
ing which science and technology are systematically applied to
production. The capital goods sector develops, agriculture
technology planning on a stages of growth theory. See: Ministry of
Science and Technology, Republic of Korea, The Long Term Plan for
Scientific and Technological Development (Seoul, Jan. 1970).
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becomes modernised, education expands to meet the needs of
industrialisation, and an efficient communications network is
establ ished.
[5] The final stage is characterised by mass consumption of durable
goods and services. The welfare state emerges and becomes the
main political manifestation of a society which has moved beyond
technological maturity.
Rostow's "stages of growth" theory has been criticised mainly for its
rigid concept of development which depends on the postulate that
there is a unique path through which all countries must proceed
before becoming "advanced". An early warning of the validity of com¬
parisons between the initial stages of development of industrialised
countries and the present conditions in the Third World, was made by
Kuznets.
"Both the absolute and relative economic position, as well
as the general cost of the immediately antecedent history,
of the now developed countries in their pre-industrial
phase were cardinally different from the economic position
and the immediate historical heritage of the underdeveloped
countries of today. It is, therefore, far from safe to
extrapolate economic or demographic aspects from the ear¬
lier records for the developed countries to current and
prospective levels for the underdeveloped". (43).
Modernisation theories often imply a technological determinism in
which the pattern of technical progress is fixed according to the
science and logic of technology and where social organisation adapts
to technical progress at each stage of development, according to the
imperatives of technology. Technology is presented as the pure
application of the laws of nature to the problems of production, and
(43) Kuznets (1958), p 151 in Agarwala and Singh (eds). This book
contains a collection of important and representative papers of
the period, and includes articles by Meier, Baran, Rostow, Furta-
do, Eckhaus, Lewis, and Chenery.
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some of the aura of science can be transferred to the machines which
supposedly derive from its principles. From this point of view, the
very idea of an alternative path of industrialisation appears to be
an absurdity. But on the face of it, it is implausible that the dif¬
ferent cultural and economic values of different societies should
have as little impact on their patterns of development as is assumed
by such modernisation (and convergence) theories (44).
Even more important, is the fact that the range and level of technol¬
ogy now available to Third World countries creates different develop¬
ment opportunities and problems from those faced in the early stages
of the countries which are now industrialised. Furthermore, techno¬
logical development in the Third World is intimately related to the
economic and political relationships with the advanced capitalist
countries. This perspective, which effectively undermines any linear
conception of development, has found expression in the structuralist
and dependency schools which have arisen within the Latin American
development context.
The Structuralist School
The structuralist view of development differs radically from Rostow's
in that, although historical factors are also explicitly taken into
account, a linear and independent notion of the development process
is rejected in favour of an emphasis on the structural economic
interrelations between developed and less developed countries. The
development of some countries is seen to take place at the expense of
the underdevelopment of others. The structuralist view has found its
(44) For a critical discussion on convergence theories of techno¬
logical development see: Fleron (1977).
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strongest expression in the approach to economic development theory
and strategy of ECLA (CEPAL) and its most representative economists,
Prebisch and Furtado. The latter has summarised this point of view
in the following terms:
"As a consequence of the rapid spread of new production
methods from a small number of centres radiating technolog¬
ical innovations, there has come to existence a process
tending to create a worldwide economic system. It is thus
that underdevelopment is considered a creature of develop¬
ment, or rather, as a consequence of the impact of the
technical processes and the international division of
labour commanded by the small number of societies that
espoused the industrial revolution of the 19th century.
The resulting relations between these societies and the
underdeveloped areas involve forms of dependence that can
hardly be overcome underdevelopment cannot be studied
as a 'phase' of the development process, since such a
'phase' would be overcome if certain factors came into play
simultaneously. And, since the underdeveloped economies
are contemporaries of - and in one way or another, depen¬
dent on - their developed counterparts, the former cannot
retrace the experiences of the latter. Therefore develop¬
ment and underdevelopment should be considered as the two
aspects of the same historical process involving the crea¬
tion and the spread of modern technology" [Furtado (1970a)
p xvi].
The initial work of ECLA economists gave primary importance to ques¬
tions concerning the participation of Latin American economies in the
international division of labour, and focussed on analyses of the
deterioration in the terms of trade, dependency, and centre and peri¬
phery relationships. Since the 1960s, they have devoted most of
their attention to the internal problems of development, and policy
issues such as bottlenecks for the expansion of import substitution
development.
Prebisch's theses, on the deteriorating terms of trade, helped
highlight the problem of the dependence of Latin American economies
on an export sector which was usually dominated by foreign interests.
This consciousness gave rise to policy proposals for import substitu¬
tion industrialisation (ISI) as a means of producing industrial
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consumer goods which were previously imported. Tariff protection
would be provided for infant industry.
ECLA theorists postulated that import substitution first concentrates
on technologically simple goods because of the domestic level of
technical knowledge and skills, and also because of the restrictions
imposed by the internal market. But, import substitution industrial¬
isation increases the requirement for imported technology which is
capital intensive, and hence becomes responsible for the relatively
little employment created by industry. Furthermore, substitution
becomes increasingly difficult when its scope is broadened to durable
consumer goods, intermediate goods, and capital goods, not only
because of the greater complexity of production technologies, but
also because they demand scales of production and investment that
clash with the narrowness of markets in Third World countries (45).
Because of the nature of import substitution industrialisation and
the financing needs of these countries, foreign investment through
transnational corporations (TNCs) began to play a dominant role in
the economies of Latin America in the 1960s. Furtado has argued that
the forceful expansion of the transnational corporations has resulted
in a process of transnational integration such that technology, embo¬
died in equipment and the design of consumer goods, tends to be less
and less the object of market transactions. Instead, it is
transferred internally among the various component firms of the
transnational corporations. The capacity to control technical pro¬
gress and to impose consumption patterns has been the decisive factor
(45) For a summary of the controversy on import substitution, see:
Hirschman (1968), and for a critical evaluation of the experience
of ISI in Africa: Fransman (1982o.)t
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in structuring the systems of production of the dependent economies
[Furtado (1970 a. ox\d b),
A key point, though, about ECLA and many of the structural ist econom¬
ists, is that radical disengagement from the international capitalist
economy is not considered. Rather this school of thought has pro¬
vided a basis for various reformist and nationalist ideologies which
aim at modernising the economy by developing the local bourgeoisie.
It has gradually been recognised that:
• "ISI has not, in practice, significantly alleviated the
balance of payments constraint; it has led to a growing
dependence on a largely imported, capital-intensive tech¬
nology and has not created extensive employment opportuni¬
ties or indigenous technological development; the process
has been heavily dependent on foreign capital and has
emphasised the establishment of consumer goods industries
at the expense of investment and capital goods industries;
it has led to what many would regard as an undesirable
redistribution of income and in general it had failed to
generate a sustained process of economic growth" [Nixson
(1982), p 49].
The modernisation of productive and social structures proposed by
ECLA thus began to appear insufficient to deal with the continued
dependence of Latin American economies. It was against this back¬
ground of the lack of development of many of the Third World coun¬
tries that the critical revision of structural i st ideas resulted in
the emergence of dependency theory.
Dependency Theory and Technological Dependence
If the relative failure of ECLA theory has constituted one source of
the growth of dependency theory, the other generally cited source has
been the work of the neo-Marxists Baran and Sweezy (1966), and Frank
(1967; 1969). These two currents often determine the different ideo¬
logical standings of the dependency theorists (known as dependistas)
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in the degree of their proximity to either ECLA or to Marxian
analysis and a more authentic opposition to capitalism. There were,
of course, many other more diffuse influences, including the long¬
standing tradition of Marxian intellectual ism in Latin America,
internal political debate on the role of the national bourgeoisie,
and also the influence of the Cuban revolution.
Gunder Frank has in many ways come to symbolise the dependency
approach to readers outside Latin America. Following Baran and
Sweezy, he asserted that the existence of surplus and its utilisation
form the basis for an analysis of different societies. Under mono¬
poly capitalism more surplus is generated, yet there is a contradic¬
tion because of the failure to provide the consumption and investment
outlets required for the absorption of rising surplus. Hence metro¬
politan capital expands into the periphery in order to stimulate
demand. Capitalist penetration, through the appropriation of indi¬
genously produced surplus, promotes a process of underdevelopment
which is not only economic, but also political and social. Thus, the
primary mechanism of underdevelopent is the process of surplus
transfer from periphery to metropole. Frank argues that there are
strict limits on capitalist development at the periphery: a national
bourgeoisie class has been eliminated, or prevented from forming at
all, thus precluding further, or future development under capitalism
[Frank (1978)].
While often critical of Frank, most of the more orthodox dependency
authors share his scepticism about the prospects of capitalist
development at the periphery. Dos Santos for example would put more
emphasis than does Frank on the alignment of the national bourgeoisie
with foreign capital, and less on the surplus drain. He also
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emphasises, as a defining characteristic of dependence, the inability
of peripheral societies to develop a capital goods sector. But he
would agree with Frank that capitalist development (or, at least,
autonomous capitalist development) is not possible, and that a
socialist path of development offers the only escape for peripheral
societies [Dos Santos (1973)]. Szentes, the Hungarian development
theorist, in contrast, claims the possibility of a gradual shift in
the balance of forces in favour of underdeveloped countries, within
the existing framework of international economic relations. He dis¬
tinguishes between:
[1] direct economic dependence (where key sectors of the under¬
developed country's economy are in the hands of foreign capi¬
tal );
[2] trade dependence (dependence on a limited number of capitalist
countries for exports and imports,and a specialised export sec¬
tor) ;
[3] financial dependence (foreign control over the banking and
credit system, and dependence on foreign loans and grants for
development); and
[4] technical dependence (dependence on technological assistance).
He also distinguishes between direct and indirect income drains from
Third World countries. Repatriation of profits from foreign capital
investment constitutes a direct and indeed major transfer of income.
Inequality of exchange in world markets, uneven rates of technical
advance and the unequal distribution of the gains from technical pro¬
gress are among the important sources of an indirect income drain.
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The unevenness of technical advance is not only reflected in the dis¬
tribution of gains from trade, but also in the sale of technological
inputs in an expanding market for knowledge and technology [Szentes
(1976)].
The concept of technological dependence is an important element in
much of the dependency literature, and reflects in part an awareness
in the early 1970s of the need to make the theory more operational.
There was also a shift in attention to the nature of domination rela¬
tions between the industrialised countries and the Third World; from
the control of primary products, to the control of finance; then to
the control of production; and finally to the control of technical
knowledge as the chief means of maintaining and increasing domina¬
tion.
Stewart, for example, sees the weakness of indigenous technological
capacity and knowledge in the Third World as not only the outcome,
but also the prime cause of technological dependence, and indeed of
dependency in general [Stewart (1977)]. She points to the self-
perpetuating nature of the tendency to import modern, relatively cap¬
ital intensive technologies from the industrialised countries,
despite their inappropriateness to the social problems in developing
economies. This tendency is self-perpetuating because employees in
the modern sector, using machinery that ensures high labour produc¬
tivity, earn wages high enough to create, sustain and encourage
demand for products whose quality specifications require production
technologies which are fairly capital-intensive. Simply stated,
modern sectors are generally supported by governments which
represent, to a greater or lesser extent, the interests of certain
elites who benefit from the activities of the modern sector. The use
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of foreign technology builds up biases in selection mechanisms in
favour of its future use, leading to further decisions in favour of
such technologies. The large, traditional and rural sector is gen¬
erally excluded from decision-making processes and choices are thus
made that favour the interests of the elite minority.
Stewart describes technology as a matrix, consisting of a set of
techniques, each of which is associated with a "vector of charac¬
teristics" which include the nature and specification of the product,
the inputs used, the scale of production and the associated manage¬
ment techniques. These characteristics are designed to fit into the
economic, institutional and technical circumstances of the economy.
The inappropriate nature of industrialised country technology for
Third World countries arises from the differences in the economic and
institutional environments. If a technique is transferred to a com¬
pletely different environment, then the original environment has to
be reproduced (46). This leads to:
[1] a heavy reliance on foreign sources for materials, personnel,
parts and services, technologies for linked processes, and for
markets;
[2] a concentration on the minority modern sector to provide
resources and demand;
[3] a technology alien to local history, with the inevitable conse¬
quences of inefficient production.
Technology is also viewed by Stewart as a package, and the efficiency
(46) cf. Reddy's metaphor likening technology to genetic material.
The criticisms levelled against Reddy, apply also to this state¬
ment of Stewart.
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or otherwise of a particular technique depends not only on its own
performance, but also on that of the surrounding and linked technolo¬
gies. Given a productive structure based on the production of indus¬
trialised country products, and using industrialised country tech¬
niques, the natural consequence is that local science and technology
systems are small and lack indigenous innovative capability. There
is a vicious circle in which weak technological capacity reinforces
dependence and dependence creates weakness. Stewart recognises that
the creation of a demand for more appropriate technologies, a local
innovative capability, a more equal income distribution, and an
emphasis on small industries and agricultural technologies which
would reverse the preference for the modern sector, are ultimately
political problems and require state intervention. However, she
remains sceptical as to whether this shift is possible, given the
current relations of dependency.
Not all of the dependistas hold such a pessimistic position. Car¬
doso, for instance, refuses to place theoretical limits on capitalist
development at the periphery. He sees dependent capitalism as capa¬
ble of growth and of transforming social relations of production,
although not of resolving the unemployment and poverty problems of
the majority of the population. Cardoso's complex and prolific writ¬
ing often make it difficult to discern a consistent methodological
position, and some of his recent writing has been so critical of the
conclusions of the dependency school as to place himself almost out¬
side of it. Like other dependistas, he emphasises, in characterising
dependency, the absence of capital goods and financial sectors, the
import of technology, and the significant penetration by foreign
enterprises. Dependency is understood to be an historical phenomenon
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which expresses the nature and consequences of the introduction of
the capitalist mode of production to Third World countries. For Car¬
doso, though, the fundamental theoretical problem is the elucidation
of the structures of domination as a means of understanding the
dynamics of class relations. The notion of dependence:
"finds not only internal 'expression', but also its true
character as implying a situation that structurally entails
a link with the outside in such a way that what happens
internally in a dependent country cannot be fully explained
without taking into consideration the links that internal
groups have with external ones. Dependence should no
longer be considered an 'external variable', its analysis
should be based on the relations between the different
social classes within the dependent nations themselves"
[Cardoso and Faletto (1979) p 22].
Interestingly, he insists on the need to analyse particular situa¬
tions rather than to develop general theories:
We do not try to place theoretical limits on the possible
course of future events. These will depend, not on academic
predictions, but on collective action guided by political
wills that make work what is structurally barely possible
[ibid, p 175].
The dependency school has in recent years come under sustained attack
(47). The major criticism made is that the dependency school fails
to grasp the real nature of the process of underdevelopment, chiefly
because (as Kay has argued) its theoretical framework is an eclectic
combination of orthodox economic theory and revolutionary phraseology
[Kay (1976)]. These problems derive as much from the original influ¬
ence of the ECLA school as from the early writings of dependency
theorists, in particular Gunder Frank. Capitalism is a crucial con¬
cept in Frank's discourse. Yet he seldom defines what he understands
by capitalism, and then only in vague terms - as a system of produc¬
tion for the market in which profit constitutes the motive for pro-
(47) For an overview see the special issue : "Is Dependency
Dead?", IDS Bulletin , vol 12, no 1, 1980.
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duction and where profit is realised for the benefit of someone other
than the direct producer. For Frank, the existence of a substantial
market constitutes the essential difference between capitalism and
pre-capitalist economies, such as feudalism. As Laclau points out,
this understanding then allows Frank to speak of capitalism in 16th
century Chile, even though the pre-conditions of capitalism, such as
accumulated capital, the separation of the workers from their means
of production and the selling of their labour power, did not even
exist. If capitalism was not the dominant mode of production in this
period, it is clearly erroneous to argue that "capitalist expansion"
promoted "capitalist underdevelopment". Laclau argues that these
problems arise because Frank does not employ concepts central to
Marxism, such as the mode and relations of production.
Taylor echoes these criticisms, arguing that Frank fails to define
capitalism as a system of production whose reproduction and develop¬
ment require specific forms of capitalist penetration of non-
capitalist societies. Frank fails to deal with the different effects
of different stages of capitalist penetration of non-capitalist
modes. All he can reply is that they produced capitalism, which is
not only inadequate, but often quite incorrect, if by capitalism is
meant a specific form of production [Taylor (1979)].
These criticisms have prompted the more general question of the use¬
fulness of dependency theory as a tool for analysing economic
development in Third World countries. Colin Leys has pointed out the
theoretical repetition and stagnation in the literature on under¬
development and dependency, and has drawn attention to the lack of
precision of many of its concepts. The vague typology of centre and
periphery, and the notion of the dependence of the latter on the
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former, give rise to the question of whether this perspective is not
a fairly arbitrary way to "sensitise us to certain features of
economic change and at the same time to anaesthetise us to other
features" (48). In the same way that Frank's writings ignore the
many important effects of the relations of production in capitalist
development, dependency theory in general is unable to formulate or
solve the problem of how domestic capital accumulation forms the
basis of class relations and struggles within the state, and of its
ambiguous relationship with foreign capital. Instead, dependency
theory merely serves to transform the old polemical inverses of
modern/traditional, advanced/backward, and rich/poor into
centre/periphery, developed/underdeveloped and dominant/dependent.
Warren has also remarked on the lack of precision of the concept of
dependence:
The concept of dependence has always been imprecise: such
significance as it has relates almost entirely to political
control of one society by another. Since national
economies are becoming increasingly interdependent the
meaning of dependence is ever more elusive, not to say
mystical [Warren (1981), p182].
Even the meaning, of development is often obscure. Usually it is
taken to mean the kind of capitalist development experienced by the
metropoli-s^s. But, if underdevelopment suggests that the Third World
cannot follow the same path, it is incumbent upon dependency theor¬
ists to disclose what development can or should mean. As Bill Warren
has noted, what underlies dependency theory is a tacit idealised
model of capitalist development without inequalities, or unevenness,
such that the performance of no actual Third World economy could ever
be described as "successful" in terms of it [Warren (1973)]. Because
(48) Leys (1977), p 96, quoting Booth. See also Leys (1980) and
Lai 1 (1975).
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the dependency school sees the periphery locked into underdevelop¬
ment, it tends to minimise or dismiss the development which actually
occurs there as being inegalitarian, unbalanced, and at most short¬
lived or illusory. This mechanistic notion of the inescapable and
vicious circle of underdevelopment and dependency, forms the basis of
the third criticism.
The most important question in the debate about dependency is whether
or not there are theoretical reasons for thinking that the ex-
colonies cannot develop domestic capitalist production. The depen¬
dency school argues that patterns of subordinate development esta¬
blished at the periphery of imperialism before and during the colo¬
nial phase, are self-perpetuating.
Frank, following Baran, located the primary mechanisms of under¬
development in processes of surplus transfer from periphery to metro-
pole. Warren, seeing no theoretical reason for any general motive to
transfer surplus in this way, or why the interests of the imperialist
countries should necessarily be served by the maintenance of under¬
development in the rest of the world, concluded that capital formed
at the periphery could be accumulated there. He backed these conclu¬
sions with evidence from some of the so-called ne-v/ly industrialised
countries (NICs), former colonies which are now beginning to develop
significant domestic productive bases [Warren (1973)].
Emmanuel entered the debate by rejecting the alleged evidence that
this was happening, proposing instead that capital is drawn towards
the poles of its own existing accumulation [Emmanuel (1974)].
Leys argued, from case studies in Kenya, that capital accumulation in
"periphery" countries cannot be understood by an examination only of
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the operation of the world economy and the transfer of surplus to the
"centre", as dependency theorists suggest. The structure of social
classes and the role of the state should also be examined. He
rejects any notions that the state is a neutral arbiter of interests,
or that it is simply the instrument of foreign capital. The initia¬
tives of the state can reflect the class power of an indigenous bour¬
geoisie which is able to protect and facilitate the movement of Afri¬
can (or national) capital into productive sectors of the economy.
Class structures and struggles are thus seen to be crucial in deter¬
mining the level and rate of capital accumulation in a "periphery"
country [Leys (1978)].
The debate has not produced conclusive evidence to show either that
capitalist development cannot occur at the periphery, or that it is
eventually bound to. Rather it demonstrates the need to study and
theorise on the conditions under which some periphery countries have,
and others have not, experienced significant measures of such growth.
The dependency school still has many adherents and its concepts per¬
meate much discussion, research, and policy on Third World develop¬
ment. It has been argued that, although some of the propositions of
the original theory have been shown to be untenable, the events of
the 1970s strengthen the main notion of dependency [Bienefeld
(1980)]. Permanent categories of periphery and core, universal gen¬
eralisations about the limitations of technology transfer, or the
lack of a national bourgeoisie in the periphery, have all been
revealed as the gross over-simplifications they always were.
Nevertheless, it is argued that two fundamental propositions of the
dependency debate have been strongly reinforced: namely, the central
importance of the potential inhibiting effect of the international
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context for the process of development; and the critical importance
of national policy in establishing the basis for a relatively more
advantageous participation in the global economy. It can be coun¬
tered that these notions are hardly peculiar to dependency theory
alone, and thus do not constitute a legitimate defence of its vali¬
dity.
Dependency theory did , however, demonstrate the inadequacy of the
analyses of many orthodox development economists in the 1960s, with
its rejection of modernisation theory, and the analysis of the nation
state, not in isolation, but in the context of international capital¬
ism. But, dependency theory still fails as an explanatory account of
underdevelopment. It does not explain what causes underdevelopment
or why capital is not accumulated to any extent in the Third World.
Criticisms of the dependency school have indicated a way forward
through a more analytical use of such concepts as relations and mode
of production in order to illuminate the manner in which capitalist
penetration and development occur (49).
Taylor, for instance, has proposed the following programme [Taylor
(1979), plOl-104].
[1] A rejection of notions of underdevelopment as being incapable of
providing any rigorous basis for analysing the existence, forms
or effects of the various types of capitalist penetration within
societies dominated by non-capitalist modes of production.
(49) The past decade has seen a great deal of work on analyses of
pre-capitalist modes : Hindess and Hirst (1975),(1977); Bettleheim
(1972); the French anthropologists Meillassoux (1964); Godelier
(1972),(1977); Terray (1972); and the French political economists
Rey and Dupre (1973).
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[2] A need for the discourse of historical materialism as a means of
analysing a Third World country as a social formation which is
dominated by an articulation of (at least) two modes of produc¬
tion - capitalist and non-capitalist - with the former increas¬
ingly dominant over the other (50).
[3] The identification of the mode of production that was dominant
within the non-capitalist mode and the form of development
specific to it, the possibility of different forms of capitalist
penetration and how the pre-capitalist conditions for the capi¬
talist mode of production are established.
[4] The analysis of underdevelopment as a social formation that is
transitional due particularly to imperialist penetration which
has as its specific economic effect a separation of direct pro¬
ducers from the means of production.
[5] "As a result of its being determined in the last instance by an
articulation of modes of production, the Third World formation
is characterised by a whole series of dislocations between the
various levels of the social formation" [p 103]. Imperialist
penetration intervenes economically, politically and ideologi¬
cally within these dislocated levels in order to ensure the
increasing dominance of the capitalist mode of production and to
create that restricted and uneven form of economic development
(50) A mode of production has been defined as "an articulated com¬
bination of relations and forces of production structured by the
dominance of the relations of production"[Hindess and Hirst
(1975), p 9].
A social formation is defined as "a complex structure of social
relations, a unity of economic, ideological and, in certain cases,
political structural levels in which the role of the economy is
determinant" [ibid p 13].
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with its political and ideological guarantees, which can in turn
produce the pre-conditions for the possibility of a socialist
mode of production.
Taylor's theses have been criticised as- a "turgid restatement of a
now familiar set of ideas dressed up in awkward and pretentious
language in the name of theoretical rigour" [Booth (1980), p 768].
Certainly many of Taylor's propositions are established by definition
rather than by reasoned argument (51). But, it is when this form of
analysis is applied to the rural areas of Third World countries,
where non-capitalist modes coexist with capitalist production, that
the relevance of this approach to this thesis becomes apparent; for
it can provide a framework within which processes of technological
change might be studied (52).
Underdevelopment in rural Africa
A recent and iconoclastic work, also within the framework of histori¬
cal materialism, has commented on the ethnocentric bias of many
Western scholars writing on underdevelopment in Africa [Hyden
(1980)]. He questions the validity of analytical models based on the
premise of the overriding dominance of capital in rural areas in
Africa. Instead of describing societal structures in terms of a
given model, Hyden's purpose has been to identify actual structural
relationships by trying to sense the parameters of social action in
rural areas. He remarks on the need to question (as Laclau does) the
(51) There are also difficulties in the epistemological basis of
Taylor's theses which largely follow the work ofA/tKu55e.r
and 8akt>ar( 1970). The economistic bias of this position has been
discussed by amongst others Hindess and Hirst (1977).
(52) A refreshingly incisive example of this form of analysis is
the historical work on Lesotho by Kimble (1978).
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assumption that the maintenance of pre-capitalist relations of pro¬
duction in the peripheral areas is an inherent condition of the pro¬
cess of accumulation in the metropolitan countries [Laclau (1971), p
35]. As Kay has argued:
"we have to face the unpalatable fact that capitalism has
created underdevelopment not simply because it has
exploited the underdeveloped countries, but because it has
not exploited them enough" (53).
Hyden takes this further and argues that the roots of Africa's under¬
development are not found in the international system, but in the
rural areas of that continent. The problems of underdevelopment do
not stem from an excessive penetration by world capitalism. Rather
they stem from the inability of capitalism to produce the same
dynamic transformation of the material base as it once did in Europe
and America. He continues:
"Development is an ambiguous process, in which the risks of
loss are as great as the prospects of gain. This ambiguity
may be particularly common among those who have been only
marginally affected by the forces of development and who
have retained a reasonable degree of social and economic
autonomy, for example, the many smallholder peasants in
Africa. In their case, development is not only a matter of
improvement of material conditions. It is also a question
of losses in respect of other values and, above all, it is
a matter of trading social autonomy for increased depen¬
dence on other social classes" [Hyden (1980), p 4].
African countries south of the Sahara (with the obvious exception of
Republic of South Africa and, perhaps, Zimbabwe) are unique in that
their economies are dominated by rural smallholder producers, or
peasants, who have persistently resisted colonial and post-
independent state attempts at modernisation and have enjoyed a degree
of independence much greater than either their Asian or Latin Ameri¬
can counterparts [Goody (1971)].
(53) [Kay (1975), p55]. For a critique of Kay see Bernstein
(1976).
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What makes the peasants different from other social classes is their
position as producers with direct access to land, and production
(with the help of family members) largely for their own consumption -
but at the same time they are integrated into a larger social econ¬
omy, to which they are forced to make a contribution in one form or
another. A peasant community may be involved in commodity production
based on the capitalist criteria of exchange value, but this need not
be its total culture. Even if it is affected by the wider capitalist
world economy, the village community is not just a reflection of the
larger society and the global economy. Pre-capitalist social forma¬
tions survive because the economic structures that give them life are
still at work.
The peasant mode is characterised by such features as a rudimentary
division of labour; a domestic orientation with production units cen¬
tred around households (and thus tending to be small); limits to the
time and effort that peasants can spend on co-operation; the need to
meet minimal human needs in a reliable manner; an overwhelming depen¬
dence on the natural resource endowment, and on human skills and sim¬
ple tools, sometimes augmented by animal draft power; a distrust of
extension agents who do not share the same experiential knowledge of
agricultural practices; and a general ignoring of the state, which
(unlike in other modes of production) is not integrally linked to the
peasant mode of production. Thus, in Africa, peasants still hold the
key to agricultural development - not the politicians, administrators
or experts, whom the peasants see as contributing neither capital nor
expertise, and who personally do not incur any of the risks involved
in production.
But, the "success of the pre-modern social formations in holding
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capitalism at bay has inhibited development efforts in Africa. Turn¬
ing the peasant producer into a modern farmer is not a simple process
which can be achieved by education, training, and government services
alone, as many Western liberals believe. Hyden argues that it is
likely to be a process full of discontinuities and conflicts; he
claims that nowhere in history have the peasantry been spared coer¬
cive measures, which he sees as a necessary evil of modernisation.
He argues that in Africa, socialism will increasingly be called upon
to supplant capitalism in trying to achieve that objective - that is,
to serve as the main agent of modernisation.
There is a sense here in which Hyden has come full circle, from the
earlier rejection of modernisation theory to the advocacy of neo-
modernisation. Part of the problem here is that Hyden (and other
like-minded analysts) do not give serious attention to the nature of
scientific and technical knowledge, and to how different forms of
technological development become feasible within different social and
economic environments. Some recent studies have indicated the impor¬
tance of indigenous technical knowledge, and of the processes whereby
people generate, incorporate, adapt, and transmit knowledge [Howes
and Chambers (1979)]. Rural people, free of disciplinary blinkers,
usually not only know more about local conditions and needs, but also
take a more holistic view than do specialists from outside. This
knowledge must be taken into account in any efforts towards develop¬
ment and technological change.
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SUMMARY
A number of important factors related to technological change have
emerged from this review of the literature which has provided the
framework for the case study in Lesotho. These are summarised
briefly (and simply) below:
[1] Technology is not merely hardware or machinery, but incorporates
. knowledge, techniques and forms of social organisation. In its
broadest sense:
"Technology discloses man's mode of dealing with nature,
the processes of production by which he sustains his life,
and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his
social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow
from them" [Marx (1954), p 352].
[2] Furthermore, technology is not merely applied science. Instead,
there is an interactive relationship where both science and
technology affect each other. It is also clear that new technol¬
ogy develops predominantly from existing technology.
[3] Neo-classical economics provides an inadequate model for under¬
standing the choice of technology. It ignores highly signifi¬
cant factors which affect technological change by concentrating
on just two characteristics associated with technology (capital
and labour), by assuming a single type of decision maker (the
profit maximising entrepeneur) and by taking a largely a-
historic view of the development of technology.
[4] The choice of technology is necessarily constrained by the
international distribution of technological knowledge and power.
Less than 3 percent of the world's R&D expenditure is spent in
the Third World and only a small proportion of this is spent in
Africa.
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[5] The development of indigenous technological capability is impor¬
tant, both for the selection of transferred technologies, and
for the adaptation and innovation of new technologies appropri¬
ate to local conditions.
[6] The origins of many of the current notions of appropriate tech¬
nology, prevalent in aid policies, may be traced to that of
intermediate technology with its a-political assumptions.
Intermediate technology has often been seen as a solution to the
problems of the underemployed rural poor, and the historical
process which gives rise to rural deprivation, is ignored. The
technological determinism in many of these notions results in a
one-sided emphasis on the inevitable impact of technology on
culture and society, and does not permit an evaluation of the
interaction between political and economic structures, and tech¬
nological change.
[7] The political economy approach, on the other hand, recognises
that innovations in technology have seldom been neutral, but are
part of the political process itself. Technology has a politi¬
cal function in society which is related to the distributon of
power and the exercise of social control. On a material level,
technology sustains and promotes the interests of a dominant
social group, and, on an ideological level, technology acts in a
symbolic manner to legitimise the dominant modes of instrumental
and productive activity of a society.
[8] The political economy approach stands in marked contrast to
modernisation theory which assumes that all societies follow the
sames stages of development. Instead, emphasis is given to the
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manner in which the relationship between industrialised coun¬
tries and the Third World promotes underdevelopment. The
approach advocated here should be differentiated from the struc¬
turalist and dependency schools of thought which are unable to
explain adequately the nature of underdevelopment. Instead, an
understanding of processes of social and technological change
must be related more closely to an analysis of the mode and
relations of production within and between societies.
This excursion into the literature on technology and development has
served to highlight aspects of technological change which have
received attention in the past. It has also indicated some of the
weaknesses of this body of theory. By placing this critical review
of the literature within an analysis of the concepts of appropriate
technology, and by linking the discussion with a brief review of
development theory, the need for a better understanding of the
specific role that technology and technological change play in rural
development in the Third World, has been shown. It is this aspect on
which this thesis is focussed. This will be undertaken by means of
an extensive case study of rural development in Lesotho, and through
an examination of the factors governing the introduction and genera¬
tion of technologies within the existing political and economic
framework.
PART TWO
A CASE STUDY IN LESOTHO
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CHAPTER THREE
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LESOTHO
One of the key conclusions of the previous chapter was that techno¬
logical change is intimately bound up with political economy. This
is an interactive process in which economic and political factors
govern the direction and nature of technological change, which in
turn give rise to, and reinforce, political and ideological struc¬
tures. The shift from pre-capitalist and traditional societies to
those where capitalist modes of production are dominant, has inevit¬
ably involved the introduction of technologies which have radically
altered the relationships between men and their tools, the means of
production, and the products of their labour. Historically, coloni¬
alism and imperialism facilitated this process. Latterly, mechanisms
such as international aid sustain this process of technological
change in both a material and ideological fashion, within a global
context of the expansion of capitalism. By examining Lesotho's
current economic and political situation, and the historical develop¬
ments which gave rise to it, it is hoped that the factors which
govern and constrain technological change and rural development will
be demonstrated.
The tiny, landlocked country of Lesotho in southern Africa presents
itself, in many ways, as an excellent case study for research on
technological change and rural development in the Third World.
Lesotho is one of the poorest and least industrialised countries in
the world (1). Poorly endowed with natural resources, a high propor-
(1) The World Bank classifies Lesotho among the 33 least developed
countries of the world [World Bank (1981a), Table 1].
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tion of its population depends on subsistence agriculture, and
manufacturing output is extremely low. Like many of the other poorer
Third World countries, it is also increasingly dependent on interna¬
tional aid. In addition, Lesotho is wholly surrounded by the Repub¬
lic of South Africa, and its enormous dependency on that country is
reflected in the fact that more than half of its economically active
male population work in South Africa as migrant labourers (2). The
labour policy of the South African economy bars black workers and
their families from permanent domicile in urban areas. At the same
time it dictates that less than subsistence wages are paid to migrant
labourers, thus ensuring that the Basotho retain a dual dependence on
traditional, marginal agriculture and migrant labour.
If Lesotho's economy were to be assessed in terms of conventional
aggregate economic indicators, it might appear that the country has
fared remarkably well over the past decade. The average growth rate
in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), over 1970-1979, was 7 per cent as
compared with an average of 1.7 per cent for the group of low-income
African countries [World Bank (1981b), p 144]. In 1977^ the growth
Kvrvcjdorvx o$ LofcOfcHo
rate peaked at 14.1 per cent [ ^ Third Five Year Development
Plan (TFYDP), p 6]. These indicators, however, conceal the reality
of Lesotho's economic predicament. As will become apparent below,
most of this growth was attributable to factors beyond Lesotho's con¬
trol. Changes in labour migration, agricultural production, and
foreign aid presage serious consequences for Lesotho's future.
(2) Other areas in Africa also experience massive labour migra^-
tion, particularly Northern and Western Africa. It has been es¬
timated that in Western Africa, about a million people are in¬
volved in labour migration, of whom about half go to Ghana and the
Ivory Coast [van der Wiel (1977), p 17].
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The economy of Lesotho, then, is structured by these three features:
[1] the export of workers to South Africa,
[2] subsistence agriculture, and
[3] dependence on foreign aid.
MIGRANT LABOUR
The dependence of Lesotho on the export of labour may be assessed
partly in terms of the numbers involved in the migratory labour sys¬
tem, and partly in terms of the proportion of national income derived
from migrant earnings.
Lesotho has an estimated population of 1.3 million people with a
potentially economic active labour force of 630,000 , of whom just
over half are male [World Bank (1981b), p 143; TFYDP, p 75]. Over
half of the latter are absent at any one time as migrant labourers in
South Africa; most Basotho males spend part of their working lives on
South African mines (3).
The importance of migrant labour to Lesotho's economy cannot be exag¬
gerated. In 1976, migrant earnings exceeded the country's gross
(3) In a survey in the Thaba Tseka Project area, 82 per cent of
males of 18 years and older reported having worked as migrant la¬
bourers [Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Project (1977a) p 7]. A
noticeable example of the fact that almost all men in Lesotho have
had experience of living and working in South Africa, is that the
present Prime Minister, Chief Lebua Jonathan, himself worked for
sometime underground in one of the gold mines near Johannesburg
[van der Wiel (1977), p 9],
The average length of migrant labour contracts is 11 months, and
the average duration of home-stay is four and a half months. Most
Basotho begin their careers as migrants when they are 18 to 20
years of age and cease to migrate when they are about 45 [van der
Wiel (1977), pp 32,46,47].
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domestic product (GDP) by 30 per cent [Singh (1982), p 302]. Nearly
three quarters of the real growth in per capita gross national pro¬
duct, in recent years, has been attributable to migrant remittances
[Eckert and Wykstra (1980), p 7]. The proportion that migrant remit¬
tances contribute to the gross national product (GNP) is shown in
Table 3.1, as well as other important trends in migrant labour, which
have emerged over the past decade (4).
Some important features may be noted. The past trend of increasing
labour migration has, since 1976, begun to be reversed (5). It is
clear, from the figures released by the Chamber of Mines in South
Africa, that a significant displacement of foreign workers has been
taking place in South African mines and it is likely that the number
of Basotho migrants will continue to decline in the future (6). It
(4) The following points regarding these data should be noted:
(i) Lesotho's financial year runs from the beginning of April to
the end of March. Thus, financial data for the years 1970, 1971,
etc. reflect those for the financial years 1970/1, 1971/2, etc.
The same applies to other financial data in this chapter.
(ii) At current exchange rates (November, 1982), there are approx¬
imately 2 Maluti to the pound Sterling.
(iii) A sizable proportion of migrants are at any one time
present in Lesotho on rest and recuperation leave. If these were
to be included, the total number of migrants in 1976, for in¬
stance, would have been approximately 200,000. Of these it is es¬
timated that 180,000 were men and 20,000 women [van der Wiel
(1977), p 16].
(iv) GNP, in Lesotho's case, is defined as GDP at Market Prices
plus migrant remittances [TFYDP, p 9].
(5) The drop in migrant employment in 1974 was attributable to la¬
bour conflict in the mines, which resulted in a significant number
of Basotho returning home before their contracts expired.
(6) In December 1973, foreign Africans constituted 80 per cent of
the black labour force recruited for mines affiliated to the South
African Chamber of Mines, and South Africans constituted the
remaining 20 per cent. In December 1978, the respective propor¬
tions were 45 per cent and 55 per cent [Murray (1980), p 15].
South Africa itself faces severe unemployment problems among its
African population, necessitating high priority measures to in¬
crease employment for its own citizens. Recent years have seen
the rapid capitalisation of South Africa's productive forces with
the result that even if fairly high growth rates are achieved they
will not automatically translate into a high growth in employment.
For example, in gold mining an increasing proportion of output is
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19/0 19/1 1972—rS73 1974 1975 1976^19// 19/8
Mo. of Basotho










40 42 52 91.9 121.5 162.2 165.2 168.5 157
GDP 80/81
market prices
(mil 1 ions Maluti)
140 147 157 159.2 159.9 172.5 210.5 247.1 -
GNP 80/81 prices
(mill ions Maiuti) 180 189 209 251.1 281.4 334.7 375.7 415.6 -
GNP/capita
80/81 Maluti 172 176 190 224 245 284 310 335 -
TABLE 3.1 : Lesotho Migrant Labour Statistics
Source: Lesotho Third Five Year Plan, pp 9,18.
Central Planning and Development Office, unpublished data.
is projected that the number of Basotho migrant labourers in South
Africa will be halved by the year 2000 [Eckert and Wykstra (1979), p
23].
In the mid 1970s there were substantial increases in real wages for
migrant labourers in the gold mines. After increases in the gold
price, mine wages were raised, ostensibly to make underground mining
more attractive to South Africa's own workers in an effort to reduce
dependence on foreign sources of mine labour supply. The increase in
being derived from highly mechanised surface operations as rela¬
tively high gold prices make it feasible to reprocess tailing
dumps.
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real mine wages was unprecedented. Lesotho, as the most extreme
example of a labour exporter among the neighbouring countries, and
with approximately three-quarters of its migrant labourers in mining,
could not help being seriously affected. In 30 months (January 1973
to June 1976), mine wages increased by 500 per cent in monetary terms
and by 330 per cent in real terms [Eckert and Wykstra (1980), p5].
It is interesting to note that the changes in the number of migrant
labourers over this period were only slight. The absence of a
response in the form of increased migrant numbers implies that the
flow of labour migration to South Africa is solely determined by the
employing industries in that country.
Table 3.1 also indicates that there has been a gradual concentration
of migrant employment in the mining industry, which has increased
Lesotho's dependence and vulnerability to the economic and political
factors affecting a single sector of South Africa's economy.
Since 1976 the increase in mine wages has been more modest; in 1978,
for the first time since independence, migrant remittances declined
in real terms. It appears that mine wages are presently tied to the
South African cost of living index, which is normally 1 to 1.5 per¬
centage points lower than Lesotho's.
The significance of this decline for the economy of Lesotho is three¬
fold. Firstly, migrant labour generates the source of a substantial
proportion of recurrent government revenue and thus a decline in
migrant remittances can contribute to a revenue crisis. Secondly, a
decline in migrant labour results in further domestic unemployment.
And finally, there are implications for rural poverty.
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Government Revenue
Lesotho is part of the South African Customs Union (SACU) and customs
revenue has played an increasingly dominant role in total government
revenue (7). Total revenues have increased substantially from M29
million in 1975 to M125 million in 1981 (8). This increase has
resulted, not from any broadening of the tax base, but from the
growth of revenues from the Customs Union from 30 per cent in 1970 to
74 per cent in 1979 [TFYDP, p61]. The major source of purchasing
power in Lesotho, and consequently the major determinant of customs
revenue receipts through their effect on imports, is migrant labour
remittances (9). A decline in remittances, or even a slowing of
their rate of growth, may contribute substantially to a customs reve¬
nue and hence government revenue crisis. The extent of the inter¬
dependence between migrant remittances, customs union revenue and
total revenue, is shown in Table 3.2.
(7) There are no duties imposed on imports from South Africa (the
main source of imports), but the country receives revenue from the
SACU according to the following formula:
R = (i+p)/(I+P) x (C+E+S) x 1.42
where: R = revenue received by Lesotho; i,I = total value of im¬
ports into Lesotho and the Customs Union respectively; p,P = total
value of dutiable goods produced and consumed in Lesotho and the
Customs Union respectively; (C+E+S) = total collection of customs,
excise and sales duties within the Customs Union.
There has been a complex and extended debate as to the benefits or
disadvantages of Lesotho's membership of the SACU. See: Mosley
(1978); Robson (1978); and Singh (1982).
(8) Unless otherwise stated, monetary figures quoted are at
current values.
(9) Remittances typically constitute about 2/3 of migrant earnings
and include direct remittances, deferred pay, cash in hand, and
goods in hand.
For the period 1973 to 1977, the elasticity of demand for imports
with respect to migrant remittances was 0.78 [Eckert and Wykstra
(1980), p 7].
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1974 1975 "1976 \WTT~ T97B" 1979
Total government"
revenue (M million) 29.3 28.9 30 53.8 77.9 96.5
Total customs
revenue (M million) 17.3 15.3 16.5 32.8 56.1 71.5
% customs revenue
of total revenue 59 53 55 61 72 74
Total migrant
contribution to - 16.7 24.8 28.9
customs revenue
(M mil 1 ion)
% migrant contribution
to customs revenue - - - 50.9 44.2 40.4
TABLE 3.2 : Migrant labour contribution to customs revenue and total
government revenue
Source : Lesotho Third Five Year Plan, Tables iv-4 and iv-5,
pp 62,64.
Domestic Employment
The second factor of significance in this decline in migrant labour
is its serious implication for unemployment in Lesotho. It is
estimated that between 1980 and 1985 there is likely to be a reduc¬
tion of 25,000 in the number of migrant labourers allowed into South
Africa. Over this same period, the labour force within Lesotho will
increase by 77,000 [TFYDP, p 75]. The economy thus has to provide
for approximately 100,000 new jobs over the next five years if the
present level of unemployment is not to increase. The magnitude of
this task is reflected in the fact that, in 1980, a total of only




















TABLE 3.3 : Employment by Sector
Source: Lesotho Third Five Year Plan, p 83.
The relatively small size of Lesotho's modern sector means that even
higher growth rates in employment will add only relatively few new
jobs during the Third Plan period (1980-5). It is apparent that
modern sector growth, even at 6 per cent per annum, will provide only
13 per cent of the required jobs.
The manufacturing sector, in particular, has been unable to provide
additional employment and, notwithstanding the activities of two
organisations created by the government for the purpose of attracting
investment and encouraging industrial enterprise, output has actually
fallen in real terms over the 1973-8 period, and remains at only 2
per cent of GDP.
At the time of independence, Lesotho's industrial sector was
extremely small. Only 23 manufacturing and construction enterprises
were listed, employing a mere 1400 workers [Selwyn (1975)]. Since
then a number of small industries have been established, mainly in
joint ventures with the Lesotho National Development Corporation
(LNDC).
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The LNDC was established in 1967 on the advice of the Afrikaner
industrialist Anton Rupert. Its primary task has been to encourage
small scale capitalist industries. The Corporation is prepared to go
to extraordinary lengths to attract foreign investment. In a publi¬
cation entitled "The World's Longest Tax Holiday", the Corporation
offers six tax free years and completely tax free allowances. In
another publication, they refer to:
" the entire South African market on its
doorstep There are no duties, restrictions, monetary
or exchange controls. There is no problem about the repa¬
triation of profi ts....There are concessions unique in
Africa....the tax shelter provided by the government for
new industries is one of the most comprehensive and gen¬
erous in the world" [LNDC (n.d.)].
The LNDC provides mainly long term finance (including equity partici¬
pation) whilst another agency, the Basotho Enterprise Development
Corporation (BEDCO), has been set up to assist in the establishment
and growth of small Basotho enterprises by providing loans and train¬
ing facilities for Basotho businessmen. By June 1978, the LNDC had
38 subsidiary companies where it owned more than 50 per cent of the
equity, and was associated with another 15 through minority share¬
holdings or long term loans. It is estimated that 80-90 per cent of
Lesotho's industrial output is produced by enterprises supported by
the LNDC. Industries have included pottery, umbrellas, sheepskin pro¬
ducts, electric lamps, and furniture manufacturers. There has been
little attempt to influence industrialisation strategy towards the
manufacture of more appropriate products which might satisfy some of
the basic needs of the population.
Industrialisation and employment creation have, on the whole, been
unimpressive. In the First Five Year Development Plan (1970-1975),
it was planned that the industrial sector would contribute most to
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reaching the target of creating 2000 to 3000 jobs per annum. But
actual employment creation remained far below this, as did the level
of investment. The Seco-nd Plan included the estimate that Lesotho's
male labour force would grow by 37,500 over the period 1975-1980.' It
was necessary, therefore, to provide 7500 new jobs each year if
either an increase in migrant labour or an increase in unemployment
was to be avoided. It was planned that most of these jobs would be
created in the construction or agriculture sectors and that a total
of 7000 new jobs would be created in industry, mines, commerce and
tourism. The revised Second Five Year Plan indicates investment tar¬
gets for these sectors which imply a high investment ratio of Mil,700
per job. This is characteristic of Lesotho's industrialisation,
which has generally been too capital intensive to absorb surplus
labour. In the event, only 1697 jobs had been created in the first
three years of the plan (Industry 609, Commerce 279, Tourism 127, and
Mines 682), and in 1979 it was estimated that the number employed in
the industry sector had grown to only 2800 [TFYDP, p 217].
One study has concluded that, on balance, there is a production cost
disadvantage in the peripheral areas of southern Africa, such as
Lesotho, in relation to South African metropolitan centres. The
costs of utilities were found to be higher in the periphery, and
there was little support for the common assumption that labour costs
were, on average, lower here. There was also little evidence to sug¬
gest that capital was more expensive, but there were structural and
institutional factors restricting its flow to the periphery. The
study also showed that little effort was made to adapt techniques to
local conditions [Selwyn (1975)].
Lesotho has only one known mineral resource with commercial potential
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- diamonds. Traditionally the Basotho have used hand tools to dig for
diamonds, but the government removed the diggers, in spite of
vigorous protests, to less productive sites, in order to make way for
prospecting by transnational mining groups. As a result, diamond
exports declined from an average of 19,000 carat in 1969 to only 9000
carat in 1972 [World Bank (1975a)]. Rio-Tinto, Lonrho, and Newmont
Mining were initially involved, but all decided not to pursue their
investments, claiming lack of commercial' viability. Subsequently,
Anglo-American/De Beers took over the licence from Rio Tinto at Let-
seng la Terai and established a medium scale mine. But it has been
claimed that deposits recoverable on economic terms will be exhausted
within ten years.
In spite of these considerations, which demonstrate the peripheral
nature of Lesotho's economy, the government stated, rather optimisti¬
cally, in the Third Five Year Plan:
"This sector [industry], although still small, appears
to offer the best hope for achieving considerable growth
for helping to effect optimum efficiency in several sec¬
tors, contributing to national income, creating domestic
employment, and helping to reduce dependence on migrant
labour" [p 215].
Lesotho is no longer going to be able to rely on migrant labour to
absorb the increase in its labour force. As the numbers of migrant
labourers allowed into South Africa decline, the problem of unemploy¬
ment in Lesotho is likely to become acute.
There is one further effect that migration has had on the domestic
employment situation. Migrants acquire new knowledge, skills, values
and aspirations during their employment in South Africa. The skill
distribution of Basotho migrants on the gold mines is shown in






















TABLE 3.4 : Skill Distribution of Basotho Underground Workers on the
Go!d Mines
Source: van der Wiel (1977), p 24.
involved in work on pipes, tracks or timber, and general shaft per¬
sonnel. The category "semi-skilled" consists mainly of drill opera¬
tors and engine drivers. Those in supervisory positions include
senior gang supervisors, haulage supervisors, senior team leaders and
senior training instructors. However, most Africans are excluded
from skilled jobs in South Africa, and thus the acquisition of skills
and technical knowledge is in reality limited.
Skills and knowledge cannot function independently of the material
conditions and the relevant social conditions in which they are
appropriate. Skills and knowledge learned in the mines can appear
useless and meaningless in the village context. The majority of
migrants, in particular those who go to the mines, are engaged in
occupations which can be of little use to Lesotho, as the country has
negligible mining operations and no significant manufacturing sector.
The value of skills and knowledge learned by agricultural migrants is
also likely to be insignificant, as the majority of these farm
labourers are employed on large, highly mechanised farms, applying
techniques which are of limited use to Lesotho.
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The most marked changes in Lesotho induced by the migrant's exposure
to modern production methods have been imitative, not of productive
innovation, but of South African metropolitan consumption patterns
such as clothing, furniture, radios and the like. Occasionally the
migrant becomes a petty shopkeeper on his return. In exceptional
cases he may establish himself as a tractor contractor.
It is the experience of the writer, however, that although the
relevance, to traditional social and economic activities, of skills
learned by migrant workers is slight, they can be of significance to
any development effort. The establishment of rural workshops, for
instance, or the creation of labour-intensive road construction
teams, all benefit from the slightly higher level of technical skills
of returning migrants. One effect of the long term decline in the
numbers of migrant labourers allowed into South Africa is that
Lesotho will have to assume greater responsibility for the technical
training of its citizens.
Rural Poverty
The reduction in the number of migrant labourers also has an effect
on rural incomes. Over 90 per cent of the population still reside in
rural areas. In the past, migration of labourers to South Africa was
mostly from poorer or landless households. Migrant labour remit¬
tances were thus seen to constitute an effective means of ensuring
relative equality of income distribution in rural areas. But recent
evidence contradicts the conventional view that income is equitably
distributed in rural areas (10). With the large increase in migrant
(10) Typical examples of the orthodox, view are: World Bank (19750.)
p 21; and The Second Five Year Plan* p 3. Contradictory and more
recent evidence is presented by van der Wiel (1977); Feachem et al
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wages in the mid 1970s, migrant remittances became the prime source
of income for rural households. Surveys have determined that rural
households with access to migrant remittances had an average income
of M1500 per annum (at 1980/1 prices) and those without, an income of
less than M400 per annum (including consumption of subsistence
crops). It is expected that the proportion of rural households with
no migrant income will rise from 40 per cent in 1980 to 67 per cent
by 1985. The income figures quoted above should be compared with an
estimated poverty datum line in 1980 of M1000 per annum [TFYDP,
p 20]. In spite of fairly high growth rates in GDP in the 1970s,
there is evidence that the real incomes of the poorest 20 per cent of
rural households has declined significantly [TFYDP, p 124]. It is
likely, therefore, that as the real value of migrant remittances
declines over the foreseeable future, many new rural households will
be living in absolute poverty. This situation has been greatly exa¬
cerbated by the failure of attempts to raise Lesotho's agricultural
output.
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
The second important factor structuring Lesotho's economy - sub¬
sistence agriculture - is profoundly affected by patterns of labour
migration.
One of these effects, which receives much comment, is that the depar¬
ture of able bodied men has resulted in a decline in male labour
available for agriculture and that measures for long term investment
in land, which involves heavy manual work such as soil conservation
(1978); and Murray (1978).
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and terracing, have been neglected [Singh (1982), p 303]. However,
recent research has shown that the proportion of the population
involved in labour migration has remained approximately constant
throughout the century (at 12 to 13 per cent). This implies that the
absolute size of the domestic labour force has increased as the total
population has grown [Eckert and Wykstra (1980), pp 2,3]. Certainly
soil erosion is a major threat to Lesotho's agriculture and it is
estimated that 2 per cent of its topsoil is washed away annually
[TFYDP, p 2]. A more likely relationship between labour migration
and soil erosion is the tendency for returning migrants to invest in
cattle, which has contributed to overgrazing with consequent soil
erosion.
Of more importance is the seminal fact that the Basotho cannot sup¬
port themselves solely from the existing land base and have, over the
past century, grown increasingly dependent on the earnings of migrant
labour in order to survive. Agriculture has come to be perceived as
a marginal economic activity, necessary only as a supplement to
migrant earnings and as a means for providing food reserves. This is
especially true of recent years, where the increases in migrant earn¬
ings have resulted in even less effort being devoted to agriculture.
Table 3.5 presents some estimates of the sources of rural household
incomes (11).
At the beginning of the decade, remittances contributed approximately
(11) Two existing studies provide data on the source of rural
household incomes. The first is based on field surveys conducted
in 1967-69 [Monyake (1973)]. The second is a study based on pri¬
mary data from baseline surveys in the Thaba Tseka, Phutiatsana,
and Thaba Bosiu project areas [van der Wiel (1977)]. These two
studies thus span the years of dramatic increases in mine wages.





























































































TOTAL Maiuti 294 501 672 783 954 1049
TABLE 3.5 : Composition of Rural Household Income
Source: Eckert and Wykstra (1980), Table 7.
40 per cent of rural household incomes. By the end of 1976 this had
increased to 71 per cent. The remittance component alone in 1976
exceeded the total household income estimate of just two years ear¬
lier. With a change of this magnitude one would expect a rapid
albeit temporary readjustment in domestic productive activities.
This is precisely what happened in the crops subsector. The very low
figure for crop incomes in 1976 is a result of an abrupt decline in
planted and harvested area, which reduced the overall production of
maize and sorghum to the lowest levels in recent history. In part,
therefore, the reason that migrant remittances contributed so high a
proportion of household incomes in 1976, is because remittances had
grown so rapidly that the incentive to seek incomes from other
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sources had been substantially reduced. The production of crops,
where investment decisions are made anew each season, suffered the
most serious neglect. Food requirements were increasingly met by
imported commodities purchased with remittances. Such a substitution
of purchased food for home produce is particularly easy when a coun¬
try already imports much of its food requirements and food marketing
channels are well established. Official estimates for crop produc¬
tion are shown in Table 3.6 and data for crop yields in Table 3.7.
Crops 1950 1960 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Maize 179.4 163.4 129.3 140.9 126.4 115.5 92.6 111.5 122.3
Sorghum 56.2 68.4 82.6 84.8 68.4 55.4 46.8 62.0 54.1
Wheat 49.2 67.7 106.4 82.1 63.4 59.7 43.9 45.6 38.0
Peas 8.5 17.6 12.2 11.8 14.4 13.1 9.7 5.7 6.6
Beans 2.5 5.6 16.4 21.3 30.7 35.1 17.3 14.3 11.9
Area Planted 295.8 322.7 346.9 340.9 303.3 278.8 210.3 239.1 232.9
Area Harvested - 309.8 292.5 319.5 25.8 224.7 186.2 219.0 214.7
Area 'Failed' - 12.9 50.4 21.4 47.5 54.1 24.1 20.1 18.2
TABLE 3.6 : Area Planted to Field Crops in Lesotho ( 000's of hec¬
tares)
source: Eckert and Wykstra (1980), Table 8.
Year 1960 r97tr~ 1973 1"975~ TW7E~ 1977 19/8
Ma i ze 68/ 514 94 b 652 57V 1568 1408 1U58
Sorghum 783 688 1008 684 555 1467 1447 1345
Wheat 850 544 745 823 799 1373 1359 952
Peas 683 365 706 580 569 991 1018 1204
Beans 243 224 381 477 2 92 143 974 822
TABLE 3.7 : Crop Yields (kg/ha)
source: Eckert and Wykstra (1980), Table 9.
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Concurrent with the sharp drop to 210,000 planted hectares in 1976,
recorded yields soared to unprecedented levels. This phenomenon has
been sustained through the last three annual surveys and has become
one of the more controversial issues regarding official statistics on
the performance of Lesotho's economy (12). Two possible explanations
for these increased yields have been suggested. Firstly, when faced
with an incentive to reduce or de-emphasise cropping, the rational
farmer will leave his least productive fields fallow first. In
Lesotho, with its wide variety of soil types, a great many farmers
had the option of restricting their cropping to good land and letting
their marginal (or distant) fields return to grass. Secondly, having
reduced the total cultivated area by nearly 40 per cent in three
years, farmers were able to concentrate their inputs on remaining
areas. The combination of much higher levels of inputs per hectare
being applied to the more fertile and responsive soils is one possi¬
ble explanation for the sudden and sustained increase of the magni¬
tude recorded for crop yields.
A more cynical analysis might suggest that the data for the increased
yields in 1976 coincided with Lesotho's tenth anniversary since
independence, and that there was a great deal of political concern to
demonstrate that Lesotho's agricultural productivity had improved.
Certainly such an abrupt change in the data is difficult to explain
(12) Some changes in sample coverage were made in 1976 with the
intent of including crops grown in the gardens next to houses in
national totals. However, recent re-examination of the primary
questionnaires indicates that the area of the major crops (as op¬
posed to garden vegetables) included in the farmstead plots is
nominal and could not have made more than a 3-5 per cent change in
the national yield averages. None of the other changes made in
1976 (such as the conversion to metric measurements) should have
had any impact on recorded yields. Consequently, the abrupt
change remains unexplained and has cast serious doubt on the vali¬
dity of the data.
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entirely in terms of unprecedented (and unlikely) increases in pro¬
ductivity (13).
It is sobering to note that, as migrant remittances have begun to
decline (in real terms), the area planted has begun to increase, with
a corresponding decline in yields. This is consonant with the long
term decline in yields which has meant, over the years, that Lesotho
has been increasingly unable to meet its own food requirements.
Domestic production of foodstuffs accounts for only one half of
domestic consumption, with the remainder made up of imports and food
aid (14).
Table 3.8 indicates the agricultural sector's falling share of GDP
from 42 per cent in 1967 to 37 per cent in 1977, and Tables 3.9 and
3.10 demonstrate the large increases in food imports in recent years.
While the contribution to GDP from livestock returns has remained
relatively constant, crop production returns have decreased as a
result of stagnant or, in some cases, declining production. Stagnant
agricultural production is due in part to the deteriorating land
base. The climate is such that if the grassland and cropland are not
properly managed, there will be excessive soil erosion. This has
been the situation for a number of years and a large number of ero-
(13) Yield data from rural development projects are consistently
lower than the figures given for the national averages. For exam¬
ple, in the Thaba Tseka project area in 1977/8, maize yields were
503 kg/ha and wheat yields 419 kg/ha compared with purported na¬
tional yield averages of 1408 kg/ha and 1359 kg/ha for the same
crops respectively [Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme
(1979a)].
(14) The estimated gross revenue from crop production (or
equivalent values for non marketed crops) in 1978 was: field crops
- Mil.4 million; fruit crops - M4.4 million; forage crops -
M79,000; and vegetable crops - M2.2 million [Ministry of Agricul¬
ture (1978), p VI-2].
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(crops) (25.1) (27.8) (20.7) (15.8) (25.2) (20.6)
(1 ivestock) (16.8) (21.7) (23.3) (23.6) (17.9) (16.2)
Mining and Quarrying 2.5 0.3 1.5 2.0 2.5 2.1
Manufacturing 2.1 2.7 4.4 4.3 3.5 1.9
Building and
Construction 2.2 2.6 1.4 3.1 4.8 9.4
Wholesale
and Retail 12.8 9.8 14.9 14.4 13.5 12.2
Catering 0.3 3.0 3.3 5.2 5.5 6.2
Transport
and Communications 1.4 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.6
Ownership of Dwellings 15.3 11.5 11.9 11.6 9.9 10.7
Central Government 16.3 10.0 8.7 11.2 10.4 13.4
Other 5.2 8.0 6.9 6.2 4.2 4.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
TABLE 3.8 : Per cent share of GDP (at factor cost)
Source : Lesotho Third Five Year Plan, p 8.c^ioscfcKoOqsiyi
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Food and live animals
mainly for food 17 21. 9 37.9 43.1 55.4
Beverages and Tobacco 3.4 5.2 7.9 9.2 12.3
Crude Materials .5 .8 1.3 2.1 2.1
Fuel 5.4 7.1 11.7 17.6 17.9
Oils and Fats .8 1.1 1.6 1.3 1.6
Chemical s 4.2 6.3 9.5 10.5 13.4
Machinery 8.4 12.8 22.7 24.4 32.3
Manufactured goods 42.1 62.0 86.9 90.8 99.3
Mi seel 1aneous 0.3 2.6
Total 81.7 117.3 179.6 199.4 237.0
TABLE 3.9 : Value of imports (millions of Maluti)
Source: Annual Statistical Bulletin 1979, Table D.3
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TABLE 3.10 : Imports of Major Cereals (metric tons, grain equivalent)
Source: Bryson (1981), p 19.
sion gullies are evident, particularly in the lowlands. The worst
erosion, however, is sheet and rill erosion from both cropland and
grassland. This is caused by lack of sufficient cover on the grass¬
land coupled with poor farming practices which greatly reduce the
plant cover, as well as the amount of residue returned to the soil.
There is no doubt that uncontrolled grazing is the major cause of
erosion on both grassland and cropland. Some 1,800,000 hectares are
used to support more than one million large livestock 'grazing
units', exceeding recommended carrying capacity for well-managed
rangeland for Lesotho by 160 per cent [ USAID (1980), p 4.]. The
extensive nationwide overstocking has not only caused vast sheet ero¬
sion from loss of vegetation cover, and gully erosion along overused
cattle trails, but it has caused a decline in the quality and produc¬
tivity of livestock. This has been manifested in lower quality wool
and mohair products (Lesotho's major exports), and low reproduction
rates for all types of livestock (15). The importance of these fac¬
tors becomes apparent when it is realised that more than half of all
farm households own some grazing stock, and that just under one half
of the total value of agricultural production is derived from the
(15) Annual Statistical Bulletin 1979, Table D.ll.
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livestock sub-sector.
The sudden increase in migrant remittances has brought about impor¬
tant changes in the livestock sub-sector. The most important of
these was a sudden reversal of Lesotho's historical role as a nett
exporter of livestock.
About 70 per cent of agricultural production is for on-farm consump¬
tion and the balance for the market (16). In 1977, live animals and
animal products made up about 40 per cent of Lesotho's exports
[TFYDP, p 15]. The number of cattle exported declined from 11,400 in
1970 to 570 in 1978, while cattle imports increased from 4700 to
57,800 over the same period. Similar trends may be observed with
other livestock, particularly sheep and goats (17). As a consequence
Lesotho's balance of payments position has worsened and it now has a
large and growing deficit in the balance of trade, which is offset
mainly by remittances from migrant workers (62%), Customs Union reve¬
nue (17%) and aid flows (13%).
One of the effects of Lesotho's position as an economic enclave is
ready access to South African markets. Lesotho's demand for goods
and services can be readily met by the highly developed economy of
South Africa. The result is a high propensity to import and strong
disincentives for domestic production. Table 3.11 presents data on
the aggregate value of trade since independence. Both imports and
exports have increased dramatically in value. Exports have grown
(16) The estimated annual gross market values (or equivalent
values for non-marketed products) in the base year 1970 (but in
1978 prices), was: animal products - M15 million; fresh meat -
M6.6 million; draft power and transport - M3.3 million; and live
exports - M2.1 million [Ministry of Agriculture (1978), p VII-3].
(17) Annual Statistical Bulletin 1979, Tables D.6, D.14.
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slightly faster in percentage terms, but due to their small absolute
value, have not offset absolute changes in the value of imports.
Consequently, since 1970 the trade deficit has grown at the rate of
35 per cent per annum, if measured at current prices, and at 21 per
cent per annum, if measured in constant 1970 prices.
Year Imports Exports Trade Balance
1966 22.9 4.4 -18.5
1967 23.8 4.2 -19.6
1968 23.9 3.4 -20.5
1969 23.9 4.1 . -19.8
1970 22.9 3.7 -19.2
1971 28.0 2.2 -25.8
1972 43.0 6.1 -36.9
1973 64.6 8.8 -55.8
1974 81.7 9.8 -71.9
1975 122.8 9.2 -113.6
1976 178.8 14.6 -164.2
1977 195.7 12.2 -183.5
1978 238.5 28.3 -210.2
TABLE 3.11 : Value of Imports and Exports (millions of Maluti).
Source: Customs and Excise Department.
Public debt has also increased, and total loans currently outstanding
with the government have risen to M71 million, many of these being
short term, relatively expensive, commercial loans (18).
To summarise - Lesotho's social and economic development options are
severely constrained by its geo-political and economic dependence on
South Africa. It remains extremely vulnerable with regard to its
main sources of national income - namely, migrant remittances and
(18) Lesotho Third Five Year Plan, p 71.
Lesotho's public debt has increased from $8.1 million in 1970 to
$51.8 million in 1979 [World Bank (1981b), p 160].
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customs union receipts. Indeed, all indications are that revenue
from these sources is diminishing, and if this process continues it
will necessitate major structural changes in Lesotho's domestic econ¬
omy. Attempts at creating significant domestic employment have been
largely ineffective: only modest increases have been achieved in the
construction and government sectors. Agricultural production contin¬
ues to stagnate, if not decline, and the balance of trade deficit and
public debt have substantially increased. With a rural population
growth rate of 2.3 per cent per annum, and deteriorating terms of
trade of 3 per cent per annum, rural poverty is steadily worsening
[TFYDP, p 123].
On the other hand, the apparent increases in yields in the mid-
seventies, which coincided with a fall in planted area and a concen¬
tration of agricultural inputs, might seem to indicate that agricul¬
tural productivity could be increased. With the reduction in labour
migration, Lesotho's rural population will be forced to try and gen¬
erate increased incomes from agriculture in order merely to survive.
The challenge for the development effort lies in providing appropri¬
ate means and knowledge to support farmers in this endeavour.
HISTORICAL ROOTS
The decline of agricultural production in Lesotho has been attributed
to many factors: population pressure, which has created an acute
shortage of land and which has resulted in the exploitation of margi¬
nal land unsuitable for agriculture; the land tenure system which has
inhibited farmers from investing in long term conservation measures;
deterioration of the land through mono-cropping, overgrazing and ero¬
sion; and the vicissitudes of climate such as drought, hail and
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frost, all of which are common in Lesotho.
However, to concentrate exclusively on these factors is to ignore the
clear historical roots of Lesotho's current economic problems.
Lesotho has not always been in as disadvantaged a situation as the
above analysis of its contemporary situation would indicate. Early
travellers described Basutoland as "the granary of the Free State and
the Cape Colony" and Casalis, a French missionary, wrote that "habits
of serious and diligent husbandry are to be sought for, not among the
Boers, but among the Basuto" [Casalis (1861)].
Writers on Lesotho's contemporary economy have not always given due
emphasis to the early history of the Basotho, and have attempted to
explain poverty in the rural periphery by recourse to commentary on
the failure of African culture to innovate or respond to changing
conditions in the sub-continent. For example, one prominent ethno¬
grapher has written:
"The Basotho are not agricultural ists by tradition and
rather grudge the amount of time they have to spend on
their lands" [Ashton (1967), p 120].
It has been argued that in Lesotho, "the facts of rural life are both
[the] cause and effect of non-development" [Wallman (1972)]. But the
crux of these arguments, that the "lack of development" in Lesotho is
the result of the economic pessimism which dominates the rural
Mosotho's world view, largely ignores the political and economic
forces which historically have conditioned the distribution of
resources. Economic historians have recently begun to argue that:
" the transition from granary to labour reserve makes it
clear that the appropriate question is not 'Why are the
Basotho sti11 poor?' but 'How have the Basotho become
poor?"' [Murray (1980), p 4].
A brief survey of the economic history of the Basotho will enable a
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better understanding of Lesotho's current political economy (19).
Early History
The history of the Basotho nation, as we know it today, dates back to
the early nineteenth century (20). Most accounts begin with the rise
of Moshoeshoe, commonly regarded as the "father of the nation". Ini¬
tially, Moshoeshoe was a minor chief established with a following of
around 2000, near to present day Butha Buthe in northern Lesotho - an
area which in the 1820s became embroiled in a period of wars and
immense turmoil known as the 1ifaqane. These wars originated with
the Zulus, who in their attempt to gain dominance in the region,
forced a number of minor groups to flee or migrate. These groups in
turn plundered and entered into war with the Sesotho speaking groups
on the southern highlands. Moshoeshoe was defeated in his first
encounter with these expanding clans, after which he led the retreat
of his people to a natural mountain fortress, Thaba Bosiu (21). This
(19) Sources of information in this section come mainly from Ash-
ton (1952); Casalis (1861); Arbousset and Daumas (1846); Germond
(1967); Ellenberger (1969); and Theal (1964). Unfortunately few
of these works deal specifically with the economic history of the
Basotho. It is relevant to note here that as the limitations of
political independence and the reality of neo-colonialism have be¬
come clear in recent years, there has been a growing emphasis
amongst historians on the need to return to the level of produc¬
tion and develop a history which can explain economic change.
Thus students have begun to examine the material formations of
pre-colonial African societies, the economic impact of missionary
penetration, of mercantile capitalism, colonialism and imperial¬
ism, and the processes whereby African social formations were in¬
tegrated into the expanding world capitalist economy. Kimble
(1978) represents one of the few studies on the Basotho in this
genre, and this section draws heavily on her research. Other work
on the economic history of Lesotho includes Leys (1973), Spray
(1975), Kowet (1978), and Murray (1980), which stand in marked
contrast to the earlier work of Williams (1970) and Wallman
(1972), which assumed a state of non-development in the country.
(20) The people of Lesotho are referred to as Basotho (one person,
a Mosotho) and speak Sesotho. Lesotho was referred to as Basuto-
land during the period of colonial rule, 1871-1966.
(21) translated - Mountain of the Night.
- 140 -
migration, in 1824, proved to be a strategic move of inestimable
value. Thaba Bosiu served as a superb fortress, and the surrounding
valleys and plateaux were ideal for crop and livestock production.
His followers began cultivating the surrounding area. Other groups
joined them, attracted by the security of the situation and the fair¬
ness and sound judgement, which increasingly became the hallmarks of
Moshoeshoe's leadership. They soon learned the value of guns and
horses from initial clashes with nomadic groups, such as the Korana,
and within a decade and a half Moshoeshoe could lay claim to a wide
extent of territory stretching from Butha Buthe in the north and
Thaba Nchu in the west, to the confluence of the Mohokare (Caledon)
and Senqu (Orange) rivers in the south (22). By this time his fol¬
lowing numbered close on 80,000.
The scale of these developments is impressive. Within three decades
Moshoeshoe's kingdom was being described by British colonial offi¬
cials, as "the key to all the South African politics so far as
natives are concerned" (23).
Productive Base
The Mohokare valley was ideally suited to the simultaneous expansion
of both cultivation and pastoral ism. An early traveller wrote:
"The country is well watered; the air keen, bracing, and
healthy, very cold in the winter, and moderately warm in
the summer season, well adapted for rearing cattle and
agriculture; a country capable of supporting a numerous
population and easy of defence" [Hall (1858), p 301].
r
In this early period, the Sesotho economy was based on six main
branches of production : pastoral ism, cultivation, hunting,
(22) See the maps in Appendix I.
(23) Theophilis Shepstone, quoted in Kimble (1978).
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gathering, handicrafts and metal-working, and military activity [Kim¬
ble (1978), p 20]. All these activities were essential for the
satisfaction of basic needs of the Basotho, such as food, clothing,
tools, and weapons. With the exception of metal working, there was
little specialisation of labour between the different branches of
production, and every household was drawn into every kind of produc¬
tive activity. Women's labour time was expended entirely in agricul¬
ture, gathering, handicrafts, and domestic tasks within individual
homesteads. There were limited co-operative and reciprocal methods
of labour organisation in some agricultural activities such as har¬
vesting and winnowing of grain. Men contributed directly towards the
reproduction of the homestead in that they were responsible for the
production of clothing and tools, for stock rearing, hunting, and
some agricultural tasks like ploughing. But much of their labour
time was expended in direct labour service for their chiefs, in the
agricul tural, hunting, and military branches of production.
An early social division of labour emerged whereby the chieftainship
was freed from directly productive labour. Moshoeshoe's clan, the
Bakoena, were able to establish lineage rights of seniority, effec¬
tively gaining control of the chieftainship and fairly extensive
powers over surplus appropriation. Through a system of "placement",
Moshoeshoe succeeded in appointing his sons and relatives to key
chieftainships. The political superstructure which evolved under
Koena hegemony was a hierarchy of delegated authority. The chief¬
tainship consisted of five main levels: morena e mohol o (the
sovereign, or king, later described by the colonial authorities as
the Paramount Chief), morena (a principal subordinate or ward chief),
morenana (sub-chief), ramotse (headman), and rametsana (village head-
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man, the lowest level of authority). Every homestead settled within
the territory was integrated into this hierarchy, and through his
ramotse owed al1egiance to his morena and morena e moholo.
The morena _e moholo held the land in trust for all the people, and
allocated areas over which the subordinate chiefs exercised control,
and to which they asserted territorial claims on behalf of the king¬
dom. Every subordinate chief parcelled out land to his sub-
chiefs,who in turn allocated land to the villagers through their
headmen. The village head was responsible for allocating grazing and
arable rights to each of his followers, but, particularly with regard
to the common pasturage, he remained in strict subordination to the
chief of the whole district. Each family head was entitled to a por¬
tion of arable land proportionate to his needs. In later times, it
became customary to limit the allocation per household to three par¬
cels of land, each measuring about one hectare. The direct producers
did not "own" the land, nor could they dispose of it as they wished,
or consider it to be their hereditary property.
The Koena lineage was able to maintain its dominance mainly by virtue
of its control of cattle. Through the mafisa system the chief's vast
herds of cattle were lent to homesteads which would herd, milk, and
breed them for him, but could not exchange or otherwise dispose of
their charges. The relationship was one which bound the client to
the chief for as long as he held the cattle, and he was expected to
perform "gratuitous service" for the owner when called upon [Kimble
(1978), p 70].
Another important and institutionalised form of 1abour-service due
from every homestead head to the chief took the form of the annual
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matseroa parties. Every adult able-bodied male was obliged to parti¬
cipate in such work parties on certain fields belonging to the
chiefs. Furthermore there were fields known as tsimo ea 1ira which
were worked by the men in their regiments at least three times a year
at the seasons of ploughing, weeding, and reaping.
Matsema obligations also extended into other areas of production.
Access to reeds and grasses, for thatching and weaving, was regulated
by the maboel1 a system and mediated by tribute labour. Maboel1 a was
a system whereby the chiefs controlled the use of communal winter
grazing areas near to villages, and also reeds and grasses, and wood
for fuel. All such scarce resources were highly valued so that no
one could cut down trees or thatch a house without the chief's con¬
sent. In the season when grasses and reeds are cut, each subject was
expected to take a bundle to the chief before collecting for himself.
The chiefs also assumed rights over the national and regional hunting
expeditions. Participation in military expeditions, led by the
chiefs, was an obligation for every adult male and most of the cap¬
tured flocks and herds became the property of the chief.
The appropriation of the fruits of 1abour-service in these forms was
the primary means whereby the chiefs extracted surplus from their
adult male followers. The wealth which a chief accumulated from such
sources was realised in three different but interconnected ways.
Firstly, he could make use of it in the interests of his own lineage.
He could use the increase in mafisa calves, or the fruits of a cattle
raid, to acquire more wives for himself and his sons. Cattle were
central to the Sesotho social structure. Not only were they a means
of subsistence (through milk, meat, skin products, transport, and
draft power), but they were the primary measure of wealth and bohali
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or bride price. The more wives and children a chief had, the more
fields and labour he had access to for the reproduction of his own
homestead and lineage, and the more male children that were produced,
the more members of his own lineage would eventually be "placed".
Secondly, the surplus could be redistributed, and, thirdly, it could
be exchanged on the commodity markets of the subcontinent.
Penetration of Mercantile Capital
The emergence of this ruling lineage was an important precondition
for the extensive relations of exchange which were to develop between
the Basotho, the white settlers and mercantile capital. Although
this lineage never established any kind of monopoly or exclusive con¬
trol over trade, it was primarily its demand for certain commodities
(cattle, guns and horses), central to the continued reproduction of
its position of supremacy within the social structure, which gave
rise to commodity production on a significant scale.
The trade of commodities began soon after the arrival of white
settlers and missionaries. In 1830, Moshoeshoe invited three members
of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS) to settle in his
territory. These settlers were among the first to leave written
accounts and records of events at that time. The first substantial
account of the Basotho was made by Eugene Casalis, who recorded that
the Basotho were prosperous, that milk and meat formed a large part
of their diet, that grazing for their animals was readily available,
that there was plenty of land for all, that crops were also important
and were cultivated chiefly by women, that when the soil became
exhausted it was referred to as having "grown old" and was left fal¬
low for a period of time, that the chief crop was mabele (sorghum),
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that the fields were worked with moguma (iron hoes), and that the
Basotho were predominantly self-sufficient, with only limited barter¬
ing with other clans [Casalis (1861)].
The first Boers (24) began to arrive in the plains to the west of
the Mohokare Valley in the 1830s and Moshoeshoe allowed them to graze
their cattle on his lands. It soon became apparent, though, that
there was a fundamental misunderstanding over the question of land
ownership. It was a Basotho custom to provide foreigners with hospi¬
tality and it was in this spirit that Moshoeshoe granted grazing con¬
cessions on land traditionally used by the Basotho. All land was
held in trust by the chief for his people and was distributed accord¬
ing to carefully established needs. For the Boers, individual title
to land was a clear and unambiguous concept formalised by boundary
lines. As more Boers arrived, conflict was inevitable. Moshoeshoe
made his position quite clear in a letter of protest to the British:
"The selling or renting of lands has hitherto been a prac¬
tice wholly unknown to us From the Boers1 first
appearance until now I have never ceased to warn them that
I viewed them as mere passersby, and although I did not
refuse them temporary hospitality, I could never allow them
any right of property. I have rented no place to them and
I have abstained from receiving any renumeration for the
use they have had in parts of the land Notwithstanding
my protestations against it, many of the the migrants have
transferred their supposed right to others without my
knowledge or consent" (25).
These conflicts were eventually to have a long-lasting and deleteri¬
ous effect on the Sesotho economy, for although one of the outstand¬
ing achievements of Moshoeshoe in ensuing years was the prevention of
the establishment of European farms within Lesotho, he could not
(24) The Boers were farmers of mainly Dutch extraction, who in the
1830s began to trek away from the Cape Colony into the interior of
southern Africa, in order to escape increasing British hegemony.
(25) Quoted in Theal (1964), vol 1, p 85.
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prevent ultimately the confiscation, by the Boers through military
conquest, of large tracts of land in the West of the territory, which
had been understood by the Basotho to be under their control.
As the Boers began to claim permanent title to the lands they grazed,
particularly in the triangle formed by the Mohokare and Senqu rivers,
Moshoeshoe heeded his missionary advisors and sought relief from the
British. The crowded events of the ensuing years, up to the annexa¬
tion of Basutoland in 1871, are outlined below.
In response to Moshoeshoe's request, the governor of the Cape Colony,
Sir George Napier, in 1843, created a buffer zone in the disputed
area. The treaty defined the boundaries of Lesotho for the first
time. But the Basotho were unfamiliar with strict boundary lines.
Moshoeshoe expressed the traditional view by stating, "My lands are
where my people live" [Lye and Murray (1980), p 63]. These different
concepts of territorial rights were to contribute to the ensuing con¬
flicts. The Napier treaty was renewed by the new governor, Sir Harry
Smith, but the conflict continued. Smith visited the area in dispute
and in 1848 declared both the Orange River Sovereignty and Basuto¬
land, sovereign areas under the Queen. The Boers retaliated and
occupied B1 oemfontein, the seat of the British Commissioner, but the
town was later retaken by the British. Moshoeshoe was now wary of
both the Boers and the British. Conflict between the Boers and the
Basotho continued. A new demarcation line was drawn up by the Brit¬
ish Resident Commissioner, Major Warden, which confiscated a large
area of Moshoeshoe's land. The new governor at the Cape blamed
Moshoeshoe for raids across the line and demanded compensation. When
Moshoeshoe refused, a British armed force was dispatched, but was
later forced to withdraw. In 1854, Britain handed the sovereignty of
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the Orange Free State to the Boers. In spite of initial peace
between the Orange Free State and Moshoeshoe, the Boers declared war
in 1858 and aimed to push the Basotho back from the disputed areas.
But Moshoeshoe was able to withstand the assault and the war was tem¬
porarily halted by a British mediator. Moshoeshoe, ageing and unsure
as to how much longer he could defend his territory, asked for Brit¬
ish protection in 1860. The British vacillated and in 1865 the Boers
launched their most powerful attack yet. The Basotho were badly
defeated and lost land well beyond the disputed areas. Many of the
people were close to starvation following the confiscation of cattle
and food supplies. The Boers closed down mission stations in the
occupied areas and many Basotho were forced to migrate well beyond
the Mohokare river. Finally, in 1868, the Basotho were proclaimed
subjects of the Queen by the governor at the Cape, Sir Philip Wode-
house. Much land was ceded to the Orange Free State and the boun¬
daries of Lesotho were greatly reduced from the area originally
understood to be under Moshoeshoe's control. In 1845, Moshoeshoe had
estimated that he controlled 440 villages south of the Mohokare river
and 260 to the north [Theal (1964), vol 1, p 85]. By 1860, he had
lost all those on the Orange Free State side of the river.
Moshoeshoe died in 1870 and a year later Basutoland was annexed to
the Cape without the leaders of the territory having been consulted.
Thus, in the period leading up to annexation, the British appeared to
have been willing to collude with the Boers when their own interests
were not directly threatened. As Casalis reports:
"You are civilised, said Moshesh to me one day You
do not steal cattle, it is true, but you steal entire coun¬
tries, and if you could, you would send our herds to pas¬
ture in the clouds" (26).
(26) Quoted in Kimble (1978), p 86.
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After annexation the Basotho were subject to new laws and taxes about
which they were seldom consulted. This was in spite of Moshoeshoe's
famous letter to Wodehouse in which he made clear that he did not
want any Basotho laws changed without the prior approval of the
Basotho Council, and that the Queen would only rule his people
through him. Later the Basotho were forbidden to carry guns, in
spite of their continued fear of the Boers who were still on their
land. This led to the 1880-3 gun war against the Cape Government,
which eventually ceded control of Basutoland to Britain in 1884. For
the next 80 years Basutoland was administered as a British Protector¬
ate.
The period up to the annexation saw the introduction of new tech¬
niques of production and increasing trade. Horses were introduced in
the 1820s [Sanders (1975), p 9]. The missionaries encouraged the use
of wagons, the introduction of wheat, vegetables, fruit trees, Angora
goats, sheep, and most important of all, the plough [Germond (1967),
p 320]. The rate of innovation appears to have accelerated substan¬
tially in the late 1860s and 1870s, after peace had been imposed. It
has been noted that:
"...the whole economy of the Basotho changed in the space
of a few years and in 1872 the Governor's Agent reported
that for the first time the hut tax had been paid entirely
in cash The primitive hoe cultivation was replaced
by ploughing and 3700 ploughs were sold during a period of
five years In 1871, there were 20 trading stations in
Basutoland and during the year 1873 the number
increased to 50 to supply the growing requirements of the
Basotho" (27).
The adoption of the plough permitted a radical change in the economy
of the Basotho as they began to trade in grain. Export earnings from
the sale of grain were used to buy European goods, such as clothes,
(27) Walton (1958), pl6, quoted by Turner (1978), p 62.
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ploughs, furniture, and guns.
The production of commodities which occurred in Lesotho prior to
annexation was ultimately due to the presence and expansion of mer¬
cantile capital in southern Africa (28). The precise manner in which
mercantile capital penetrated into the southern highveld at this time
was complex, and took different forms. The arrival of the white
farmers with a demand for grain in the early 1830s acted as an impor¬
tant catalyst in the production and exchange of agricultural commodi¬
ties by the Basotho. Exchange between these two groups at first took
the form of direct barter, but, increasingly, itinerant and fixed
traders with links in the Cape Colony began to act as intermediaries
for such exchanges.
Another aspect of the penetration by mercantile capital can be found
in the presence of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS)
missionaries in Lesotho. In their activities and ideological impact
they epitomised the ambivalent and contradictory effects of mercan¬
tile capital on Sesotho society. The missionaries worked to stimu¬
late production on the part of individuals, in an attempt to under¬
mine the relations of personal dependence existing between chiefs and
their followers and the various customs which maintained and per¬
petuated these relations. By propagating notions of private pro¬
perty, and the right of the direct producer to dispose of his own
products, and by encouraging a homestead to cut its links with the
key processes of reproduction ( matsema, mafisa, and bohali) they
were aiming at the dissolution of the existing framework of social
(28) The sole function and condition of existence of this form of
capital is to promote the exchange of commodities and to act as a
mediator in the realm of circulation between the different spheres
of production [ Marx (1959), p 325].
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relations. They argued that a man should dispose of his labour time
as he pleased, either by applying it to the production of agricul¬
tural goods for exchange, or by entering into 1abour-service or
wage-labour with white colonists. The net effect of such interven¬
tion was the emergence of independent commodity producers.
Mining Capital and the Growth of Labour Migration
Diamonds were discovered in 1867 in the Kimberley district of South
Africa and there was a new demand by the colonists and traders for
the grain and labour of the Basotho. The years 1868-1880 were ones
of prosperity for the Basotho and there were significant increases in
the production of agricultural commodities such as wheat, maize,
wool, and mohair. In 1873, 100,000 bags of grain - wheat, maize and
sorghum - and 2000 bags of wool were exported. In the same year,
goods of British or foreign manufacture worth about £150,000 were
imported into the country [Murray (1980), p 5]. But these years were
also ones of rapid and traumatic changes for the Basotho. Their for¬
mal independence had been brought to an end. Following the Aliwal
North Convention, large tracts of Basutoland's most fertile land had
been lost to the Orange River Sovereignty and the geographical boun¬
daries of the country had been sealed. Basutoland became integrated
more closely into the political economy of South Africa. In the
period up to the First World War, the country continued to export
grain to South Africa. During the 1880s and 1890s the entire low¬
lands came under the plough [Spray (1975), p 4]. In 1896, the coun¬
try was still referred to as "the granary of South Africa" by the
Catholic missionary Ferdinand Porte [Spray (1975), p 5]. By the
early 1900s, wool and mohair had become more important than grain in
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export earnings. But the overall impression of the accounts of this
time was that the 1870s had been a golden age and that the relative
prosperity of these times would not be repeated.
By the end of the 1870s, evidence of the relative impoverishment of
Basutoland was becoming clearly visible. The imposition of the hut
tax, the influx of traders, and the decline of other branches of pro¬
duction, were forcing Basotho into ever greater dependence on commo¬
dity production for exchange. A missionary noted in 1887:
"The population is rapidly increasing, the fields are
becoming exhausted, the pastures diminishing, stock farming
yields more disappointments than profits...."[Germond
(1967), p 469].
In 1881 Basotho smiths were still at work, but bought iron from white
merchants instead of extracting it from local ore; by 1908 iron-
working was under white control. Other craftsmen were overshadowed
by the white's economy as trade was mostly in white hands. A railway
line was built from the Cape to Kimberley and American wheat began to
be imported at the expense of Basotho grain, which had tariffs
imposed on it, first by the Orange Free State and later also by the
Transvaal.
The discovery of diamonds and the imposition of colonial rule marked
an important decade of transition for the Basotho. The fifteen years
between the discovery of diamonds and the discovery of gold witnessed
both an intensification of previous trends, and the emergence of new
developments. The forces promoting the production of commodities -
both internal and external - intensified. The striking difference was
that, with the establishment of capitalist production at the mines,
on the colonial rail-works and in some farming districts, there was a
greater demand for the sale of labour-power as a commodity.
- 152 -
The development of diamond, and subsequently gold, mining was, in
many ways, a major watershed in the economic history of the sub¬
continent. The African people were drawn more firmly into the capi¬
talist economy of South Africa. A transition from one form of parti¬
cipation in commodity markets, the production of agricultural commo¬
dities, to another, labour migration, was made necessary by the
changing nature and requirements of capital. It was estimated that
by 1875, out of a total population of 127,000 , nearly 15,000 men
were obtaining passes to work outside of the territory, and, by 1884,
this number had doubled [Ashton (1952), p 162].
Enforced labour migrancy did not happen prior to the establishment of
the gold mining industry in South Africa. There is, however, evi¬
dence of some labour migration before the opening of the mines, which
might be categorised as voluntary migration. Casalis, in 1861,
writes of Basotho going to the Cape Colony for work. The Basotho
also began to work for white farmers as the latter established them¬
selves and began to raise crops as well as livestock. It has been
noted that farming in the Orange Free State would probably not have
developed in the way it has if Basotho labour had not been available
[Wilson (1972), p 14]. However, prior to gold mining, there was no
dominant mode of production in the sub-continent. There was no
influx of imperial capital, on any scale, and no substantial develop¬
ment of capitalist agriculture. Wider political divisions between
and within settler groups inhibited the creation of an economic
infrastructure to serve the emergent capitalist mode of production.
Above all, at this stage, Basotho producers could still satisfy their
immediate cash needs through agricultural production for exchange.
Competition among employers of labour thus led to wage increases, the
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free sales of arms, and a perennial state of "labour shortages".
Labour migration at this time was a function of the prevailing social
division of labour within the Sesotho social structure - hence the
previous emphasis on the role of the chieftainship and Koena lineage
in organising such movements. Traditionally the system of tribute
labour had worked reasonably well and, in exercising his power, the
chief was responsible to the people he ruled. Major decisions were
usually made only after a chief's followers had been consulted in a
pitso, a public gathering where all men had the right to voice an
opinion. Thus a chief was a "chief by the people" and if he proved
unworthy of his office, his critics could abandon his rule for
another [Jingoes (1975)]. But as land shortages became an acute
problem and as the chief's position was made more secure by the colo¬
nial administration, he had less to fear from dissatisfied followers.
A hut tax was introduced, with the chiefs holding the power of tax
collection. The percentage they received for performing this duty,
together with the fines imposed by the chief, in his judicial capa¬
city, were important additions to their often not inconsiderable
incomes. For example, Molapo, second son of Moshoeshoe and senior
chief in the Leribe District, received approximately £800 a year out
of the hut-tax collected from his people [Murray (1980), p 6].
Chiefs demanded that only those who had paid their taxes should be
given land. The system of tribute labour was also extended beyond the
traditionally accepted bounds. The significance of the chiefs'
unchecked control over land was greatly enhanced by the loss of
arable land to the Boers, such that institutions which were origi¬
nally acceptable to the people, became increasingly oppressive.
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These factors contributed to the early growth of labour migration.
The chiefs found that the migrant labour system could be an important
means of increasing their own incomes. They received a percentage of
recruitment fees and also benefited from the direct taxation of
recruits in the form of traditional tributes. Often those who could
not afford taxes or fines were forced into recruitment [Kowet (1978),
p 98]. But at this early stage, migration was hardly a significant
feature of the Basotho economy and it is likely that the labourers
left for short periods only.
It was the emergence of the gold mining industry which "created the
conditions for the dominance of the capitalist mode" [Legassick
(1974)]. By 1899, a mere 13 years after the discovery of gold, the
gold mines employed some 100,000 African workers [Wilson (1972), p
3]. Various measures such as land appropriation, selective develop¬
ment of the infrastructure, and subsidisation of capitalist farming,
ensured that African agricultural commodity producers were no longer
able to satisfy their growing cash needs (including taxation) through
the exchange of their agricultural produce, and were thus compelled
to sell their labour-power on the capitalist market [Bundy (1972)].
Minimisation of costs incurred in gold mining was achieved by ena¬
bling capital to obtain labour-power at a price less than the cost of
its reproduction, a cost which was instead borne by the restructured
and conserved non-capitalist mode of production in the rural areas.
Labour migrancy can thus be seen to be a direct function of the
interaction between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production
in southern Africa.
The number of labourers leaving Basutoland continued to increase, as
is indicated in Table 3.12 (29).
(29) The actual number of Basotho involved in labour migration was
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TABLE 3.12 : Basotho Migrant Labourers Working in South Africa.
Source: van der Wiel (1977), p 14.
Labour migration should be seen against the general background of
events in southern Africa at the turn of the century which:
"....contributed to the diminution of the surplus-
generating capacity of the peasant, and to a lessened con¬
trol of the peasant over his surplus; and at the same time
that the possibilities for accumulation were thus res¬
tricted, the capitalist penetration raised the demand for a
cash income. The peasant's increasing involvement in
migrant labour depleted the intensity of economic activity
in the peasant areas, thereby reproducing the necessity for
more migrant labour" [Bundy (1972), p 388].
Africans from all over the region had responded to the opportunities
of farming for new markets in much the same way as the Basotho had
done. Members of the Cape Assembly, in a debate in 1880, thought the
Basotho1s rise to prosperity remarkable, but matched by that of the
Fingoes and Tembu of the Eastern Cape [Spray (1975), p 19]. There
were complaints from the mines, as well as from the white farmers,
much higher than is indicated in this table, as a sizable propor¬
tion of the migrant workers were on leave at home at the time of
the population censuses. The drop in the number of migrant work¬
ers in 1966 is chiefly due to the fact that, in 1963, South Africa
had instituted border control posts and the movement of migrant
labourers was controlled more strictly. A significant number of
Basotho who migrated before 1963 settled permanently in South
Africa. These people had been included in the population censuses
prior to 1966. The 1966 census also adopted a more stringent de¬
finition of those who should be considered migrant labourers.
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about the shortage of labour. The alternative was to destroy African
farming and thus, in 1913, the Land Act was passed, limiting the land
available to Africans to a mere 13 per cent of the area of South
Africa. One of the effects of the Land Act was to increase the
migration into Basutoland by black farmers, thus further exacerbating
pressure on the land. An early African writer noted that:
"....the influx of outsiders into Basutoland could not con¬
tinue at the rate it was then proceeding without seriously
complicating the land question in Basutoland, where the
chieftains are constantly quarrelling over small patches of
arable land" [Plaatje (191b), p 105].
Labour migration soon became more important than the export of agri¬
cultural commodities, and by 1903 Basutoland had to import food for
the first time [van der Wiel (1977), p 63]. The colonial administra¬
tion was prepared to encourage this process. In 1899 the Resident
Commissioner wrote:
"Though for its size and population Basutoland produces a
comparatively enormous amount of grain, it has an industry
of great economic value to South Africa, viz. the output of
native labour. It supplies the sinews of agriculture in
the Orange Free State, to a large extent it keeps going
railway works, coal mining, the diamond mines at Jagersfon-
tein and Kimberley, the gold mines of the Transvaal and
furnishes, in addition, a large amount of domestic services
in the surrounding territories. These facts are the best
rejoinder to those who argue that Basutoland is a useless
native reserve. To others who urge higher education of the
natives, it may be pointed out that to educate them above
labour would be a great mistake. Primarily the native
labour industry supplies a dominant want, and secondarily
it tends to fertilise native territories with the cash
which is at once diffused for English goods" (30).
A series of environmental setbacks served to hasten this process.
There were some catastrophic droughts, and in the 1890s a rindepest
epidemic decimated the cattle population [Germond (1967), p 476],
This rendered ploughing very difficult and severely hampered the
(30) Colonial Annual Reports (1898/1899), quoted in Lesotho Third
Five Year PI an, p ii.
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transport of grain. Despite these difficulties, Basutoland retained
its role as a substantial exporter of grain until the 1920s. From
that period onwards the territory began to import large amounts of
food, especially maize.
In summary then, the production and exchange of agricultural commodi¬
ties and the sale of labour-power by the Basotho represents essen¬
tially two different forms of one fundamental process: the develop¬
ment of the production of commodities. At the core of the process of
colonial conquest lay the transformation of Basotho production, the
orientation of production more and more to exchange values by making
the satisfaction of needs and subsistence more dependent on the sale,
rather than on the immediate use of the product. The enforced tran¬
sition from one form of participation in the commodity markets to
another was, for the African populations in the sub-continent, ulti¬
mately determined by the changing nature and requirements of capital.
In the long run, the whole process "created the conditions for the
structural dependence of the non-capitalist social formations on the
capitalist social formation of South Africa - the form of under¬
development specific to the era of gold mining in the sub-continent"
(31).
This analysis effectively refutes some of the tribal-cultural reasons
which have been advanced for the high prevalence of labour migration
from Lesotho. One of these is that labour migration acts as a kind
of rite de passage or initiation into adult life [Schapera (1937),
p 117]. None of the respondents in extensive surveys conducted in
the Phuthiatsana and Thaba Tseka project areas claimed to have left
(31) This is the main thesis of Kimble (1978).
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for this reason (32). Nor do any motives associated with modernising
influences appear to have any significant effect on labour migration.
Once again surveys indicated that mining ranked as the least desir¬
able profession. On the other hand there is no doubt that there are
certain prestige factors associated with migrant labour such as
access to ready cash and desirable consumer goods. It is also
interesting to note that population density and accessibility do not
have any significant impact on the magnitude of the migratory labour
flow. Population density is substantially lower in the mountain area
than in the lowlands, and lowland people have easier access to the
employment centres of South Africa and to the recruiting stations,
almost all of which are located in this area. Yet the proportion of
migrants from the mountain area is only marginally less than that for
the lowlands [van der Wiel (1977), p 19]. These facts tend to sup¬
port the above thesis that the Basotho are forced to enter into
labour migration as a consequence of an historical process which has
weakened their indigenous economy and which has ensured that Lesotho
remains primarily a labour reserve, serving the interests of the
white controlled, capitalist (and predominantly mining) economy of
South Africa.
We have seen that the growth of production of agricultural commodi¬
ties, its subsequent decline, and the growth of labour migration,
were not only determined by these external factors, but were also
influenced by the internal Basotho social structure. The social
division of labour and the forms of surplus extraction and exploita¬
tion were reinforced by political developments during, and subsequent
(32) Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Project (1977a); Phuthiatsa-




In the ensuing years of colonial administration, positions of power
and control were secured by a social class which failed to challenge
or alter the steady increase in labour migration and Lesotho's grow¬
ing dependence on the economy of South Africa.
Modern political development can be said to have begun with the
founding of a National Pitso , or popular assembly, in 1874. This
adaptation of the traditional clan meeting provided a forum for the
men to participate in decision making. However, the large numbers
involved and the distances to the capital caused the Pitso to be more
an opportunity for the Paramount Chief to announce decisions than for
him to receive advice on proposals. In 1903, a National Council was
established as an advisory body to the Paramount Chief, and, in 1910,
it was superseded by the Basutoland Council. It comprised 100
members, 94 of whom were appointed by the Paramount Chief, and hence
was dominated by the "sons of Moshoeshoe", members of the ruling
lineage which had been "placed" in the various positions of the
chieftainship.
The stated aims of the colonial administration were to maintain law
and order and to see that British interests were favoured at the
lowest possible cost. An interest was maintained in the chiefs
largely because of their political control over the people. In 1938,
after a visit by Sir Alan Pirn, the British decided to reduce the
number of gazetted chiefs. Within eight years the number was reduced
from 1330 to 122. This was accomplished with little protest other
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than from the chiefs themselves. Later they were reduced even
further, to 63, giving the British even firmer control. The terri¬
tory was administered by a Resident Commissioner in Maseru aided,
after 1946, by 9 District Commissioners. More elected members were
incorporated in the Basutoland Council and District Councils were
also established.
The first political opposition to the chiefs emerged among the civil
servant and trading classes. They organised, in 1903, the Progres¬
sive Association to oppose the power of appointed chiefs and to seek
election of representatives to the Basutoland Council. In 1950, they
gained the right to nominate one member to the council. A more radi¬
cal organisation, Lekhotla la Bafo, came into being in the 1920s and
established links with the South African Communist Party. Although
suppressed for sedition during the war, it too was later granted
representation on the National Council.
Demands for greater say in government increased. Village Committees
were set up as constituencies for elections to the District Councils.
They began to function as checks on the chief's authority to distri¬
bute land, and also began to encourage the establishment of farming
co-operatives. The District Councils began to gain widespread public
support. They administered the migrants' deferred pay and on occa¬
sion provided credit and loans for agricultural development.
As Basutoland appeared to be moving towards self-government, the
first modern political parties came into being. The Basutoland Afri¬
can Congress (later called the Basutoland Congress Party), led by
Ntsu Mokhehle, began to oppose British rule in 1952. The British
proposed modest reforms in 1954, but the Congress demanded constitu-
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tional talks. The British responded by suspending the leaders of the
Congress, but this only caused the movement to become more strident
and popular.
Mokhehle's Congress party was attacked by the Roman Catholic Church
for its "communist connections". The Church was influential
throughout the country and, together with the white traders, was
instrumental in the formation of the Basutoland National Party (BNP),
in 1959, under Chief Lebua Jonathan. Much of Jonathan's support came
from the minor chiefs who had been de-gazetted by the British. The
BNP took a firm anti-communist line and advocated close links with
South Africa.
A succession dispute between the Regent and the Paramount Chief
designate was instrumental in the emergence of the Marema Tlou Party
(MTP), whose leader, Chief Samuel Matete, formerly a member of the
Congress Party, supported the Paramount Chief and drew much of his
support from the leading chiefs.
The Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) commanded support in the village
committees, District Councils and among the migrant workers. In the
1960 elections to the National Council, it won the great majority of
the seats, with the BNP gaining only one. The BCP however was dogged
by internal dissent. Mokhehle himself fell out with ANC refugees
from South Africa and suspected their spokesman, Joe Matthews, and
others of aiding the formation of the Lesotho Communist Party. The
BCP deputy leader, Khaketla, who had provided the party with a mouth¬
piece in his newspaper Mohlabani, left to form the Basutoland Freedom
Party in 1961. After failing to join the BNP, it merged with the MTP
to form the Marema Tlou Freedom Party (MFP). Mokhehle's BCP suffered
- 162 -
further setbacks when in 1964 ten of his pariiamentary supporters in
the National Council left the party. By the time the London Consti¬
tutional Conference had been called to negotiate independence, he
could count on only 17 of the original 29 party members who had been
elected to the Council in 1960.
Under the new Independence Constitution, the Paramount Chief was to
become head of state under the title of "King of Lesotho". He was
empowered to make 11 appointments to the Senate, which was to include
the 22 Principal Chiefs as ex officio members. The National Assembly
was to consist of 60 members elected by universal adult suffrage.
The Executive would consist of a Cabinet with a Prime Minister and
not less than 7 ministers, all responsible to the lower house.
Prior to the 1965 elections the BCP took an increasingly anti-
chieftainship stance. It gained support from the trade unions, but
the BNP had the backing of the powerful Catholic Church as well as
the media, including the South African propaganda service for Afri¬
cans, "Radio Bantu". The BNP, with 41 per cent of the vote, ulti¬
mately won 31 seats, while the BCP gained only 25. The MFP, which
focussed much of its election campaign on the future role of the
Paramount Chief within the new constitution, won the remaining 4
seats. Lebua Jonathan himself lost his seat but was subsequently
returned to parliament after a safe by-election.
The Republic of South Africa had openly backed the BNP with the pro¬
vision of vehicles and election expenses. The BNP leader was allowed
to address gatherings of migrant workers in the Republic, whilst most
of the opponents of the party were banned from doing so. Immediately
prior to Jonathan's re-election, 100,000 bags of maize were sent to
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him as a "gift", most of which were distributed in his constituency
[Khaketla (1971), p 32]. Mokhehle's BCP and the MFP strongly opposed
Britain's decision to grant independence to the new government on the
grounds that power was being handed over to a minority regime "under
the guidance of Dr Verwoerd" (the Prime Minister of South Africa at
the time) [Spence (1968), p49]. Independence, however, was granted
finally in 1966.
Jonathan continued to maintain close ties with Pretoria. An influen¬
tial team of South African advisors and administrative personnel was
appointed, including the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, the
Director of Public Prosecutions, the Chief Electoral Officer, an
economic advisor, a district magistrate, the Director of Radio
Lesotho, a constitutional advisor, and some sixty other advisors. Dr
Anton Rupert, one of the most influential Afrikaner industrialists in
South Africa, served as an industrial advisor. Perhaps the most prom¬
inent among the advisors was Senator Horwood, now Minister of Finance
in South Africa [Khakhetla (1971), p 120; Weisfelder (1972), p 133].
Jonathan began to centralise and consolidate power. The second and
third tiers of government were dissolved, thus destroying many years
of hard work and mobilisation of the people. Three months after
independence, after a constitutional dispute involving the king, the
latter was confined to his palace and later had to sign a pledge to
adhere to his role as constitutional monarch. Mokhehle was also
briefly detained.
The BNP government began to control employment practices. In the new
projects created by the LNDC, the BNP insisted that only card-
carrying party members were to be employed. The mine labour recruit-
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ing organisations followed suit [Khaketla (1971), p 184].
However, the aid and investment from South Africa, which had been
hoped for by the BNP, failed to materialise. Between 1967 and 1970,
aid from South Africa amounted to only 50,000 bags of maize and
sorghum, 1000 bags of fertiliser, the provision of police experts,
and an agriculture demonstration [Leistner (1970), pp 11-18].
Two important bills were passed by the BNP government. The Pioneer
Industry Act was intended to attract foreign investment and was a
consequence of pressure by South Africa against the land tenure sys¬
tem in Lesotho. The Pioneer Industry Board was given power to to
grant leases of land for a period of 99 years. This power was later
transferred to the LNDC. However, in spite of these measures and the
generous incentive schemes offered by LNDC, the actual level of
foreign investment was disappointing.
The second bill, the Chieftainship Act, was a political measure to
control the powers of the chiefs. The Minister of Chieftainship
Affairs was empowered to withhold salaries of chiefs if, in his opin¬
ion, they were not properly carrying out their duties. Under the
act, a chief could be banished from his area, his movements within
the country were required to be sanctioned beforehand by the minis¬
ter, and his associates were only to be those who were deemed "desir¬
able" by the Minister.
As the 1970 elections approached, the opposition parties concentrated
on the lack of economic development in the country since independence
and criticised the BNP1 s links with South Africa. Despite the
efforts of the South African Electoral Officer to halt the opposition
in some constituencies by changes in the delimitation of constituent
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areas, there was a 60 per cent swing of support against the BNP in a
high electoral turnout [Kowet (1978), p 209; Macartney (1974), p
492]. The results were never made public. Jonathan suspended the
constitution and declared a state of emergency. Opposition members
were arrested, newspapers banned, a curfew imposed, and the king
forced into exile. South African military personnel took responsi¬
bility for supervising the state of emergency and South African
troops were stationed on the borders.
Britain suspended aid for a short period, but later resumed grants,
as did the USA, after claims that Lesotho was facing a catastrophic
drought. Most of the detainees were released by mid-1972 and the
king returned from exile. In 1973, Parliament resumed with nominated
members, including some who had lost their seats in the 1970 elec¬
tions. An attempt was made to form a government of national unity,
but without success. In 1974, following an attempted insurrection
which was put down with violence (about a hundred people were
killed), the much-weakened BCP, which had been deprived of its vic¬
tory in 1970, took the road to exile. Some of the BCP leaders later
returned to the country to benefit from an amnesty and government
posts offered by the prime minister, who had become sensitive to his
image abroad. The BCP split into several factions, but its original
leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, has continued to fight for free and honest
elections supervised by the United Nations.
Subsequent years saw an apparent shift in relations with South
Africa. Government members became increasingly outspoken in their
criticism of the apartheid regime. There has been the refusal to
allow a South African consulate to be opened in Maseru, a refusal to
recognise the "independence" of the Bantustans, and a territorial
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claim for the return of the "historic part of the kingdom" from the
Orange Free State. One effect of this shift has been a marked
increase in the flow of international aid to Lesotho. As Lesotho's
international perspective widened, and its contacts with other Afri¬
can countries grew, it became apparent that recognition of the BNP
government by the Organisation of African Unity would follow as long
as Lesotho distanced itself from South Africa. In 1975, the OAU
Secretary General visited Lesotho for the first time; he was followed
two years later by the Assistant Secretary General of the United
Nations. There was a call for aid to reduce Lesotho's dependence on
the Republic of South Africa and the UNDP singled out Lesotho as one
of six countries requiring special attention from the international aid
community.
Lesotho discovered that she had underestimated her room for
manoeuvre. She gained a limited leverage with South Africa as the
latter still regarded Lesotho as important in aiding its own attempt
to break out of isolation and establish contacts with other African
states. Lesotho also learned that relationships with multi-national
corporations within South Africa are perhaps of more significance.
They employ most of Lesotho's migrants in the gold mines and contacts
with the Anglo-American group, for instance, have grown with De Beers
(one of its associated companies) investing in Lesotho. This trend
has been reinforced as the regional balance of power has tilted
markedly against the white regime with the independence of Angola,
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.
»
It can be argued that the substance of Lesotho's changed relationship
with South Africa has been confined to the verbal rather than the
concrete. Lesotho government leaders warn of chaos and violence in
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the sub-continent and voice support for South African liberation
movements. South African personnel in Lesotho have largely been
replaced by U.N. advisors and donor agency expatriates. But Lesotho
appreciates that interstate relations can be carried out at many
varied, and often contradictory, levels. A Basotho labour represen¬
tative is still maintained in South Africa and Lesotho is still a
member of the South African Customs Union. On a private level, the
government encourages interest in Lesotho among South Africans,
including potential investors, tourists, and suppliers.
Perhaps the most striking example of how relations between Lesotho
and South Africa, however publicly hostile, conceal a private accep¬
tance of the relations of economic dependence, is the recent revival
of the Oxbow-Maiibamatso hydro-electric scheme. The Highlands Water
Scheme (as it has been renamed) could become one of the largest and
most ambitious regional development projects in Africa. It is
planned to divert water for sale to South Africa from the upper Maii-
bamatso and Senqu rivers, which rise in Lesotho, and at the same time
to generate hydro-electric power to meet the latter's own energy
needs. Water is the one remaining natural resource of real revenue
earning potential in Lesotho. There has been an agreement to share
equally the £6 million cost of a two year feasibility study of the
project, starting in June 1982. The EEC has indicated a willingness
to pay for Lesotho's share under the terms of the Lome Convention.
In addition, technical assistance worth some £650,000 will be pro¬
vided by the United Nations, through the World Bank, in the form of a
team of engineers and financial analysts, to help Lesotho to carry
out the study. As now envisaged, the scheme will entail the building
of five storage dams, a 100 km diversion tunnel through the moun-
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tains, three power stations, and a pumping station in northern
Lesotho. Construction will be completed in four stages, ending in
1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 respectively. About 35 cubic metres of
water a second will be diverted northwards, from the south-flowing
Malibamatso and Orange rivers, to the Pretoria - Witwatersrand -
Vereeninging area of South Africa, mainly for industrial use. South
Africa will pay a royalty for each cubic metre exported on a cost-
plus basis. In spite of the impressiveness of the scale and earning
potential of this scheme, there has hitherto been no discussion or
appreciation of the likely crippling effect the huge capital and loan
burden is likely to have on Lesotho's miniscule economy. Experience
of other large water/hydro-electric schemes has not been encouraging
(33).
At the same time South Africa has continued to destabilise Lesotho by
providing facilities for the armed faction of the BCP, the Lesotho
Liberation Army (LLA), to wage an urban and rural guerrilla campaign,
which has hitherto taken relatively few lives, but has proved
increasingly irksome to the BNP government. Recent incidents have
included the shelling of the main base of Lesotho's paramilitary
force, the PMU, from across the border, and the assassination of a
government minister.
All these events have contributed to Lesotho's enormous dependence on
South Africa. This situation is maintained not only by the interests
of mining capital, which have ensured that Lesotho remains predom¬
inantly a labour reserve, but also by a minority government within
Lesotho which has left the country deeply divided, and which has been
(33) See for instance David Hart's study on the Volta River Pro¬
ject in Ghana [Hart (1977)].
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more concerned with holding on to power than mobilising its people
for development.
Of the four national aims stated in the first and second five year
plans - economic growth, social justice, maximum domestic employment,
and economic independence - Lesotho has had only modest success in
terms of economic growth, and that has been due largely to factors
beyond its control - namely the increase in migrant remittances.
Lesotho has been conspicuously unsuccessful in the other three objec¬
tives. Just as the 1870s marked a watershed in Lesotho's develop¬
ment, so do the 1970s. In the former period, Lesotho experienced
relative affluence and prosperity as it responded to the demand for
its commodities. However, the advent of mining led to the steady
growth of labour migration, and the decline of agricultural produc¬
tion. Now, one hundred years later, it is changes in the mining sec¬
tor in South Africa which again necessitate radical changes in
Lesotho's domestic economy. For although Lesotho has experienced, in
the past decade, a rapid growth of incomes, the country's economic
prospects are bleak. In the next decade, growth in the potential
labour force will be reflected in unemployment, rather than in migra¬
tion, and will create an unprecedented problem of poverty. It
remains to be seen whether the possible opportunities which foreign
aid offers can be purposefully used to counter or at least ameliorate
these trends. It is within this context that the third major factor
structuring Lesotho's economy, international aid, is examined.
FOREIGN AID
Foreign aid has become immensely important as a vehicle for techno¬
logical change and development in Lesotho. Aid, though, is something
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of a double edged sword. If used purposefully it could provide an
opportunity of ameliorating the effects of reduced migrant labour.
If not, it could merely add substantial recurrent costs to the
budget, result in inappropriate project and technology choices being
made, and, in the end, simply mean increased markets for South Afri¬
can contractors and manufacturers of consumer goods.
One of the first acts of the BNP government, in 1965, was to approve
an IDA loan of $4.1 million for the Lebua Jonathan highway [Wies-
felder (1972), p 131]. The BNP's attempt to use large scale presti¬
gious development projects to woo voters is illustrated in a pre¬
election speech made in 1969 by Jonathan.
"If you think that the roads we have constructed are a good
thing, return us to power. If you think the electricity we
have brought to Lesotho is a good thing, return us to
power. If you think the industries we have brought to
Lesotho are a good thing, return us to power If you
reject the BNP, then you reject the developments we have
achieved" [Khakhetla (1971), p 189].
This speech reveals three key features of development and foreign
assistance in the initial years following independence.
[1] Development projects were of direct benefit to only a small pro¬
portion of Lesotho's population. For example, the road, North-
East of the capital and by-passing Jonathan's village, was the
only bitumenised road in the country. Electricity supplies were
available only in some of the urban centres in the western belt
of the country, close to the border with South Africa (4 per
cent of the population reside in urban areas). Furthermore,
only a handful of local industries were established, and these
produced mostly relatively expensive consumer goods, many of
them for export. Overall, these development projects probably
benefited less than 5 per cent of the population.
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[2] Jonathan's speech itself suggests that development projects were
designed by the BNP government to stay in power rather than in
accordance with any development goals.
[3] All three major projects cited by Jonathan illustrate the impor¬
tance of South African involvement at that time. South African
contractors were involved in the construction of the highway,
electricity was supplied from South Africa's ESCOM grid, and the
majority of industries established were dependent on South Afri¬
can capital.
In the years following the coup in 1970, Lesotho paradoxically began
to seek and receive aid from abroad. As has already been argued,
this shift, from co-operation with South Africa to a greater reliance
on international aid, followed the recognition that actual economic
aid had been minimal and that Lesotho had much to gain if it at least
appeared to distance itself from South Africa. In a speech to a
meeting of donor agencies, Lebua Jonathan demonstrated the extent to
which Lesotho began to take advantage of its position of dependence
on South Africa.
"It is not my intention here to go at length into what is
now happening in South Africa; I merely wanted to emphasise
in passing that the more the racist regime in South Africa
is pushed into the corner by national and international
forces of change, the more vengeful they are going to
become towards not only their unfortunate Black victims in
South Africa, but also towards all symbols of the free
world's principles of a just society, and my country is the
nearest target. This is the emergency situation under
which we are living, and because of which we will con¬
stantly be knocking at the doors of all countries of good
will" (34).
Thus despite, and perhaps because of, Lesotho's overwhelming economic
(34) Concluding remarks by Prime Minister Lebua Jonathan at the
Lesotho Donor Conference, Maseru, 1975.
- 172 -
dependence on South Africa, she has become the recipient of rela¬
tively large amounts of international aid, to such an extent that aid
has become, in recent years, a crucial and substantial element in
Lesotho's national development plans and programmes.
Historically, Britain has provided most of Lesotho's foreign capital.
In the colonial years, Britain had striven to reduce its contribution
to Lesotho's recurrent budget and, in the years following indepen¬
dence, Britain's grants-in-aid declined from M5.2 million in 1966 to
MO.9 million in 1971. This decline reflected, in part, the reduction
of Lesotho's recurrent budgetary deficits from M6.1 million to Ml.3
million over the same period (35). However, Lesotho's capital expen¬
diture increased marginally, as did British capital grants which
increased from M2.4 million in 1966 to M3.2 million in 1971 [World
Bank (1975a^p 26]. As recently as 1972, Britain still contributed
as much as 80 per cent of Lesotho's capital budget. The extent to
which Lesotho's dependence on foreign aid has both increased and
diversified is illustrated by the fact that, by 1975, British capital
aid formed only 30 per cent of the total, the deficit being made up
by other donors.
Lesotho's own contribution to the development budget has been com¬
paratively small. In 1973, only Ml million was forthcoming from
local sources, although subsequently the percentage of local capital
has increased substantially, largely as a result of Lesotho's
increased share from the customs union revenue pool. During the
Second Plan period, foreign aid contributed 59 per cent of funding
(35) Lesotho's recurrent budget is currently wholly financed from
domestic resources, whereas the capital budget remains heavily
dependent on external aid flows.
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towards development, whilst government revenues provided 31 per cent
and commercial loans 10 per cent [TFYDP, p 61]. But, the importance
of this development should not be over-estimated, particularly as
Lesotho's contribution to the development budget has largely been
accounted for by projects such as the new Hilton Hotel (Ml.3 million)
and the new Royal Palace (MO.3 million) for which donors were more
reluctant to provide funds.
The steady increase in development assistance to Lesotho is shown in
Table 3.13.
19/0 19/1 19/2 19/3 1974 19/5 19/6 19// 19/8 19/9
iU 1/ 14 14 21 3U 3U 39 5U 64
TABLE 3.13 : Disbursements of Official Development Assistance to
Lesotho ($ million)
source: World Bank (1981b), Table 22.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that the
value of development assistance to Lesotho in 1977 included $18.5
million of technical assistance, $21.6 million of capital loans and
grants, and $8.5 million of food aid (36). Domestic resources util¬
ised for development purposes within this year amounted to $11.2
(36) United Nations Development Programme (1978a), p 3.
This data conflicts with that of the World Bank. Note however
that the World Bank's figures include only Official Development
Assistence (ODA), which consists of loans and grants made on con¬
cessional financial terms by official agencies of the members of
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD and members
of OPEC, with the objective of promoting economic development and
welfare. Reliable and accurate data on aid disbursements are al¬
most impossible to obtain. No less than 76 agencies are listed as
probable donors to Lesotho in the Second Development Plan. Each of
these agencies operates with different financial years, and allo¬
cates aid for periods of varying length. Furthermore, aid alloca¬
tions are seldom fully utilised, and so there are bound to be
discrepancies in precise estimates of aid absorbed by Lesotho.
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million, of which $6.1 million was made up of Lesotho Government cap¬
ital account expenditures and $5.1 million was obtained in the form
of loans from the local commercial banks. Thus altogether, Lesotho's
externally and internally financed national development programme,
excluding private investment, amounted to $59.8 million in 1977.
During the same year, the technical assistance programme provided (on
a long or short term basis) for 339 experts, 233 volunteers, and 514
fel1owships.
The trend towards a further increase in technical and capital assis¬
tance to Lesotho continued during 1978. The value of development
funding amounted to $23 million of technical assistance, $24 million
in capital loans and grants, and $11.5 million in food aid. By 1979,
technical assistance had increased to $49 million, part of which
represents commitments by bilateral donors for 1980 and later years.
Capital assistance in loans and grants, for 1979 and beyond, totalled
about $134 million and food aid amounted to about $15 million [UNDP
(1979a),(1980a)].
Over the two years 1978 and 1979, 59 per cent of the net official
development assistance to Lesotho comprised direct grants [World Bank
(1981b), p 165]. Other aid indicators are shown in Table 3.13.
Although the proportions of aid which Lesotho receives are generally
higher than the average for low income sub-Saharan African countries,
they are not unusual. For example Botswana, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau,
Mauritania, Senegal, and Swaziland all receive higher per capita aid
disbursements. And in terms of aid as a percentage of GNP, Botswana,
Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau,
Mali, Mauritania, Rwanda, Swaziland and Upper Volta all receive
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Net official development assistance (disbursements)
U.S. dollars Bilateral As X As X of
per capita as X of of gross domestic
total GNP investment
Average for low
income countries 18.4 60 6.6 47
Lesotho 48.8 68.8 14.4 91.2
TABLE 3.13 : Indicators of Aid to Sub-Saharan African Countries,
1979.
Source: World Bank (1981b), p 164.
note: net disbursements equal gross disbursements less payments to
donors for amortisation.
higher proportions. Again, in terms of aid as a percentage of gross
domestic investment, Burundi, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Somalia, and Upper
Volta surpass Lesotho [World Bank (1981b), p 164]. The position of
Lesotho as a recipient of aid is thus not atypical of many sub-
Saharan African countries.
Technical assistance is provided in the form of the supply of skilled
personnel, consultants, training courses and scholarships. Over the
second plan period, some 1200 expatriate personnel were seconded to
Lesotho, and the number of technical assistance projects amounted to
about 290 in 1979 alone. The majority were in the agricultural and
rural development sectors and in education , followed by the tran¬
sport, communication and industry sectors. The major donor was Bri¬
tain, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, the UNDP, and other U.N.
agencies. Increased levels of technical assistance and numbers of
expatriate personnel are expected over the Third Plan period [UNDP
(1980a)].
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Food aid is mostly provided by the Catholic Relief Services and the
World Food Programme, with smaller amounts by Save the Children Fund
and the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada. The food goes to pri¬
mary school feeding and clinic nutrition programmes, strategic
reserves, and poorly organised labour intensive public work schemes
such as the construction and maintenance of fish ponds, conservation
works, and rural access roads. Food aid imports have increased from
13.9 tonnes in 1975 to 37.8 tonnes in 1979 (37).
In the case of capital assistance, the major sources for commitments
for 1979 and beyond were the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Canada, the African Development Bank, the Arab Bank for
Economic Development in Africa, the United States, the Kuwait Fund
for Arab Economic Development, and the Netherlands (38). Capital
assistance projects may be divided into two main categories: firstly,
prestigious projects, like the new International Airport and the
Earth Satellite Communications System, as well as other transport and
communications projects, like the national roads project; and,
secondly, agricultural and rural development projects. United King¬
dom aid has mainly been directed towards the last two sectors.
In 1980/81, M186 million of aid had been promised by donor agencies
for ensuing years. This amount was more than double the total
government recurrent expenditure and nearly four times the public
capital expenditure for 1979/80. Although for Lesotho this aid
represents a huge reserve of investment resources, there are limits
to the country's capability of absorbing further external inputs.
(37) World Bank (1981b), p 166. Units are metric tons, grain
equivalent.
(38) For a detailed list of aid projects, see Appendix II.
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The rapidly accelerating development programme is placing an increas¬
ing strain on domestic financial resources as recurrent expenditures
such as wages and maintenance costs on capital projects have to be
absorbed. Total government expenditure rose by almost two-and-a-half
times between 1975 and 1979 [TFYDP, p 23]. The increase in recurrent
expenditure has been offset in recent years by increased income from
customs union receipts, mainly due to increased migrant wages. How¬
ever, as this source of revenue declines, a potential and serious
public expenditure crisis is likely to arise.
Despite more than ten years of international aid, the structure of
Lesotho's economy remains largely unaltered. It has already been
noted that Lesotho's dependence on migrant labour remains as strong
as ever and that its economy is extremely vulnerable to changes in
this sector. Agricultural production has stagnated and probably
declined, dependence on imports has increased, and industrial
development has been extremely limited. The Lesotho government has
been able to capitalise on anti-South African sentiment, and, argu¬
ably, international aid has served merely to maintain the BNP party
in power.
The aid process does, however, serve to influence and structure the
design and nature of development programmes and technological change.
The interplay of interests between donors and the ruling elite in
Lesotho determines what kinds of development programmes are given
priority. On the one hand, the political elite in Lesotho have
demanded prestigious projects which have mostly involved foreign con¬
tractors employing primarily foreign skilled labour and capital
intensive techniques, such that much of the money invested in these
projects has left the country through foreign firms. Technologies
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chosen for projects in which donor agencies are involved are often
biased towards a relatively high level of imported capital components
through either the restriction of agency financing to foreign
exchange capital costs, or through procurement tying.
On the other hand, many of the current development projects have been
conceived by donors who then approached the respective ministries and
invited them to consider their interest in making a request for sup¬
port for a project. The effect of this is ambiguous. Firstly some
projects will reflect the trends towards imported capital intensive-
ness as described above. There is, however, a second effect which is
primarily ideological. All major donor agencies have, since the late
seventies, been influenced by the philosophy of "basic needs" and
also "appropriate technology". These concepts have to a greater or
lesser extent reoriented their aid policy towards the needs of the
rural poor. This shift has been reflected in Lesotho in the concen¬
tration of development projects in the agricultural and development
sectors, and in attempts to introduce more appropriate technologies
which take into account local conditions and needs.
The government of Lesotho has begun to capitalise on this trend.
Realising that many donor agency have included among their policy
pronouncements the meeting of basic needs and the utilisation of
appropriate technologies, the Third Five Year Plan gives some
emphasis to re-allocating resources to the rural poor:
"...a major portion of development expenditure will be
focussed on the rural sector alternative technologies
with differing implications for the number of jobs created
and the share of wages will be analysed. We start with the
social and economic status of large poverty groups and
design development programmes with their needs and problems
as the basis..." [TFYDP, pp 51,52].
This interplay of interests between aid agencies, the government of
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Lesotho, and the recipients of aid projects, will be examined in
succeeding chapters.
SUMMARY
This chapter has sought to place an analysis of those factors which
govern and constrain the nature and scope of technological change and
rural development firmly within the larger context of political econ¬
omy. This has been achieved by first surveying the current economic
and political conditions in Lesotho, and then by tracing the histori¬
cal developments which have given rise to this situation.
In the early history of the Basotho, productive activities were cen¬
tred on individual households and were directed towards the satisfac¬
tion of basic needs such as food, clothing, tools and weapons. The
development of agricultural technologies was governed by the tech¬
niques of shifting cultivation and an ecological knowledge, which was
based on a perspective of an extensive availability of land. There
was thus little need for an intensive agriculture and the technolo¬
gies which it required. In traditional Sesotho agriculture there was
little labour specialisation other than that between men and women.
However, an early social division of labour emerged when the chief¬
tainship were freed from directly productive labour. With the estab¬
lishment of Moshoeshoe's clan, the Bakoena, as a ruling lineage,
gained fairly extensive powers of surplus appropriation through such
systems as mafisa, matsema, and maboella, as well as military obliga¬
tions. The emergence of this ruling lineage was an important precon¬
dition for the extensive relations of exchange which were to develop
between the Basotho and the white settlers and mercantile capital.
The demand of the chieftainship for commodities such as cattle, guns,
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and horses, which were essential to the continued reproduction of its
position of supremacy, facilitated the rise of commodity production
on a significant scale.
The establishment of the mission stations provided an ideological
reinforcement for the shift to commodity production. With the pene¬
tration of mercantile capital and the establishment of trading
stores, the missionaries encouraged and helped provide the means for
rapid technological change. The plough, wagons, and new varieties of
crops were introduced, which enabled the productive base of the
Basotho to be transformed to the extent that Lesotho was frequently
referred to as the "granary of southern Africa" by contemporary writ¬
ers. The settlement of boer farmers in the Free State, the develop¬
ment of the railways of the Cape, and the opening of the diamond
mines, created not only new markets for Basotho grain, but also
heralded the beginning of labour migration on the part of the
Basotho. It has been argued that the production and exchange of
agricultural commodities and the sale of their labour power by the
Basotho represented two different forms of a single process - the
development of the production of commodities. At the core of this
process was the colonial penetration of the sub-continent and the
transformation of African production, such that it was oriented more
and more towards exchange values, by making the satisfaction of needs
and subsistence more dependent on the sale, rather than on the
immediate use, of the product.
The enforced transition from one form of participation in the commo¬
dity markets (the production of and sale of grain) to another (the
sale of labour power) was ultimately determined by the establishment
of mining capital with the development of the gold mines. This
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process was facilitated by the colonial power, which not only allowed
the productive base of Lesotho to be greatly reduced by the confisca¬
tion of Basotho land by the Boers, but also by various administrative
measures, such as the hut tax which created a cash demand most easily
met through labour migration. In the long run the whole process
created the conditions for the structural dependence of the Basotho
economy on mining capital in South Africa.
Labour migration increased inexorably right up to the mid-1970s,
unchallenged by the political elite which had assumed power within
Lesotho. The reduced area of land available to the Basotho required
the development of techniques more suited to intensive agriculture,
for which traditional techniques and knowledge were often inadequate.
Yet, because of the labour policy of the economy of South Africa,
with its insistence on short term migratory labour contracts and the
paying of less than subsistence wages, the Basotho have always, in
some measure, remained dependent on domestic agricultural production.
This dual dependence of the Basotho on migrant labour and subsistence
agriculture has had a profound effect on their attitudes towards
technological change and innovation in domestic productive activi¬
ties. Given the overriding importance of labour migration to
Lesotho's economy, it is not surprising that agricultural production
has stagnated and declined, and that there has been minimal techno¬
logical change in Basotho agriculture over the past one hundred
years. The development of the regional economy in southern Africa,
centred on mining capital, has simply not allowed the possibility for
the development and adoption of improved technologies which would
have enabled an expansion of agricultural commodity production.
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The sensitivity and directness of the response of Lesotho's domestic
economy to changes in labour migration has been demonstrated, partic¬
ularly in connection with the performance of Lesotho's economy over
the past decade. The sharp rise in migrant earnings had an immediate
and deleterious effect on agricultural production. The recent
decline in the value of migrant remittances, however, has forced
greater attention to be given to agriculture.
These factors structure the environment within which attempts to
introduce technological change are made. The above analysis has
shown that international aid now contributes the major source of
investment in Lesotho, and has become the principal means for
attempting to effect these changes. Given Lesotho's almost non¬
existent industrial base and the severe difficulties for employment
creation in this sector, coupled with the recognition that the
overwhelming majority of Basotho still depend in part on the land,
many aid projects have been directed towards technological change in
rural development. More attention has been paid to transforming the
agricultural productive base over the past decade, than throughout
the entire past century. Given the growing importance of interna¬
tional aid, it is relevant to examine the manner in which the aid
process governs the direction, nature and scope of attempts at tech¬
nological change and rural development.
Before drawing conclusions as to the effect of aid on the nature of
technological change, the following three chapters will examine the
content of this intervention in rural development, and the different
attempts which have been made to transform the productive base
through various projects incorporating technological change.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE CONTEXT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT
The discussion until now has been confined primarily to theoretical
and structural analyses of technological change. We have surveyed
the literature dealing with technology and development and, in the
case of Lesotho, have indicated political and economic structures
which have historically governed the nature and direction of techno¬
logical change. It has been argued that an examination of technolog¬
ical change is best undertaken within such a context. It is fruitful
nevertheless, to examine processes of technological change at the
more immediate level of people actually adopting a new technology, or
modifying an existing one. This is particularly important in rural
development, where ordinary people participate in a more immediate
sense in the adoption of new technologies and in decisions regarding
productive activity, than, for instance, in industrial development,
where workers have generally had little control over processes of
technological change.
Rural households employ family labour, they own the means of produc¬
tion, and they are involved directly and regularly in investment
decisions concerning crop and livestock production. This is not to
say that rural people are unrestricted in their choice and adoption
of new technologies. These decisions are necessarily constrained by
political and, primarily, economic structures which govern the gen¬
eration, availability and nature of new technologies and their suc¬
cessful dissemination. Nevertheless, an understanding of processes
of technological change in rural development is not complete without
an appreciation of the physical and social conditions within which
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rural people have to survive, and the perspectives which shape their
attitudes towards productive activity and technological change. It
is thus necessary to examine a number of social and physical factors
which might affect the process of technological change. How is agri-
cul tural production organised? What technologies are currently being
utilised? What are the physical constraints to improved agricultural
production? What are the important local institutions and authority
structures? What forms of social cooperation and interdependence
exist? Does the land tenure system constrain technological change?
How dependent are rural areas on urban centres for supplies, technol¬
ogy, and markets? How do these questions affect the perceptions of
households towards rural production and technological change?
The first part of this chapter will be used to outline some of the
essential features of agrarian society and the rural environment in
order to answer these questions. The second part will consist of an
examination of the history of colonial intervention in rural develop¬
ment in Lesotho and will complete the analysis of the background
against which modern rural development programmes have been under¬
taken .
It would seem self evident that the characteristics of rural house¬
holds which are the supposed beneficiaries of rural development pro¬
grammes, would need to be known before any project was implemented.
Yet, in many of the rural development projects undertaken in the
Colonial period, and, indeed, in many of the post-independent pro¬
jects, such knowledge has been absent, or has been thought generally
to be of little significance. But, as later sections in the thesis
will demonstrate, the nature of agrarian society and perceptions
regarding rural productive activity, have a decisive effect on the
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ultimate success of programmes aimed at introducing technological
change.
RURAL ENVIRONMENT
Nearly 95 per cent of the population of Lesotho live in rural areas;
and with an insignificant domestic industrial base, and no commercial
deposits of minerals (other than small quantities of diamonds), most
Basotho (87%) derive at least part of their income from agriculture
[World Bank (1981b), p 178, 179].
Subsistence agriculture forms the basis of Lesotho's domestic econ¬
omy, and the historical development and subsequent decline of agri-
cul tural production in Lesotho has already been described. But agri¬
cultural production is constrained not only by institutional and
structural factors. At the best of times, agriculture in Lesotho is
a precarious occupation. Poor soils and the vicissitudes of a harsh
climate, provide difficult obstacles for attempts to improve agricul¬
tural productivity.
Physical Environment
For an agricultural nation, land is one of the most fundamental
natural resources. Not only the type of agriculture, but also the
general levels of productivity and prosperity depend on the natural
soil endowment, and upon the management which maintains and improves
this endowment or, alternatively, degrades it. Traditional institu¬
tions and practices have evolved which closely govern access to and
uti1ity of 1 and.
All land is nominally held in trust by the king, although the
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government, through the chiefs, effectively controls its allocation.
Thus, land cannot be owned or accumulated by individuals. Tradition¬
ally, all rural households have been entitled to farm enough land to
feed themselves, and have been allocated a maximum of three fields of
varying size. Arable land is divided into small, fragmented hold¬
ings, which, in the past, have been distributed relatively equitably
(1). With the increase in population the average holding per house¬
hold is now less than 2 ha. [TFYDP, p 157]. The head of the house¬
hold normally retains the use of his land allocation for his lifetime
provided that he does not fail to cultivate it for more than two
years in succession. On his death, his widow would be allowed to
retain a field and an entitled son might be allocated some of the
1 and.
The basic function of the land tenure system has been to provide as
many Basotho households as possible with some share of the sub¬
sistence resources offered by arable land. This has been the great
strength of the system. Most rural households have had the the secu¬
rity of growing at least some food, and the aggregation of land by
individuals or foreigners has been obviated. But with every house¬
hold being entitled to a plot of land, and with a fast increasing
population (2), the land has been minutely parcelled out.
Land use rights are restricted to the cultivation and harvesting of a
seasonal crop; after the harvest the land is declared open for commu¬
nal grazing. All village and mountain pastures are open to such com-
(1) Less than 10% of farm holdings are greater than 4 hectares,
and approximately 25% of holdings are less than 1 hectare [SFYDP,
p 71].
(2) The annual population growth rate is 2.3 per cent [World Bank
(1981a), p 166].
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munal use, but the chiefs have the authority and responsibility to
regulate grazing.
Aid donors have brought, over the years, considerable pressure on the
government of Lesotho to effect land reform. A recent multi-donor
mission stated that:
"....a revolutionary land reform programme is needed to
achieve the Government's objective for a total transforma¬
tion of the agricultural base of the economy" [UNDP
(1980b), p 5]
It argued further that this could only be achieved by
[1] establishing viable small family farm units, and
[2] applying a proper management system to village grazing land and
mountain pastures.
The mission also stated that:
"It is for consideration whether donors should limit new
commitments to the agricultural sector until a land reform
programme is agreed to by the Government of Lesotho and a
plan of implementation formulated" [ibid, p 9].
A new land tenure law was passed by the legislature in 1979, which
was intended to meet the demands of the World Bank and other donor
agencies for permanence of tenure for farmers. It came short of per¬
mitting exclusive ownership of land, but made provision for the issu¬
ing of licences to farmers for the exclusive right of use of allo¬
cated fields. Ninety year leases would be issued for residence sites.
The law permits improvements to be made on the land, which may be
transferred through inheritance, but may not be sold without the
approval of the government. Land allocations are to made by a com¬
mittee headed by a chief. Committee members were to be elected or
appointed citizens, who could, in principle, vote out the chiefs'
decisions. The bill thus reduces the most significant remaining
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power of the chiefs by weakening their authority over land alloca¬
tion. The government argues that this new system enhances the secu¬
rity of land tenure and will persuade farmers to invest in improve¬
ments, which, in turn, will permit the possibility of moving from
subsistence agriculture to cash cropping.
Topsoil and water are two of Lesotho's most valuable resources. Both
are being wasted by a spectacular process of erosion. This erosion
has been going on for more than a generation despite the installation
of a basic protection system of contour banks on virtually all arable
land. The surge of water down inadequately vegetated slopes is obvi¬
ously destroying topsoil by gully formation, particularly in the low¬
lands. But, the widespread sheet erosion which accompanies such run¬
off, although much less visible, is far more deleterious and has
resulted in the general reduction of fertility on both range and cul¬
tivated land. The conservation of soil and water is particularly
difficult in Lesotho because of physical factors which cannot be
changed: rugged topography, intense summer rain storms, cold winters,
and, in the lowland, highly dispersible soils. However, the natural
potential for erosion is aggravated by forms of poor land use, espe¬
cially overgrazing, poor cropping, and the cultivation of unsuitably
steep land or of land without adequate protection. All of these can,
however, be changed. [SFYDP, p 3].
CIimate
Another important factor which determines agricultural potential is
precipitation. The average annual rainfall of a particular region in
Lesotho, along with the average temperatures, is determined largely
by the altitude, and distance from the escarpment. There is a gen¬
eral tendency for the annual mean rainfall to increase as one moves
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from West to East, and from South to North. Almost all of Lesotho is
within the 600 mm isohyet, and the mountain regions receive up to 900
mm per annum. In the extensive Senqu valley^ though, mountain ranges
interrupt the passage of rain clouds from both the East and the West,
and the mean rainfall is considerably less than that in the lowlands.
The undeniable advantages of a high annual rainfall in Lesotho must
be weighed against two major climatic short-comings. Firstly, pre¬
cipitation has a markedly seasonal character. Over 85 per cent of
the annual rainfall comes in the summer between the months of October
and April [Ambrose (1976), p 25]. This is ideal for the cultivation
of maize and sorghum, since both require intensive rainfall during
their growing seasons (3). But the timing is critical, especially
for sorghum. The onset of the spring rains, awaited with such anx¬
iety every year, is fairly unpredictable. Planting later than October
is fraught with risks, as this will delay the whole growing cycle,
and crops are likely to be destroyed by early autumn frosts if they
have not reached maturity by March or April. Excessive or violent
precipitation is a further climatic constraint, and can cause fields
to become waterlogged, thus delaying ploughing early in the season.
Rain often falls in short, violent storms which accelerate soil ero¬
sion and which may damage crops. Hail can also be severe, and not
infrequently causes serious damage to wheat harvests, as well as to
peas, beans, and sorghum.
Secondly, there is a high frequency of droughts. General droughts
affecting the entire region have been recorded at fairly frequent
(3) The growing season for sorghum is 9 months from
August/September to May/June; and for maize, 6 months, from No¬
vember to May/June.
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intervals and, even in the years between these droughts, crop yields
can be drastically reduced as a result of rainfalls lower than aver¬
age. High summer temperatures can also severely damage crops and
reduce yields, even when the average seasonal rainfall is favourable.
Clearly, climate is one of the major constraints in agriculture.
Many farmers believe that their most serious problem is drought.
Hail is also frequently mentioned as a potentially devastating threat
[Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project (1977a), pp 14,15].
Basotho village life is greatly affected by the precarious extremes
of the weather. Rain is often accompanied by ferocious thunder and
electric storms. In a landscape devoid of trees, people and animals
are exposed to lightning strikes, which annually claim a number of
victims.
Climatic extremes are most apparent in the mountain region, where
frost can occur in any month. Although the mountain region receives
the highest rainfall, climatic extremes create harsh conditions for
rural living and agricultural production. At various times of the
year, snow, sleet, lightning, hail, or dust storms may be experi¬
enced, and temperatures can range from -10 °C in June or July, to
35 °C in January [Ambrose (1976), p 27].
Ecological Zones
Lesotho is conveniently divided into four principal ecological zones:
the lowlands, which consist of arable plains along the Western edge
of the country, bordered by the Mohokare (Caledon) River and the
Orange Free State, with an altitude of between 1500m and 1800m above
sea-level, and dotted with small plateaux; the foothills, to the East
of the lowlands; the mountain region, comprising the Eastern three-
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quarters of Lesotho, and rising from 2100m to just under 3500m above
sea-level at Thabana-Ntlenyana (the highest peak in Southern-Africa);
and the Senqu River valley, which stretches into the mountain region
from the South-West (4).
Geologically, Lesotho is relatively uncomplicated. Standing almost
anywhere in the lowlands, one can see at a glance the country's geo¬
logical history. Clearest of all is the horizontal boundary between
the white sandstone and the darker basalt rocks of the Maluti (the
mountain region). This boundary usually occurs at about 1800 m above
sea-level. In the west, the basalt has frequently been weathered
away, leaving isolated sandstone plateaux. Running across the coun¬
try are dolerite dykes, which were formerly lava fissures. Many a
footpath, or even a road, makes it way up the sandstone escarpment by
means of a trough caused by the faster weathering dolerite. The
dolerite itself is used for surfacing roads and many dykes have
become quarries. Where dykes cut across the plains they form bar¬
riers impermeable to underground water, and provide useful sites for
borehol es.
Crop Production
The land has been intensively used for over a century and continues
to be farmed mainly for subsistence. Only 390 , 000 ha. (or 13 per
cent of Lesotho's total area of 3 million ha.) are classified as
arable (5). The staple crops in the lowlands and foothills are maize
(4) Lesotho is the only country in the world with all its land si¬
tuated more than 1000m above sea-level [Ambrose (1976), p21].
(5) Ministry of Agriculture (1978), p VI-3.
The area of Lesotho is approximately 30,300 sq. km., which makes
it similar in size to Belgium.
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and sorghum, with wheat being more common in the mountain region.
Some cash cropping, notably of white haricot beans and peas, also
takes place and about half the households in Lesotho also grow garden
vegetables (6).
Spring ploughing and planting are the first and most fundamental of
the season's agricultural tasks. There are few tractors in Lesotho
and the advantages which they offer, in terms of greater speed and
efficiency of ploughing, are often offset by the difficulty in being
able to book a tractor contractor when field conditions are at their
best. In the marginal agricultural conditions of Lesotho, the
returns to the extra investment in tractor ploughing are, at best,
uncertain for many peasant farmers. Indeed, it has been argued
that where land continues to be cultivated by individuals and fields
are not amalgamated for the purpose of mechanisation, cattle are a
more suitable source of traction [Turner (1978), p 132].
The earlier method of turning the soil with a hoe before planting, is
now rarely encountered. Instead, animal drawn metal ploughs, either
with fixed or reversible mouldboards, coulters and often a wheel in
front of the share, are almost universally used. These are generally
imported from South Africa and are distributed through rural trading
stores or government village distribution points. From two to eight
oxen are used as draft animals, although cows and occasionally bulls
are also yoked into the teams. Yokes consist simply of straight
wooden poles, with pegs inserted on each side of the animals' neck,
and are secured with straps of hide or woven grass ropes. When
(6) In 1950, maize and sorghum accounted for nearly 80 per cent of
planted area. In recent years this figure has fallen to less than
60 per cent - reflecting a shift to cash crops such as wheat and
beans [Ministry of Agriculture (1978), p VI-3].
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ploughing, men and boys leave the village early in the morning with
their oxen yoked together to pull a simply constructed sledge tran¬
sporting the plough to the fields. Ploughing is traditionally under¬
taken exclusively by men, although, latterly, women might occasion¬
ally be seen assisting. One person holds the plough, and one drives
the oxen, usually with a long whip which is kept whirring over the
animals' backs, while they are urged on constantly with cries and
whistles. Seeds are generally broadcast by hand, although some farm¬
ers are beginning to use animal drawn planters. The latter, however,
often develop minor mechanical faults, which frequently remain unat¬
tended to. Although use of a planter helps to ensure correct plant¬
ing depth and economical seed dispersal, factors such as lack of
technical knowledge or support services tend to impede maximum effi¬
ciency. Harrows are more commonly used; it is a cheaper implement
and less prone to breakages. Often it consists of little more than a
crude metal frame set with spikes, and is drawn by only two animals.
Women also spend mornings in the fields at this time, following the
men at a later hour with buckets or tins of beer and basins of food
for the workers.
There is a general shortage of farming resources in Lesotho, and over
one half of rural households rent or borrow farm equipment (7). Most
villagers experience difficulty in getting their lands ploughed and
planted in time. Adequate draft power is scarce and after the dry
winter, most draft animals are weak and underfed. Surveys have shown
(7) In a survey in the Thaba Tseka Project area, 53 per cent of
the households exchanged and combined resources with another
household. Most of these arrangements were for ploughing. About a
third of the households participated in sharecropping arrange¬
ments, although only 10 per cent of the total cultivated land was
involved in sharecropping [Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Pro¬
ject (1977a), pp 18-21].
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that in some areas, especially in the lowlands, only half of rural
households own any cattle and only a third claim to have sufficient
draft power available [Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project
(1978), p 8].
A high percentage of rural Basotho enter into share-cropping partner¬
ships ( seahlolo ) with one or more others, either to work their own
fields or to have part use of someone else's fields. Share-cropping
is an established institution for the distribution of factors of pro¬
duction. Rural households, which would otherwise be unable to plant
and harvest crops due to shortages of these factors, enter into
agreements with other households. The key factors of production are
land, labour, tractive power, implements, seeds, and food for those
working and various combinations of these factors are encountered in
the contributions of the two parties to the sharecropping arrange¬
ment. Typically, one party may contribute land, seeds, and, perhaps,
food for the labourers, whilst the other party may contribute oxen,
implements, and labour. It is generally a formal arrangement span¬
ning a full season from ploughing to harvest and involves the distri¬
bution of the harvest between the two parties in a fixed proportion.
The most common practice is to divide the yield equally.
Although the use of fertiliser has increased over the years, the pro¬
portion of Basotho land-holders applying fertiliser to their fields
is still low. Basotho are well aware that fertilisers increase
yields, just as they know that natural additives such as manure
improve the soil's fertility. Few land-holders have the ready cash
with which to purchase fertiliser, and are sceptical of recouping
their investment with a good crop, as yields may still be reduced
through drought, frost, or pests. It may often be a wiser decision
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to buy food than to buy fertiliser. Dung is also rarely applied to
the fields as it is used chiefly as a fuel.
Pesticides are rarely used, although most farmers refer to worms and
caterpillars ( seboko ) and specifically cutworms ( seseli ) as being
a hazard to crop production [Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme
(1979b), p 21].
Traditional Sesotho farming knowledge included techniques for driving
seseli out of farmers' fields. A traditional doctor would burn some
worms in a pot, together with the roots of certain plants, and it was
believed that the odour would draw the worms out of the fields to
open places where they would be devoured by ants [Ashton (1967), p
127]. However, contemporary farmers generally tend to be scornful
about traditional Sesotho techniques.
After fields have been ploughed (and perhaps harrowed) and the crops
planted, operations which rarely occupy more than two or three weeks
in total, there is an hiatus until it is judged to be time to begin
weeding. Nearly every household owns at least one hoe, which is the
principal tool for weeding. If ploughing and planting are the most
essential, weeding is the most tedious of agricultural chores. At
the height of the weeding season, in high summer, a conscientious
woman will spend many hours a day in the fields. She may call a
working party ( 1etsema ) if she can afford to feed them and is suf¬
ficiently popular to attract people away from their own lands.
The haphazard collection of green maize may occur in late summer and
autumn, but the full crops of both sorghum and maize are generally
left to dry for some time before finally being harvested in the
winter months of June and July. More concentrated efforts to harvest
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the crop quickly tend to be made with wheat and beans, in which case
a family may work for most of the day or be joined by many other peo¬
ple in a 1etsema working party. Wheat is reaped with sickles and is
stacked into a small rick at the side of the field to await thresh¬
ing.
Harvesting and threshing do not place a heavy demand upon the time of
the Basotho land-holder. Both operations tend to be carried out
haphazardly, when the time and inclination present themselves. All
in all, the contribution of the Basotho as farmers to the production
of food is not great; most land-holders prefer to perform the bare
minimum of tasks necessary to enable them to gather some crop from
their fields at the end of the season. Estimated average labour
inputs for current crop production practices in Lesotho are shown in
Table 4.1.
Land
Crop Preparation Planting Cultivating Weeding Harvesting Total
Ma i ze 4.2 1.5 1.2 8.5 17.5 32.9
Sorghum 4.2 1.5 1.2 8.5 13.6 29.0
Wheat 4.2 1.5 - - 11.8 17.5
Beans 4.2 1.5 - - 12.4 18.1
Peas 4.2 1.5 - - 12.4 18.1
TABLE 4.1 : Annual Labour Input Requirements for Current Crop Prac¬
tices in Lesotho (Man Days per hectare).
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (1978), p VI-8.
Mote: It is assumed that land preparation (including ploughing and
harrowing), planting (including fertiliser application), and inter-
row cultivation are performed with ox power. Hand operations include
weeding and harvesting (picking and/or cutting), stacking, threshing,
winnowing, sizing (in the case of beans), and transport to village.
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Few households can live on their crop output alone - holdings are too
small, natural conditions are too poor and the investment of time and
effort by land-holders in their crops is too low for agriculture to
make more than a supplementary contribution to subsistence. As one
project report summarises the situation:
"Farmers plough normally only once, mostly plant home-grown
seeds, use animals for draft power, rarely harrow their
fields, plant the seeds at the same time as they plough,
only rarely use fertiliser, weed the crops usually only
once, do not irrigate, rarely protect against insects, and
harvest late. The main reasons they give are lack of
money, knowledge [sic], labour and power. The low level of
farming practice combined with the severe climatic and soil
problems of Lesotho combine to make the country's agricul¬
ture very unproductive. Farming thus becomes a risk which
is too great to justify sustained effort, which in turn
aggravates the farmers' poor attitude towards farming, and
so continues the cycle of unproductive farming" [Senqu
River Agricultural Extension Project (1978), p 17].
Livestock Production
Although arable farming continues to be the principal target of aid
for production in Lesotho, agriculturalists and planners working
there are becoming bolder in their private assertions that much of
the country is not particularly well suited for crops and more atten¬
tion should be devoted to livestock production. It is certainly true
that most of the country is mountainous and covered in grassland
suitable for livestock grazing.
Investment in grazing stock is the main form of private investment in
the agricultural sector. More than half the rural households own
cattle, sheep or goats, but the numbers are far from evenly distri¬
buted (8). Cattle are grazed on communally held ranges, mostly in
the mountain region, and after the harvest they are permitted to
(8) Less than 10 per cent of households own nearly half the
nation's cattle [Ministry of Agriculture (1978), p VII-11).
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graze crop residues on cultivated land. The number of grazing
animals far exceeds the carrying capacity of the land (9). The
deleterious consequences of overstocking and generally poor herd
management - severe gully erosion, and undernourished and poorly bred
animals - have persisted in Lesotho for many years and have come to
be expected as unavoidable side effects of livestock ownership.
Livestock have multiple uses within the Sesotho agricultural economy
and culture. Cattle provide draft power, food and, in time of emer¬
gency or need for cash, marketable assets to the rural household.
Sheep and goats are largely valued by the Basotho for their market
value in wool and mohair, and for domestic consumption. Horses and
donkeys continue to be the most commonly used means of transporta¬
tion. The use of livestock must also be understood in terms of the
particular roles which different animals play in social relationships
of reciprocity and redistribution. Cattle, being the most presti¬
gious animals, are prominent in important social events such as wed¬
dings, funerals, and special religious occasions. Through the social
conventions of mafisa (the letting out of grazing animals to be
managed by another household) and bohali (bride-price), the transfer
of grazing animals between families and villages over time has been
consi derable.
Mafisa is a system whereby livestock are lent to relatives and close
friends who make use of the products of the animals (10). At its
(9) Recommended stocking rates range between 41 and 67 per cent of
the actual livestock population (1975) [Ministry of Agriculture
(1978), p VII-8].
(10) A survey within the Thaba Tseka Project area determined that
37 per cent of the households have livestock out on mafisa, and 26
per cent of farm households manage livestock for other owners
[Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Project (1976), p 28].
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best the system offers a means of support and welfare for poor rela¬
tives and friends by providing them with milk, wool, and traction.
At its worst it is a system whereby rich households with accumulated
livestock can ensure that their herds are well looked after.
Livestock and cattle have assumed traditionally an important function
in Basotho society as bohali (bridewealth). As a potential bearer of
children, a wife is regarded as a source of labour, and the payment
of bohal i by the husband's kin to hers is in compensation to the
latter for the loss not only of her own labour but that of the chil¬
dren she may produce [Murray (1976a)]. Customary demand and the
level of payments, in these transactions, are high by any comparative
standard, and the payment of bohali commonly extends over many years.
The standard payment is 20 cattle, together with 10 small livestock
and a horse, but the total is rarely reached, even after the
husband's paternity has been acknowledged and full formal agreement
has been reached between the two families. If, as is often the case,
cattle are not available in the man's household, the principal alter¬
native means of payment is cash. A portion might also be paid in
other material goods. Clearly, the struggle to acquire and maintain
a number of cattle for potential bohali negotiations, has caused most
rural households to concentrate on quantity rather than quality in
livestock rearing. It has been pointed out, however, that the physi¬
cal role of cattle in marriage transactions is declining, and that
the most important function of cattle in Sesotho life today is as
source of traction for agriculture and transport [Turner (1978), p
140].
Livestock practices have remained virtually unchanged for a century
or more, despite the efforts of colonial and international aid
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"experts" to commercialise it. It has been noted that in relation to
crop production, livestock husbandry appears to be less risky,
requires less operating costs and, in most instances, offers a higher
payoff in terms of net returns to family labour. It should be remem¬
bered that the domestic consumption of livestock products is of
immense importance as a contribution to the subsistence and survival
of rural households. It has been estimated that the annual domestic
utilisation of livestock and livestock products amounts to a market
value equivalent to about three times the gross revenue earned from
exports [Ministry of Agriculture (1978), p V11-3].
Village Technologies
Apart from crop and livestock production, technologies utilised by
rural Basotho revolve chiefly around the processing of grain, and
also housing construction.
Grain Processing
Threshing of wheat is done by hand, usually on a patch of beaten
ground or a smooth, flat rock ( seotlo ). The threshing of sorghum
and beans is also commonly done on a seotlo. Maize cobs are usually
brought back to the village in sacks where they are threshed and
shelled in spare moments. Threshed grain is often stored in large
woven grass baskets ( sesiu ).
In the more remote parts of Lesotho, some wheat and maize is still
ground by hand with a small flat stone ( si 1 pane ) on a 1arger stone
( 1 eloala ), whose top is smoothed and hollowed. Grinding grain by
hand is extremely time consuming and many hours work are necessary to
produce enough flour for just a couple of days. Increasingly, many
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households take their grain to be ground by a diesel powered hammer
mill at one of the trading stores, where cash has to be paid for the
service. A common sl^Kt in the mountain region is trains of donkeys
transporting sacks of grain on their backs to be milled at the
nearest trading store.
The staple village diet is maize ( poone ). Nearly three-quarters of
rural families consume all the maize which they produce [Senqu River
Agricultural Extension Project (1978), p 22]. It is eaten in kernels
on or off the cob, or in the form of porridge. Some sources suggest
that the importance of maize as a household crop has declined -
despite its continued importance in the rural diet - because an
increasing number of families can afford to purchase imported, ready
ground maize [Turner (1978), p 164], Sorghum ( mabele ), on the
other hand, provides the most traditional and best-loved items in the
Basotho diet: various sorts of porridge and, above all, joala. The
latter is a home brewed beer and is itself quite nourishing. It
varies in alcoholic strength, depending on the length of fermenta¬
tion, and may lead to severe inebriation. When sorghum is plentiful,
a woman will brew as much as her clay pots, or assortment of tins,
will allow. A common sight in Lesotho is a white cloth or plastic
bag fastened to a make-shift flag-pole outside a hut, indicating that
beer is available for sale. The brewing and sale of beer by poorer
households is one of the chief mechanisms for the partial redistribu¬
tion of migrant remittances in the village.
Sour bread is made from ground maize and also from wheat flour. A
high proportion of the Basotho's diet consists of carbohydrate, to
the extent that the incidence of deficiency diseases is relatively
high. Left over chunks of dry cold porridge are eaten for breakfast,
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and as sustainers between meals by those who spend the day around the
house.
Meat is eaten only on very special occasions, when a sheep or cow
might be slaughtered. Only two fruits grow indigenously: small hard
peaches, and the succulent fruit of the prickly pear in the lowlands.
Some households tend small vegetable gardens. Mohoho , a wild,
small-leaved vegetable, which tastes of strong spinach, is collected;
it is found sparsely scattered between crops and along the edges of
fields and paths.
Fuel
Porridge is cooked for more than an hour, and bread is steamed for
nearly an hour and a half, but fuel is extremely scarce in rural
areas. There are very few trees in Lesotho, which is predominantly a
grassland. In the remote valleys, indigenous trees such as the Cape
willow ( Salix capensis ) and the wild olive ( 01ea africana ) can
still be found, and introduced species such as the weeping willow
(Salix babylonica) and the white poplar ( Populus alba ) propagate
along the edge of rivers. These trees are carefully protected by
village custom; they are used sparingly, and mainly for building pur¬
poses. Given the almost total lack of firewood, most households
depend on dried animal dung ( 1 isu or khapane ) for their supply of
natural fuel. It is collected from livestock kraals , and open
fields, and is first stacked in piles to be thoroughly dried in the
sun. A gorse like bush (Chrysocoma tennifolia or Aster filifolius),
known to the Basotho as sehala-hala, is used for kindling. It grows
sparsely, and only in the foothills and mountain region. Women and
young girls spend long hours collecting huge bundles, which they
transport on their heads. Lis_u is preferred for both cooking and
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warming the house, and it burns with little or no smell. Cooking is
performed over an open fire, usually built on the floor in the centre
of the hut. Paraffin stoves, which are freely available from most
trading stores, are used for short cooking operations, but the fuel
is expensive and is increasingly beyond the means of many households.
Electrification is confined to a handful of towns along the border
with South Africa in the West, and apart from a few standby diesel
generating plants, is supplied from South Africa's ESCOM grid.
Housing Construction
Rural Basotho live in small scattered villages which are frequently
sited in rocky places: for obvious reasons, houses have not generally
been built on land where crops can be grown.
Dwellings are traditionally built in the form of circular stone¬
walled huts (rondavels), roofed with willow or poplar rafters, and
thatching grass. In the lowlands and foothills, sandstone is readily
available, and is cut to size for building purposes. In the mountain
region, individual basalt stones are collected and arranged in walls
with a mud and dung mortar. The allocation of building materials is
controlled at the village level. Permission has to be sought from
the chief for the cutting of trees from the village woodlot, and for
the cutting of thatching grass.
Floors are smeared with a dung paste and are often decorated with
finger drawn designs (matsema), which are renewed periodically. The
inside walls and the ochre around doors are also often etched in
geometric patterns. Rural women retain a high degree of environmen¬
tal knowledge concerning various types of soil and their usefulness
for plastering and decorating walls and floors [Turner (1978), p
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207].
Increasingly the traditional rondavel is giving way to the modern
rectangular shaped stone or cement block houses with zinc sheet roof¬
ing, in spite of these new materials' inferior thermal insulating
properties. In the more remote areas, modern building materials are
virtually unattainable, and a high degree of masonry and thatching
skills persist. It is interesting to note, that as one approaches
the more developed areas (including rural development project cen¬
tres), many of these skills have been lost, and the quality of build¬
ing workmanship is visibly poorer.
Other Vi11 age Technologies
Paradoxically, water supply is a perennial problem in Lesotho; for
although rivers and streams are plentiful, the country nevertheless
experiences periodic droughts. There are few irrigation schemes and
very few villages have piped water supplies. This is partly because
villages are seldom located in valleys, which are generally narrow
and steep sided. There has been little indigenous development of
pumping devices, or of energy sources to power them. Most village
water supplies are taken from springs, which are generally protected
with makeshift stone walls. These are often situated up to an half-
r
an-hours walk from the village and a great deal of time can be spent
by women collecting water in large vessels, which they manage to
transport by balancing them on their heads. There has been limited
development of gravity piped water from springs into villages. The
Basotho are hesitant to drink from rivers as clothes are washed in
streams and the waste disposal areas of many villages are situated
near streams and rivers.
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Clothing is now almost exclusively Western in style and origin, with
all clothing being imported from outside the country. One variant is
the Basotho blanket which dates from Colonial times and often still
is made in Britain. These blankets have become something of a
national dress and they are worn most frequently in the mountain
region, even in the hottest weather. A vivid image retained after
travelling through the mountain region, is the sight of Basotho, on
horseback, wearing their colourful and patterned blankets, and occa¬
sionally the traditional conically shaped Basotho grass hats.
Many technical skills persist in the villages. Grass is woven into
mats and also ropes, which are used as halters for their ponies.
Hides and skins are cut into strips and also woven into ropes. Clay
pots, some of considerable size, are still made in some areas.
Rural Perceptions and Technical Knowledge
Aspects of rural and agricultural technologies which resemble more
closely the practice before the pattern of close, settled cultivation
was established, incorporate an intricate array of relevant tradi¬
tional technical knowledge. Detailed knowledge concerning, for exam¬
ple, different types of grazing grasses or wild vegetables suitable
for eating, assist the Basotho to survive successfully in an often
inhospitable environment. This is also true of other areas of vil¬
lage life, such as building techniques.
Although many of these skills and much of this traditional knowledge
has remained relevant to day-to-day rural living and survival, many
other traditional agricultural practices have not been successfully
adapted to changing conditions. This is particularly true of some of
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the crucial aspects of agriculture such as knowledge of soil and crop
types and cultivation techniques where traditional Sesotho knowledge
has become less and less effective. Furthermore, although the impor¬
tance of identifying and combating pests is widely recognised, tradi¬
tional modes of response are adopted with decreasing frequency,
without yet being replaced by any effective alternative. With regard
to increasing the fertility of the soil by applying additives or
returning nutrients to it, the Basotho today - despite what they know
of chemical fertilisers - probably do less than their forefathers,
who had a more luxurious resource base to exploit.
It can be argued that Basotho farmers adopt a minimalist technical
approach to farming. New farming knowledge and skills have not in
general matched the transformation which has taken place from casual
cultivation amid abundant resources to the annual exploitation of
small, and fixed, parcels of land.
The Basotho, however, have been more successful in creating and
adapting forms of social organisation which have facilitated their
survival as an agrarian nation over a century of conflict and pres¬
sures. The pattern of land-holding altered at an early date in
response to the new technological opportunities offered by the
plough, and the system of land tenure has continued to function
fairly effectively in sharing the land equitably as a subsistence
resource.
Nevertheless, Sesotho agricultural knowledge has not developed signi¬
ficantly this century and the Basotho have been unable to innovate
and adapt agricultural technologies to improve productivity.
Instead, land-holders have been forced to make decisions, in the face
- 207 -
of economic pressures and opportunities which have led them away from
the land, but which, at the same time, have not permitted them to
ignore it. Farming is not worth their while, but their subsistence
still requires it. Opportunist exploitation, rather than dedicated
husbandry, is the predictable response to such conditions [Turner
(1978), p 236].
Again we are brought back to the force of our original analysis.
Central to the transformation of technical knowledge and the adoption
of new techniques has been the historical process which has shaped
Lesotho's political economy, and hence the attitudes of the Basotho
to agriculture and technological change. The requirement to enter
labour migration has meant that agriculture has remained a subsidi¬
ary, although still necessary, productive activity. Decisions con¬
cerning investment in technological change are thus governed by per¬
ceptions of the comparative value of returns from agriculture in
relation to migrant earnings.
These attitudes to technological change and innovation are interwoven
with general cultural perceptions which are defined by the material
conditions of rural life. The Basotho are continually interacting
with Western culture within the regional economy. Radio advertise¬
ments, magazines, the experience of Basotho migrant labourers in the
metropolitan centres of South Africa, and the lifestyles of expatri¬
ates and the educated elite within Lesotho itself, all serve to
transform general Sesotho aspirations and perceptions.
Ultimately these perceptions are most forcibly shaped by the labour
strategy of mining capital within the regional economy, and the phi¬
losophy of apartheid, or separate development, which it evolved.
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This philosophy asserts that black societies (including the Basotho)
should retain independent cultures, whose separateness should be
preserved within political units located in designated rural areas,
whilst still providing the labour necessary for accumulation in the
metropolitan centres. In reality, of course, this has meant politi¬
cal domination and economic exploitation by a white minority over the
majority, but it also involves a form of cultural domination.
A degree of cultural domination is likely so long as Africans are
forced to participate in the Western capitalist economy on unequal
terms. This is demonstrated in labour migration where "pull" fac¬
tors, such as the desire to emulate lifestyles and obtain consumer
goods which are available in urban centres, begin to operate with the
economic and political "push" factors which gave rise to labour
migration in the first place. Material aspirations change and alien
tastes in clothing, food, and household goods are adopted. Many
Basotho aspire to Western cultural norms and often denigrate tradi¬
tional aspects of rural life. Yet coupled with these aspirations is
the prevalence of a national pride, and a reliance on indigenous
forms of social organisation and productive activity, to regulate
their existence in Lesotho. For the system which dominates them, and
seeks their labour, also requires that they contribute towards their
subsistence through their traditional agricultural activities.
The material and social aspirations embodied by contemporary Sesotho
culture affect strongly its perceptions of farming as the Basotho
find their security in an agricultural base. But, although farming
is essential to their subsistence, its potential as the means of
prosperity and happiness is limited. Each innovation undertaken by
the Basotho, each positive or negative reaction to a development
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initiative, is shaped by these perceptions. When rural development
seeks to strengthen the security of these agrarian foundations, the
Basotho are likely to react with interest. The same is likely to be
true of other rural development initiatives such as improved water
supplies, access tracks, clinics and any programme aimed at making
rural life easier. But, when rural development has more grandiose or
less tangible ambitions, involving a higher degree of risk, the
Basotho are likely to be politely non-committal, and development pro¬
grammes are bound to fail through lack of participation by the peo-
pl e.
HISTORY OF BRITISH COLONIAL INVOLVEMENT IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT
The history of attempts to reverse the inexorable decline of produc¬
tion in the rural regions of Lesotho provides a fascinating (and
unfortunate) example of the problems involved in introducing techno¬
logical change and rural development. The British Colonial adminis¬
tration, and the subsequent post-independence government, aided by
international aid agencies, have introduced a succession of rural
development programmes which were designed to raise agricultural pro¬
ductivity , to improve rural living conditions, and to enhance
Lesotho's social and economic development. These programmes have all
involved attempts to encourage technological change, with varying
degrees of success, and perhaps more, of failure. This section will
trace, in broad outline, the history and extent of Colonial rural
development programmes in Lesotho in order to examine which factors
shaped the nature, content and adoption of these programmes and the
new or improved technologies which they attempted to introduce.
It has already been noted that, during the early period of Colonial
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rule, the British effectively neglected agricultural and infrastruc-
tural development and were concerned rather to incur the minimum of
expenditure, while ensuring that Basutoland developed chiefly as a
labour reserve for mining capital in South Africa.
There is, however, a long history of government intervention in rural
development in Lesotho - although many of these early efforts were
meagre and ineffectual. Colonial Reports record that District Com¬
missioners distributed food crops and tree seeds free of charge and
imported Arab stallions in order to improve the breeding of the
Basotho pony. When the British did eventually attempt minor involve¬
ment in rural development, it was directed primarily towards soil
conservation; there was a recognition that, as an agrarian nation,
Lesotho's land resources are of prime importance.
Colonial Soil Conservation Programmes
In spite of ample signs of erosion damage dating back at least to
1850, the British colonial administration made no serious remedial
attempts until the early part of the twentieth century. The first
evidence of official attention to the soil erosion problem dates from
1902, after the publication of a report by Sir William Will cocks, who
remarked that:
"The denudation of the country, owing to....ravines, is
very serious, and if allowed to continue for as many years
in the future as it has during the last thirty years, the
loss to the country will be incalculable" [Will cocks
(1901), p 31].
Subsequent government rural development assistance was focused ini¬
tially on tree planting recommendations, but some crop management
advice was also included [Nobe and Seckler (1979), p 3]. The Depart¬
ment of Agriculture in Basutoland was established in 1910, and its
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work prior to the mid-1930s was directed mainly towards providing
veterinary services. The Department's limited soil and water conser¬
vation activities continued with tree planting schemes and included
some donga (gully) control, rather than with any efforts directed
towards reducing the rate of runoff and sheet erosion on crop and
range!and. An agricultural officer was appointed in 1911, but work
practically stopped during the First World War and the officer
returned to the territory only in 1921. Rural development efforts
were still insignificant; the grant for donga prevention in 1928, for
example, was only £1500. Three agricultural demonstrators were
engaged, but fresh dongas were continually forming and being allowed
to develop.
The British government only became really concerned with Basutoland's
dependence on its agricultural resource base in the early 1930s, at
which time accelerated soil erosion was already clearly evident
[Fitzgerald-Lee (1951)]. The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
appointed a Commission "to enquire into the position of Basutoland
from the financial and economic points of view and to report
thereon". In 1935, Sir Alan Pirn's report was published and it identi¬
fied:
"....the greatest need of the Territory [as being] the ini¬
tiation of measures to deal with the erosion which is
steadily ruining the country" [Pirn (1935), p 134].
The situation was exacerbated by very heavy rainfalls, after some
years of severe drought, and the rate of soil erosion was visibly
accelerated. Soon thereafter, a soil conservation programme was ini¬
tiated. The first phase, from 1935 to about 1950, focussed mainly on
mechanical structures and on tree planting with a budget of £160,000
being made available to carry out the recommended measures.
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Mechanised equipment and skilled personnel were imported and, with
the deployment of large contingents of Basotho labour, the early
goals had, by 1945, largely been achieved: 62,000 ha. of arable lands
(44%), out of some 142,000 ha. in the lowlands had been protected
with terracing; out of a mountain area of 182,000 ha., 35,000 ha.
(18%) had been protected with buffer strips; 179 dams, with an aver¬
age capacity of 7,700 cubic metres, had been constructed; and over
822,000 trees had been planted [Nobe and Seckler (1979), p 57].
In 1943, as a consequence of the shortage of mechanical equipment and
funds during the Second World War, the High Commissioner in Basuto-
land suggested an extensive tree planting campaign which was of low
capital intensity and which could be carried out almost exclusively
with Basotho labour. The objective of this scheme was the binding of
soil with tree roots in badly eroded areas. At the same time, the
resulting plantations would also provide a fuel supply, thus releas¬
ing dung for field fertilisation. Again, these early efforts were
considered to be a success and they led, in part, to the allocation
of £830,000, in 1945, for the second ten year development programme,
of which 36 per cent was earmarked for the agricultural sector. A
follow up grant of £133,000 was provided, in 1950, for the same pur¬
pose. A great number of trees were planted, but it has been
estimated that less than 10% survived. [Nobe and Seckler (1979), p
66].
In 1952, the Department of Agriculture in Maseru reported that
approximately two-thirds of the arable area in the lowlands had been
protected by terraces and grass strips, that about three-quarters of
the foothills had been protected with grass or buffer strips and that
the whole mountain area was due to be completely protected by the
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following year. One publication noted:
"Grazing control has been successfully introduced and is
being rigidly enforced by many of the chiefs; mountain
sides and valleys are being ungrazed for as long as a year,
and the ravaged grasslands are being given a chance to
recover" [Fitzgerald-Lee (1951), p 523].
By the mid-1950s, the essential recommendations of the Pirn Report had
been substantially implemented [Nobe and Seckler (1979) p 58]. It
has been calculated that, over twenty years, the whole programme
worked out to an investment of approximately £1.50 per ha. of arable
land protected with conservation structures (11). This was, in
organisational and physical terms, a remarkable achievement. Contem¬
porary research publications by outside observers were enthusiastic
about the fight against erosion, which was regarded as the finest
conservation work in sub-Saharan Africa [Fitzgerald-Lee (1951), p
523].
But, by this time, a new policy direction in the country's soil con¬
servation programme had already begun. Lack of maintenance of
installed conservation works had emerged as a major problem; and
British technical and administrative personnel had begun to realise
that the system had largely been a failure. Deterioration of pas¬
tures had increased, thus further endangering soil resources. Anti-
erosion works appeared to have had only a limited effect and soil
erosion was continuing unabated. The direct participation of farmers
in the programme had effectively been limited to their employment as
manual labourers. Very little educational work had been undertaken
to convince them of the importance of conservation measures. Some of
the conservation works were badly constructed and emptied into don¬
gas, thus aggravating the erosion process. It is clear that very
(11) 12/- per acre [Quirion (1958), p 125].
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little research and monitoring work had been undertaken, despite
Pirn's recommendation that survey, observation, and experiment were
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the programme. The work had
been focussed almost exclusively on the physical achievement of
preconceived objectives.
During the first ten years of the programme, the British administra¬
tion had been almost wholly responsible for the construction and
maintenance of the conservation structures. Many farmers began to
resent this work, particularly when contour banks were constructed
which cut arbitrarily through fields allocated to different farmers.
During the Second World War, the construction phase, and also mainte¬
nance of structures, virtually ceased due to machinery, budget and
technical constraints. Upon re-examining the structures after the
war, the responsible technical personnel decided that it would be too
expensive to reconstruct the many structures which had fallen into
disrepair. Furthermore, it was considered that the maintenance of
the structures should be the farmers' responsibility. The resul t was
that many key sections of the original system were neglected, and
breached terraces and grassed waterways subsequently turned into don¬
gas. Enforcement regulations were introduced in order to try and
ensure that maintenance activities were carried out. Naturally,
these measures were resisted, and caused further resentment and
suspicion on the part of the land-holders. The Department's policy
for gaining the participation and understanding of the Basotho, were
demonstrably inadequate.
The lack of enthusiasm and the refusal of the Basotho to assume
responsibility for the maintenance of conservation structures has led
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some writers to explain the individual farmer's failure to save his
land in terms of "ignorance and apathy" [Quirion (1958), p 126].
However, it may be argued that, under the country's land tenure
rules, all land is held in trust by the Paramount Chief. The state
had thus initiated conservation schemes on its own land and peasant
farmers expected the government to protect its own investments. If
this is accepted, it is hardly surprising that the conservation meas¬
ures were bound to fail after the government ceased to assume respon¬
sibility for their maintenance.
In the event the effectiveness of the much admired physical system of
conservation structures was to a large extent vitiated by an inade¬
quate policy of encouraging participation and understanding by those
most affected by these efforts of rural development.
Colonial Rural Development: Phase II (1950-1966)
During the decade of the 1950s, a new policy of rural development in
Lesotho was initiated which sought to overcome these problems. At
that time colonial thinking was moulded by new concepts and ideolo¬
gies which stressed the value of consultation with local people and
the encouragement of community development and self-help (12). Pilot
projects were started which served, subsequently, as prototypes for
the area based projects in Lesotho funded by international aid in
recent years. Some of the more important projects will be reviewed
briefly below.
(12) It is interesting to note also the influence of American
thinking on British colonial agricultural policy at this time. It
was argued that: "One complete watershed should be taken and
turned into a miniature 'Tennessee Valley Authority'" [Department
of Agriculture Annual Report 1951, Maseru, p 12].
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Tebe-Tebeng Valley Scheme
The Tebe-Tebeng Valley Scheme was the first of the pilot projects and
was located in the lowlands in the North-West of the country. It
covered an area of 16,000 ha. with a population of approximately
8000. Planning began in 1951, and the scheme operated on a grant of
£85,900 by the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund [Nobe and
Seckler (1978), p 74]. The main aims of the project were:
"Construction of roads, protection of land by soil conser¬
vation methods, building of dams and establishment of
cooperative group farms; the Pilot Project Team is to
work with rather than for the people, and in its 1 arger
aspect the project wiTl be an experiment in Community
Development aimed at progress through the stimulation of
local initiative and self-help" (13).
Other activities included grazing control, fish farming, irrigation,
fruit tree planting, improvement of local cattle, the supply of agri¬
cultural inputs, such as improved seed, the sale of carts, the
installation of village water supply systems, and the formation of
Young Farmers' Clubs.
Substantial achievements were recorded in some of these activities.
Lands were terraced, gully erosion arrested, and many trees planted.
The Tebe-Tebeng Valley Scheme was considered to be a success in its
early stages and was expanded to include mechanised agricultural
inputs. Because of the acute shortage of animal draught power, and
the importance of ploughing and planting soon after the spring rains,
the potential of mechanisation as a means of speeding up this process
had been recognised. However, the indiscriminate use of tractors in
Lesotho is not automatically beneficial to the land, and their effect
can be to speed erosion processes as much as farming operations
(13) Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1952, Maseru.
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[Sheddick (1954), p 76], This was one of the factors that prompted
the government to set up an experimental scheme for Mechanised Group
Farming as part of the pilot project with a further grant of £31,800.
The object of the scheme was to amalgamate small holdings into blocks
large enough for economic tractor operations. Four cooperative
societies were formed, each with its own management committee.
Members were charged for tractor ploughing, planting, discing, and
harrowing.
The scheme, however, soon ran into difficulties. A great deal of
money was lost due to farmers failing to pay tractor hire charges,
the difficulties of organising economic land units, and confusion
over ownership of, and responsibility for, the machines. No project
evaluations appear to have been made but one writer noted that the
project had shown that large-scale mechanisation projects were
"impracticable in the Basutoland context" [Wallman (1969), p 118].
This study also revealed that there was a lack of seriousness in tak¬
ing into account local peoples' views. There were reports of farming
timetables being imposed, in spite of locally expressed reservations
as to their suitability for the area. With subsequent low yields
suspicion of the project amongst land-holders grew. It was also
argued that the system of communication through chiefs and official
committees did not work. Many of these problems were beginning to be
overcome but the project, nevertheless, was closed in 1957, amid much
resentment and bitterness (14).
The project marked the beginnings of Government concern for the human
element in rural development projects but, because of the regulatory
(14) Nobe and Seckler (1979), p 69; Turner (1978) reports that the
project was finally closed only in 1960.
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and enforcement methods used, the problem of protecting government
investments, including the maintenance of soil conservation struc¬
tures, grew more serious as relations between the people and the
Department of Agriculture deteriorated. The annual report noted:
"The Department field staff have of necessity become
involved in policing activities which are not strictly
their responsibility. The feeling of the people towards
the staff is reflected in their distrust of any attempt to
introduce Extension work and their unwillingness to accept
staff as the 'farmer's friend'" (15).
When, in 1958, it was decided finally to shift the Department's
emphasis from regulation to extension, it was the realisation that
the "regulatory approach" was not working, as much as the then
fashionable appeal of extension philosophy, that decided the change.
The official view noted:
"It has become apparent to this department that the solu¬
tion of the erosion problem is not to be found in mechani¬
cal structures alone, but in the reorganisation of the land
use system....There has to be complete union of the socio¬
logical and technical procedures if any measure of success
is to be achieved.." (16).
The first project in which all these factors were to be taken into
account was the Taung Reclamation Scheme.
Taung Reclamation Scheme
The scheme covered an area of 49,000 ha. in the South-West region of
the lowlands, in the Mohales Hoek District. Plans for the scheme
originated from colonial government officers, who were concerned at
the poverty stricken nature of the area, and the lack of attention
given by the people to the proper maintenance of contour furrows and
other mechanical works previously established there. The implementa-
(15) Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1957, Maseru.
(16) Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1958, Maseru.
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tion of the scheme was given further impetus by the representations
of the Paramount Chief, who was struck by the appalling erosion visi¬
ble when travelling through the region.
The scheme was to be preceded by a survey of the animal and human
populations, land use, the types of soil, and their ecological poten¬
tial. Based on this study, a first phase of the project was designed
which would involve overworked land being rested, animals being sent
temporarily out of the area to mountain cattle posts, and the closing
of fields which were unsuitable for cultivation. In the second
phase, land use was to be planned so as to maximise and sustain the
productive potential of the area.
It was estimated that a quarter of the fields would have to be closed
at any one time, and that land holders would stand to lose, at most,
only one field during any particular period. The chiefs were to
ensure that closure regulations were equitably allocated and it was
also their responsibility to explain the purpose of the scheme to the
people, and to ensure that animals were sent out to the cattle posts.
The survey was carried out in June 1956. By the spring of that year,
of
the stock were ordered out,* the district and, by the following winter,
a proportion of the fields had been closed.
Again, the scheme was initially judged to be a success [Morse
(I960)]. However, it soon became apparent that the regulations were
only exceptionally being obeyed and, by 1961, the project was judged
a complete failure. The Colonial Government decided to cut its con¬
siderable losses and withdraw from the project, despite several
structures being left unfinished, and considerable resentment and
insecurity being expressed by the local inhabitants.
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One subsequent study of the scheme [Wallman (1969)] concluded that
among the factors contributing to the failure of the project were:
[1] The administration and management of the scheme was confusing
and cumbersome. At least three branches of government had some
interest in its implementation, and each had officers in the
field operating to different schedules and responsible to dif¬
ferent administrative authorities.
[2] There was a shortage of staff and a lack of communication with
the local people. Village meetings ( 1ipitso ) and extension
work proved ineffectual, and officers were insensitive to the
economic insecurities of the farmers. Land was never properly
reallocated, and without land or animals there would be no
insurance against starvation.
[3] Political divisions acted as a further constraint to the scheme.
The chiefs were suspicious and resented the powers of the newly
elected District Council. Some politicians were keen to exploit
the difficulties experienced by the scheme, for partisan party
purposes.
"Farmech" Mechanisation Scheme
This scheme was initiated by the newly elected Mafeteng District
Council, which, in the face of opposition from the Department of
Agriculture, recommended a project which would serve as a demonstra¬
tion in mechanisation. The Council obtained a loan of £45,000 from
the High Commissioner and, in 1961, the first six of the projected
twenty-four tractors were delivered. Credit was to be made available
to farmers to pay for tractor hire and it was anticipated that
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increased income from increased crop yields would pay for the loans.
Preparatory surveys were made of the number and size of fields, and
of the likely demand for tractors.
The scheme soon ran into difficulties. The initial land measurements
were found to be inaccurate, so that the listed size and the tendered
cost of ploughing each field had to be raised by as much as 40 per
cent. Over two years the scheme deteriorated; it lost money, ran
down its capital equipment, and achieved nothing but increasing unpo-
pularity.
Wallman (1969) argues that the factors contributing to the failure of
the project were similar to those for the Taung scheme:
"(i) an ambiguity of political leadership which entails the
mutual distrust of the various arms of government and
a minimum of cooperation between them, and which has
undermined the confidence of villagers in any adminis¬
trative or government instruction;
(ii) a degree of economic insecurity so marked that the
average villager could not sensibly take the gamble of
innovation, even if he believed that the country's
economic potential warranted the effort;
(iii)a machinery of administration so cumbersome that exe¬
cutive action is hampered at every level, so remote
from villages that decisions must be taken
without reference to the people they most concern, and
so out of touch with rural life that there is little
likelihood of plans being properly communicated or of
their effect being controlled" [Wallman (1969), p
153].
Wallman concluded that:
"...the absence of necessary political and economic condi¬
tions combined with certain deficiencies of administration
and communication are basic to problems of rural develop¬
ment in Basutoland" [ibid, p 164].
The "Farmech" scheme, however, was revived. A qualified manager was
appointed, as well as an additional six field organisers who managed
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to establish a better relationship with the land-holders. The new
manager knew the language and customs of the people and quickly
gained their trust and confidence. It was made clear that the pro¬
gramme belonged to no one party and was meant to benefit all the peo¬
ple of the area. A share-cropping arrangement was initiated in order
to ease the investment risk of the farmers. The scheme produced the
only successful wheat harvest in the country in 1963, and the subse¬
quent years appeared to hold equal promise. However, as few details
of subsequent performance are available the final fate of the scheme
remains unclear. Contemporary reports of the initial period of the
second phase of the scheme indicate, however, that "Farmech" was
"....providing a valuable service in the District and [had]
a good chance of becoming the profit-making public corpora¬
tion that the original planners envisaged" [Wallman (1969),
p 152].
One of the key factors, contributing to the apparent success of the
introduction of mechanisation and technological change in the second
phase, was the degree of on site innovation, where tractor hire was
combined with traditional share-cropping arrangements. The scheme
thus highlights the importance of social aspects of technological
change.
Thaba Phatsoa Project
This area, in the north-west of the country, received special atten¬
tion from the Ministry of Agriculture for a number of years. The
principal intervention was the construction of a large earth dam with
a capacity of 3.4 million cubic metres. Other programmes involved
livestock improvement, afforestation, home economics, nutrition, pub¬
lic health campaigns and the improvement of water supplies. Irriga¬
tion of lands began in 1963, and subsidiary reservoirs and fish ponds
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were built subsequently.
Initially, the Conservation Division of the Ministry of Agriculture
absorbed all irrigation, ploughing, and other costs. In the second
year, land-holders had to pay for ploughing and fertiliser inputs.
After two years the Government pulled out of the scheme and, rather
ambitiously, handed over control to a local committee, whose subse¬
quent operations were confused and ineffective. After a year of
inactivity, the Irrigation Section of the Department of Agriculture's
Crops Division took over the management of the scheme. It was
expanded to cover 21 ha. and credit was provided to the land-holders.
Technical problems were tackled, including the need to redesign the
water channels twice before satisfactory functioning was achieved.
The project survived into the 1970s, although an economic appraisal,
in 1972, revealed that the annual return per hectare was only M 57.
In the early 1970s, it became apparent that the dam was beginning to
silt up, due to soil erosion in the catchment area. Subsequent meas¬
ures to control livestock grazing in the area were opposed by the
livestock owners, who argued that immediate benefits would accrue not
to them but only to the participants in the irrigation project.
Further proposals for a programme of livestock improvement for the
catchment area and the planting of fodder crops, which might make the
proposals for grazing control acceptable, have not yet been agreed,
even amongst the various Government Departments concerned. Few les¬
sons appear to have been learned from the earlier pilot projects
which had shown the need for an integrated programme which could
offer linked benefits.
- 224 -
Other Early Pilot Projects
Very little information exists on the other pilot projects of this
period. The Mejametalana Improvement Area Project was started in
1959; to be followed at various other dates by the Tsakholo, Tsoaing,
Leshoele Irrigation (17), Malibamatso Basin, and Roma Projects. Con¬
temporary reports describe these projects variously as "making good
progress" or being "a success", but little technical information is
provided in order to evaluate whether these descriptions have any
meaning. The style and structure of the annual reports of the
Department of Agriculture were such that failure was seldom mentioned
and detailed analyses of projects were seldom undertaken. Rather,
all mention of a project simply disappears from one annual report to
the next, with the inference that these projects had ceased to
operate.
Very little was achieved in the last years of British rule. Finan¬
cial constraints in 1964 resulted in the retrenchment of many exten¬
sion workers, and much of the stock of equipment was not renewed.
Some three-quarters of the total budget of the Department of Agricul-
ture, at this time, was absorbed by salaries [Wallman (1969), p 165].
Perhaps the most striking feature of these projects was the way in
which the mistakes and experience of the past were virtually ignored.
Little account seems to be have been taken by the "Farmech" Scheme of
the experience of cooperative mechanised farming in the first pilot
project at Tebe-Tebeng. Again, there appears to have been little
cumulative learning from the experience of soil conservation measures
(17) Reported in 1981 as still operating successfully [TFYDP, p
165].
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in the early development programmes. This lack of analysis and crit¬
ical examination of past failures and attempts at introducing techno¬
logical change in rural development projects indicates some features
about the way in which these schemes were formulated. Apart from the
"Farmech" Scheme, the pilot rural development projects were initiated
by colonial officials and it is of interest here to examine briefly
some of the colonial procedures involved in the design of these pro¬
jects.
Basutoland's major source of development funding over this period,
was the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund from which the British
Government allocated money to the Basutoland Colonial Government in
successive five-year periods. Technical departments, managed by
expatriates, originated proposals in order to compete for a portion
of this allocation. The bureaucratic machinery proved extremely
cumbersome and approval of projects could take up to eight months.
Technical departments seldom consulted with villagers in a proposed
rural development scheme, often on the grounds that the money had not
yet been secured, the timing was uncertain, and the plans and esti¬
mates were, almost certainly, to be modified before being put into
operation. Schemes which involved local participation or coordina¬
tion with other projects were therefore not favoured. The position
was further complicated by the fact that there had long been the
expectation that Basutoland might eventually be incorporated into
South Africa, and the funds allocated for development were accord¬
ingly small. For instance, Britain allocated only £1.2 million to
Basutoland between 1963 and 1965 [Wallman (1969), p 168].
Given the absence of any means for the coherent and purposeful
expression of political will in the country at this time, it is
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perhaps not surprising that development consisted of a number of
haphazard, rather ill-conceived programmes, unconnected with any
national economic development goals. Wallman notes that there was
"no real coordination and no statement of priorities that might prop¬
erly be called a development plan"[Wallman (1969), p 167].
SUMMARY
This brief review of Sesotho rural and agricultural practices, tech¬
niques and technical knowledge, and colonial attempts to introduce
technological change and improvements to agricultural productivity,
has provided an introduction to the context in which modern, post-
independence rural development projects are undertaken.
It is clear that the Mosotho farmer is remarkably resilient; he has
managed to survive for over a century, with relatively unchanged
technologies and agricultural practices, in the face of difficult
environmental, economic and political circumstances, and in spite of
some fifty years of colonial rural development schemes aimed at
inducing technological change. His survival, though, has been a tri¬
umph of social organisation, rather tixan one of technology. Since
the adoption of the plough in the mid-nineteenth century, agricul¬
tural and rural technologies have remained virtually unaltered.
There has been no widespread adoption of new technologies, or of
efforts to innovate and improve production practices.
On the other hand, local institutions associated with resource
management are well developed. For example, allocations of scarce
resources, such as land and building materials, are controlled at the
village level, and are based primarily upon need and ability to use
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them. These customs, coupled with social organisation and practices
of shared work and joint land and animal management, have ensured
that the great majority of Basotho households have had access to the
means of agricultural production.
Attempts to introduce technological change and rural development have
to be undertaken not only within an appreciation of the political,
economic and environmental constraints on rural production, but also
by giving due consideration to the complexity and importance of the
social practices to which these constraints have given rise. It is
clear that early rural development programmes did not take into con¬
sideration either the economic constraints on agricultural production
in Lesotho or the social practices and perceptions which informed
Basotho decisions regarding investment and technological change.
This disregard of indigenous values, perceptions and knowledge was
not purely bureaucratic insensitivity to Basotho aspirations.
Rather, it was a direct consequence of an ethnocentric belief that
British and European technical and agricultural knowledge was univer¬
sally applicable. Such knowledge was regarded as "scientific" and,
therefore, independent of cultural perceptions and social practice.
The appropriateness of this knowledge for the rural environment in
Lesotho was not questioned. The design of Colonial programmes, and,
indeed, subsequent interventions by aid agencies, to arrest the
decline of Sesotho agricultural production has inevitably been
affected by expatriate perceptions of Basotho agricultural practices
and of the technical improvements necessary for increased agricul¬
tural production. Although missionaries in the nineteenth century
had observed that:
"Every part of the country is once more under
cul tivation....export of grain is taking place by the
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thousand bags...the Basuto are becoming more and more
industrious " [Germond (1 967), pp 320, 321],
and remarked on the "agricultural genius of the Basuto" [Germond
(1967), p 444], many subsequent Colonial accounts stated that:
"....the Basuto are not good agricul tural i sts and do not
make the best of their natural resources" [Ashton (1939), p
153].
The influential Pirn Report, which resulted in the most extensive pro¬
gramme of soil conservation and agricultural development during colo¬
nial rule, echoed these sentiments:
"Taking the country as a whole, Basutoland has many advan¬
tages and if the Basuto were a genuinely agricultural peo¬
ple it provides all the essentials for a substantial degree
of prosperity" [Pirn (1935), p 5].
and again:
"Like all other South African tribes they have never been a
genuinely agricultural people" [ibid., p 29].
These European views of Basotho farming practices all infer an
evaluative comparison. Behind almost all descriptions of Basotho
farmers, positive or negative, loom the image of other farmers;
perhaps poorer, but most often better farmers. In almost all colo¬
nial accounts, the comparative image is unmistakably European.
Some observers may have attempted to be relatively even-handed, and
simply recorded Basotho agricultural techniques and customs with
minimum evaluation [eg. Sheddick (1954)]. For many others, though,
particularly those involved with the technical side of agricul ture
and improvement schemes, despair at Basotho farming practices and
attitudes was based on an image of what constituted "proper" farming
practice. The assumption of the Pirn report appeared to be that
Lesotho was potentially prosperous and could be so if only the people
were "genuine" farmers. "Non-genuine" farmers could not be expected
to know what is necessary or proper for farm or resource management.
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Indigenous technical knowledge and concepts were thus considered
valueless and British conservation efforts did little to incorporate
native contributions, except as suppliers of labour power under expa¬
triate supervision. The ethnocentricity of Colonial administrators
ignored the possibility that there could be a coherent Basotho agri¬
cultural knowledge and social practice which could resist and chal¬
lenge the imposition of foreign technologies which appeared to make
little sense, and which could only be regarded as being of secondary
importance to Basotho prosperity.
The extensive terracing of lands was one of the proudest achievements
of the programme which resulted from the Pirn Report; no other rural
development programme has since had such an impact upon the landscape
of Lesotho. Many of the conservation structures are still in evi¬
dence today and most fields are generally laid out along contour
lines. It is thus fatuous to argue that all British conservation
works were a complete failure. There must have been some dissemina¬
tion of technical knowledge over the extended period in which these
works were undertaken. But Basotho farmers never identified them¬
selves with these schemes, and there was never a significant move¬
ment, either at the individual or village level, to adopt all the
conservation practices, or maintain or extend the works. The
emphasis of the programme was entirely on the mechanical construction
of conservation works according to preconceived objectives and
designs.
This insensitivity to Sesotho traditional knowledge and agricultural
practices, and the inability to communicate with and ensure farmer
participation, was also reflected in colonial pilot rural development
projects. Although Colonial programmes were influenced by the
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prevailing ideologies of community development and agricultural
extension, incorporation of these principles of involvement and
mobilisation of the local community was restricted, in practice, to
rhetoric in project documents.
Community development was a concept which was popular in the 1950s.
It was a deliberate reaction to the sectoral rural development
approach which paid insufficient attention to local participation and
the incorporation of the rural poor in development efforts. It was
based on the assumption that the mobilisation and development of com¬
munity resources, both human and physical, motivated by the multi¬
purpose village worker, and supplemented with credit and the supply
of necessary inputs, would lead to the modernisation of agrarian
societies. In practice, over-stretched in its aims, starved of
investment resources, oblivious to local practices, community
development came to be seen as a combination of welfare services,
agricultural extension and construction of small-scale works on a
self-help basis. By the mid-1960s it had become apparent that com¬
munity development had produced few results and the concept began to
be abandoned.
The initiation of the first pilot project,Tebe-Tebeng, was a response
to the realisation that tree planting and the construction of soil
conservation works had been largely unsuccessful because they had
been undertaken in isolation from rural productive activities and had
not involved rural people. The project was designed to "work with
people" and was to be an "experiment in Community Development aimed
at progress through the stimulation of local initiative and self-
help". Although the project was relatively broad in scope and cou¬
pled soil conservation activities with crop and livestock improvement
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schemes, and the betterment of village infrastructure, it is clear
that the project did not incorporate the noble principles enunciated
in its design. The project originated from, and was imposed by,
Colonial officials, and technological change was still seen in purely
technical terms: mechanisation, the supply of improved inputs, and
the direct transfer of European agricultural and technical knowledge.
Local participation and involvement in the scheme was not achieved
and agricultural extension staff had to resort to policing activi¬
ties.
Similar ideas of technological change were incorporated in the next
large rural development scheme at Taung. Although contemporary
reports of the Department of Agriculture noted explicitly that "there
has to be a complete union of sociological and technical procedures",
there is no evidence that this new approach was adopted. The Taung
project was among the first to undertake extensive surveys of the
project area, but these were confined to the collection of physical
data only. Once again, as in other Colonial rural development pro¬
jects, there was little attempt to incorporate the knowledge and
views of the supposed beneficiaries of these schemes. No socio¬
economic surveys were undertaken, and there was little on-site exper¬
imentation and research on appropriate farming methods.
The overall impact of attempts to introduce technological change, in
the Colonial period, was negligible and the comment must be made that
there is no evidence of any adoption of technical improvements by
rural Basotho as a result of these rural development programmes.
Rural development programmes originated mostly from Colonial offi¬
cials, and the nature of the technical improvements which were
- 232 -
attempted were affected by ethnocentric assumptions concerning the
universal validity of European technical knowledge, by the prevailing
ideologies of the period, by the denigration of indigenous knowledge
and perceptions, and disregard of the social dimensions of technolog¬
ical change. These themes will be explored in the following chapter
which is devoted to an examination of the impact of international aid
on post-independence rural development programmes and projects.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL AID
ON POST-INDEPENDENCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT
Following Lesotho's independence from British Colonial rule, in 1966,
both the amount of development aid and the number of donor agencies
involved in the country have increased dramatically. In 1979, the
amount of official development assistance disbursed to Lesotho was,
in real terms, more than six times that disbursed in 1970, and it is
estimated that more than 70 different agencies have contributed to
Lesotho's development budget. The importance of aid to Lesotho's
economy is reflected in the fact that net official development assis¬
tance amounts to more than 90 per cent of gross domestic investment
[World Bank (1981b), pp 164,165; UNDP (1980a)].
Much of this aid has been directed towards the rural sector. There
has been the recognition that because the great majority of Basotho
live in rural areas, and because agriculture contributes approxi¬
mately 40 per cent towards GDP, rural development constitutes a key
area for development investment. Lesotho's rural development expen¬
diture has been almost wholly financed by international aid agencies,
which have played a key role in shaping rural development policy.
This chapter seeks to examine, in some detail, the effect of the
involvement of international agencies in rural development and pro¬
grammes of technological change in Lesotho.
These high levels of aid did not occur immediately after indepen¬
dence, however, and it it was some years before the increased levels
of development assistance began to have a significant impact on rural
development. At the time of the inception of the First Five Year
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Development Plan, in 1970, the annual agricultural budget for
recurrent expenditure was Ml million and for capital expenditure -
MO.6 million [World Bank (1975a), p 42]. These low levels are indi¬
cative of the lack of rural development effort before, and immedi¬
ately after, independence. Capital expenditure on rural development,
during this time, was confined to some improvements in existing
facilities, and to small pilot development projects in conservation
and irrigation. The main effort of the Ministry of Agriculture was
in the lowlands and was aimed at slowing down the alarming rate of
erosion.
Government annual development expenditure on agriculture in the First
Five Year Plan was to increase from MO.6 million to Ml.6 million.
Over the five year period, M2 million was to be devoted to irrigation
projects, M250,000 to crop research, and MO. 8 million to the Leribe
Pilot Project [SFYDP, p 78]. In the first three years of the Plan,
however, no more than MO.7 million a year was spent on the develop¬
ment of agriculture [World Bank (1975a), p 42].
The Lesotho government and donor agencies began to see the disap¬
pointingly low level of farmer response to rural development pro¬
grammes as lying in part in its failure to demonstrate the benefits
to farmers in terms of short-term income earning potential. This
recognition led government policy makers, in the late 1960s, to seek
international aid agency funding for semi-autonomous, area-based
crash projects aimed at modernising agriculture and producing visible
results within a relatively short period.
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LARGE AREA BASED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
Liphiring Integrated Project
One of the first of these projects was the Liphiring Integrated Pro¬
ject, which aimed at increasing rural productivity through improved
dryland farming and livestock development. It was situated in the
Mohales Hoek District in the same area in which the Taung project had
previously been undertaken in the late 1950s. The Western part of
the Mohales Hoek district is one of the driest areas in the country
and is still severely eroded. A second conservation scheme had been
initiated there in 1968-1970 and had concentrated mainly on the con¬
struction of conservation terraces and contour banks.
In 1971, Britain gave a grant of M58,000 for a new project, the
objectives of which were:
[1] to increase the cash income of the people, with a consequent
"enhancement of their prosperity and an enrichment of their
1ives";
[2] to initiate improved cropping patterns and practices on land
suitable for arable farming;
[3] to improve the quality of the livestock of the area and hence to
provide a base for intensified livestock production; and
[4] to intensify on-going programmes of soil and water conservation.
The project covered an area of 1130 ha., of which some 400 ha. were
arable. An association was formed for participation in the project
and was joined initially by 111 of the 220 households in the area.
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The lands of member households were amalgamated into two blocks of
240 ha. and 40 ha., thus forming the largest consolidated farming
units in the country. The profits from the sale of the agricultural
produce were to be shared amongst participants in proportion to their
original holdings of land. Livestock improvement proposals included
the culling of stock by one third.
The main assumption on which the project was based was that wheat
yields could be increased. In the event they declined, resulting in
an overall loss for the project. The livestock culling proposal was
fiercely resisted, and, consequently, never implemented. Finally, in
1977, the project was terminated when it was recognised that wheat
could not be grown profitably in the area, and that local farmers
would not agree to the livestock "improvement" scheme.
The failure of yet another project in this same area seems incredi¬
ble. It appears that people joined the project as a result of the
imploring of a charismatic chief of the area and after stern lectures
by the then Deputy Prime Minister, who was also from southern
Lesotho. But government support was far from adequate. No socio¬
economic studies of the area were undertaken, there had been little
on-site research on wheat varieties, and the design of the project
was unrealistic. Even the early optimistic estimates, which included
the livestock programme, predicted a net annual return to each family
of about M95, an amount which would hardly have met their subsistence
needs and could not have created possibilities for prosperity.
Leribe/Khomokhoana Projects
The Leribe Project (known initially as the UNDP Pilot Agricultural
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Scheme) began in 1970 as a pilot project. It was the first substan¬
tial post-independence rural development scheme undertaken in Lesotho
and covered 1000 households and an area of 2000 ha. in the vicinity
of Hlotse (Leribe), across the border from the South African town of
Ficksburg. A significant proportion of the population of the area
migrated daily to work in Ficksburg. The nearness of this town, with
its attendant labour opportunities, markets, and sources of supplies,
coupled with relatively fertile soils, a low incidence of soil ero¬
sion, and reasonably good road communications, did not exactly pro¬
vide a typical area for the siting of a pilot scheme for the low-
1ands.
The Leribe Project was designed to demonstrate the impact on produc¬
tion and income of an integrated approach to agricultural development
within the existing system of land tenure. It concentrated on the
application of relatively simple packages of inputs, including
mechanisation, improved seed, insecticides, fertiliser, and extension
services. It was also designed to test the acceptability and effec¬
tiveness of semi-cooperative farmer organisations. There were train¬
ing programmes for agricultural staff, and soil conservation works
were undertaken.
The UNDP contributed $1.48 million to the project, over a five year
period, and the Government of Lesotho's contribution was $602,000.
In the project area yields of traditional crops doubled, as did cash
incomes, although, in individual terms, this amounted to an increase
from only M20 to M40 a year. An initial evaluation concluded that
the project demonstrated that farmers are responsive to improved
agricultural techniques [World Bank (1975a), p 43].
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The scheme was phased out, in 1975, when some aspects were incor¬
porated into a much larger agricultural project in the adjacent Kho-
mokhoana catchment area, encompassing 19,000 ha. of which 13,000 ha.
were cultivated. The enlarged scheme, known as the Khomokhoana Rural
Development Project, was financed by the Government of Sweden (SIDA),
through the FA0, with a grant of $2.8 million. In addition, the
government of Lesotho also contributed Ml.45 million, over a five
year period from April 1975. Much of SIDA's contribution was
expended on expatriate salaries. Although the project director was a
Mosotho, a high proportion of project staff were expatriates, includ¬
ing the extension officer, farm mechanisation specialist, soil con¬
servationist, soil conservation engineer, animal production officer,
marketing and credit officer, production economist, field agronomist,
administrative officer, and special consultants.
The goal of the project was the intensification of crop and livestock
production, and was to be achieved through improved systems of
credit, input, and marketing facilities, integration of conservation
works with agricultural production, and involvement of farmers
[SFYDP, p 85].
Although the Khomokhoana Project grew out of a pilot scheme, its
goals, nevertheless, were overambitious. Yield increases in the
demonstration plots were impressive but were less so on farmers'
fields in the project area. Dissemination of knowledge was ranked
high as a project objective but met with only limited success.
According to project personnel, this was mainly due to the lack of
effectiveness of extension staff. Lack of capital, of technical and
management skills, and of suitable equipment were listed as major
constraints. Risk of financial loss, lack of formal production
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incentives, and an attitude that agriculture is only a supplementary
income source, were noted as constraints on farmers' acceptance of
the development programmes.
A number of the project's activities were dependent on the efficient
operation of sophisticated machinery. The project staff reported
that:
"Unfortunately, most of the Project's activities depend on
the availability of the correct equipment, working at the
correct time and properly supervised. In many cases the
lack of staff has made this impossible An example of
this problem is that 112 working days, were lost during the
six month period by the Project s two bulldozers while they
awaited repairs" [FAO/SIDA (1977), p 2].
It was also noted that the project's two combine harvesters, used for
harvesting wheat, broke down a number of times. Project staff
ascribed this to the high proportion of time spent manoeuvring in
small fields and travelling over rough access tracks.
The project made good progress in integrating crop and livestock
efforts with conservation activities. Less progress was made on
integrating project activities with the long-term activities of the
Ministry of Agriculture, with the consequence that many of the les¬
sons learned, and much of the knowledge gained, were lost on the
departure of project staff. Nevertheless, the government later
claimed that:
"A substantial amount of information has been gained which
has been utilised in the formulation and implementation of
the Thaba-Bosiu and Senqu Projects which started later in
the [First Five Year Development] Plan period" [SFYDP, p
8].
The Khomokhoana project was terminated in mid-1980, at the end of the
planned funding period.
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Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project
Soon after the commencement of the Leribe Pilot Project, an agricul¬
tural extension project was initiated in one of the poorest parts of
the country - the Senqu River valley, in September 1972. The pro¬
ject was to promote agricultural development, through strengthening
the extension effort, in the two southern districts of Mohales Hoek
and Quthing.
The project area is divided into four distinct ecological zones: the
Senqu River valley (35%), lowlands (10%), foothills (5%), and moun¬
tain region (50%). Arable land is limited to about 10 per cent of the
project area. The population of the two districts was estimated as
219,000. Seven areas which showed particular potential for improve¬
ment were selected initially for special attention. Data gathering
and planning w«>ce. designed to prepare the agricultural sector in this
entire region for a large scale comprehensive rural development pro¬
gramme. Extension efforts were to concentrate on consolidated dry¬
land farming, irrigation, livestock production, range management, and
conservation.
The project began soon after the ending of the preparatory phase in
April 1974. The UNDP contributed $ 219,500 and the Government of
Lesotho M49,000 for the preparatory phase of the project. During
phase I, the UNDP contributed a further $1.54 million and the Govern¬
ment of Lesotho M215,700. A large proportion (48%) of the UNDP's
contribution was absorbed by the salaries of expatriate personnel,
who filled the positions of project manager, agronomist, watershed
management officer, animal production officer, extension/training
officer, range management officer, farm management economist, crop
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production officer, rural sociologist, administrator, credit market¬
ing officer, surveyor, and mechanic [Nobe and Seckler (1979), p
107],
The project absorbed almost the entire staff of the Agricultural
Extension Service of the Mohales Hoek and Quthing Districts. A
senior District Extension Officer was assigned as project co-manager.
On paper, the project was responsible to the Permanent Secretary of
the Ministry of Agriculture in his capacity as chairman of the Pro¬
ject Coordinating Committee, which comprised the Permanent Secre¬
taries of the Ministries of Interior, Works, Education, and Health,
the Directors of Central Planning and the Bureau of Statistics, the
District Chiefs, farmers' representatives, and UNDP and FAO person¬
nel. In practice, the committee met only once. Of more value were
the monthly meetings of the District Coordinating Committee, which
involved all the senior district staff of the various ministries, and
the project staff.
The long term objectives of the Senqu River Agricultural Extension
Project were to assist the Government of Lesotho in meeting its
national aim of raising agricultural production above subsistence
levels, and to promote cash cropping. To achieve these targets it
was believed necessary to:
[1] identify the constraints to rural development in the project
area;
[2] determine and demonstrate the economic feasibility of overcoming
these constraints; and
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[3] strengthen the Government services to carry out development
activities [Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project (1978), p
2].
The immediate objectives of the project were to:
[1] expand the application of sound animal production practices
through improved feeding, breeding and management;
[2] expand the application of sound crop production;
[3] demonstrate economic methods of irrigation, and fodder produc¬
tion;
[4] expand conservation works and practices;
[5] provide short- and medium-term credit;
[6] leave behind a well-trained cadre of national staff; and
[7] assist Government in the formulation of a comprehensive rural
development plan for the entire project area [Senqu River Agri¬
cultural Extension Project (1977a), pp 2,3].
In April 1976, a UNDP/FAO Project Formulation Mission completed a
Phase II Project design and forwarded it to the UNDP for approval and
funding under the UNDP/Government of Lesotho Country Programme. It
seemed as though the next phase of the project would proceed [SFYDP,
p 85], but this funding was not approved, and the Senqu River Agri¬
cultural Extension Project was terminated in August 1976. Most of
the experienced staff were lost, but a small contingent stayed on
under the Ministry of Agriculture in an effort to integrate the ongo¬
ing activities with the planned Basic Agricultural Services Programme
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(BASP). By late 1977, most of the machinery and equipment had been
reallocated to BASP and the last of the FAO expatriates were prepar¬
ing to leave.
Many of the activities of the project were, in effect, failures. One
survey noted that:
"Consolidated blocks rarely produced high yields, were not
received favourably by the farmers, lost money in almost
all cases, and were finally closed down" [Senqu River Agri¬
cultural Extension Project (1978), p 2].
Another survey remarked that a
"....common response of farmers when asked about the Senqu
Project is to say they know nothing about it" [Senqu River
Agricultural Extension Project (1977a), p 32].
In 1978, it was reported that irrigation equipment worth M50,000 was
lying unused in the project area [Nobe and Seckler (1979), p 113].
One of the more worthwhile aspects of the project was the number of
detailed socio-economic surveys of rural households and attitudes
towards farming which were undertaken. Unfortunately, by the time
these had been produced, the project was already being phased out. A
"Socio-Economic Technical Report" undertaken by the Project, suggests
that the constraints to agricultural development are as much social
as they are economic:
" the philosophy behind this study is that, in order to
design a project which is socially and economically feasi¬
ble and sustainable, and in which the rural farmers would
have sufficient confidence to carry out the work on their
own initiative, it is necessary to have a deep and careful
knowledge of the farmers' attitudes, practices and prob¬
lems, and to involve the farmers at all stages of the local
planning and implementation process" [Senqu River Agricul¬
tural Extension Project (1978), p 2].
The survey of farming practices revealed that only one third of the
farmers used any recommended practices and that very few used all of
them. This situation was possibly worse than if they had used none
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at all, as often the successful use of one practice requires the use
of others. Thus resources were wasted without achieving signifi¬
cantly improved production.
The survey also found that farmers know that they have problems with
crop production, but are not optimistic about solving them. The
major problems are perceived to be cutworms, drought, animals eating
their crops, erosion, poor farming, lack of supplies, theft, late
ploughing and weeds. They knew that the solutions to these problems,
require insecticide, better farming, rain, fencing, tractors, terrac¬
ing, irrigation, and grazing control for animals. These solutions
either require money or labour or good weather, none of which is
available in abundance. Only one half of the farmers interviewed for
the survey believed that their needs were being satisfied from their
fields, and many recognised that their yields were low. Only a quar¬
ter of these farmers thought that their fields were improving, while
40 per cent thought that good rains were what was needed. More farm¬
ers were prepared to wait for nature to help them than to respond to
the new technologies being introduced by project officers. The con¬
straints on rural development were further compounded by the lack of
understanding by project personnel of these farmer perceptions [Senqu
River Agricultural Extension Project (1978), p 8]. The survey stated
further that:
"At the same time that the farmers on the consolidated
blocks did little and produced less in their fields within
the blocks, there were individual farmers in the Senqu Pro¬
ject area who, unknown to the Project were obtaining
good yields, earning modest sums through sales of their
surplus, and demonstrated good farming practices to their
neighbours" [Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project
(1978), p 1].
These better (and wealthier) farming households differed in many ways
from the ordinary households. They had more family members, in
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particular, more males at home. They had more fields and implements,
they tended to use the recognised improved agricultural practices,
and their yields were higher. This group of farmers were also more
likely to encourage their sons to work on the farm, rather than to
migrate to the mines of South Africa.
The Senqu Project aimed to identify and overcome the constraints to
rural development. The report argues that their surveys demonstrated
that these constraints were already being overcome by the better
farmers. They had the resources, the motivation and the knowledge
which the ordinary farmers lacked, and as a result they used adequate
farming practices, and managed to produce enough for home consumption
as well as a surplus for sale. In contrast, the Senqu River Project
made net losses in such activities as farming the consolidated
blocks.
The survey suggested that in order to meet the third objective of the
project, namely the strengthening of services to carry out develop¬
ment objectives, it was necessary to study the motivation and methods
of the better farmers and find ways to transfer their motivation and
methods to the ordinary farmers.
What the survey does not mention, is that these "better" farmers were
obviously wealthier and had access to resources which poorer farmers
lacked. Clearly, any programme aimed at poorer farmers would need to
take into account the problems of access to resources.
The project, however, never had the opportunity to act on these find¬
ings, or to base their programmes for the ordinary farmer on these
considerations. In many respects the 52 months of the project can be
viewed as an experiment - but one which was never expanded into a
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programme of technological change which might have allowed the possi¬
bility of improved economic development of the area.
Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project
The Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project was designed after a visit
by teams from the International Development Association (IDA) and
USAID, in March, 1972. It was the first USAID/World Bank joint agri¬
cultural development project in Lesotho, and if successful, was to be
replicated in the rest of the country.
The Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project began in 1973 after the
negotiation of credit of $5.6 million from the IDA, and receipt of a
grant of $3.3 million from the USAID. It was planned to run for six
years, to March 1979, and it was estimated that the total project
cost would be approximately $12 million, with the UNCDF contributing
$185,000 and the Government of Lesotho approximately $3 million. The
j
IDA loan was to be repaid in semi-annual installments commencing in
1983, ten years after signing the agreement. Interest repayments
were to be one percent per annum for the principal amount for the
first ten years (1983-1993), and at three percent of the principal
amount for the next thirty years [Nobe and Seckler (1979), p 86].
The Project had the goal of improving the livelihood of 17,500 rural
households in a 121,000 ha. area in the lowlands and foothills not
far from the capital, Maseru.
The project's objectives were:
[1] to provide a more assured subsistence and to increase the income
derived from crop and livestock production;
[2] to control erosion and transform land use patterns to permit the
introduction of a permanent system of integrated farming combin¬
ing rotational cropping with improved livestock production; and
[3] to provide data for the preparation of similar rural development
projects in other areas [Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project
(1975), p 1].
The project's activities were classified as "simple", "complex", or
"special".
"The Project does not offer ready-made solutions based on
pre-conceived ideas but endeavours rather to provide
appropriate services to meet farmers' stated needs (simple
activities). Where farmers are not sure what they do need
and previous services have been only partially successful
(e.g. soil conservation, commercial milk production and the
introduction of a sound permanent farming system) great
care is taken to assess realistically the resources avail¬
able, obtain a clear picture of the socio-economic scene
and, through continuous dialogue with the community con¬
cerned, modify the preliminary technical solution until it
is realistic, appropriate and accepted (complex activi¬
ties)" [Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project (1975), p 1].
Simple activities were in response to calls from farming households
for the timely supply of farm inputs for the four main crops: maize,
sorghum, beans and wheat. It was considered that there were no
social constraints on the adoption by individual farmers of the
inputs and of the improved methods of using them. The simple activi¬
ties consisted of three interdependent elements:
[1] a supplies and marketing system to put the inputs within reach
of the farmers at the right time;
[2] the spot repair and maintenance of tracks and roads to permit
the inputs to reach the distribution points; and
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[3] demonstration of the value of the inputs, instruction in
improved use of the inputs, and the repair, and instruction in
the use, of farm implements.
Complex activities consisted of the introduction of new land use pat¬
terns to entire communities, which would enable farmers to follow
improved soil conservation and livestock husbandry methods and
develop sound integrated farming systems. The following elements
were to be included:
[1] soil surveys and land use classification;
[2] revised land use plans incorporating fodder production in con¬
servation programmes;
[3] the installation of a complete system of conservation measures;
and
[4] instruction of the whole community in conservation and animal
and crop husbandry.
Special activities included such projects as the limited introduction
of asparagus as a high value cash crop and the setting up of an
asparagus cannery.
Some 70 village distribution points (VDPs), supplied through 7 pro¬
ject operated stores, were set up. Demonstration plots were esta¬
blished at many of the VDPs, and various other extension activities,
such as short courses for farmers, 1 ipitso , and field days were
organised. Agricultural research was also undertaken. A mobile
repair service was initiated, as well as a credit scheme. Some 74 km
of access roads were constructed in order to facilitate the supply of
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farm inputs, and the marketing of produce. A soil conservation
scheme was begun which included: aerial surveys and mapping; a soil
survey; land use and conservation planning; dialogue with the commun¬
ity; and, finally, the construction of conservation works. An inter¬
nal project report claimed that:
"Many meetings were held with the community at large and
also with an advisory committee elected by the people. The
conservation plan was thoroughly studied, discussed and
modified in detail until understood and accepted by the
community" [Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project (1975), p
13].
All divisions of the project, with the exception of the extension
division, were controlled and managed by expatriates, who filled the
following positions: project manager; senior economist; economist;
anthropologist; senior agronomist and two assistant agronomists; per¬
sonal secretary to the project manager; clerical supervisor; chief
finance officer; chief conservation and roads officer; conservation
engineer; conservation and land planning officer; conservation layout
officer; workshop manager; equipment officer; chief development and
training officer; and agricultural machinery officer.
After only two years' operation the staff were so confident of the
success of the overall project that they recommended that a second
phase be funded for the period 1977 to 1981, which would expand the
simple activities of the project throughout the lowland and
foothills, and which would continue the more complex activities
within a Thaba Bosiu Phase II Project. However, internal project
reports at the time stated:
"The Project does not yet know if yields and income have
been raised by Project activities....farmers themselves
[however] have been quick to take advantage of Project
facilities. Virtually without credit they have increased
their consumption of fertiliser by 33% " [Thaba Bosiu
Rural Development Project (1975), p 28].
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The project had achieved its aim of increasing the supply and availa¬
bility of inputs, but there was nevertheless little evidence to
demonstrate that yields, and more important, incomes had risen. The
farmers had thus probably incurred losses and were almost certainly
worse off. Furthermore, reports at the time mentioned that:
"There were serious communication failures, where activi¬
ties were performed but farmers were simply not made aware
of them. For example, the availability of credit was not
known to many farmers; leaflets were not distributed well
enough and too few farmers listened to broadcasts; compara¬
tively few farmers were reached through field days.
Many Project activities were poorly executed. For example,
some demonstration plots were failures, supervision and
performance of VDP agents was uneven, there were labour
management problems in conservation works, some research
trials were lost and there were delays in the production of
socio-economic studies" [ibid., p 29].
One constraint which was mentioned was the shortage of" qualified
local and foreign staff. Even by the the end of the second year of
operation, the most crucial section of the programme - extension work
- was only half staffed.
A decision was initially taken by the Government of Lesotho to super¬
sede the Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project by creating two
further projects [SFYDP, p 84]. A Basic Agricultural Services Pro¬
ject (BASP) would expand the simple activities of the Thaba Bosiu
Project throughout the lowlands by building a national farm supplies
and marketing network at village level with coordinated provision for
extension, credit and road building. Later, a Thaba Bosiu II Project
would continue the complex activities associated with conservation,
livestock, integrated farming, asparagus and other high value crops
within the original Thaba Bosiu I boundaries.
In the event, BASP took much longer to activate than had originally
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been envisaged and the decision to proceed with Thaba Bosiu II was
revoked. Activities dependent on the IDA loan were terminated in
October 1977, when these funds were exhausted. Those activities
dependent on USAID funds (mainly conservation works) continued until
March 1979. The asparagus project and cannery have continued to
operate.
A substantial overall evaluation of the Thaba Bosiu Rural Development
Project was never undertaken. The above analysis has indicated that
little progress was achieved in increasing crop yields and outputs,
on which most of the original project justification was based. One
research paper has noted that some progress was made in "disseminat¬
ing technical knowledge, including development of basic research
data" [Nobe and Seckler (1979), p 101], but little evidence is sup¬
plied in support of this contention. Enormous sums of money were
spent with apparently very little to show for it. It has been calcu¬
lated that the cost of the conservation measures amounted to nearly
£185 per ha. (M146 per acre) [Nobe and Seckler (1979), p 101]. Such
an investment seems disproportionately high when it is remembered
that nearly 30 years previously, following the conservation programme
initiated as a result of the Pirn Report, farmers were unwilling to
protect government investments of only £1.50 per ha. [Quirrion
(1958), p 125].
Project and aid agency staff have argued that one of the major
successes of the project was the degree of institutional innovation
it achieved, through the creation of an autonomous administrative
authority for the project, and which enabled far greater efficiency
in management and execution of activities. The project could circum¬
vent many of the government bureaucratic delays, inter-departmental
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conflicts and lack of coordination. It was planned that, on the com¬
pletion of the project, the administrative and infrastructural com¬
ponents of the project would be absorbed by the BASP programme within
the Ministry of Agriculture. But, by 1979, a donor had still not
been found for this block of the programme, and much of the adminis¬
trative structure had disappeared. Trained staff moved elsewhere,
thus eliminating much of the hard work and experience of the
previous four years.
Indeed, the anomaly of an autonomous project authority, with a high
concentration of expatriate staff, and with the ability to recruit
some of the best qualified Basotho into highly paid jobs, was not
sustainable, and was bound to collapse once the donor funding was
exhausted. A fair amount of antagonism developed between the govern¬
ment and the project management over its employment practices, which
often involved hiring opposition (BCP) supporters contrary to govern¬
ment policy. The government was determined that the project would
not be seen as a "BCP Project" and this was one factor amongst
those which contributed to the decision not to extend the project in
1977.
COUNTRY-WIDE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES
Basic Agricultural Services Programme (BASP)
The strategy of agricultural development in the mid-1970s was centred
on the three area-based projects just reviewed - namely, Khomokhoana,
Senqu and Thaba Bosiu. It was realised subsequently that this
approach had several distinct drawbacks. The area-based projects,
with a high degree of expatriate support and substantial resources,
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operated in a largely autonomous manner without adequate coordination
with government programmes. It was decided subsequently to absorb
these projects into the planning and administrative structure of the
Ministry of Agriculture; and to pursue programmes with a wider and
more diffuse impact. It was within this context that BASP was con¬
ceived and planned, with the assistance of the World Bank's Regional
Mission in East Africa, in 1976 and 1977.
BASP was intended to operate throughout the lowlands and foothills of
Lesotho, covering an area of some 295,000 ha. of arable land. It was
based on the experience and achievements of the principal area-based
rural development projects of the early and mid-1970s. The programme
was to involve the development of physical infrastructure such as
roads and stores, the provision of inputs, credit, extension and out¬
put marketing facilities. The programme also aimed to strengthen the
capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture to plan, implement and evalu¬
ate projects, and included a substantial training component. In con¬
trast to the major area-based projects, BASP attempted to induce a
gradual, incremental improvement to farming practices and yields, but
as the programme aimed to include most of Lesotho's farmers, the
envisaged national increase in agricultural production was to be sub¬
stantial .
An underlying assumption in the design of BASP was that Basotho farm¬
ers respond rationally to their options and constraints. The design
of the programme recognised the marginal contribution of income from
agriculture to the average rural household's total income, the "pull
factor" of labour opportunities in South Africa, the high risk of a
crop failure, and that land is thus perceived by rural households
chiefly as a source of security, rather than as a source of income
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[SFYDP, p 86]. The project's objectives imply, though, that it is
still necessary to support the domestic agricultural sector and
render it more productive where possible.
The estimated cost, in May 1978, for the 1977-1981 period was M23
million ($26.4 million), and the foreign exchange component was
estimated at $15.2 million (58%). Programme costs were originally to
be financed by: the World Bank/IDA - $6 million; Federal Republic of
Germany - $4.7 million; the U.K. - $3.9 million; the European
Development Fund - $3.9 million; the UNDP - $0.02 million; the
Government of Lesotho - $7.7 million, and the farmers' own contribu¬
tion - $1.1 million. Of the IDA contribution, $3.8 million was to go
to the foreign exchange cost of internationally recruited staff;
$500,000 towards the foreign exchange costs for vehicles and equip¬
ment; $900,000 for the costs of civil works; and the remaining
$800,000 for operating expenses including local salaries and wages.
The economic rate of return for the project, calculated over 25
years, was estimated at 13 per cent [Guma (n.d.), p 2]. BASP has a
staff of approximately 720, including 29 internationally recruited
aid personnel. The project was designed to bring benefits to approx¬
imately 128,000 households, either directly through increased input
supplies, credit and extension services, or indirectly through the
improved infrastructure.
Initially, there was some disagreement between the World Bank and the
government of Lesotho; the former preferred component funding, but
the latter, with the backing of individual donors, preferred, and
ultimately obtained, block funding (i.e. donors would fund complete
programmes in particular areas, rather than particular functions
within BASP). Six areas were to be established, each with their own
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management and central office. A BASP Division was established at
the Ministry of Agriculture. Its purpose was to strengthen the
mangement capability of the Ministry, and to coordinate and supervise
the implementation of BASP.
The programme took much longer to get started than was originally
anticipated. This was partly due to additional demands on scarce
skilled staff for the formulation and reconciliation of the different
objectives of the winter wheat cultivation programme.
A strong monitoring and evaluation component was built into the pro¬
gramme:
*1. To survey and diagnostically analyse what is going on
in any given development area both in respect to
sociologic attitude and economic reality.
2. To find out some hitherto scientifically unrecognised
local technologies in order to appreciate the indi¬
genous practices and study their applicability as
appropriate technologies vis-a-vis the modern techno-
1ogies.
3. To apply the results of such study in formulating
applicable policies and designing practical strategies
which, upon implementation of the relevant
project/programme, should ensure reasonable success in
solving the area's socio-economic problems.
4. To use the resulting baseline data as benchmark
against which the effects, impacts, implications and
validity of the implemented project is measured" (1).
Extensive base-line socio-economic surveys were completed and com¬
puter processed. This included data on labour, land, farm resources,
related agronomic and ecological factors, and farmer attitudes.
BASP is still operating, but it is too early to assess its
(1) Guma (n.d.), p4. Grammar, spelling, punctuation and numbering
anomalies in this, and other quotes in this case study, have not
been corrected or altered from the original documents.
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performance or effectiveness.
Winter Wheat Programme / Cooperative Crop Production Programme
In 1976, the Ministry of Agriculture undertook to share-crop large
areas of arable land in the lowlands for the growing of winter wheat
in a mechanised farming operation. Based on the traditional concept
of share-cropping, but with the government and farmers as partners,
it was hoped that the project would raise Lesotho's agricultural out¬
put by exploiting the large proportion of land which lies fallow in
winter. There was also the desire within high levels of government
to demonstrate improvements in Lesotho's agricultural output on the
occasion of the country's tenth anniversary of independence.
The result was the ambitious Winter Wheat Programme, which severely
stretched the resources of the Ministry of Agriculture. The govern¬
ment supported all expenses, including seed, ploughing, planting,
discing, harrowing, fertiliser, and combine harvesting. After har¬
vest, the farmer was to pay the government M30 per hectare, either in
cash or in wheat, according to its official price. The harvest was
then to be divided equally between government and land-holders. The
government also undertook to buy the farmers' share at a fixed rate.
Land-holders were to be responsible for weeding, threshing, and other
non-mechanised operations. The scheme was to be restricted to four
areas along the western edge of the country; Peka, Mafeteng, Khubet-
soana, and Rakolo. South African farmers were to be involved, as
contractors, for the various mechanised operations.
Basotho farmers responded enthusiastically to this opportunity. The
project design intended that 12,000 ha. would be planted, but only
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3100 ha. were finally involved in the scheme. A shortage of com¬
petent staff to manage the project meant that contractors were over¬
paid, excessive fertiliser was used, and seeding rates were exceeded.
There was also the problem of storage for the harvested grain. The
government reportedly sustained losses of between M300,000 and
M360.000.
The programme was later renamed the Cooperative Crop Production Pro¬
gramme (CCPP). It has been claimed that yields finally proved to be
40 to 50 per cent higher than the national average [TFYDP, p 167].
On the government's own admission, though, the programme still had
serious drawbacks. Chief of these was the huge financial losses the
government was incurring. The programme was modified to provide for
cost sharing between the government and the farmers, except for the
ploughing costs, which were to be contributed by the government as a
subsidy. Even this refinement was not sufficient to prevent the pro¬
ject from incurring further substantial losses.
Consequently in mid-1979, following much criticism from donor agen¬
cies, it was decided to reassess the programme, and explore other
approaches for accelerating yield increases and production.
SMALL AREA-BASED INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
Sections within the government have recognised that it has "neither
the capacity nor the knowledge to implement a nationwide programme"
of rural development [TFYDP, p 136]. It has thus persisted with
small area-based experimental projects. The following projects are
expected to run until the end of the Third Plan period, by which time
they will have been phased out as independent activities. Little
- 258 -
information exists on these projects and no evaluations are known to
have been made. The following section summarises briefly the main
objectives of these projects and their source of funding (2).
Thabana Morena Integrated Rural Development Project
This project was planned at the end of the Second Plan period follow¬
ing a visit of a UN mission on rural development in Lesotho. It was
to be an integrated development programme in the Mafeteng District
which encompassed approximately 60,000 people, and was to be based
on the "expressed needs of the villagers" [UNDP (1978b), p 8].
The design phase was funded by the UNDP and was executed by the FAO,
which provided two "experts" and five local staff. The project team
was to:
[1] undertake an intensive study of a variety of sociological and
economic factors in the area;
[2] investigate and develop the best methods of motivating the peo¬
ple to participate in activities which they determine are
(2) At least four recent small rural development projects are
known to exist in the country other than those reviewed here:
namely, Mafotholeng, Hololo Valley, Mphaki, and Siloe. The first
is a small-scale project situated in the Berea District and has
demonstrated the possibilities of using local resources for rural
development [TFYDP, p 137]; the second is an Irish funded project
situated in the lowlands and incorporates irrigation technologies.
The Mphaki project was formulated in 1977; it covers a mountain
area of 72,000 ha. in the Quthing District, incorporating approxi¬
mately 25,000 large livestock units. The Siloe Rural Development
Project is located close to the Thabana-Morena area and is chiefly
involved in the construction of water supplies. It is expected
that the project will gradually integrate other development ac¬
tivities which have been requested, such as conservation, lives¬
tock, and craft development. Further discussion here is not war¬
ranted on account of the small sizes of these projects and the




[3] implement the assistance project on a small scale; and
[4] design a more comprehensive project.
The budget for the design phase is shown below in Table 5.1.
Item Cost $
1. 2 experts for 1 year 96,000
2. 9 man-months short term consultancies 35,000
3. Salaries for local staff 15,000
4. 1 vehicle 6,000
5. 3 horses and equipment 1,000
6. Operating costs 20,000
TOTAL $173,000
TABLE 5.1 : Design Costs for Thabana Morena Integrated Rural Develop¬
ment Project
Source: FAO (n.d.). "Integrated Rural Development Project in the
Kingdom of Lesotho", mimeo, p 8.
The Government of the Netherlands approved a further $1 million for
the execution of the project. It has been claimed that project com¬
ponents are being determined "entirely by what the communities want"
[TFYDP, p 137]. These have included a feeder road, constructed on a
voluntary basis, a fishpond,1 atrine construction, and vegetable gar¬
dens.
Rankakala Development Project
The Rankakala Development Project was established in 1977 to provide
rural education and development services to a remote area in the
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Quacha's Nek district. Encompassing 28 villages, with a total popu¬
lation of about 10,000 , the project sought to utilise an integrated
approach to rural development. It included family planning, nutri¬
tion, child care, food production, the construction of a health cen¬
tre and the creation of employment opportunities.
The project was to run from September 1977 to October 1980. A pro¬
ject authority was established which included the senior district
officers of the relevant ministries, and operated under the chairman¬
ship of the District Administrator. An elected committee of vil¬
lagers, with the project manager acting as the organising secretary,
was responsible for the implementation of the project.
The project aimed:
"a) to establish a health centre to decrease the incidence
of maternal and child mortality and morbidity,
b) to establish a health centre where 150 village
midwives, 300 women (nutrition and home economics),
160 farmers and 24 women (knitting) shall be trained
over the plan period,
c) to assist technically the community to produce excess
crops for marketing, and
d) after 1980, to use this centre for the training of
family planning fieldworkers, nutrition and agricul¬
ture extension workers and health workers" [Lesotho
Distance Teaching Centre (1978), p 7].
Ha Makoae Rural Development Project
This project has been implemented by the non-governrnental aid organi¬
sation, Plenty International (3), and provides a marked contrast with
(3) Plenty was established in Canada in 1976 as a "grass-roots
international development agency. Its aim is to work amongst the
poorest people, sharing the world's resources through equitable
and appropriate means, and working towards village self-
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other rural development projects in Lesotho. The project began in a
modest way in 197 9, with two Plenty volunteers living in the village
of Ha Sempe near Sebapala in the Quthing District. The first year was
spent learning the language and customs of the villagers and helping
to start modest development projects, such as an irrigated vegetable
garden, a fruit orchard, and tree planting. The Plenty organisation
has described its work in the following terms:
"The existence of this project has demonstrated that simple
technologies like gravity-fed irrigation, fencing, quality
seeds, hand tools, instruction of intensive vegetable gar¬
dening techniques and committee organisation can create a
sufficient supply of fresh vegetables where little previ¬
ously existed' [Plenty Lesotho (1980o^3p 4].
Following discussions with the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural
Development, a site near Ha Makoae was allocated to Plenty to build
and operate a village technology centre. Initial discussions with
the surrounding villagers revealed that one of the urgent needs was
for a foot bridge across the Quthing River, and this was the first
project undertaken by the Plenty team. A number of rondavels (tradi¬
tional round huts) for staff housing were built using local stone and
thatch, and employing local artisans. Other activities included soy¬
bean cooking demonstrations, tree planting, horticulture and village
water supplies. During this time it became clear that the continuous
and close interaction between the Plenty development team and the
Basotho was a significant factor in the successful implementation of
projects.
Funding was initially modest, with $26,925 being supplied by CIDA in
1979. The increased funding in 1980 is shown in Table 5.2 below.
sufficiency" [Plenty Lesotho (lDSOct^p 4]. Funded mainly by UN I -
CEF and CIDA, projects have also been undertaken in Guatemala,
Haiti, San Diego and South Bronx. Plenty evolved from the Farm
Community in Tennessee founded by Steve Gaskin.
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Catholic Relief Service 900
TOTAL 63,800
TABLE 5.2 : Ha Mokoae Rural Development Project Funding (1980)
Source: Plenty Lesotho (19800.).,p 11.
It was planned to increase the scope and expenditure of the project
further in 1981, with a planned budget of (Canadian) $139,000.
Planned projects included communal vegetable gardens, greenhouses,
further expansion of the village technology centre, photo-voltaic
powered lighting systems, a micro-hydroelectric scheme, a village
technology workshop, a solar soy dairy, fruit orchards, afforesta¬
tion, composting latrines, and extension programmes.
THABA TSEKA RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
The largest and most extensive rural development project undertaken
to date in Lesotho has been the Thaba Tseka project. The project
duration, from the planning stage through to the end of the final
phase, is ten years and rural development activities have encompassed
an entire district, or approximately 10 per cent of the country. The
greater portion of the field work of the writer was undertaken at
Thaba Tseka and the evolution of the project will be examined in some
detail in order to determine the nature of the impact of interna-
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ti'onal aid on rural development and programmes of technological
change.
Prior to the commencement of development efforts at Thaba Tseka (4),
public investment had been almost exclusively concentrated in the
lowlands of Lesotho. Approximately one quarter of the nation's popu¬
lation resides in the neglected mountain region, which constitutes
three-quarters of the country's total area, and nearly all of its
rangeland. Communications were difficult, there was a lack of all
weather roads, and settlements are widely dispersed over a rugged
topography. The government finally recognised that the mountain peo¬
ple had been the least affected by the increased development efforts
after independence (5), and that overgrazing and soil erosion were
accelerating. It was decided to embark on a complex and large pro¬
gramme which would bring the necessary services to the mountain
residents, and which would attempt to create the necessary conditions
to improve their material well being.
Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Project (Phase I)
A FAO/World Bank mission, in which the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) also participated, visited Lesotho in
November and December 1974, with terms of reference to prepare a
first phase mountain area development project which would be suitable
j
for financing by IDA and CIDA. The FAO/World Bank proposal stated
(4) Thaba Tseka translates as "mountain with a white blaze" so
named after the white marks left on the south-facing cliffs by a
vulture colony. Tseka translates as white blaze on a horse's
forehead.
(5) The average household income in 1974 in the mountain region
was estimated as M45 from crop production, and M105 from livestock
[FAO (1975), p 6].
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that the project:
"....would comprise a series of developments which together
would form an integrated minimum package for the implemen¬
tation of the first phase and for the formulation of a
wider second phase. The project would have components cov¬
ering road construction, rangeland and crop development,
improvements of living conditions in villages and a
Regional Centre to implement phase one activities. Given
the lack of local experience in rangeland improvement, one
of the project's key objectives would be to evolve and
assess rangeland development and utilisation methods suit¬
able for wider application later" [FAO (1975), p i].
The project area consisted of 46,000 ha., mostly in the eastern
region of the Maseru District, but with a portion stretching into the
Leribe District. The area covered 1500 households, with a total
population of approximately 9,000.
Thaba Tseka had been selected by the Government of Lesotho as a suit¬
able base for the proposed development of the mountain region chiefly
because of its central location. Prior to the commencement of the
project, very little infrastructure existed in the Thaba Tseka area
apart from a nearby mission, secondary school, mission hospital, a
woolshed, two trading stores, a credit union, a food aid store,
livestock shed, and rudimentary housing for police, water survey
technicians, and a livestock officer. Residents in the area lived in
small scattered villages in traditional stone and thatch dwellings.
(6). Access to Thaba Tseka was either by air (landing on an inclined
(6) Man is no recent arrival in the mountain valleys of the Thaba
Tseka District. Archeological investigations have yielded dates
for Middle Stone Age deposits going back more than 43,000 years.
Later hunters left a record of aspects of their life in the rock
paintings still to be found in sandstone shelters. Most paintings
now clearly visible probably date from the past 500 years. Howev¬
er, painting at Sehonghong was clearly taking place before A.D.
450. The San, who were the artists, lived a hunter gatherer ex¬
istence, which became threatened in the nineteenth century as
white settlers began to reduce the wild animal population with
guns. The San were unacquainted with agriculture and as their
source of livelihood disappeared, they began increasingly to raid
the cattle of the Basotho to the West and of the white farmers of
Natal to the East. Punitive expeditions were organised by both
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grass strip), by four wheel drive vehicle over a rough track, or on
horse-back over bridle paths. The 180 km journey from Maseru to
Thaba Tseka by vehicle could take a full day, and breakdowns or
adverse weather conditions frequently delayed such trips indefin-
itely.
The project's main investment was to be the establishment of a
regional centre at Thaba Tseka and a road link with the capital
Maseru. Other aspects of the project were to include the improvement
of feeder roads within the project area in order to facilitate the
supply of inputs and the marketing of farm produce, and livestock and
crop production improvement schemes.
Livestock development was to include better grazing management and
experimentation with methods for improving rangeland. For crop pro¬
duction the main emphasis was to be on better land preparation and
the supply of inputs along the lines introduced by the Thaba Bosiu
project. A "lead farmer" approach was to be adopted with the objec¬
tive of reaching 5 per cent of the farmers in the first year. Farmer
participation was to reach an estimated 60 per cent after 6 years.
It was envisaged that crop yields would increase from 500 kg/ha to
1100 kg/ha for maize, from 550 to 1400 kg/ha for wheat and from 350
to 750 kg/ha for peas [FA0 (1975), p 16].
The project was also to provide piped water to about 8000 people in
16 village areas, using gravity feed systems from nearby springs.
sides, and the last organised band of San, under the chief Soai,
was destroyed in 1871.
The shortage of land in the lowlands led to increased use of the
Maluti as pasture in the summer months. Subsequent to the Gun War
of 1880/1 refugees began to resettle in the mountain region. The
first permanent villages in the Thaba Tseka District were esta¬
blished in the 1890s.
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Sanitation was to be provided at 8 primary schools and woodlots were
to be established.
The proportion of total expenditure planned for the various project
components is shown in Table 5.3.




Regional Centre 38 63
Agricul ture 16 81
Village Development 1 80
Phase II Study 1 85
TABLE 5.3 : Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Project (Phase I) Cost
A11ocation
Source: FAO (1975), p 12.
The initial project design estimated a total cost of $10.8 million
for Phase I, although it was anticipated that there would be some
cost escalation over the four year project period [FAO (1975), p 11].
The final cost for Phase I was approximately $15 million, of which
Canada contributed $6 million, the World Bank $5.5 million, the Brit¬
ish Overseas Development Ministry (ODM) $1,5 million, and the Govern¬
ment of Lesotho about $2.4 million [CIDA (1980), p 2].
The foreign exchange component amounted to 65 per cent of the total
aid disbursement. Most of this would be absorbed by consultant and
expatriate salaries. Expatriate personnel were to fill the posts of
project director, animal production expert, pasture agronomist, agri¬
cultural economist, project accountant, clerk of works and two tech¬
nicians. Project staff were also to prepare a Phase II mountain area
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development programme.
At the request of the Government of Lesotho the project was to be
implemented within the existing Government structure and procedures.
Whilst the project's road component would be implemented by the Min¬
istry of Works, a new project division was to be established within
the Ministry of Agriculture for the agricultural component. The
various development activities of the project were to be coordinated
by a "Mountain Area _Development Coordinating Committee" under the
chairmanship*of the Permanent Secretary of Agriculture. The commit¬
tee would also be responsible for the identification of a Phase II
project.
The work of the project commenced in June 1975, with the setting up
of a base camp, by the Canadians, at Thaba Tseka involving tents and
small caravans, and the planting of trial crops commenced in October.
After the construction of prefabricated houses, staff were able to
move their families to the mountains by January 1976. The building
of an office and warehouse in Maseru was then undertaken, as well as
the construction of a farmers' training centre and a workshop at
Thaba Tseka. By the end of the first year of operations the project
had physical and operational bases at Maseru and Thaba Tseka.
Infrastructure Development
In the early conception and planning of the project, it was recog¬
nised that considerable housing would be required for technical
assistance and local field staff at Thaba Tseka. It was also planned
that Thaba Tseka, because of its central location in the mountain
region, would eventually develop into an administrative and commer-
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cial centre for the mountain interior. The proposed road, financed
by the World Bank, and a new airstrip finaced by CIDA, were largely
justified on the basis of such further development. Early planning
envisaged that residential and commercial development would evolve as
the project expanded in subsequent phases. But, after the first year
of operations, there were substantial deviations from earlier con¬
cepts of how the project should be implemented. Plans unfolded for
the construction of a town of some 300 houses, including provision
for a business district complete with a centralised water supply and
sewerage system. In addition to the road and airstrip, an electri¬
city transmission line from the lowlands (and South Africa) was to be
built. These altered plans were embarked upon, even though existing
finances would not meet the increased scale of the construction phase
of the project.
Thus, during the second and third years of the project, the predom¬
inant focus was on the construction of the town, and all efforts were
devoted to the difficult logistical problems of mounting a major con¬
struction programme in the remote rural environment of the mountain
region. Architectural and engineering consultants, many associated
with South African firms, were engaged to prepare designs for the
houses and the water and sewerage works. Building construction was
planned around the use of concrete blocks, which were to be manufac¬
tured at Thaba Tseka.
The nature of the construction programme and the design of the houses
became significant factors in determining the overall impact of the
programme on the surrounding area, and in shaping local residents'
perceptions of the project. The sophisticated design of the houses
and the emphasis given by project staff to the rapid and "efficient"
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completion of the construction phase, meant that contractors and
skilled labour were mostly hired from the lowlands to manage the
building programme. The resident population was thus deprived of a
desirable share of employment opportunities, and the original plan,
that the building programme should provide a major avenue for train¬
ing local artisans, was ignored. Traditional skills, such as stone
masonry and thatching, could not be exploited as the building designs
required construction techniques utilising concrete block walls and
slate roofing.
The houses were also poorly designed for the harsh climate in the
mountain region. No extra insulation was built into the walls or
ceilings and it was assumed that electrical heating appliances would
be adequate. Little consideration was given to the use of solar
energy for water heating, although the incident solar radiation in
the region is high - even in the cold winter months, which are gen¬
erally cloudless. Roof over-hangs and side wall parapets (supposedly
matching the shape of traditional huts) effectively blocked out any
passive solar space heating. The size and cost of the houses ( many
with attached car garages) were wholly out of proportion to the
social and economic environment. Not only were local staff unlikely
to be able to afford the heating bills for the houses (indeed many
occupants later allowed their electricity supplies to be cut off),
but local perceptions of the nature of the rural development project
were bound to be influenced by the building of houses which cost more
than a hundred times their average annual incomes from agriculture.
The townsite was a planning disaster. Sophisticated building stan¬
dards and regulations meant that local people who had been drawn to
the site because of possible employment opportunities were unable to
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afford to build housing within the townsite. Those houses which had
been built by the project were restricted, in the main, to expatriate
personnel and government officials from Maseru. A shanty town (with
no water supply or sewerage system) thus developed alongside the main
town, and it was here that many of the services and businesses
required by the town residents (such as shops, rented accommodation,
hotels, bars, and transport companies) were provided by
entrepreneurs. The project townsite thus became wholly associated
with government bureaucrats and aid personnel.
This concentration on the creation of infrastructure also emphasised
the way in which aid projects can add substantially to the recurrent
budget obligations of the Government of Lesotho. Low cost and subsi¬
dised capital investments might provide the critical infrastructure
for helping to gain access to rural areas, but it is important to
examine the concomitant operating and maintenance costs of donor pro¬
jects. The project director wrote:
"....the major outcome of Phase I was a dramatic demonstra¬
tion of the enormous capital and recurrent budget implica¬
tions of undertaking major infrastructure development"
[Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (1978a), p 3.].
Liaison and communication with relevant government departments and
ministries was minimal during the construction phase. The co¬
ordinating committee never met regularly in this first phase and the
project proceeded independently, seeking government approval only
when required. In this respect, the Thaba Tseka Project was no dif¬
ferent from the other large rural development projects in operation
at this time. The Thaba Bosiu Project was being administered by an
independent project authority which was geared more to fulfilling the
specific operational objectives of donor agencies than pursuing the
goals arising out of government policy.
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By late 1978, over seventy houses had been constructed, the Farmers'
Training Centre had been in operation for some time, and an adminis¬
trative building containing extensive office space had recently come
into use.
The haste to complete the construction of the townsite continued,
even though the improved access road to Thaba Tseka had not been com¬
pleted and appalling road conditions were greatly escalating tran¬
sport costs.
The first written assessment of the project was completed in May
1978. It stated'that:
"The priority activity of the Project to date has been con¬
struction of the townsite houses and administrative
offices. Construction proceeded as planned, and, despite
major* constraints, has been completed on schedule. The
Project has been subjectively evaluated as successful in
the construction phase by Government of Lesotho officials
and by both. Basotho and Canadian personnel. The speed of
the townsite construction rendered impractical the use of
local skills and materials, and the consideration of local
values and customs.
Agricultural and other rural development objectives have
suffered as a result of the priority placed on townsite
construction. The Project has, for the most part, failed
to attend to many agricul tural concerns stressed in initial
Project documents" [Hughes and Norwood (1978), p 4].
Crop Development
Whilst this massive effort had been devoted to constructing an admin¬
istrative centre for the project, very little work had been done to
implement the original agricultural and rural development objectives
of the project. This was particularly so of the primary objective of
improved range management.
Since the majority of the farmers involved with herding were also
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dependent on the subsistence cropping of limited areas of arable
land, improved field cropping was considered a more realistic area to
begin the process of agricultural development. The thinking was that
if some farmers could be seen to be helped, to even modest levels of
improved crop production, confidence in the project and rate of
farmer participation would be increased with a total effect of
greater cooperation in implementing the much broader measures
required to institute range management.
The agricultural programme over the first three cropping seasons con¬
centrated on research into the development of appropriate crop
varieties and cultivation practices to improve production. It was
argued that this experimental period was essential in order to
develop a base, from which effective extension and improved farm out¬
put could materialise from demonstrated benefits of improved methods.
A CIDA assessment in 1978 noted:
"Perhaps the greatest benefit to date has been the experi¬
ence attained particularly as concerns the realisation of
the extreme constraints to crop production in the mountain
areas and the limitations within which improvements must
take place" [CIDA (1978), p 16].
Over 2000 plot tests were conducted on the experimental farm and at
selected sites within the project area. One of the more important
results concerned the relative success of Mexican varieties of maize,
bred for high altitude, and which proved to be hardier and higher
yielding than traditional varieties.
Closely associated with the research programme, was the initiation of
a number of surveys and studies to further identify and define the
physical and human resource base upon which agricultural and rural
development could be based. Numerous technical and socio-economic
reports were produced in order to provide a basis for further project
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work. At the end of the second year, project staff had prepared 13
technical papers (7).
Extension
Agricultural extension constituted a further weakness of the project.
By the second cropping season four extension agents were employed on
the project and, by 1978, the number had increased to only five. A
number of attempts were made to hold field demonstrations at selected
plots cultivated by the project and a crop growers' association had
0
been losely organised in the immediate vicinity of Thaba Tseka.
Extension was never a priority of the project and extension agents
were rarely involved in project planning sessions.
The first effort to support farmers was the establishment of five
village distribution points (VDPs) within the first year of the pro¬
ject. These centres were to provide farm inputs such as seed, fer¬
tiliser, and farm equipment not readily available from other sources.
Each centre was equipped with a tractor and basic implements for
hire. In addition to a storeman and tractor driver, it was planned
that each VDP would have an extension agent who would provide techni¬
cal advice and supervise credit. VDPs were also to market agricul¬
tural produce.
Lipitso were held in the five main village areas to explain the pur¬
pose of setting up the VDPs and nearly all farmers initially welcomed
their establishment. Of the 100 farmers interviewed in a survey, 95
had visited and used the VDPs. However, when interviewed some time
(7) Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Project, Quarterly Report
April -June 1977, p 1
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after operation had commenced, only 65 per cent were satisfied with
their operation [Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Project (1977b), p
5].
The project management expected that the introduction of VDP facili¬
ties would encourage the cultivation of more fields. But, according
to extension agents' observations, in 1977, the number of uncul¬
tivated fields around Thaba Tseka had increased more than ever before
[ibid., p 11]. These expectations of project staff demonstrate the
extent to which overall economic structures were ignored in local
project design. There was no appreciation of the fact that migrant
wages had increased so markedly in the preceding two years and that
households were thus likely to be less dependent on agriculture.
The tractor hire system had been implemented to facilitate the timely
planting of crops and to help overcome the shortage of suitable
animal draft power. To this end five tractors were purchased in
February 1976 and each was to be associated with a VDP. Although the
demand for tractor hire was high from the onset of the project, it
I
soon became evident that unless such an operation could be tightly
programmed, it would be highly inefficient in the mountain region
where small fields, steep slopes, and rocky ground all impede mechan-.
ical cultivation. By charging rates equivalent to those in the low¬
lands, it was soon demonstrated that the project would have to subsi¬
dise the operation of tractors, or transfer the charges to the farmer
to a level where lack of viability and demand would effectively end
the scheme. A decision was made to terminate the scheme and to sell
the tractors to prospective local contractors. This had some unhappy
(and not surprising) consequences with contractors being unable to
pay back the purchase loans.
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The overall effect of project attempts to induce technological change
and improve agricultural production may be gauged by the fact that,
in a review of the extension programme in 1978, -it was estimated that
fewer than 20 farmers may have benefited substantially from extension
[CIDA (1978), p 24].
The most notable effort at promoting improved cropping through exten¬
sive project support was the potato programme, which was a conse¬
quence of plans by the government to establish Thaba Tseka as a cen¬
tre for seed potato production for the country at large. The project
was to undertake an extensive production programme whereby it would
assume responsibility for the provision of seed and conduct planting
and harvesting operations; farmers would be entirely responsible for
weeding. It was planned that the project would finance all opera¬
tions, handle the marketing of produce, and deduct all expenses when
the crop was sold, leaving remaining profits for farmers. It was
thought that this form of share-cropping would activate farmer parti¬
cipation to the extent that they would take over all responsibility
for cultivation in future years. Over the 1976/7 cropping season
some 20 ha. of potatoes were planted by the project on farmers'
fields. Although crops and economic prospects looked promising,
farmer involvement was marginal, to the extent that the project had
to assume responsibility for almost all operations, including weed¬
ing.
In the next year, a crop association was formed with the intention of
generating greater interest and participation in the potato scheme
and to expand it to peas and wheat in following years. It was
planned that the association would now assume responsibility for
planting, weeding and ridging operations. Of the initial membership
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of 53 farmers, 37 agreed to grow potatoes in the 1977/8 season.
Although the previous season had indicated promising profitability,
only 6 farmers ultimately participated in planting operations. Once
again, the project took over the planting operation by employing
local labour - now on some 54 ha. Little weeding was done and, cou¬
pled with poor seed, there was a high incidence of disease with a
consequent low quality produce. In the event, 90 per cent of the
total crop was diseased and unsuitable for seed stock. The project
management subsequently decided not to harvest the crop but did agree
to purchase the potatoes at a competitive market price. The farmers
harvested some of the potatoes, for their own consumption, and a lim¬
ited amount was sold to the project.
The project managers conceded that some lessons had been learned,
including the folly of promoting a high risk, high cost crop which
required a high management skill input, and of which farmers had had
no previous experience. The importance of involving farmers from the
start in the planning and implementation of projects was also recog¬
nised [Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (1978a), pp 6 -9].
Livestock Development
At the onset of the project, it was believed that the use of the
arable land in the mountains could be substantially improved by
employing better seed and practising improved methods of field crop¬
ping. At the same time it was obvious that arable land was too lim¬
ited in supply, too widely dispersed, too remote from markets, and
too dependent on supporting subsistence to advance towards surplus
crop production aimed at contributing to Lesotho's staple food supply
and cash reserves. Alternatively, the broad expanse of range!and and
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the large resident livestock population existed as the major means
through which mountain area development and output could be achieved.
What essentially was required was to develop a farming system which
would improve subsistence cropping and range management and, thereby,
permit livestock production to evolve as the predominant base for
economic output and activity.
The Thaba Tseka Project was thus initiated on the premise that the
extensive range and livestock population of the area represented by
far the greatest potential asset to be developed in the mountain
region. It also represented the greatest challenge, in terms of
technical, institutional and social problems to be overcome, and the
time which would be required to effect significant change to socio¬
economic benefit.
Some progress had been made towards livestock development. Research
had identified appropriate grass varieties which would improve the
range and had also confirmed the excellent regenerative capacity of
the mountain rangeland. During this time, national legislation was
introduced to control overgrazing and to encourage rational utilisa¬
tion. But a great deal more needed to be accomplished before any
improvement in livestock production and in the livelihood of farmers
would be apparent.
It was thought that in order to develop livestock farming a certain
amount of infrastructural development was required. There is little
doubt, however, that the preoccupation with building the administra¬
tive centre for the project, particularly in the second and third
years of the project, inhibited, and indeed impaired, the project's
ability to pursue these primary agricultural objectives.
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Research and Experimentation
Efforts towards agricultural development in Phase I of the Thaba
Tseka Mountain Development Project were thus directed primarily
towards research and experimentation. The main areas of activity are
summarised below:
[1] Field crops, particularly wheat, maize, sorghum, barley, oats,
brassicas, sunflowers, triticale and rye were tested to identify
those crops and practices most suited to the mountain environ¬
ment of the project.
[2] A variety of range improvement methods were investigated such as
the use of different mixtures of grass seeds on different
slopes, the use of seeding rates and the fencing off of small
areas near cattle posts to record the regenerative capacity of
the rangeland.
[3] Different fruits, vegetables and trees were tested for mountain
adaptability.
[4] Technological innovations applicable to farm production and com¬
munity development were tested. These included low cost
latrines, an hydraulic ram pumping system and solar heating dev¬
ices.
With the agricultural programme directed towards experimentation and
the resources of the project concentrated on the creation of physical
infrastructure, there was little possibility for the residents of the
area to derive any immediate benefits.
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Assessment of Phase I
An independent consultant, evaluating the first phase of the project,
concluded:
"Overall, however, the Thaba Tseka Project Area people con¬
sider neither the households nor the area to be better off.
The factors influencing peoples' perceptions of status are
varied and complex. Nonetheless, the quality of village
life as perceived by the people and as measured by peoples'
perceptions of wellbeing has not improved and has in fact,
declined" [CIDA (1979), p 149].
The emphasis on the construction of the townsite began to be viewed
by CIDA as unfortunate, but not disastrous for the achievement of the
primary rural development objectives.
An assessment by a CIDA official in 1978 concluded that:
"Perhaps the best indication, however, that the building of
the town has been a successful project undertaking is the
dramatic institutional development that has taken place
since housing, office accommodation, and public services
have become available" [CIDA (1978), p 14].
The road, electric transmission line, and townsite were regarded as
essential pre-conditions for development. Perhaps the houses should
have been more modestly constructed; they should have incorporated
training and the use of local labour and material; but, for CIDA, the
essential hypothesis remained immutable. CIDA officials stated that:
"....the agricultural programme of the Thaba Tseka [Pro¬
ject], has been highly successful in accomplishing much of
the technical, infrastructural, institutional and social
pioneering essential to making planned agricultural/rural
development a practical reality. As it now stands, the
project is aimed, organised and managed to prompt and
spread agricultural improvement at the village level in
line with early conceptions, government's priorities for
mountain area development, realistic approaches to techni¬
cal and human problems, and practical proposals to overcome
constraints and generate feasible viable development" [CIDA
(1978), p 33].
A new project director was critical of this assertion that physical
infrastructure was a pre-condition for development.
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"The 'pre-condition' mentality is exclusively goal orien¬
tated, focusing on the end product. Actual development is,
on the other hand, a never-ending evolving process. The
key question that must be posed is not how fast we can fin¬
ish this construction project so that we can get on with
the next stage, but rather how best can we use this build¬
ing phase to maximise social and local economic develop¬
ment" [Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (1979b), p
29].
He was nevertheless optimistic that the infrastructure could be used
as a basis for a rural development programme with new emphases, and
expressed the view that:
"During the past three years, major investments have
transformed a quiet, bucolic valley into a bustling new
town. An area once noted for its remoteness and total
deficiency of government services is now designated a dis¬
trict capital for the mountainous central region of the
country. But if Thaba Tseka is to reflect the initial
spirit of the agreement between the governments of Lesotho
and Canada, it must be a growth centre dedicated to bring¬
ing services to the people, not a growth pole drawing peo¬
ple to the services" [Thaba Tseka Rural Development Pro¬
gramme (1978a), p 2].
However, the nature of the design of the project site and the fact
that such a large proportion of the Phase I budget, and most of the
energies of the project staff, had been absorbed in the development
of a fully serviced townsite, the supporting infrastructure (road,
electricity transmission line, water supply and sewerage systems),
and the logistic support which it required. Such demands had a last¬
ing effect on the programme's ability to effectively communicate with
the residents of the district and involve them in the attempts to
introduce technological change and rural development (8).
(8) One survey noted that the "hostility of some chiefs and their
subjects towards Thaba Tseka Programme drove enumerators out of
some villages" [Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (1979c), p
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Thaba Tseka Rural Development Project (Phase II)
It had been planned from the beginning that Phase I would be followed
by a second phase project. The clearest indicator that Phase II
would proceed irrespective of the success of Phase I was the con¬
struction of a sophisticated townsite with accommodation for more
than 80 families. Clearly, the townsite was not designed merely to
serve the 1500 households in the project area but was meant to serve
as an administrative centre for the entire mountain area. This
intention was confirmed in the Second Five Year Development Plan
(1975 -1980):
"Although the major emphasis of the project is on agricul¬
tural production, the project is broad in scope and
includes physical and social infrastructure, encouragement
of rural industry and the creation of government machinery
to administer a new tenth district comprised of some of the
mountainous areas of the adjacent districts" [SFYDP, p
103].
The new Thaba Tseka District would cover an area of 464,000 ha. with
a population of approximately 90,000 people.
Phase I was scheduled for completion in April 1979 but, due to the
escalation of construction activities, CIDA funds for local costs
were exhausted by May 1978. The Government of Lesotho provided funds
to maintain project functions and CIDA continued to support technical
assistance and training during the interim period before the design
of Phase II was finally approved.
The contracts of many of the Canadian cooperants expired in early
1978 and a new management team arrived. Before long, a reassessment
of the project's activities was undertaken and, within the context of
planning for the second phase of the project, much innovative thought
and effort was given to orienting the project more towards its origi-
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nal rural development objectives.
In March 1978, the Permanent Secretaries of the various Ministries
met and decided to combine the immanent creation of the tenth Dis¬
trict with the planned development strategies for Phase II of the
Thaba Tseka Project (9). At that meeting the Ministry of Agriculture
representative stressed the need for an integrated approach to rural
development and recommended the convening of a Thaba Tseka Coordinat¬
ing Committee, which would initiate and coordinate government ser¬
vices in the district.
A draft Plan of Operations for the second phase was prepared by the
on-site project staff in consultation with the Coordinating Committee
in April 1978. This initial document stressed the need for "bottom
up" planning, decentralised and integrated development administra¬
tion, and flexibility as key concepts to the success of the second
phase. It stated that:
"....rural populations must be involved in the planning and
implementation of the proposed changes to their own pro¬
jects and programmes....an effort should be made to
integrate the efforts of various ministries to minimise the
duplication and mi sail ocations of scarce resources. In
order to provide integrated services, planning must be done
at the District level Planning must follow a 'learning
by doing1 approach. If the project is to be really respon¬
sive to the needs of the people, the budget can be
developed as the project evolves" [Thaba Tseka Rural
Development Programme (1978b), pp 1,2].
It was planned that the concerns of the first phase would be
broadened to include "quality of life" objectives such as health,
education, and village infrastructure. The draft plan of operations
was finally completed in December 1978, after discussion with CIDA
officials. In February 1979, the Chairman of the Thaba Tseka
(9) The Thaba Tseka District was officially inaugurated in March
1980.
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Coordinating Committee described the goals of the TTRDP as experimen¬
tation in development orientated institution building, decentralisa¬
tion of decision-making, and involvement of people in their own
development. All development and administrative activities were to
be coordinated and integrated at the District level and, if success¬
ful, would serve as a model for the other districts of Lesotho.
It was concluded that the Thaba Tseka Coordinating Committee should
be an advisory body and that the project would be implemented under
the District Administrator, subject only to the policy guidance and
direction of the Coordinating Committee. Thus, an area-based agri¬
cultural project, which had focussed primarily on infrastructure
development and on range management, was transformed into a district
development programme, with all Ministries combining to participate
in an integrated and innovative approach to development in the moun¬
tain area.
The Coordinating committee met monthly. It consisted of the Deputy
Permanent Secretaries, and senior government officials of the various
interested ministries; it included the project management, and was
chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture.
These developments must largely be attributed to the motivation, ini¬
tiative, and aggressiveness of the new project management. In the
process of developing a new and broader institutional framework, the
project, through the director, emerged as the agent providing the
leadership and coordination to institute the changes and develop¬
ments .
Phase II was to run from 1 April 1979 to 31 March 1984. CIDA was to
become the main donor, and was to contribute $7,683,000 (Canadian)
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over the five year period [CIDA (1980), p 4]. The Government of
Lesotho's contribution was to be M2,058,000 (10).
Plan of Operations
The goal and purposes of Phase II were laid out in a Plan of Opera¬
tions which formed the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding between
Canada and the Government of Lesotho.
"The overall goal of this project is to increase the capa¬
city for self-reliance in agricultural production and to
improve the quality of life of the Basotho people of the
Thaba Tseka District of Lesotho" [CIDA (1980), p 1].
The specific purposes of the second phase were:
"a. To improve the quality of life of the mountain people
of the region by way of improving the quality and out¬
put of livestock and rangeland, raising of educational
participation and training opportunities, construction
of essential village infrastructure, creation of vital
village organisations and improving sanitation and
health.
b. To double the commercial output of crops and livestock
from the Thaba Tseka District by the end of year five
of Phase II of the Project and increase incomes
derived from farming.
c. To increase the participation of Thaba Tseka District
residents in the decision making process with regard
to the economic development of the areas through their
involvement in village committees and other decision
making media so as to achieve by year five of the Pro¬
ject a 60% rate of participation.
d. To enable the Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Project
to continue to provide the people of the mountain dis¬
trict with assistance in meeting their basic human
needs" [ibid, p 3].
The programme was also to aim at:
"...continuing identification of those technological
(10) Thaba Tseka Rural Development Project (1980). Minutes of the
Planning and Budgeting Session 19-20 November 1980, Thaba Tseka.
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innovations which are appropriate to the environment, iden¬
tification of the needs of the local people and dissemina¬
tion of the tested, new technologies and ideas, and on
training of the people in the use of technologies to ensure
that all changes can be appreciated and adopted by all"
[ibid., p 5].
A meeting of the Thaba Tseka Coordinating Committee, in February
1979, queried these objectives, particularly the basis upon which
quantifiable goals, such as the doubling of crop and livestock pro¬
duction, were formulated. The committee stressed the need to be
flexible both in terms of budget and programme objectives, if the
programme was to respond to the needs of the people of the district
and was to encourage their participation in development planning
(11).
A key aspect of the new phase of the programme was the immediate
expansion of the rural development operations of the project into
other mountain areas of the newly created District of Thaba Tseka.
The Plan of Operations lists ten distinct components of the project.
These are summarised in Table 5.4 below.
Although a considerable proportion of the budget was still to be
spent on infrastructure, much of this was to be directed away from
the townsite. The increased expenditure on other components of the
project reflected the increased emphasis on rural development. Some
18 per cent was to be spent on agriculture and 13 per cent on rural
technology, education, and health. A considerable proportion of the
Canadian disbursement was effectively to remain in Canadian hands and
$3,3225,000 of the total $7,683,000 (42%) was to be absorbed on
salaries for Canadian cooperants, consultants, and universities.




















200,000 up to 6 Candidates per year for training
abroad.
2,400,000 Up to 36 man years of Canadian technical
assistance.
625,000 Canadian consultant services for agri-
cul tural and appropriate technology sup¬
port.
District roads;
village water supplies; maintenance of
district buildings; trade centre; town-
site; construction; village distribution
points; stone crusher and cement block
plants; drilling and blasting opera¬
tions.
1,355,000 Grazing and stocking control; range
development; livestock marketing; graz¬
ing associations; fodder production;
animal breeding services; livestock
demonstrations; crop research; exten¬
sion; communal and commercial vegetable
gardens; nutrition; farmer training;
woodlots; and soil conservation.
550,000 Rural Technology Unit.
193,000 Additions to Thaba Tseka Primary school;
audio-visual production unit; appren¬
ticeship programme; C0SC tuition.
190,000 Health training; village health workers;
latrine construction.
570,000 Staff; office supplies and travel
allowances.
100,000 Comprehensive evaluation at end of 3rd
year and at the end of the project; pro¬
vision for annual reviews with the
Government of Ls^otho assess any needed
changes to project aims and the Plan of
Operations.
TABLE 5.4 : Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (Phase II) Pro¬
ject Components.
Source: abstracted from Plan of Operations [CIDA (1980)].
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The scope of the project was greatly expanded. In May 1979, project
documents listed 73 separate project activities: 28 of these were
concentrated in the agricultural division; 17 in the technical divi¬
sion; 11 in the education division; 5 in the health division; and the
rest in the support divisions - administration and the workshop
[Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (1979d)]- In April 1980, 67
separate projects were listed. The agriculture division still consti¬
tuted the largest section of the programme with 25 projects, followed
by 15 in the technical division, 7 in health, and 6 in education
[Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (1980a)]. Eight divisions
were established: Agriculture, Health, Education, Technical, Commun¬
ity Development, Administration, Transport and Workshop, and Evalua¬
tion.
In 1978, the Agriculture Division was reorganised into 7 district
sections. These comprised livestock and range management, crop pro¬
duction, agricultural research, woodlots, horticulture, agricultural
extension (1).
One of the Agriculture Division's most important projects was the
establishment, in 1978, of a grazing association. A large area of
rangeland was fenced in order to control the number and quality of
livestock, but only five farmers finally joined the association. In
November 1980, the local Thaba Tseka Court ruled that the grazing
association did not have exclusive rights to the fenced area. Fences
were knocked down, gates were stolen, and many farmers in the immedi¬
ate area drove their livestock into the area. The project pursued
(1) Thirteen woodlots were established by the end of 1979 with ap¬
proximately 60,000 trees growing. In 1979, there were still only
5 extension agents.
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the matter to Cabinet level, but no action was taken to challenge the
court's ruling or to enact new legislation.
Research and experimentation continued to be an important part of the
agricultural programme. Research work included fodder crop trials
for sorghum, maize, brassicas, cereals, teff, and lucerne; range
research with overseeding and range management, including stocking
rate surveys (2).
All construction and engineering functions of the TTRDP were concen¬
trated in the Technical Division which comprised five main sections:
village water supply; road construction; townsite construction and
maintenance; a trade centre; and a rural technology unit (3).
Very little was achieved in the construction of new village water
supply systems, although this was listed specifically as one of the
TTRDP's objectives in the Plan of Operations, and was cited fre¬
quently by the villagers as a top priority. A total of 36 systems
have been installed in the District (11 by the project), and of these
18 are still working (5 of them installed by the project).
The involvement of the TTRDP in road construction began with the con¬
struction of the main access road from the lowlands through to Thaba
Tseka. The Thaba Tseka Project had contributed M150,000 to the Min¬
istry of Works for the construction of the last stretch of this road
from Mantsonyane. Other road construction activities in the district
at this time were restricted to labour intensive construction of
tracks and bridle paths, with poor supervision, low construction
(2) See the detailed summary by D. Beckman (1981) of rangeland
research.
(3) The work of the Rural Technology Unit will be discussed in
Chapter 6.
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standards, and labourers being paid with food-aid. In 1978, the pro¬
ject increased its involvement in road construction by taking over
responsibility for the supervision of food-aid labour gangs from the
Ministry of Rural Development. Training courses were run for super¬
visors in an attempt to improve productivity.
A model project to demonstrate efficient labour intensive construc¬
tion methods was begun in 1979. In response to frequent requests, a
45 km road was built into the remote and isolated Lesobeng valley in
order to facilitate the supply of needed services and the marketing
of agricultural produce.
Based on ILO labour intensive road construction methods developed in
Kenya, the TTRDP explored and devised construction techniques, techn¬
ical standards, planning procedures, organisational and reporting
structures, and training programmes which were appropriate to local
needs and conditions, and which fully utilised local resources.
The project also cooperated with the Labour Construction Unit (LCU)
in the Lowlands. This unit was established as an experiment to
explore alternative road construction methods to those employed in
the Government's national road network programme. The government was
determined to complete the latter in as short a time as possible.
Foreign contractors were mostly employed, with the inevitable conse¬
quences of Lesotho losing the most important potential benefits of
infrastructure construction. The national roads programme was typi¬
cal of an approach to development which dissects a complex social and
economic process into distinct and isolated steps. The rapid crea¬
tion of infrastructure was seen as an essential pre-condition for
social and economic development but the use of capital intensive
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machinery, foreign contractors and operators, meant that local and
rural populations reaped few of the benefits from the substantial
investments. The LCU sought instead to employ efficient labour
intensive methods, which would give priority to the training and
employment of local people.
The techniques developed by the LCU were adapted for the Lesobeng
road project and the management of the TTRDP claimed that this con¬
struction project had demonstrated that labour intensive construction
techniques could compete, on both a cost and on a technical level,
with capital intensive methods used by foreign contractors.
In 1978, the Trade Centre was set up as a training facility in build¬
ing and carpentry skills. Trainees were offered 10 month courses
which incorporated both formal lessons and practical experience in
their trade. Only hand tools were to be used and it was hoped that:
"the standard and design of mountain dwellings and struc¬
ture could be improved through developing tradesmen who
appreciate the building principles involved. It would also
give local labour a viable alternative to job migration to
the mines in the Republic of South Africa small
local industries could be established" [Thaba Tseka Rural
Development Programme (1979e), p 8].
Building techniques were to involve the use of concrete blocks, and
not the traditional stone masonry skills which were used widely
throughout the mountain region in the construction of most dwellings.
Thus it is likely that this course helped accelerate the movement
away from the use of locally available materials and building design.
The growth of square or rectangular concrete block dwellings with
galvanised zinc sheet roofing was conspicuous around the project
site. It is also apparent that traditional dwellings, away from the
sphere of influence of the project, were better constructed, cheaper
to build, and through using traditional materials, such as stone
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walls and thatched roofing, were better insulated against the
extremes of the mountain climate. On completion of the Trade Centre
course, many of the trainees expected employment on the project site;
they were reluctant to utilise their skills in their home villages,
as the project initiators had originally hoped that they would.
Townsite construction and maintenance assumed a fairly low priority
in Phase II and was concerned mainly with the conversion of garages
into single accommodation units, and the installation of solar water
heaters manufactured in South Africa.
The Health Division consisted of a district medical officer, a public
health nurse, a nutritionist, and a public health inspector. The
division was formed in 1978 and included in its work the establish¬
ment of a rural clinic programme and training for village health
workers. Generally the programme was small, ineffective, and carried
out with little consultation and coordination with the nearby mission
hospital. It is difficult to imagine that the health programme con¬
tributed in any significant way to the improvement of health in the
District.
The Economic Analysis and Evaluation Division came into being with
the reorganisation of the project in 1978. The division was respon¬
sible for the collection and analysis of data, and produced a number
of socio-economic surveys. In a household survey, carried out in
1979, problems were perceived to be chiefly hunger, unemployment,
shortage of fields, and shortage of cash. Major needs were seen to
be employment, water supplies, health facilities, better roads and
transport. It must be said that these requests were mostly shaped by
the desire of villagers to get projects for which the project was
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willing to employ paid labour. When asked about the activities with
which they most associated the project, those in the immediate vicin¬
ity of the Thaba Tseka townsite named construction. Other areas
regarded tree planting as the most notable activity. The benefits
from the Thaba Tseka Project were seen as employment and food aid.
The main "successes" of the project were identified as the building
of the townsite, planting trees, and improved transportation. In
only one area (Ha Soai) did the villagers see the creation of a VDP
as a major accomplishment which gave some benefits to crop farming.
The major shortcomings of the project were seen as a failure to pro¬
vide a mine recruiting agency [!], failure to provide more employ¬
ment, and, in some areas, failure to provide roads. Other shortcom¬
ings recorded were the failure to provide shops and grinding mills.
The division also assessed the effectiveness of extension undertaken
by the programme. Thaba Tseka had until then used the traditional
extension agent system; agricultural extension agents were employed
by the project to offer advice to farmers. The evaluation report
argued that this system had several disadvantages. In particular,
extension agents were not accountable to the farmers and did not bear
the consequences of possible failure (4). There were also wide
differences in their abilities, respect engendered, and concomitant
effectiveness of each agent. At no point did the field agent generate
confidence in more than 40 per cent of the farmers which he served
[Thaba Tseka Rural Development Project (1978a), pp 23-24]. This is,
perhaps, not surprising as most of the agents' training was not
(4) A new variety of seed, which had not been fully tested in the
mountains, was sold to farmers through the VDPs and resulted in
much lower yields on farms. One incident like this confirms to
farmers the wisdom of their cautious conservatism [Thaba Tseka
Rural Development Programme (1979a), p 87].
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specific to the mountain region. A study of 36 rural development
projects CUSAID (1975)] was reviewed in the report, which concluded
that those projects operating with traditional extension services
(defined as area-based agricultural generalists dealing with indivi¬
dual farmers) were the least effective in delivering useful and util¬
ized agricultural knowledge. It was found that:
"(i) A low cost method that can increase adoption rates is
one in which small farmers are utilised as extension-
ists, para-professionals, promoters and directors of
agricultural assistance in local areas. This method
has proved especially effective when the technology to
be advanced is very specific one crop, one subject at
a time - which the small farmer can be taught to
explain to others. This approach has led to higher
adoption rates than those resulting from the efforts
of a few highly trained professionals with a variety
of messages to impart to the local population.
(ii) Assigning extensionists to local organisations
improves... accountability.
(iii)When a farmers physical environment is poor and crop
yields generally low, new technology has to evolve
slowly with outside experts working closely with local
farmers.... It is not cost effective to hurry techno¬
logical innovation...." [Thaba Tseka Rural Development
Programme (1978a), p 23 and 24].
Consideration of this report led the Thaba Tseka Project to adopt a
lead farmer approach from 1978 onwards. Extension agents, in consul¬
tation with villagers, selected leading farmers who attended courses
at the Farmers' Training Centre. There is, however, no evidence that
extension agents became any more accountable to the farmers, or that
technical knowledge was further disseminated by lead farmers.
Institutional Development
The final version of the Plan of Operations for Phase II (prepared by
CIDA) differed considerably from the draft prepared by on-site
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project staff in consultation with the Coordinating Committee. More
emphasis had been given by project staff to institutional change in
order to effect greater decentralisation and integration of project
activities. The project management was able, nevertheless, to
achieve a measure of coordination and integration of development
orientated activities of the various Ministries in the district
through the creation of the Division Heads Committee, which consisted
of senior representatives of government ministries in the District.
The committee met monthly and helped coordinate project planning and
execution and enabled the more efficient deployment of resources.
Some decentral isation of decision-making and project execution was
realised by the relaxation of specific government procedures, the
voting of ministerial funds to district administration and the field¬
ing of senior officers capable of independently planning and budget¬
ing their own district level activities. An attempt was made to
increase the involvement of the people of the District in the plan¬
ning of development activities. In December 1979, a District
Development Committee was established which allowed greater represen¬
tation by the people of the district. Government officials, politi¬
cians and representati ves of the churches were barred. Instead, the
committee comprised elected villagers, representatives of ward chiefs
and local interest groups.
An attempt was also made to ensure multi-donor participation in the
district, and to move away from the prevalent belief that Thaba
Tseka was a Canadian project. The Irish Government funded the estab¬
lishment of a National Basotho Pony Stud at Thaba Tseka, and DANIDA
and the US Peace Corps provided additional technical assistance.
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The management of the Thaba Tseka, in collaboration with the Thaba
Tseka Coordinating Committee, played a significant role in stimulat¬
ing discussion in Lesotho on the merits of decentralisation. A
workshop was organised at the National University to which senior
government officials were invited. In his opening remarks the Senior
Permanent Secretary stated:
"Government accepts the need for rationalised decentralisa¬
tion aimed at a more equitable distribution of resources in
accordance with the needs and peculiarities of different
districts and/or regions in the country" (5).
There was always an ambivalence of commitment on the part of the
government in its support for decentralisation. A speech by the
Prime Minister, in the National Assembly, that "decentralisation will
be effected through a well co-ordinated institutional hierarchy" (6),
began to hint at a renewed emphasis on centralised control, rather
than a decentralisation of decision-making and project planning to
the rural population.
The donor agencies also voiced support for decentralisation.
"Decentralisation is directed towards increased democrati-
sation in the society, which should be welcomed by any
donor. However, it is a complex process and probably will
take a very long time. It probably can be supported in
different ways that will not detract from more tangible
objectives" [UNDP (1980c), p 7],
Whilst the informal structure and scope of the TTRDP evolved with
alacrity, the official 1 egitimisation of the institutional process
moved much more slowly.. However, as yet there has been no major
legislative move to institutionalise the system of decentralised
integrated district development administration. Proposals were put
(5) Address of Mr Kotsokoane, Senior Permanent Secretary, to the
Workshop on Decentralisation at the National University of
Lesotho, Roma, 8-12 July 1980.
(6) Speech by Lebua Jonathan in the National Assembly, 13 March
1980.
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forward by the project management for the establishment of a District
Development Authority wholly within the government administrative
structure. Staff and funds would be allocated to, and controlled at,
the District level. A strong case was also made to localise the
position of Programme Director. These proposals were never enacted,
even though they were repeated again in early 1981.
Towards the end of 1980, there was once again a major turnover of
expatriate personnel with the ending of cooperant two year contracts.
The new project management were less experienced and did not attach
as much importance to the concept of decentralised, integrated rural
development, and as a result the momentum towards institutional
development dwindled. Key government personnel, who had previously
been involved in these developments, were moved to other posts (7).
The precise organisational structure and the relationships between
project planning and finance, and the Government of Lesotho's activi¬
ties in the District, had not been clearly defined in the Plan of
Operations. Neither had any account been taken of the increased
financial needs of the TTRDP which were implicit in its enlarged
responsibility for rural development throughout the entire district.
The new director of the programme wrote:
"The progression to a district-wide role for the Project
was, apparently, made with the full awareness of the spon¬
sors. Yet it could hardly be said that the resources pro¬
vided are adequate to make this a reality" (8).
The 1979/80 budget was overspent, and there were no allowances in the
Phase II disbursement schedule for inflation. There was, however,
(7) The Permanent Secretary for Agriculture was posted as Ambassa¬
dor to Italy.
(8) Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (1981). Quarterly Re¬
port, April -June, p 4.
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little response from either CIDA or the Government of Lesotho to
appeals from project staff for additional support. Many projects had
to be curtailed with local labour being made redundant. This caused
considerable resentment and suspicion against the programme.
There was a great deal of confusion and uncertainty as to the
government's own intentions regarding decentralisation, and it was
not clear whether the previous experiments in institutional develop¬
ment had accorded with government policy. Power within the govern¬
ment appeared to be centred around a small clique of ministers close
to Lebua Jonathan, and senior government officials were hesitant to
make any bold policy initiatives.
The appointment, by the Government of Lesotho, of District Coordina¬
tors to each of the ten districts at the end of 1980, appeared to
signal a commitment to move towards a more decentralised form of
development administration. As the most senior government officials
in each district, they were to have broad powers of coordination and
liaison, ensuring that government policy was correctly interpreted
and carried out, as well as overseeing security. No special guide¬
lines were issued for the Thaba Tseka District and there was confu¬
sion as to the precise relationship between the office of the Dis¬
trict Coordinator and the management of the Thaba Tseka Rural
Development Programme. Basotho nationals began to report directly to
the District Coordinator and the integrated structure of project
planning, budgeting and execution began to break down. The District
Coordinator seemed to encourage this process and was concerned to
place as many staff as possible directly under his control. The pro¬
gramme was also requested to sack employees who were thought to be
supporters of the opposition party. It appeared as though the chief
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concern of the government in appointing District Coordinators was not
decentralisation but greater "security".
Morale declined among the staff, and the main preoccupation of the
TTRDP over the next year was to try and define its role, given the
lack of commitment by the Government of Lesotho to develop a fully
fledged decentralised and integrated district development programme,
and the unwillingness of CIDA to become involved in "political"
issues. The new director commented:
"One faces a declining budget with no allowance for infla¬
tion. Further, there is no clear commitment from the local
government to the programmes which it endorsed. This com¬
bined with a certain aura of uncertainty in the last few
months, creates a very unsatisfactory environment in which
to plan future programmes....In fact, what is called for
now, particularly from the Government of Lesotho, is some
guidance as to what it really wishes for the future of the
TTRDP" (9).
Plans to increase participation in project planning by the people of
the District also began to dissolve. Contact between the District
Development Committee (DDC) and the Thaba Tseka Programme was
minimal. The DDC produced a list of development priorities including
the building of roads, clinics, a wool shed and a livestock marketing
centre. They also requested more extension agents, increased veteri¬
nary services and improved breeding stock. There were suggestions
for the smoother running of the graziers' association, and also for
the need to involve traditional herbalists in the health programme
(10). The proceedings of the committee were in Sesotho and expatri¬
ate project staff thus never attended these meetings. Only a per¬
functory priority listing of development requests was produced in
(9) Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (1981). Quarterly Re¬
port, April-June, p 3.
(10) Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (1980). Minutes of
the meeting of the District Development Committee - 9 October
1980, Thaba Tseka.
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English and these were never formally incorporated in project plan¬
ning sessions.
Once again, rural development activities of the programme were
neglected. The preoccupation of the Phase II project team with
integration, decentralisation and institution building, mirrored the
almost exclusive emphasis of the Phase I project on the creation of
infrastructure at the expense of agricultural development. The Thaba
Tseka Programme is due to be phased out in 1984 at the end of the
current funding period. There is little evidence that this huge
investment in the mountain region has had any effect in raising agri¬
cultural production or improving the well-being of rural households.
RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY
International aid agencies have had considerable influence in shaping
overall rural development policy in Lesotho. Apart from their
involvement in the design of individual projects, donor conferences
have also been held in which aid agencies have explicitly influenced
agricultural and rural development policy. Donor conferences were
held in Maseru in 1975, 1977, and 1979. The Government of Lesotho
outlined general policy objectives and proposed various development
projects. Donor agencies prepared joint responses to these plans,
and frequently offered their own suggestions. At the 1979 confer¬
ence, called to review the Third Five Year Development Plan, the aid
agencies specified that:
"
special attention will have to be paid to the
development of agriculture...It is therefore suggested that
a multi-donor conference be organised next year to consider
how to increase the contribution of agriculture in income
and employment generation....Such a conference could be
prepared on the basis of a multi-donor assessment of prob¬
lems being faced in the development of agriculture in
- 300 -
Lesotho." (11).
A multi-donor mission subsequently visited Lesotho. The Cooperative
Crop Production Programme was much criticised for its inefficient use
of subsidies and its heavy reliance on mechanised inputs from South
African farmers. Specific recommendations were made concerning land
tenure with the clear inference that aid would be withheld unless the
requisite changes were implemented.
A number of initiatives have been made by donor agencies in the past
to effect institutional changes in Lesotho in order to control agri-
cul tural and rural development policy more closely. Although the
bilateral aid agencies generally preferred semi-autonomous rural
development projects centred in specific areas, mul ti-1ateral agen¬
cies began to express some concern at the lack of coordination and
integration of rural development projects in the country.
Rural development activities were executed by a variety of Ministries
including Agriculture, Health, Education, Works, and the Department
of Community and Rural Development, then part of the Ministry of the
Interior. The latter department had been primarily concerned with
rural community-based projects, such as village water supplies, moun¬
tain access tracks, feeder roads, footbridges, conservation works,
and communal gardens. A Ministry of Rural Development was formed
from the existing Department of Community and Rural Development in
1976.
In 1977, the UN Administration Committee on Co-ordination sent a task
force on rural development to Lesotho. Following the recommendations
(11) Remarks by the Regional Director for Africa of UNDP on behalf
of donor agencies [Kingdom of Lesotho (1979), p 112].
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of a subsequent report [UNDP/FAO (1978)] a Policy Co-ordinating and
Implementing Unit was established in the Ministry of Rural Develop¬
ment in 1979. Known as the project for Assistance in Integrated
Rural Development, and funded by the UNDP with a grant of $742,000
over a two year period, the project aimed at better co-ordination, at
both national and district levels, between the various technical min¬
istries [UNDP (1978b), p7]. The infrastructure created under this
project was also intended to strengthen channels through which rural
people could participate in the planning, execution and maintenance
of rural development programmes.
UN Volunteers were assigned to work in each of the 10 districts as
District Resource Planning Co-ordinators. The information on each
village, collected and stored by the UNVs, was to be used to evaluate
village needs, as well as to assign project priorities.
In spite of these measures, a lack of co-ordination of development
activities has persisted. The Ministry of Rural Development has com¬
munity development officers in the field, who are responsible
directly to the Ministry. Most large-scale rural development pro¬
jects have fallen under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agri¬
culture. The Department has agricultural officers in each district
and has also established farmer associations at village level (12).
Until 1981, the most senior official at district level was the Dis¬
trict Administrator, who was a staff member of the Ministry of the
(12) The confusion surrounding policy is further demonstrated by
the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture did not have its contri¬
bution to the Third Five Year Plan ready in time for the draft
plan, and when the plan was finally published the chapters on
Agricultural policy had already been superseded by the "Blueprint
for action on Agricultural Development" published in November,
1980.
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Interior. This Ministry also retained responsibility for the Chief¬
tainship. In 1981, District Coordinators were appointed as the most
senior government official at district level, and were responsible
directly to the Senior Permanent Secretary in the Prime Minister's
Office.
Despite the many projects and programmes in Lesotho, no formalised
means exist for local people to participate in the planning or execu¬
tion of development projects. The District Development Committees
supposedly "co-ordinate development activities and secure the
involvement of the people's representatives" [TFYDP, p 134], but, in
reality, they are composed of representatives of the Government, the
chieftainship, traders, and representatives of appointed village
development committees. Requests for development assistance generally
reflect the balance of interests between these groups. Ordinary vil¬
lage people effectively have no say in either government, or in
development activities which affect them.
Rural Development Ideologies
The influence of international aid agencies on rural development pol¬
icy and technological change has perhaps been greatest at the ideo¬
logical level. Policy statements by the Government of Lesotho tend
to be made in response to donor agency rhetoric concerning the impor¬
tance of integration, "bottom-up" planning and the need to direct aid
towards the poor.
The quinquennial requirement (encouraged by international aid agen¬
cies) for preparing national development plans, produces one of the
few publicly available sources for analysing apparent government pol-
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icy. The government has stated that:
"The need for effective rural development in the Third Plan
is abundantly clear. The basic tenet of our policy is to
design programmes to ensure that social and economic bene¬
fits reach the poor and that Government action assists the
poor to help themselves. We are now particularly concerned
with the poorest of the poor within the rural sector, the
bottom 25 per cent of households who have few resources of
any kind" [TFYDP, p 128].
This emphasis on the rural poor mirrors the policy statements of the
aid agencies, particularly those of the four major donors (UNDP,
World Bank, USAID, and CIDA) which have funded large rural develop¬
ment projects in Lesotho. For example, the World Bank defines rural
development as:
"....a strategy designed to improve the economic and social
life of a specific group of people - the rural poor" [World
Bank (1975b), p 3],
and the UNDP notes that:
"A primary objective should be to improve the quality of
life of the rural poor. This implies the involvement of
the rural poor in the development process and requires
their participation in the decision-making process and the
implementation of these decisions" [UNDP (1979b), p 11].
Recently, there has been limited debate within the government on a
strategy for generating a viable pattern of rural development within
the overall development strategy. The Ministry of Rural Development
has stated that its objectives are to:
*- continue to execute integrated rural development
activities in specific parts of Lesotho, not as
independent area based projects, but as experiments in
the optimal use of available resources, and of the
existing Government machinery
develop a system of bottom-up planning involving local
communities and field workers, with emphasis on the
mountain and southern areas
distil the replicable solutions provided by the exper¬
imental activities and begin to apply them throughout
the country" [TFYDP, p 138].
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The government ostensibly recognises four key elements to a success¬
ful rural development strategy and these are summarised below [TFYDP,
pp 128-131].
Integration
Lesotho's bureaucracy is still highly centralised, with administra¬
tive and technical functions organised vertically from the Ministries
located in the capital. It is now beginning to be recognised that
the lives of rural people, and the determinants of their behaviour,
are not organised along sectoral lines and that development in rural
areas must, accordingly, integrate activities. For example, a pro¬
gramme to improve the nutrition of children, involves not only nutri¬
tion education, but also an integrated programme which encourages
village gardens, constructs a clean water supply, introduces pit
latrines, and employs village health workers. Again, a programme to
improve crop production may involve the provision of improved agri-
cul tural inputs, marketing outlets, rural roads, repair facilities
for farm implements, a soil conservation programme, improvement of
animal draft power, and land reform.
The policy statement argues that the government has recognised the
need for co-ordination at at least three levels. In central govern¬
ment, the planning of projects must take account of the roles of all
concerned ministries and backing from the centre is necessary for
action in the field. At district level, the day-to-day activities of
supervisory and field staff have to be coordinated. Finally, there
has to be coordination of activities at the community level in the
villages [TFYDP, p 129].
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Decentralisation
If there is to be greater co-ordination and consultation at district
and local levels, a large measure of discretion and responsibility
must be accorded the lower levels of administration for both planning
and implementation of development programmes. District Development
Committees must be given the capacity for more effective action. To
achieve effective decentralisation, a considerable upgrading of
lower-level staff will be required.
Consultation
The government also claims that it recognises the need for consulta¬
tion and the fuller involvement of local people in development
activities.
"We shall be involving local people in the full process of
planning and implementing the solutions to our problems. A
'bottom-up' approach to development is essential" [TFYDP, p
130].
Again, these emphases have been largely a response to international
aid agency policy statements. CIDA, through its involvement in the
Thaba Tseka Project, and through the initiation of local seminars and
conferences, has been particularly influential in shaping stated
government policy on rural development. CIDA defines rural develop¬
ment as:
"...an integrated, 'trans-sectoral1 process based on
activities designed to promote, particularly within the
poor segments of the rural population, a substantial
improvement in well-being as well as self-reliance" [CIDA
(1976), p A-2].
The agency listed as priorities:
"(a) sensitization of the rural poor not so much to their
problems which they know only too well, but to their
own potential and the means at their disposal to
change their condition;
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(b) examination of the food problem and related produc¬
tion, storage, marketing and distribution require¬
ments;
(c) development of rural infrastructure and measures to
improve or preserve soil conditions....;
(d) institution building, including the training of super¬
visory and managerial personnel, notably at the com¬
munity or village level; and
(e) development of community services such as rural school
and health services, and credit and banking facili¬
ties, to complement the above activities" [ibid., p
A-6 ].
Furthermore, the agency noted that:
"Applied research and practical training are prerequisites
to effective work in rural development, and should be car¬
ried out concurrently. Applied research relates to both
planning requirements (knowledge of the communities, and
the data base), and implementation (appropriate technolo¬
gies and institutions)" [ibid., p A-7].
Nearly all of these policies were given some expression in the Thaba
Tseka Rural Development Programme. Yet, ultimately, there was a lack
of commitment; integration, institution building, and decentralisa¬
tion were attempted, but were never fully implemented. There is a
hollow ring to these policy statements of both aid agencies and the
recipient government which reflects their ideological character. For
example, on the same page of the document which emphasises the need
for "bottom-up" planning, the government of Lesotho reveal ingly
states:
"In order to achieve effective consultation, target groups
have to be made fully aware of the objectives of a particu¬
lar programme and what the people can expect to get out of
it" [TFYDP, p 130].
The implication here is that the government decides which groups are
"targeted" and what the objectives of development programmes are.
It may be argued that the very nature of the aid process is such
that, in reality, it does not easily allow decentralised decision-
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making and planning. If large sums of money have to be transferred
to the rural areas it has been thought easier to achieve this through
"national" schemes directed towards "target populations" in "imple¬
mentation zones". Foreign aid, thus, increases the tendency towards
centralisation of development administration and donor projects
directed at rural areas have reinforced these tendencies. Rural
development policy pronouncements have remained, all too often, at
the level of rhetoric and ideology. The aid process requires
apparent adherence to these ideologies, and the Government of Lesotho
has attempted to maximise aid disbursements by appearing to incor¬
porate the principles enshrined in policy statements of international
aid agencies into its own development plans.
SUMMARY
Some of the key features of post-independence rural development pro¬
jects are summarised in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. A number of superficial
observations are immediately obvious. Firstly, there has been a ten¬
dency for rural development projects to increase both in their scope
and in the size of their budgets. The area covered by the Thaba
Tseka Project was more than 200 times greater than that encompassed
by the Leribe Project, and the annual budget was approximately seven
times greater.
Secondly, the sources of development funding have gradually diversi¬
fied. The first post-independence rural development project, the
Liphiring Integrated Project, was funded by Britain and its design
was not dissimilar to many of the colonial pilot projects, incor¬
porating impractical proposals such as amalgamation of land holdings
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Project District Area (ha) Period Donor Amount
Liphiring
Integrated Project Mohales Hoek 1130 1971-77 U.K. M58,000
Leribe Leribe 2000 1970-75 UNDP $1,480,000
Pilot Project GoL $602,000
Khomokhoana Rural Leribe 19,000 1975-80 SIDA $2,800,000
Development Project GoL Ml,450,000
Senqu River Mohales Hoek 140,000 1972-74 UNDP $219,500
Agricultural Quthing GoL $49,000
Extension 1974-76 UNDP $1,540,000
Project -77 GoL $215,700
Thaba Bosiu Maseru 121,000 1973-77 IDA $5,600,000
Rural -79 USAID $3,300,000
Development UNCDF $185,000
Project GoL $3,000,000







Thaba Tseka Maseru 46,000 1975-78 CIDA C$6,000,000
Phase I Leribe World Bank C$5,500,000
0DM C$1,500,000
GoL C$2,400,000
Phase II Thaba Tseka 464,000 1979-84 CIDA C$7,683,000
GoL M2,058,000
TABLE 5.6 : Large Rural Development Projects in Lesotho.
Source: See discussion on each project above.
Note: US $ unless otherwise specified.
Lesotho has come to rely more heavily on multilateral agencies such
as the UNDP, World Bank, and on bilateral agencies such as USAID and
CIDA.
Thirdly, in spite of this diversity, the nature of the various large
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rural development projects has been remarkably similar. The Leribe,
Khomokhoana, Senqu, Thaba Bosiu, and BASP projects have all incor¬
porated the provision of farm input packages with such components as
improved seed, fertiliser, extension, credit, and marketing. Nearly
all of them also involved similar measures of soil conservation and
livestock production. There were, of course, features which were
different in these projects, but these were concerned mostly with
special activities such as asparagus canning at the Thaba Bosiu Pro¬
ject, or the creation of a new town at Thaba Tseka.
The cynical comment has been made by an observer of Third World
development issues (13), that the nature and content of rural
development projects is determined primarily by the project design
team's preference for one, or more, of three options:
[1] simple replication of a previous project design (in order to
avoid time-consuming and awkward study of yet another "targeted
area"),
[2] larger and more complex projects (in order to have a greater
public impact than any previous project in the country), or
[3] esoteric projects of particular concern to themselves.
Such an analysis might not be too far from the truth. Nevertheless,
the interplay of interests between aid agencies, the Government of
Lesotho, and the supposed beneficiaries of aid, has had an important
effect on the nature of rural development projects and attempts to
induce technological change. Significant in this process, has been
the stated policies and ideologies of aid agencies.
(13) H. Dickinson, Edinburgh.
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We have noted above how government policy on rural development has
been, to a large extent, a direct response to aid agency policy pro¬
nouncements with their emphases on programmes to improve "the quality
of life of the rural poor" [UNDP (1979b), p 11], "bottom-up" planning
and integration. These policies and ideologies have also influenced
the design of particular projects. For example, the concept of
integration has been incorporated into most of the rural development
projects surveyed above.
"Integrated rural development" has become a fashionable catchword in
the development literature of the 1970s, particularly since the World
Bank identified it as a priority and planned a quinquennial alloca¬
tion of $3,500 million for the period 1975 to 1979 for this purpose.
Integrated rural development is justified, firstly, by arguing that
rural development is part of a wider process of social change which
needs a broad and integrated approach and, secondly, by maintaining
that scarce government resources should be used efficiently by
optimising inter-ministerial cooperation.
Integration implies not only the "horizontal" integration of project
components, but also the "vertical" integration of project activities
with national policy objectives and programme administration. All
too often, integrated programmes have been required to accomplish far
too many visible results in too short a time period and, therefor^
have been able to allocate only limited commitment and effort to the
development of institutional capability and vertical integration. It
is noticeable that the Khomokhoana, Senqu, and Thaba Bosiu Projects
(and probably also the Thaba Tseka Project, when the current funding
period lapses) have left no institutional structures whereby the
various development programmes might continue in the respective
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project areas.
The Thaba Bosiu Project, and the Thaba Tseka Rural Development Pro¬
gramme during its first phase, were administered by semi-autonomous
project authorities, independent of local administration. This is an
arrangement frequently found in countries where local institutions
are considered too weak to execute integrated rural development pro¬
jects [Lele (1975), p 127-130]. These projects incorporated effi¬
cient, technically orientated values and management structures. As
such they were highly successful in establishing infrastructure and a
core of agricultural research. In comparison with the indigenous
government administration, these project authorities benefited from a
clear orientation towards achieving visible and measurable results
within a specific time. They had more independence and greater finan¬
cial resources than local government and, usually more technical and
management expertise. However, they have suffered from a limited
impact on the population of the area.
The fundamental premise on which these projects were developed and
ultimately approved was that if an appropriate level of technical and
capital assistance was applied, a desired level of social and
economic progress could be accomplished. In all of the projects dis¬
cussed above, key positions were filled by expatriates. However,
reliance on internationally recruited skilled personnel creates a
contradiction in the project design from the beginning. Investment
has been judged primarily by the criterion of an acceptable rate of
return, calculated on the basis of quantifiable production targets
derived from standard input-output coefficients for physical inputs
such as fertiliser and seed, and do not explicitly take into account
the high cost of expatriate skills which have been used in these
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projects. The higher the proportion of expenditure on expatriate
staff, the greater the need for ambitious production targets to carry
the burden of these costs so that an acceptable internal rate of
return can still be achieved. These ambitious short-term production
targets make it extremely difficult for rural development projects to
accomplish their objectives successfully.
The large area-based rural development projects were effectively
designed to solve all the physical, institutional and socio-economic
problems, which had developed over the past hundred years, within a
short-term integrated project effort. Their objectives were to raise
national agricultural production, but no prior analyses were made to
identify the factors which were limiting agricultural production.
The project document for the Thaba Tseka Project envisaged that crop
yields would more than double over a five year period, with over 60
per cent of farmers participating in improvement schemes. The
result, of course, was very different - with agricultural development
progressing little further than the carrying out of research trials.
It has been noted that, in East Africa, similar integrated, area-
based projects have been successful in developing new rural develop¬
ment methods, techniques and insights, but many projects were found
nevertheless to fail}
"....the benefits which derived from them have been lim¬
ited to the small populations involved. Through special
inputs these projects may be made to work, but the vast
majority of the rural populations of the country is usually
unaffected in any positive way"[Chambers (1974), p 16].
The high level of political protection required, as well as the
dependence on foreign inputs, proved to be additional potential
sources of failure in the East African context; political priorities
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would change, and turnover among expatriate staff would be high.
Since this type of project has shown to be particularly sensitive to
the calibre of management, the latter factor contributed heavily to
project failures.
The concentration of expatriate technical expertise in semi-
autonomous projects has made it doubly difficult for these projects
to be integrated vertically into continuing development administra¬
tion. Firstly, it has not been realistic for scarce indigenous
trained manpower and undeveloped institutions to take over the exten¬
sive programme activities which had been managed by skilled expatri¬
ate personnel. Secondly, the desirability of continuing these pro¬
grammes is itself questionable , given their over-ambitious goals and
lack of concrete results.
The concept of integrated rural development has been criticised for
some time. It has been argued that:
"....policy or programme objectives are adopted for which
no readily available closed system technology or programme
methodologies are available. Integrated rural development
can be described perhaps not too inaccurately, as an ideol¬
ogy in search of a methodology or a technology [Ruttan
(1975), p4-14].
It is unfortunate that this ideology is frequently based on "targets"
or "goals" of planners and rarely relates to the needs, desires, or
perceptions of the small farmers who are the supposed beneficiaries
of integrated rural development.
The rural development programmes reviewed above have all assumed that
rural farmers are rational economic beings who think more or less in
the same ways as western technicians. They assume, rightly, that the
foreign technicians are mostly competent within their own cultural
setting but they assume, dubiously, that this competence can be
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transferred directly and simply by imitation or teaching to persons
with a different cultural, social and economic environment.
Technological change in rural development projects is embodied pri¬
marily in technical assistance programmes, through the provision of
foreign technical personnel. Table 5.7 shows the high proportions of
aid disbursements which are spent on the foreign exchange costs of
internationally recruited personnel.
Project Donor Percentage
Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project UNDP 48
Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project IDA 63
Thabana Morena Integrated Rural Development Project UNDP 56
Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Project (Phase I) CIDA 65
Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (Phase II) CIDA 42
TABLE 5.7 : Proportion of Total Aid Disbursement Allocated to Foreign
Exchange Cost of International Project Personnel.
Source: Extracted from discussion on individual projects above.
Technical assistance, thus, consists primarily of technical knowledge
transferred by European and North American aid personnel. In this
respect, technological change in rural development is quite different
to that in the industrial sector where the means of technological
change are embodied primarily in the supply of licence agreements,
blue-prints or new machinery which form the basis of the extension of
technical knowledge among those involved in the production process.
It is important to recognise the significance of the interaction, in
rural development projects, of foreign technical knowledge with indi¬
genous technical knowledge and practice. Rural development, directed
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and funded by international aid, involves programmes of technological
change which reflect the technical knowledge of foreign personnel.
This phenomenon has a crucial effect on the likely "success" of rural
development programmes.
The design of rural development projects and the nature of technical
programmes aimed at improving agricultural production have been
shaped both by the prevailing ideologies, and by the social and
context-dependent nature of technical knowledge (14). The corollary
of questioning the wisdom of the direct transfer of foreign technical
knowledge is to argue for the need for local research and develop¬
ment. One positive development in the series of rural development
projects reviewed above, is the increasing emphasis which has been
given to local socio-economic surveys and local research to develop
and test improved agricultural production techniques. A great deal
of valuable and detailed information has become available on the
characteristics of farm households, on their preferences and atti¬
tudes towards agriculture, and on new seed varieties, cultivation and
rangeland improvement techniques (15). Unfortunately, most of the
results of this research have become available only towards the end
of the projects' duration and this knowledge has never been
transferred effectively to local farmers.
\
Very few projects have made provision for extensive local research
before the project was designed and implemented. The small Ha Mokoae
project is an exception. In the initial stages of this project, an
(14) This point is discussed in more detail in the concluding
chapter.
(15) The emphasis on local research has perhaps been most clearly
expressed in the establishment of the Rural Technology Unit at
Thaba Tseka. This research and development institution will be
examined in Chapter Six.
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extended period was spent learning about and assimilating local
social and environmental conditions and knowledge before any attempt
was made to implement large programmes. The fact that Ha Mokoae was
also the only project (amongst those reviewed here) which was staffed
and directed by a non-governmental aid organisation emphasises the
extent to which the functioning of the official aid agencies con¬
strains or determines the nature of the design of rural development
programmes and the commitment to preliminary local research. The
design of rural development programmes according to predetermined
goals does not allow for time consuming and complex preliminary
research which might point unpredictably to the need for programmes
at variance with the accepted policies and technical procedures of
the official aid agencies.
Much of the on-site research of these rural development projects was
undertaken within accepted Western scientific and technical para¬
digms. Socio-economic surveys undertaken by post-independence rural
development projects have frequently incorporated similar ethnocen¬
tric assumptions concerning what constitutes "proper" or "correct"
farming practice and knowledge, to those found in many of the Colo¬
nial accounts of Sesotho agriculture. This is in spite of the pro¬
fessed concern of these later projects to understand and appreciate
Basotho perceptions of agricultural production, and their castigation
of the
"...expert who knows even before he arrives in Lesotho what
must be done, from his own perspective Unfortunately,
the foreign aid system is inbred and self-directed to such
an extent that it perpetuates the system of Western experts
promoting what to the Western outsider appear to be techni¬
cally sound solutions....The comment is often made, both by
Basotho and by white expatriates, that the Basotho are
incapable of the creativity and competence of the white
farmers [in the Republic of South Africa]. Foreign aid
which promotes that stereotype cannot succeed in producing
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rural agricultural development" [Senqu River Agricultural
Project (1977a), pp 29,30].
Yet, in the same research report, the writer notes:
"Serious farming,as we have seen, is prevented by the poor
distribution of fields around the village, by the lack of
tools and ploughing power, by the lack of labour, by the
lack of such modern inputs as good seeds and fertiliser,
and by the erratic climate. It is no wonder that the rural
resident is not a serious farmer, when we consider all the
obstacles to effective farming that he faces. It may well
be simply the necessity to plough the fields in order to
maintain rights over them is all that leads the rural
resident to do crop farming at all" [ibid., p 18].
Although the first impression on reading this passage is that it is
but another graphic account of the optimising traditional farmer
whose actions are rational within the context of real and perceived
constraints, the repeated reference to "serious" farming reveals the
underlying assumptions of an alternative image of another kind of
farmer, one who utilises more "correct" farming practices. The
report never explicitly defines a "serious farmer". Must a serious
farmer be a commercial rather than a subsistence farmer? Must he use
modern inputs such as improved seeds and fertiliser?
Comparisons and characteristics based upon stylised and simplified
perceptions are common wherever cultures are in contact. But the
images discussed here gain added significance as they influence the
design and implementation of rural development projects.
Without exception, the rural development projects reviewed above have
failed to raise agricultural production and rural incomes signifi¬
cantly. Why has this failure occurred? Clearly, any answer to this
question must take into account the way in which Basotho farmers'
perceptions and attitudes to domestic agricultural production are
shaped by the regional political economy and also the severe environ¬
mental constraints. Yet a full answer needs to go further than this,
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and must probe more fully the implications of transferring Western
technical knowledge to traditional Third World agrarian societies.
This question will be explored further in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE THABA TSEKA RURAL TECHNOLOGY UNIT
AND THE SOLAR ENERGY PROJECT
The rural development projects which have been reviewed in this
thesis have been directed towards the rapid achievement of visible
results. The adoption of new agricultural technologies by farmers
has generally been perceived as an increase in the use of one or more
of three production factors; namely, land, labour or capital. Given
the shortage of arable land, most programmes have concentrated on the
development of land-augmenting technologies rather than on mechanisa¬
tion, or other labour-saving technologies. The former involves
methods of increasing productivity per unit area through the intro¬
duction of improved seeds, fertiliser and pesticides. These efforts
necessitate an increase in capital resources and most programmes have
had to include credit and marketing schemes. It is clear that these
measures also require a high level of institutional support; and it
is within this context that many of the rural development projects of
the past decade may be understood, with their emphases on high levels
of management and the provision of farm packages aimed at achieving
rapid increases in agricultural production. The lack of success of
these efforts has been noted and ascribed not only to the failure of
adequate institutional development and support, but also to the
failure to undertake longer-term local research which would ade¬
quately take into account the constraints of the small farmer.
The fundamental importance of local research and innovation in the
case of rural development cannot be overemphasised. As one survey of
rural development projects in Africa has remarked:
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"Where considerable effort has been made to adapt technol¬
ogy to suit small farm conditions, ....the response of
small farmers to innovation has been truly dramatic" [Lele
(1975), p 180].
Two different approaches to rural development research may be dis¬
tinguished. The first form of research may be described as an inter¬
ventionist approach to technological change. Generally, the rate at
which increased productivity is achieved in new technologies is
related to the extent to which the research worker allows himself to
move beyond the limitations and constraints faced by small farmers.
Research workers estimate an achievable level of institutional sup¬
port and design the improved technology within these anticipated con-
straints.
The second approach is to limit research to technologies which fit
entirely within the existing environment experienced by the farmers.
•
This necessarily requires long acquaintance with the agricultural
community and the undertaking of sophisticated and long-term research
to determine what technological change is feasible within the exist¬
ing constraints. It has already been noted that the farming tech¬
niques of the Basotho and their attitudes towards technological
change have formed over a century in which Lesotho has been drawn
firmly into the regional economy, and the Basotho have come to be
more dependent on migrant labour than on agriculture. Given this
overriding constraint, there are no simple solutions, and no readily
available technologies, which can be readily assimilated by the
Basotho in order to improve agricultural production and rural wel¬
fare.
It is unfortunate that rural development programmes in Lesotho have
concentrated, often unconsciously, on the former approach, which is
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highly sensitive to institutional support, in order to overcome the
political and economic constraints which inhibit technological change
in agricultural production. Because the level and quality of insti¬
tutional support has been far from adequate it is difficult to assess
accurately the potential of new technical knowledge and innovations
which have been introduced. These considerations apply less to non-
agricultural technologies. It has already been noted that the
Basotho have generally responded enthusiastically towards any pro¬
gramme which would increase their domestic security and well-being
and which involves a minimum of risk. This chapter will examine the
introduction of non-agricul tural technologies in order to understand
further the process of technological change in rural development. An
example of such a programme was the emphasis given to appropriate
technology and the initiation of a solar energy project at Thaba
Tseka.
The Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (TTRDP), with its added
concerns of health, education and infrastructure development, has
sought to introduce, not only improved agricultural technologies, but
also those technologies aimed at increasing welfare in the villages.
More than any other rural development project in Lesotho, the TTRDP
has given explicit attention to the broader implications of techno¬
logical change. The director of the project wrote:
"While the Thaba Tseka team views the introduction of tech¬
nology as an important means to improve the productivity
and well-being of the mountain people, the approach taken
in the introduction of new technologies must be considered
with great care. Identification of what changes should be
introduced must be accompanied by assessments of the
effects that may result from introducing changes in tradi¬
tional practices. The team does not accept the proposition
that highly productive technological societies can simply
transfer their methods, and expect success. This "carbon
copy" mentality will not only disappoint goals, but will
exacerbate the problems of poverty, inequality,
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malnutrition, and the general low standard of living.
Technology cannot be transferred; rather, it must be
adapted, matching the results of scientific research with
local physical, social and economic conditions. It is a
mistake to believe that the solutions to low production
levels and overgrazing are resolved by simply introducing
large doses of technology. It is also a mistake to dismiss
all traditional ways as retrogressive. The obliteration of
traditional cultures through modernisation may be inevit¬
able, but it should be remembered that the thoughtless
introduction of modern technology has, in the last two
decades, impoverished many rural people of the world.
Therefore, what must not be lost in the process of change,
are the people's traditional insights and resources. Oth¬
erwise, technology applied indiscriminately as a "fix" may
create more problems than it solves" [Thaba Tseka Rural
Development Programme (1978p 27].
This concern with local research and the development of technologies
was given practical expression in the establishment of a Rural Tech¬
nology Unit (RTU) with the remit:
"To adapt and introduce technologies which are appropriate
in terms of cost, environment, maintenance, and use, in the
mountain areas of Lesotho, and to increase the quality and
standard of living of village people through increasing
opportunities for training and self-sufficiency" [Thaba
Tseka Rural Development Programme (19810.), p 1],
The emphasis on "appropriate technologies", and its implication that
underused resources should be exploited, gave rise to the solar
energy project. Before examining this project, it is of interest to
look briefly at the structure and objectives of the RTU. The Unit
represents an innovative and, as far as Lesotho is concerned, unique
attempt at creating a research institution which would be responsive
to local needs and constraints (1). But its success can only be
(1) It should be noted that there have been other attempts at the
research and development of technologies aimed at increasing the
welfare of the rural population, or at stimulating rural industry
in Lesotho, but these efforts have been meagre and uncoordinated.
Apart from water supply and road construction technologies, the
following projects may be noted:
1. The Thaba-Khupa Ecumenical Farm Institute formed an appropriate
technology unit which established a blacksmiths' workshop.
2. The Ministry of Rural Development formed a solar energy section
which carried out a year's practical research.
3. An inexpensive spinning wheel was developed and a mohair spin¬
ning project was launched to provide 2000 rural women with addi-
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assessed by a full consideration of the technological changes it
introduced and the factors which influenced the nature of its
research and development programme.
THE DESIGN OF THE RURAL TECHNOLOGY UNIT
An initial project proposal for the establishment of a rural technol¬
ogy unit was made in August 1978, following contact by Thaba Tseka
project staff with a blacksmithing workshop at Thaba Khupa in the
lowlands of Lesotho. Thaba Khupa was funded mainly by the Danish aid
agency, DANIDA, and was involved in the repair, adaptation and
manufacture of agricultural implements. It had gained a reputation
of being a successful example of the application of "appropriate
technologies" and was one of the rural technology projects most often
shown to international aid delegations visiting Lesotho. The TTRDP
management hoped to duplicate the Thaba Khupa workshop at Thaba Tseka
and expand its activities to include research and development of
tional cash income. Spinners are given production credit for pur¬
chase of the spinning wheel, often from local credit unions, and
they attend courses to learn spinning techniques and cooperative
management. The project, set up with CARE assistance, sells raw
mohair to the spinners and purchases the spun yarn for local and
overseas marketing.
4. Following visits by the small-scale technology advisor of the
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in 1976 and 1977, and discus¬
sions in the Central Planning and Development Office (CPDO), an
Appropriate Technology Unit was set up in 1979, headed by an "ex¬
pert", who was funded by the Commonwealth Secretariat for one
year. The main function of the unit was to act as an information
centre and to coordinate AT related activities. The unit was fi¬
nally closed down in 1981. The Washington based aid agency, Ap¬
propriate Technology International, then funded a study to deter¬
mine if there could be a further role for such an information
unit. But, following an indeterminate report, lack of enthusiasm
in government, and a substantial offer by UNIDO for an industrial
development information service, the idea was dropped and the unit
closed. Very little was accomplished over this period, other than




Construction of the workshop began in April 1979 and was carried out
by trainees on the building course of the Trade Centre at the pro¬
ject. Difficulty was experienced in recruiting skilled artisans to
staff the workshop. Local men were recruited, eventually, and were
sent on training courses at Thaba Khupa which included blacksmithing
and welding instruction. A Danish technician, visiting Lesotho, was
hired to run the agricultural section of the Rural Technology Unit.
By that time, a number of projects had already commenced. A consul¬
tant had been retained to evaluate wind power potential and to
develop prototypes. A small-scale hydro-electric scheme was being
constructed (2), and a solar energy programme was being planned. In
the agricultural section, a draft animal programme was instituted and
an inventory of tools and techniques commonly utilised in mountain
agriculture was carried out.
Over the next two years, the aims and the organisational structure of
the Rural Technology Unit were defined more closely. Its specific
objectives were:
*1. To assess and evaluate the present tools, techniques
and implements employed by the people in agricultural
production.
2. To develop and test improvements or alternatives to
these, that will increase agricultural productivity.
(2) ATI approved a grant of $8100 for equipment purchases and
evaluation of the project, the purpose of which was to explore the
potential for exploiting water resources by introducing a small
scale experimental hydro-electric facility. The system was
designed for an average stream flow of 6.7 1/sec and an installed
capacity of 5-7 kW.
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3. To develop and test prototypes that will meet recog¬
nised needs in agricultural activities.
4. To develop and test any potentially income generating
or economically viable method, process or technique
appropriate to the conditions of the mountain area.
5. To determine the area of needed improvement in any
other facet of village technology and design, and to
test prototypes and methods to fulfill those needs.
6. To encourage participation of village people in iden¬
tifying needs and working with the RTU to meet those
needs.
7. To increase opportunities for training and self-
sufficiency by involving locally trained artisans in
the research and development work and by encouraging
an innovative attitude.
8. To offer technical, financial, accounting, and manage¬
ment training to encourage self-reliance and to enable
local residents to eventually assume control of RTU.
9. To undertake any allied work which might be required
to meet a recognised local need.
10. To liaise with other projects or organisations working
in related areas" [Thaba Tseka Rural Development Pro¬
gramme (1981aj ,p 1].
The Rural Technology Unit was divided into three main sections as the
organisational chart in Figure 5.1 indicates. In 1981, the positions
of Division Head, RTU Coordinator, and the heads of the agriculture
and village technology sections, were filled by foreign aid person¬
nel. Two of these were university-qualified engineers and the other
two were agricultural technicians with a number of years' experience
and training. In addition, there were three other university-
qualified scientists and engineers working in the village technology
section - two Peace Corps Volunteers assigned temporarily to the RTU
(3), and an American consultant.
(3) The two PCVs had been sent to Lesotho to work on the USAID
funded Renewable Energy Technology Project whose start had been
delayed. The TTRDP Project Director managed to persuade the Peace
Corps to second the volunteers to work on the RTU's programme on
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FIGURE 5.1 : Rural Technology Organisational Chart
There was a strong emphasis in the RTU on training Basotho to take
over responsibility for functions which were being performed by expa¬
triates, and all workers in the RTU were drawn into the planning and
decision-making process. But, apart from the few Basotho who had
been trained by the programme, there was very little indigenous
technical capability. The workshop was headed by a Mosotho and,
towards the end of 1981, the position of village technology section
head had been localised, although all scientific and engineering
decisions were still being referred to expatriate engineers working
in the section. As might be expected, this continuing reliance on
expatriate expertise was to have a significant effect on the nature
of the R&D programme.
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Agricultural Technology
The agricultural technology section aimed to:
[1] evaluate the tools and implements in use in the district, and to
determine the possibilities for their local manufacture; deter¬
mine which agricul tural tools and techniques could be improved;
and design, develop and test appropriate tools, implements and
techniques to fulfill these needs;
[2] test and construct small-scale irrigation projects;
[3] improve 1 eatherworking skills in the district, and coordinate
the supply of raw materials and the marketing of finished items
until such time as a locally managed cooperative was established
to take over these functions;
[4] develop an appropriate small-scale production technique for the
tanning of local hides in order to supply local leather workers;
[5] evaluate the types of animal draft available in the district,
and determine the best utilisation of these by improved training
and harnessing; and
[6] determine the needs for improved food storage and develop
appropriate designs for these needs [Thaba Tseka Rural Develop¬
ment Programme (198KOJ.
Ox-drawn agricultural implements were adapted for horse draft.
Horses and mules were trained for draft power, animal trainers were
hired, and a draft animal hire system established in order to over¬
come the severe shortage of draft power during the crucial spring
ploughing months. Mobile maize shellers were constructed and various
- 329 -
imported agricultural machinery was tested, including the low-cost
Tinkabi tractor, manufactured in Swaziland. Two of the more success¬
ful programmes of this section have been the improvement of saddlery
production in the District, and research into rural tanning technolo¬
gies.
Leatherwork and tanning
The horse has remained the chief means of transport for the Basotho,
and there is a great demand for saddlery. These items have mostly
been imported, but a few Basotho craftsmen have begun to repair and
produce them.
In the past there had been some limited training in leatherwork. For
example, in 1926, the Lesotho Evangelical Church opened a technical
school in Quthing and offered a three-year course in saddlery and
1eathercraft. In 1965, this school was taken over by the Ministry of
Education and the course now produces some five leather craftsmen
annually. Another leather craft course was run at the Lerotholi
Technical Institute in Maseru, but was closed in 1953. Most of the
1eatherworkers in the Thaba Tseka District, however, learned their
skills from a craftsman at Mokhotlong who takes in apprentices.
In 1978, two saddlery makers approached the Thaba Tseka Rural
Development Programme for assistance in the supply of raw materials
and the marketing of finished items. Research indicated that none of
the materials which were currently being used in saddlery production
originated in Lesotho; none of the many hides and skins available in
the district were being used for this purpose, although surveys
showed that, in 1975, there were 1000 cattle and 30,000 sheep hides
available from animals slaughtered in the district. Little local
- 330 -
knowledge existed for the treatment and tanning of these hides, other
than the preparation of twisted leather ropes and the limited prac¬
tice of de-hairing skins by covering them with ash and burying them
for varying periods. Some skins were also preserved by smoking over
open fires.
Initial efforts were devoted to extension programmes to educate vil¬
lagers on the best methods of salting and curing hides and skins. A
marketing system was then established to purchase unused hides for
export. Tanning experiments were initiated in order to develop a
simple rural tanning technology. Research progressed well, and fund¬
ing is awaited to establish a small tanning industry.
Courses have also been run to upgrade the skills of saddlery and har¬
ness makers. These courses also offered tuition in basic accounting
and business management. A successful supply and marketing system
for saddlery production has also been established.
Village Technology
The village technology section sought to:
[1] develop techniques and devices to improve the delivery of water
to villages, particularly through the local design, construc¬
tion, testing, and installation of windmills and hydraulic rams;
[2] determine which types of solar devices are appropriate for sup¬
plementing or replacing present sources of energy, particularly
in the areas of cooking and heating; improve the efficiency of
utilisation of present sources of energy through the development
of fuel efficient mud stoves and paolas; examine the feasibility
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of small-scale electricity production, using renewable sources,
such as hydro-power, wind, and photovoltaic systems;
[3] determine village sanitation needs and develop appropriate means
of meeting these needs; and
[4] evaluate present forms of housing and identify possible improve¬
ments [Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (1981a)J.
Among the projects undertaken was the successful installation at a
clinic of a photovoltaic panel to charge batteries which powered a
radio transmitter and emergency lighting, and the installation of a
test wind generator and a micro-hydroelectric system. Hydraulic rams
were tested at various sites and the performances of commercially and
locally manufactured systems were compared. A windmill for pumping
water was manufactured at the RTU workshop and is currently being
tested. Little work was done on village sanitation.
The village technology section was responsible for one of the largest
projects undertaken by the RTU - an extensive research and develop¬
ment programme on solar energy (4).
Workshop
The workshop's function was to:
[1] act as a repair facility for damaged agricultural implements and
household goods which were brought in by villagers;
[2] produce prototypes for the other sections;
(4) This programme will be examined below in some detail.
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[3] produce and sell those devices that had been successfully tested
and for which there was a known market; and
[4] train local artisans in metal working skills and assist in the
establishment of village workshops in the district [Thaba Tseka
Rural Development Programme (1981cOj,
The workshop manufactured ox yokes, plough beams, cooking stands, and
ox-drawn wagons, all for sale. Pots, ploughs, stoves and harrows
were brought in by villagers for repair. A mobile repair service was
instituted and various village meetings were held to market goods
manufactured by the workshop. A satellite workshop was also esta¬
blished at the village of Ha Soai in the Thaba Tseka District.
The objectives of the Rural Technology Unit, and the ffi# functions of
its three sections, stand in marked contrast to the research efforts
of most other rural development programmes which frequently served
merely to test transferred technologies. The Rural Technology Unit
was committed to analysing existing technologies in the District,
improving or modifying them if necessary, testing innovations and
manufacturing technologies appropriate to the needs and conditions of
the area. The importance of local research and development institu¬
tions should be stressed. They constitute an attractive alternative
to national or international technical institutes, research centres
or universities whose research is often irrelevant to the concerns of
rural producers. Rural technology centres offer possibilities for:
assessment of local technical needs; formulation of programmes of
technological development; improvement of traditional techniques;
collection and dissemination of technical information from external
sources; adaptation of transferred technologies to suit local condi-
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tions; provision of supporting services and organisation for produc¬
tion; training; field testing of innovations; and formulation of area
development programmes. Many of these functions were incorporated in
one of the most extensive research, development and dissemination
efforts undertaken by the RTU - the solar energy project.
SOLAR ENERGY RESEARCH PROJECT
Project Design
At the end of 1978, an American energy consultant, who had been trav¬
elling through Africa, arrived at Thaba Tseka and showed an interest
in the work being undertaken there. He was hired subsequently by the
TTRDP project managers to undertake a study of the potential for wind
energy devices. A number of anemometers were installed and a test
windmill was built to generate electricity for lighting for a
doctor's house at the hospital. Most of the energy demands from
institutions were, however, for hot water, cooking, distilled water,
as well as lighting. Early conclusions of the project were that wind
energy showed a less immediate potential, and required greater study,
than did the more obvious benefits of solar energy. Incident solar
radiation for the region was high even in the cold winter months,
which were generally cloud-free.
In early 1979, the consultant, in cooperation with the project
management, designed a programme of work on solar energy for six
months. Its overall purpose was:
"To evaluate the potential of solar energy and develop pro¬
totypes for harnessing and utilising this energy in various
fields" (5).
(5) Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (1979). Quarterly Re-
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The stated objectives of the project were to:
"1. Evaluate existing solar data and the present level of
solar technology in Southern Africa to determine its
applicability to the Lesotho Mountain Region.
2. Establish local data collection facilities.
3. Utilising various designs of solar collectors set up a
test rack for the purpose of correlating the above
information, performance testing and training of per¬
sonnel .
4. Design, build and test systems, using locally produced
and tested solar collectors, to meet domestic and
institutional water heating needs.
5. Design, build and test prototype space heating sys¬
tems.
6. Develop solar energy in various fields i.e. solar pro¬
duce driers, solar cookers, solar greenhouse heating
systems, solar stills, solar cookers, etc.
7. Research the possible development and fabrication of
water pumps....
8. Carry out all the above with regard for the economics
and social acceptance of the items produced"
[ibid., p 30].
The solar energy work began in February 1979, with the American
energy consultant working for three months on the initial stages of
prototype development, climate research and surveying solar energy
work in other areas in Southern Africa. The consultant recommended
that he and an American colleague, who had some experience in commun¬
ity based introduction of renewable energy technologies in the USA,
be hired for a further phase of the project. The TTRDP management
agreed to fund a second phase and, in June 1979, the two Americans
toured the USA and Canada visiting universities and research centres
involved in solar energy research. Some information and literature
port January - March 1979, Thaba Tseka, p 30.
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was collected, which has now been deposited in the library on solar
energy at the RTU in Thaba Tseka. The costs for the first two phases
of the project are shown in Table 6.1.
Phase Component Cost (Maluti)
I Solar expert - 50 days 3500




Phase I Total 11900
II Two solar experts - 66 days 9200
Air fares from N.America 2600





Phase II Total 33,600
TABLE 6.1 : Budget for Solar Energy Research and Experimentation Pro¬
ject (Phases I & II).
Source: Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (1979). Quarterly Re¬
port January-March, Thaba Tseka, pp 31,32.
In April 1979, a proposal and a request for funds was presented to
Appropriate Technology International (ATI), by the TTRDP Director and
the Head of the Technical Division, for a third phase of the solar
energy project. ATI's concern at this point was with the commercial¬
isation of the technologies, and this aspect was written into the
project design [ATI (1982), p 16]. ATI agreed, finally, in August
1979, to fund the project until May 1980. The funding period was
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later extended, to December 1980, and the total grant amounted to
approximately $47,000.
The objectives of this phase were to:
"1) Secure the services of four Basotho crafts people with
technical training to act as apprentices. Phase III
would not begin without the presence of these
trainees. They would finish the phase with skills on
building, installing and maintaining solar devices.
2) Assess the work of Phase I and II to determine what
additional designs should be tried. Continue experi¬
mentation to expand on Phase I putting emphasis on
solar cooling by evaporation, solar produce drying,
solar greenhouses, cookers and passive space heating
system skills.
3) Determine overall possibility of various solar designs
and develop a method of production and identify a dis¬
tribution system.
4) Build and install on a local village and institutional
level several water heating systems, cookers,
greenhouses or other promising solar development as a
village test and as a training service" [Klein and
Wyatt (1980), p Al-2].
The project was to involve 27 weeks of work. ATI was to fund the
consultants' salaries, travel to Lesotho, and some US made solar
testing equipment. The TTRDP was to provide for the trainees'
salaries, local materials, consultant living expenses, administrative
support, and travel within Southern Africa.
On completion of the initial ATI funding period, in May 1980, the
consultants prepared a report which included detailed engineering
drawings of the various devices which had been designed and con¬
structed, together with a mass of climatic data relevant to the
design and operation of solar energy technologies. As well as being
a technically useful manual on certain solar energy devices, the
report showed that the consultants had changed certain priorities
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during the course of the project, in response to the reaction from
end users of the devices. It also suggested that while mistakes had
been made, many useful insights had been gained into dissemination
techniques. The report concluded:
"We have investigated energy needs of the District and
developed a number of solar energy prototypes, many of
which can be built locally. These ideas may prove to be of
interest to local people, but there has not been sufficient
time to fully evaluate their acceptance of these devices or
techniques" [Klein and Wyatt (1980), p 13-1].
A chief recommendation of the report was, therefore, that the work be
continued for a further period, employing only one of the consul¬
tants, the other American having already decided to return to the
United States for personal reasons. This recommendation was endorsed
by the TTRDP management, and ATI agreed to extend the funding period
to December 1980. This final phase, it was claimed, would permit
continued monitoring and wider dissemination of technologies intro¬
duced in Phase I, and would specifically produce:
"[1] A selection of fully tested solar devices for cooking,
water heating, food drying and battery charging with
details of costs, markets, and most suitable manufac¬
turing options, many of which will have been made by
villagers themselves or sold to them.
[2] Demonstrated improvements, and their costs and bene¬
fits, which can be made to the local houses.
[3] Demonstrated and installed improved wood and dung-
burning stoves and experience in the costing, market
demand, and methods of manufacture.
[4] Four Basotho with expertise in extension work on
appropriate technologies to the villages, with a spe¬
cial understanding of the principles and manufacturing
techniques applicable to solar devices and cooVing
methods" [ATI (1982), p 5].
Early in 1981, the work having been completed, the consultant pro¬
duced a second report, equally useful in terms of technical and
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evaluative data.
The Basotho who had been trained have successfully continued as a
unit of the Rural Technology Unit of the TTRDP and the dissemination
of the technologies developed, as well as some research and develop¬
ment work, is continuing. The American consultant employed on the
project has since been hired by the Lesotho Renewable Energy Technol¬
ogy Project (RET) funded by USAID.
A number of points are evident, from the above discussion, on the
factors which influenced the initial design of the project.
[1] The local residents of the District had no role in originating
the project, defining energy needs, or directing research prior¬
ities. Instead, all of these functions were controlled by the
project managers, i.e. by international aid personnel. No
detailed surveys of energy use and demand were undertaken before
the research and development priorities were set.
[2] The project originated from the concern of the project managers
to be seen to incorporate an "appropriate technology" component
into TTRDP activities, and renewable energy technologies were
perceived as being intrinsically appropriate.
[3] The "professional" concern of individuals to secure lucrative
contracts was a significant factor in the development of the
project. A travelling American "consultant" convinced the pro¬
ject managers to hire him to undertake initial exploratory work
in wind energy (his own particular field of interest). Subse¬
quent project reports all recommended further contracts, the
hiring of a colleague, a trip back to the USA, and two further
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"project phases".
[4] The support of international aid agencies was vital in ensuring
that the project was undertaken at all. Canadian aid personnel
at Thaba Tseka agreed to the initial funding, and the final
phase was dependent on ATI funding. The solar energy project
was an obvious "target" for donor funding, given the incorpora¬
tion of the notion of appropriate technology into aid agency
policy pronouncements of the period.
The initiation, design and nature of the solar energy project was
structured by the aid process. Canadian staff employed on the CIDA
funded TTRDP established the aims and objectives of the project, and
ATI also insisted, for example, that the commercialisation of techno¬
logies be an important component of the project. Renewable energy
technology projects were regarded as important because they fitted in




Some of the technologies which were developed, constructed and tested
by the RTU are described briefly below.
Water Heaters
Several types of small batch water heaters costing M13, and capable
of heating 10-20 1/day were built for village use. Five litre cook¬
ing oil tins, distributed by food-for-work programmes, were blackened
and placed in a double walled sheet metal box insulated with 50 mm of
fibre-glass and with a fibre-glass glazing panel fitted in a lid. The
boxes would then be propped up at a suitable inclination to the sun.
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Temperatures of 50 °C were obtained and it was hoped that the devices
would save on fuels used to heat water for washing. Simpler ver¬
sions, consisting of blackened tins placed in stone and mud enclo¬
sures insulated with dried grass and a fibre-glass cover, were con¬
structed with a fixed orientation and inclination to the sun. These
were less efficient than the earlier model but cost only M5 to con¬
struct. The various devices were tested extensively, but very few
were sold. It is the opinion of the writer that there existed much
less interest in water heaters than had initially been supposed by
the consultants.
Food dehydrators
Several different kinds of food dehydrators were tested. The stone
and mud wall version, suitable for household use, cost M8 to con¬
struct. A Ministry of Rural Development designed model, made from
sheet metal, was found to cost M45. Again, interest in the technol¬
ogy was disappointing; at the start of the project it was thought by
the consultants that the mud stone wall type would be the most easily
adopted, but very few were sold.
Photovoltaic Panels
Photo-voltaic panels supplying batteries were tested at the RTU and,
in May 1980, one was installed at a clinic. The system has continued
to be monitored and is working well. The cost of the panels was over
$3000 and no plans have been made to install similar devices at other
potential sites in the district.
Solar distillation
The demand for distilled water is chiefly from clinics and garages
which had previously imported it from the lowlands. One solar still
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was built and tested at the RTU workshop; it cost approximately M50
to manufacture and worked well, although no dissemination of the
technology was undertaken.
Solar housing
One of the consultants, with the permission of a local village head¬
man, built himself a solar rondavel and lived in it for nine months.
Better insulation was used, and larger windows were installed in
North facing walls to increase the passive solar heat gain. Data was
collected and much interest in the house was shown by village people.
However, the writer observed no move by villagers to imitate any of
these features and no organised dissemination of these technologies
was undertaken by the project.
Cookers
A number of alternative cooking devices were constructed and tested.
The performance of parabolic dish cookers and steam cookers had been
found to be susceptible to wind conditions and development work on
these devices was terminated. The construction and dissemination of
hay boxes was more successful. Hay boxes provide a means for storing
heated food in an insulated container and allowing retained heat to
continue the cooking process.
Solar Oven
The oven consists of a double-walled sheet-metal box painted black
inside with the space between the walls filled with fibre-glass insu¬
lation. The box is fitted with an inclined, double-glazed door and
with four galvanised sheet-metal concentrating reflectors. The solar
ovens performed impressively, and aroused great interest at village
demonstrations where they often prompted the amazed exclamation:
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"Mollo o kae?" (Where is the fire?). The units were able to cook a
wide variety of foods successfully, including papa (maize porridge),
rice, potatoes, cabbage, beef stew, chicken, bread and water for tea
and coffee. On sunny days, temperatures of 120 °C could be main¬
tained for a three or four hour period. The oven's performance was
unaffected by wind and it even performed satisfactorily on cloudy
days with only short periods of sunshine. For best performance, the
ovens had to be reoriented towards the sun every half hour or so. It
was possible, however, to cook satisfactorily by pointing the oven
slightly ahead of the sun's trajectory at the start of the cooking
operation, and leave it in this position, thus allowing women to go
to the fields if necessary. The unit costs M 45, an amount which
could be afforded by some returning migrant labourers, but which put
the oven beyond the means of many poorer households. A number of
different designs were constructed and tested extensively, over a
period of 12 months, until one particular design was selected as
being the most efficient and appropriate to local conditions.
Paolas
Paolas consist of no more than an old tin or twenty litre oil drum,
perforated for ventilation, in which a fire is made, and on which the
cooking pot is supported. Paolas have been used extensively by rural
households for cooking and brewing. The RTU started manufacturing
improved paolas subsequent to the solar energy project and largely as
a result of the interaction of RTU staff with villagers, during dis¬
semination trips and the holding of lipitso (village meetings). Here
was a cooking device which was being used by rural households and
which could be improved by increasing the efficiency of combustion.
A number of prototypes were constructed from sheet-metal which proved
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to be much more efficient than the conventional paolas in terms of
fuel used for conventional cooking tasks. The paolas were designed
to fit the standard range of three-legged cast-iron pots commonly
used by rural households and were conically shaped to maximise the
flow of the flame past the cooking pot. A novel two-stage construc¬
tion method was devised which allowed rapid manufacture from master
sheet metal patterns. The units cost approximately M5 and within a
short period a regular market demand had been established.
Dissemination
In terms of the stated objectives of the project, the results show
many areas in which it might be reasonably said to have failed. Wood
stoves were never developed, but most important of all very few dev¬
ices were disseminated. Table 6.2 shows the number of devices which
were produced and sold by the end of 1980.
The performance ratings in this table are subjective assessments by
project personnel and the estimates of the potential markets for each
of the solar devices appear to be purely guess work. It is interest¬
ing to note that those devices with an estimated market of over one
hundred (stone and mud construction water heaters, stone and mud con¬
struction food dehydrators, small solar greenhouses, and the solar
rondavel) were not especially exploited in the next phase of the
solar project, and did not achieve anything like the market potential
envisaged. Instead, the sheet-metal water heaters and ovens proved
the most successful and popular solar devices.
In 1981, metal ovens and the improved paola were in regular produc¬
tion at the RTU and, particularly the paola, were selling well. No
- 344 -
Solar device No. Performanee Unit cost No. Potenti al
bui 11 scale 1-10 Maiuti sol d market
Stone cold frames 2 _ 30 0 *100
Solar ovens 12 8 50 10 *100
Parabolic cooker 1 - 65 0
Solar steam cooker 2 2 100 0 *50
Photovoltaics 1 3 2300 0 5-30
Hay box 3 7 1 1 *100
(grass & cardboard)
Hay box 1 8 6 0 -
(styrafoam & cardboard)
Water heater 20 8 15 14 oorHV
(sheet metal)
Water heater 25 6 5 19 *100
(stone and mud)
Food dryers 1 8 50 1 oLOV
(village)
Food dryers 3 7 8 2 100
(stone and mud)
Large greenhouse 1 - 1000 0 *100
Small greenhouse 1 - 50 0 *100
Sol ar Rondavel 2 8 300 0 *100
TABLE 6.2 : Solar devices constructed, September 1979 - December
1980, Performance Rating and Potential Market.
Source: ATI (1982), Appendix B; RTU records.
more photovoltaic battery chargers have been installed at clinics, no
solar distillation units were being installed, no food dehydrators
were being purchased by farmers, and no significant changes have been
observed in rondavel design following the construction of the model
solar rondavel. ATI also considered that the project had been disap¬
pointing and remarked that:
"....very little success appears to have been achieved in
the commercialisation of the devices: no local craftsmen,
either at Thaba Tseka or in the capital of Maseru appear to
be yet interested in manufacturing and selling the devices
for their own profit. Only the RTU has established a cou¬
ple of devices which it can construct and sell to local
people successfully" [ATI (1982), p 7].
It may be argued that these results are not wholly unexpected.
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Indeed, it would have been surprising if a whole range of solar dev¬
ices had become suddenly popular, and in great demand, within such a
short period. This lack of progress should be placed within the per¬
spective of introducing a completely new concept and technology in a
remote rural region where transport and communication are extremely
difficult. Two consultants each worked for approximately one year,
supported by no more than four untrained local people. Over twenty-
five separate devices were built, tested, and to some extent dissem¬
inated. It might be said that the project was of some value in that
it produced the following:
[1] full and detailed technical documentation of the devices built
and tested, including costs;
[2] some indication of the more obvious cases of devices which were
not likely to be adopted, and those in which some interest was
shown;
[3] four trained Basotho with experience in construction and dis¬
semination of these devices, who are continuing to operate as a
unit within the RTU; and
[4] operating models of many of the devices, which are on display
for visitors to the project site.
The ATI staff involved were satisfied that many of its objectives in
funding the project were achieved, even though there were several
obvious areas in which the project itself fell far short of its own
stated objectives. ATI was, nevertheless, committed to creating a
long term programme in Lesotho and to being a major force in the
region in support of the appropriate technology movement (6). The
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agency understood that the TTRDP was being regarded by the Government
of Lesotho as a possible model for decentralised development adminis¬
tration in other districts, and it was thought that it (ATI) could
become "influential in determining its (TTRDP1 s) management structure
as well as its specific activities" [ATI (1982), p 6]. Further, ATI
considered that Thaba Tseka's credibility in the field of appropriate
technology had risen to the level where it was seen as the leader in
the field in Lesotho. In the longer term, ATI hoped that it would be
able to influence the design of the prospective Renewable Energy
Technology (RET) project in Lesotho. The American consultant at
Thaba Tseka was later able to join the RET project and ATI regarded
this as justification for its funding of the solar energy project
[ATI (1982), p 8].
Aspects of the original solar energy project were integrated into the
continuing activities of the village technology section of the RTU.
Extension efforts were undertaken by RTU staff in order to demon¬
strate and sell new devices. In 1980, a total of 21 1 ipitso were
held and a display of various solar devices was mounted at the RTU
and also at the monthly livestock market at Thaba Tseka.
A preliminary examination of the introduction of solar water heaters
in the Thaba Tseka District was undertaken by the RTU, in October
1980, in two villages where households had bought mud and stone con¬
struction solar water heaters. The purpose of the survey was to
obtain an evaluation of the solar water heaters based on the experi¬
ence of those who had bought them, to determine the diffusion net¬
works for solar devices, and to determine the usage of various types
(6) Two other AT projects were being supported in Lesotho by ATI -
at Thaba Khupa and the AT information unit at BEDCO.
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of fuel by the people in the villages.
It was found that those who had bought solar devices were, on aver¬
age, of a higher educational level and were more likely to have some
form of remunerative employment. They were also generally more
wealthy, owning more livestock and had the use of more fields. The
reasons given for buying the devices were that they helped to save
fuel, that they would help to reduce money spent on paraffin, and the
time to collect fuel. There was some confusion as to the precise use
of the solar water heaters. Although 64 per cent of the respondents
expected the devices to heat water, 36 per cent thought that they
could be used for cooking, and 4 per cent thought that they were for
food drying. The confusion arose in part because of a previous pitso
where a range of solar devices had been demonstrated. All those who
had actually bought solar water heaters were, however, amongst those
who expected the devices to heat water only. All purchasers under¬
stood that the effectiveness of the devices depended on the weather.
However, some devices were not being used through the winter months,
some devices had fallen into disrepair, and others needed adjustment.
Knowledge of the new technologies was fairly widespread in the vil¬
lages where solar devices had been purchased, but did not spread much
beyond. One conclusion of the survey appears to be that the new
technology is regarded as a risk and that only the more well off
households were prepared to experiment with, and purchase, new dev¬
ices [Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (1981b)].
The RTU project team, in conjunction with the writer, also decided to
embark on an extensive village trial to test the acceptability of
solar ovens to villagers and to see if they would be willing to buy
them after a trial period. In February 1981, a grant agreement was
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negotiated with USAID to fund the village trial which began the fol¬
lowing month, when a Peace Corps volunteer and the energy supervisor
of RTU's Village technology section travelled to the village of Ha
Mohau, in the Lesobeng Valley, to hold a pitso and discuss with the
villagers the proposed solar oven project. The villagers were
apparently enthusiastic and 45 ovens were transported subsequently by
mules on the ten-hour journey over steep and rocky mountain terrain.
The two extension workers lived in the village for a two-month
period, during which time they instructed villagers in the basic
aspects of solar oven use.
Visits to the village, made by the writer, indicated that villagers
were wary of adopting the innovation and not all of the ovens could
be distributed, even though they were offered free of charge. All
those who accepted ovens managed to cook successfully. When the two
extension workers left the village, at the beginning of May, six
women were using their ovens four or more times per week, five used
them one to three times a week, and the rest used the ovens only
occasionally. The extension workers had managed to cook most of
their food in the ovens; there is little doubt that they generated a
great deal of interest, and extension workers received many visits
from neighbouring villagers.
It was planned to measure the amount of fuel saved by the use of the
ovens, but difficulties were experienced in obtaining accurate meas¬
urements. Joala would be brewed intermittently and this affected the
amount of fuel used. There were also seasonal variations in fuel use
which meant that measurements taken by the extension workers, during
the short period in which they were in the village were of little
value. From April onwards, villagers also began to spend most of
- 349 -
their time harvesting in the fields and, therefore, had little time
to experiment with the ovens on a daily basis. When the village was
visited again, in July 1981, villagers were still spending most of
the day in the fields and were using their ovens only occasionally
for heating water. Despite a prevalence of clear skies there was a
widespread belief that the ovens would not work in the colder
weather. They also indicated that since fires were lit, anyway, to
heat their houses, they preferred to cook over the same fires. Most
villagers, however, still believed that the ovens would save some
fuel.
It was intended that the extension project would run for a year, at
the end of which villagers would be given the opportunity of buying
the ovens. Ha Mahau was visited in February 1982 by four RTU workers
who found that most villagers were not using the ovens, although many
claimed that they would be willing to purchase them. Subsequently,
RTU staff have decided to pay less attention to solar devices and
concentrate more on the development of fuel-efficient stoves.
It is clear that there are limitations to the widespread dissemina¬
tion of solar devices. On the other hand, it is of interest to note
that the development and dissemination of the improved paolas have
been extremely successful. In this instance the decisive factor
appears to have been that the technology involved was a simple, but
effective, modification to a commonly used device. The RTU continues
to manufacture and sell paolas without any significant marketing and
dissemination effort.
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Social and Environmental Factors Affecting Rural Energy Use
In order to gain a fuller understanding of the factors involved in
the introduction of solar energy technologies in Lesotho, it is help¬
ful to look at the patterns of rural energy use and demand. Tables
6.3 and 6.4 summarise fuel use patterns in Lesotho in 1980.
Modern Fuels Traditional Fuels Total
Petroleum El ec- Sub Fuel - Crop Sub All
Sector Products tricity Coal Total wood Dung Res. Total Fuel s
Urban
Households 0.29 0.06 0.66 1.01 0.19 0.19 1.20
Rural
Households 0.50 - 0.35 0.85 9.50 4 . 90 1.00 1 5.40 16.25
Agriculture 0.12 - - 0.12 - _ 0.12
Industry 0.61 0.13 0.25 0.99 - - - - 0.99
Commerce/
Institutions 0.24 0.14 0.67 1.05 0.1 0.1 1.15
Transport 1.14 — — 1.14 — — — — 1.14
TOTAL 2.90 0.33 1.93 5.16 9.79 4.9 1.0 15.69 20.85
TABLE 6.3 : Fuel Consumption by Sector, 1980 - Peta Joules
Source: SADCC (1982), Annex, Lesotho Output Tables.
Lesotho is dependent on South Africa for the importation of refined
petroleum products, electricity, coal and small amounts of firewood.
Although this dependence on South Africa further increases Lesotho's
vulnerability and exacerbates the trade deficit, commercial fuels
constitute only a quarter of the total fuel consumption. Three-
quarters of the national energy demand is supplied by traditional
indigenous fuels. It is clear, too, from Tables 6.3 and 6.4 that
rural households are by far the largest fuel consumers. It is in
this sector that Lesotho faces a growing energy crisis.
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Total Rural % Contribution % of National
Fuel Household Fuel of Individual Fuel
Consumption (PJ) Fuels Consumption
Petroleum Products 0.5 3.1 17.2
Coal 0.35 2.2 13.5
Fuelwood 9.5 58.4 97
Dung 4.9 30.2 100
Crop Residues 1.0 6.1 100
16.25 100 78
TABLE 6.4 : Total Rural Household Fuel Consumption
"Source: Village study, Best (1979), SADCC (1982).
The rural population of Lesotho has long been dependent on animated
(human and animal) and traditional (fuelwood and dung) energy sources
to fulfil the two major functions central to their subsistence:
namely, the powering of the agricultural production cycle, including
the cultivation, harvesting and irrigation of crops; and the feeding
and watering of humans and livestock. Unlike the populations of the
industrialised nations, the rural poor of the Third World, including
Lesotho, use energy almost exclusively for life-sustaining activi¬
ties. This irreducibility of energy demand, coupled with an increas¬
ing population, environmental degradation (including deforestation
and soil erosion), and stagnating agricultural production, is one of
the major problems facing Lesotho's rural population in a period of
escalating world energy costs.
There is no rural electrification in Lesotho and rural households
depend on four sources of fuel for domestic energy requirements:
fuelwood, dung, crop-residues and paraffin (7). Cooking represents
(7) Coal is consumed by a small minority of wealthy households who
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the major need for fuel, followed by house heating, warming water,
brewing joala and lighting. Paraffin and small quantities of candles
and coal are the only imported fuels used by rural households.
Fuelwood
The vegetation of Lesotho is chiefly grassland, with some small her¬
baceous multi-stemmed bushes, known to the Basotho as sehala-hala,
which provide the main source of fuel for rural households. Women
collect 10 to 30 kg bundles, two to six times per week, depending on
the size of their families and the time of year. It has been
observed by the writer that in some villages women have to walk up to
3 km to collect to collect sehala-hala. It is estimated that the
average annual consumption is 1.5 tonnes per family. Demand is
greatest in autumn and in winter there is a decline in brushwood con¬
sumption due to a substitution of dung for fuelwood. Sehala-hala is
becoming increasingly scarce. In a study of domestic energy consump¬
tion in the village of Malefiloane, near Mokhotlong, 80 per cent of
the women interviewed, asserted that it had become harder to collect
brushwood and 87 per cent considered collection of fuelwood a burden
[Best (1979),pll]. Sehala-hala burns quickly without making coals
and thus does not provide much domestic space heating.
In recent years, there has been an attempt to increase the availabil¬
ity of fuelwood through the planting of village woodlots. Eucalyptus
and pine species have been planted mainly and the most successful
have been E_. bridgesiana, IE. rubida and P_. radiata. The total area
planted by mid-1982 was 3,500 ha. and a planting rate of approxi¬
mately 1000 ha. per annum is planned for the next three years. Ini-
arrange their own bulk purchases and transport.
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tial harvests suggest that the average yields from mature plots range
from 16 tonnes/ha. in the north, 9.6 tonnes/ha. in the central area
to 4.8 tonnes/ha. south of Mafeteng. The woodlots project was esta¬
blished in 1973 and has been funded by the United Kingdom, the
Government of Lesotho and the Anglo-American Corporation. The FAO,
African Development Bank and the German government are considering
funding an expanded afforestation project.
Wood is a much more scarce fuel than sehala-hala, and its use is con¬
trolled by the chiefs. In a survey of fuel used in six villages in
the Thaba Tseka District, only 20 per cent of respondents reported
having cut trees during the past year, although most preferred wood
to either dung or paraffin as a source of fuel. The survey also
showed that there is a basic lack of knowledge about forestry on the
part of rural households and there were widely different views
expressed as to when trees should be planted and cut. Such views
persisted despite the National Tree Planting Day being in the optimal
month for planting [Thaba Tseka Rural Development Programme (1980b)].
Dung
The shortage of fuel wood in Lesotho has resulted in a far greater
reliance on dung for fuel than is usual for developing countries with
similar agricultural economies. The Basotho refer to four categories
of dung: khapane (from cows), kuluba (from horses and donkeys), 1isu
(dried manure which is cut and dug out of cattle kraals, usually
twice a year), and moraha (wet dung dug out of kraals after heavy
rains and formed into cakes which are dried in the sun). Not all
families have access to 1 isu or moraha as not all own sufficient
livestock, but khapane and kuluba are freely collected from the land.
The average annual 1 isu production has been estimated at 670 kg per
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cow, 6 kg per sheep or goat and 475 kg per horse (8). Dung is pre¬
ferred to sehaia-hala in winter because it provides space heating.
The average annual household consumption of dung was estimated at
1.35 tonnes in Malefiloane.
Crop Residues
During the harvest season, many families burn matlakala (crop resi¬
dues) such as wheat straw, maize stalks, and dried bean, pea and len¬
til plants. Women will often help to remove maize kernels from the
cob for another woman and, in return, they will keep the maize cobs
for fuel. Straw chaff is sometimes mixed with fresh cow dung and
left to dry to form maphoroa, which is also burnt.
Paraffin
Many rural households possess primus stoves which are generally used
for short cooking tasks such as boiling water for tea. Paraffin
stoves are also often used when dung is not available and a few days'
rain has exhausted the supply of dry sehala-hala. However, with
increasing paraffin prices, ever fewer households can afford to use
the stoves.
Lesotho imported 27 million litres of paraffin, worth M4.5 million,
in 1977 (9). It is estimated that households consume on average 26
litres of paraffin per year, involving an expenditure which amounts
to 2.5 per cent of household income [Best (1979), p 15]. In 1978,
the price of paraffin was 25 cents per litre, by 1980 this had
increased to 75 cents and in the remote village of Ha Mahau, for
(8) The mass has been measured at an average moisture content of
between 5 and 8 per cent [Best (1979), p 13J.
(9) A total of M17.6 million (8.8% of total imports) was spent on
fuel and lubricant imports in 1977.
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example, the price in 1981 was Ml per litre. These price increases
have effectively ended any major shift to the use of paraffin and
other commercial fuels for cooking and domestic heating.
With increased paraffin prices, rural households have been forced to
rely more heavily on indigenous fuels. As a result there have been
three major detrimental consequences of the increased use of fuel-
wood, dung and crop residues for fuel.
[1] The increased consumption of fuelwood has resulted in a further
depletion of ground cover which has exacerbated the severe soil
erosion in Lesotho.
[2] Dung and crop residues are not being returned to the soil as
essential elements of soil structure and fertiliser. The result
has been a progressive degradation of soil quality and a
decrease in crop production.
[3] The growing scarcity of fuels has meant that more time must be
taken away from other pursuits in order to forage for fuelwood.
This burden has fallen most heavily on women and children and
imposes constraints on agricultural production during peak
periods of activity.
Given these fuel shortages and the importance of cooking in domestic
energy use, it would appear that the solar energy project and RTU's
focus on the production and dissemination of solar ovens was
appropriate. The ovens are able to cook a wide variety of .foods,
common to the local diet, and can effect substantial savings in
scarce fuelwood and dung. But, in spite of the substantial research
and development effort, and a village trial where solar ovens were
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offered free of charge, there was no significant adoption of the new
technology by villagers, no maintenance of the ovens, and no attempts
at modifying them to increase their performance.
The crucial question remains - why, despite these efforts, has there
been an almost total lack of success in effecting technological
change? It has been argued in this thesis that part of the explana¬
tion is revealed in an examination of the aid process which ori¬
ginated, funded and directed the innovation and dissemination of
these solar technologies. Patterns of energy use and demand in
Lesotho are not unique; indeed, they are remarkably similar to, and
characteristic of, the rural energy problems faced by many Third
World countries. The impact of the aid agency, ATI, on the initia¬
tion, design and implementation of the solar energy project should be
assessed within the broader perspective of the response of major aid
agencies to Third World rural energy needs.
SUMMARY : THE IMPACT OF AID ON RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMMES
Until the 1970s, very little attention had been given to traditional
rural energy consumption in the Third World. Planning for Third
World energy production, and aid agency funding of energy-related
projects, focussed almost exclusively on the development of central
electrical power generating capacity through the creation of large-
scale power plants or the installation of on-site diesel powered gen¬
erating systems. With the "energy crisis" of the mid and late 1970s,
and the evolution of the notion of appropriate technology, there has
been new concern for the provision of decentralised rural energy sys¬
tems based on technologies able to exploit renewable energy sources.
These concerns have been incorporated in aid policy, and aid agency
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involvement in the funding of renewable energy technology projects
has become substantial. In 1979, the International Energy Agency
noted that more than 250 renewable energy projects had been funded by
OECD bilateral donors with grants and loans amounting to more than
$200 million. Most of this aid (86%) is accounted for by four
donors: the United States, Germany, Canada, and Sweden [Ashworth
(1980), p 259]. USAID has recently initiated and funded large renew¬
able energy technology programmes in several Third World countries,
including Lesotho.
The key to understanding the current lack of diffusion of renewable
energy technologies to poor rural areas of the Third World lies in an
examination of the policy and operating procedures of aid agencies.
The determining factor in the introduction of these technologies is a
need as perceived by project personnel, rather than a demand
expressed by local villagers. The solar energy project at Thaba
Tseka originated in this way - as, indeed, did the host institution,
the RTU.
The response of donor agencies to rural energy projects has often
been contradictory. In many cases, the bilateral donor's ideological
concerns for providing assistance to the rural poor of the Third
World are tempered with the commercial objectives of developing mark¬
ets for the export of solar technologies. Such contradictions are
sometimes reflected in the conflicting interests among different
institutions in the donor country. In the United States, agencies
such as USAID and ATI are, supposedly, concerned with improving the
economic and social well-being of the rural poor and have been
instrumental in the initiation and funding of RET programmes to this
end. Yet these same agencies have to justify politically these
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expenditures and grants and cannot ignore, for example, the US
Department of Energy's Solar Technology Transfer Programme which
seeks to facilitate the transfer of proven technologies from its
technical R&D programme to the private sector. One of the elements
of this programme is to assist in the development of an export market
in the Third World for these solar technologies.
It has been argued that the industrialised countries have a long-term
interest in the development of renewable resources, and the expansion
of overseas markets is one way of funding the development of the
necessary technologies [Hoffman (1980)]. An established demand for
such technologies in overseas markets will provide an important
stimulus to the nascent alternative energy sector in the industrial¬
ised countries, and will help to maintain the commercial viability of
the technologies until the domestic market is more fully developed.
What makes the solar energy project of the RTU at Thaba Tseka an
interesting case study is the extent to which such contradictions and
paradoxes in the aid process are revealed. The project has provided
no immediate market opportunities for American private sector solar
energy manufacturers, apart from the insignificant purchase of a
solar radiation data collection instrument and a photovoltaic panel.
Markets were not sought for further photovoltaic panels, even though
the device functioned successfully and it was estimated that there
were potential applications at some 30 other clinics.
The project originated from the notion that solar energy technologies
were "appropriate" per se. From the beginning there was, therefore,
a preoccupation with the development of, and experimentation with,
solar devices. Many of them were replicas of designs which had been
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developed and constructed by alternative communities which were com¬
mitted to self-sufficient, ecologically-sound life-styles within the
industrialised countries. Indeed, the two American consultants hired
for the solar energy project at Thaba Tseka came from just such a
background. The project, thus, did not originate from an expressed
need of local villagers, and comprehensive research was never under¬
taken to assess and understand local energy-use patterns and needs.
It was thus only after the termination of the solar energy project
that RTU staff were relatively successful in reorientating research
towards the development and dissemination of the improved paola - a
non-solar device, but highly economic and successful in achieving the
same ends as those intended by the solar devices, namely, a saving of
scarce indigenous fuels.
The significance of technical personnel in these aid programmes
further reveals the paradoxes of the aid process and the ideological
nature of the concern for introducing "appropriate" renewable energy
technologies. For, although there was a serious intent to alleviate
fuel shortages in the Thaba Tseka area, and much effort was devoted
to the development, production and dissemination of efficient solar
ovens, there is no doubt that the benefits to the consultants far
outweighed those to the villagers of the area. Major conclusions of
the various phases of the project consistently included recommenda¬
tions for further contracts, and the greater proportion of aid dis¬
bursed by ATI for the project was spent on consultant fees, living
expenses and travel allowances. In Phase I of the project these pay¬
ments amounted to 57 per cent and, in Phase II, 52 per cent of the
aid disbursed. Furthermore, ATI stated explicitly that a major jus¬
tification for funding the project was that the experience gained by
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the American consultant could be utilised by the proposed USAID
funded RET project (and presumably, ultimately, in the alternative
energy industry in the United States).
Technical assistance in the solar energy project took the form of the
provision of technical personnel on short-term contracts, rather than
the export of solar devices and the development of markets for Ameri¬
can manufacturers. In this respect, the solar energy project was
similar to the rural development programmes, reviewed in previous
chapters, which attempted to introduce improved agricultural techno¬
logies. Processes of technological change were introduced through
the transfer of technical knowledge through engineers and technicians
from the donor countries. Technical knowledge based on preconceived
notions, or motivated by ideological concerns, was transferred to an
alien environment and to a rural population who had not sought it and
which was both unable and unwilling to incorporate it into the common
practices. The consequence, once again, was both a failure to effect
technological change and to provide any increase in welfare for the
rural population of Lesotho.
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PART THREE




Technological change, in the predominantly agrarian nation of
Lesotho, has been shaped by the two fundamental features of the
country's economy: namely, migrant labour and international aid.
Central to the transformation of technical knowledge and the adoption
of new technologies has been the historical process which has shaped
Lesotho's economic structure and the growth of migrant labour. It is
not necessary to summarise and discuss the effects of labour migra¬
tion here once again; Chapters Three and Four have dealt extensively
with Lesotho's political economy and the rural environment. It is
sufficient to note that the dual dependence of rural Basotho on
migrant labour and subsistence agriculture has had a profound effect
on their perspectives and attitudes towards technological change and
innovation in domestic productive activities. In this respect the
case of Lesotho, although not typical, is not unique; it represents,
in exaggerated form, the situation faced by many other southern Afri¬
can labour-exporting countries. It is difficult, though, to general¬
ise Lesotho's dependence on labour migration, and the effects this
has had on technological change, to the majority of other poor Third
World countries. This is not the case with international aid, the
second key factor structuring technological change in Lesotho, and
the discussion in this chapter will concentrate on the significance
of aid policies, ideologies and knowledge in structuring the nature
of rural development programmes aimed at introducing technological
change.
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AID AND THE CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY
International aid has become one of the most important sources of
investment in many of the poorer Third World countries, and has
become a major vehicle for technological change. Official develop¬
ment assistance to Lesotho, in 1979, amounted to more than 90 per
cent of gross domestic investment in Lesotho. In six other countries
in sub-Saharan Africa this proportion was higher than in Lesotho, and
in no less than 17 countries in this region aid amounted to more than
half of the gross domestic investment. The total amount of aid dis¬
bursed to these countries has increased nearly six-fold in real terms
between 1970 and 1979 [World Bank (1981b), Tables 22 and 23]. The
role which aid assumes as a vehicle for technological change is par¬
ticularly significant in those countries which have a negligible
industrial base. The common means for technological change, in the
form of transnational corporation investments, licence agreements and
the purchase of industrial processes and machinery, are largely ino¬
perative in these countries, and the aid process has become the dom¬
inant means for the introduction of new technologies.
There are a number of ways in which international aid agencies influ¬
ence the choice of technology in Third World countries. For example,
technologies chosen for projects in which aid agencies are involved
are generally biased towards a relatively high level of imported cap¬
ital components by the restriction of agency financing to foreign
exchange capital costs. There are pressures on the staff of regional
aid offices to achieve lending targets and to maximise the contribu¬
tion from the donor nation; these disbursements are contractual and
long-term, compared with the uncertainties of local sources. These
tendencies are reinforced by the fact that many aid agencies'
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internal assessment of effectiveness are measured merely in terms of
the amount of money lent and the number of projects processed.
International aid agencies tend to finance equipment (usually high in
import content) rather than labour costs, and new capital rather than
maintenance. National governments rarely assess how far the detailed
project designs submitted by the operating agency may have been
biased towards a high capital and import content. Rather, aid is
generally seen as a welcome addition to scarce domestic resources for
investment and foreign exchange. There is, therefore, a danger that
the pressures to maximise aid agency financing may skew the whole
investment programme of the country in the direction of those sectors
which contain presentable projects of high import, capital-
intensiveness. The relatively low requirements of preparatory and
design work in relation to the total project cost, which imported
capital-intensive projects generally involve, make them attractive
not only to local administrators but also to hard pressed staff of
the lending agencies. The technological bias introduced by these
factors is evident in such development projects in Lesotho as the
earth-satellite communications system, the international airport, the
national roads network and the Maseru water supply project.
The choice of technologies in development projects is also, in many
ways, the consequence of a bargaining process between the local
government and international aid agencies. The motives for aid are
often the potential spin-offs from investment projects in terms of
new markets and export contracts. The greater the potential market
in a Third World country, the greater the scope for that country to
influence the choice of development projects and technologies funded
by aid agencies. This is less true of poorer Third World countries
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with limited markets. Paradoxically, though, there is a sense in
which their poverty itself serves to influence the nature of develop¬
ment programmes and technological change, and it is in these coun¬
tries that the contradictions of the aid process are most clearly
manifested.
The aid process has to a large extent been legitimised by the pro¬
fessed concern of donor countries for the poor of the Third World.
This concern has been expressed in such ideologies as "basic needs"
and "appropriate technology", and the focus on rural development for
the poor. It will be argued later that, in a minority of cases,
these ideologies are transformed into actual programmes, and, to the
extent that aid constitutes a primary source for the introduction of
new technologies in poorer agrarian nations, the impact of aid ideo¬
logies can be an fy important factor in the choice of technology in a
manner very different to that described above. Instead of skewing
the choice towards imported capital intensive technologies, aid may
result in rural development programmes which initiate local research,
development and manufacture of "appropriate technologies". But,
before pursuing this argument, the ideological character of much of
stated aid policy will be demonstrated with reference to the con¬
cealed interests of donor countries.
In global terms, very little aid is directed towards the poor. In
the American aid programme, only 32 per cent of American aid (exclud¬
ing the Economic Support Fund and food aid) goes to what the World
Bank classifies as "low-income" countries. The top ten recipients of
American aid received more than half of the total $5,600 million
allocation made in 1980. Of these countries, only five are in the
Third World - including Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and
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Philippines, not all of whom are renowned for their commitment to the
poor.
An analysis of World Bank loans also reveals that the concern for the
poor is a minority interest. In 1979, approximately $10,000 million
was lent to 75 countries. Ten countries - India, Indonesia, Brazil,
Mexico, Korea, Philippines, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey and Colombia -
received 56 per cent of the total aid disbursement. Only two of
these countries are classified as "low-income" countries and the
majority are notorious for their neglect of their poor [Lappe (1980),
p 29]. Aid for agriculture and rural development has also consti¬
tuted a small proportion of aid disbursements. It has been estimated
that, in 1978, one third of World Bank loans were allocated to these
sectors and, in 1979, the proportion was one only quarter [Lappe
(1980), p 43]. It is difficult to calculate what proportion of these
loans were actually directed towards the rural poor. Loans charac-
terised as meeting the basic needs of the poor go overwhelmingly to
build infrastructure, and projects aimed at increasing agricultural
productivity also do not automatically benefit small farmers or the
landless and hungry. The difficulties of assessing accurately if aid
is directed towards the rural poor is compounded further by the fact
that many projects are often merely renamed to fit new ideologies.
It should be stressed again that the availability of external aid to
finance new investment in itself affects the choice of technology;
for the interests of the donor agency then becomes an important ele¬
ment in the decision making process. Many considerations other than
the needs of the recipient country may affect the type of aid or
credits made available by the donor agency, and it may be argued that
the form of aid frequently depends more on the requirements of the
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donor country's economy than on those of the recipient's.
AID AND CONCEALED INTERESTS
Aid has never been an unconditional transfer of financial resources.
Usually, the conditions attached to aid are clearly and directly
intended to serve the interests of the donor countries. The aid pro¬
cess, thus, often results in Third World countries incurring various
costs. These costs arise from procurement tying, political and
economic commitments which have to be made for receiving foreign
assistance, disbursement procedures of the aid agencies, the repay¬
ment burden and recurrent budget implications of project aid.
Procurement tying
The immediate advantages to the international donor agencies of fund¬
ing development projects in Lesotho would not, at first, appear
great. An examination of many of the aid projects reveals, however,
that funding agreements frequently involve the procedure of procure¬
ment tying which stipulates that capital equipment has to be bought
in the donor country. There are many examples of this phenomenon in
Lesotho: among them are loans for the purchase of Canadian aircraft,
German communications equipment and European water treatment technol¬
ogy. The advantage to the donor country in terms of orders and con¬
tracts from any one of these projects might seem insignificant but,
cumulatively, business generated from aid agreements in Lesotho,
Africa, and in the Third World in general, adds significantly to
donor country trade.
The practice of tying foreign aid to the purchase of equipment in the
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donor country began at the end of the 1950s in response to the bal¬
ance of payment difficulties donor countries were experiencing at
that time. This was the case with the United States when it began,
in 1959, to tie supplies, financed by development loans, to US
sources; subsequently, it insisted that funds, which were remitted to
meet local costs of projects, were also used for imports from the US.
In 1963, Britain began to tie aid in the same way. The blanket res¬
triction on buying British can be circumvented only after lengthy
delays, and then only in special circumstances. The proportion of
British aid (excluding technical co-operation) which was fully tied
to the procurement of British goods and services, in 1977, was 44 per
cent. A further 19 per cent was limited to the procurement of equip¬
ment and services in either Britain or the recipient country [Arnold
(1979), p 45].
The practice of procurement tying may transfer costs to the recipient
countries for two reasons. Firstly, suppliers in the donor country,
realising that the goods are financed under aid programmes and that
the recipient country has no choice but to make this purchase under
aid, charge a monopoly price. Secondly, the cost of production in
the donor country may be higher than that from the traditional
source, which is the main reason why purchases were not made from the
donor country originally. Accordingly, the real value of foreign
assistance is reduced.
A further economic motive for aid is the generation of employment for
donor country nationals through the growth in export orders and also
in the provision of "experts" to staff development projects. This
latter aspect is seldom mentioned in the discussion on the costs of
procurement tying in aid projects. But the fact that bilateral donor
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agencies generally restrict their financing of project staff to
nationals of the donor country often means that personnel costs are
disproportionately high. These costs become significant in rural
development projects where the costs of expatriate project personnel
frequently constitute the major budgetary item.
A consequence of this policy is that most aid "disbursements" are
spent, in effect, in the donor country. It has been estimated that
three out of every four dollars in USAID's budget are used to pur¬
chase products and consultative services in the United States. Dur¬
ing 1978, USAID financed purchases from over 3000 US corporations;
the sum involved amounted to more than $1000 million [Lappe (1980), p
90].
Political and Economic Commitments
Some of the conditions attached to aid have been justified in terms
of the need to promote economic development in underdeveloped coun¬
tries, and aid is seen as a means for influencing general economic
policies in specific directions. Particular emphasis is given to
measures to achieve or maintain financial and monetary stability, the
elimination of import and currency restrictions and price controls,
and a greater reliance on market mechanisms for achieving growth.
These preferences are generally based on an acceptance and upholding
of the existing international framework of capitalism. Advocates of
this view argue that the choice of economic policies is a reasonably
technical matter and that it is possible for aid agencies to make
objective recommendations. But these arguments obscure the political
motives of international aid, especially from bilateral agencies,
which seek to sustain or promote political and economic structures
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beneficial, or at least not inimical, to the interests of the donor
country.
Aid is, in general, available to countries whose internal political
arrangements, foreign policy alignments, treatment of foreign private
investment, debt-servicing record, and export policies are considered
desirable, or potentially desirable, by the countries or institutions
providing aid. These interests are particularly evident in the aid
programme of the United States. In 1980, approximately a quarter of
its aid budget of $5,600 million was allocated to development pro¬
jects, a third to the Economic Support Fund, a quarter to food aid
and the rest to the Peace Corps, operating expenses of USAID and to
the multi-lateral aid agencies. The Economic Support Fund is aimed
specifically at the provision of balance of payments, infrastructure
and other capital and technical assistance to regions of the world in
which the USA has special foreign policy and "security" interests.
In 1980, 86 per cent of the fund was allocated to the Middle East -
mostly to Egypt and Israel. These two countries received more aid
than all the other development projects funded by USAID in the rest
of the world. The top six recipients of US economic aid are also the
top recipients of military assistance [Lappe (1980), p 15].
Political considerations are particularly important in explaining the
disbursements of aid to Lesotho from the United States, the Federal
Republic of Germany and Britain. These countries see it to be in
their interest to maintain stability in southern Africa so that their
substantial investments in the Republic of South Africa would not be
jeopardised. Loans provide one means of ensuring political allegi¬
ance, as does the provision of Western expatriates in key administra¬
tive functions in the government, and the offer of scholarships to
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Western universities.
The costs of political and economic alignment with donor countries
are experienced mainly by the rural poor, whom the donor agencies
purport to aid, while the government elite frequently benefit from
the aid process. The government of Lesotho has specific motives for
seeking to maximise aid receipts; there is little doubt that the BNP
has seen aid as a means of maintaining power at the expense of the
rural poor, who have been denied control over the resources which are
supposedly being directed towards their development. Just as South
African aid was used to support the BNP in the 1960s, international
aid, unwittingly very often, has been used by the BNP to establish
its dominance in the country. Many development projects have been
used to ensure employment of BNP supporters at the expense of the
BCP. For example, the provision of a new fleet of buses by Iran for
the capital, Maseru, provided one opportunity for creating exclusive
employment for BNP supporters. Another, more recent, example is the
Labour Construction Unit, a Swedish funded labour-intensive works
construction organisation, which has to hire all its labour through
the Prime Minister's office.
Disbursement Procedures
The timing of aid agreements and disbursement procedures are often
key elements in the effectiveness of aid programmes with delays in
these procedures adding to the cost of aid to the recipient country.
Most colonial countries, on gaining political independence, remained,
initially at least, dependent upon foreign aid, mainly from the old
colonial power. Gradually, Third World countries have begun to deal
with more donors whose procedures and practices differ considerably.
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This process has been evident in Lesotho in the 1970s. Reliance on
the international aid market tends to lead to wasted administrative
resources as considerable time and effort is spent dealing with the
plethora of aid agencies, each with its own administrative pro¬
cedures, financial years and policy objectives. Project priorities
have to be reconciled with those of prospective donors; often, donors
will agree to finance only selected aspects of a particular project,
with the result that the whole design process has to be repeated and
further donors approached. Dependence on foreign aid also tends to
limit rational national budgeting and financial planning. This is
apparent in Lesotho where financial decisions often have to wait upon
foreign budgetary procedures. Even when aid agreements are finally
signed, there are further delays while local aid agency staff check
that material specifications and the proposed suppliers meet donor
requirements. These delays in the aid process often mean that aid
allocations are underspent. Foreign aid is also subject to the
vagaries of the donor country's own internal political and economic
situation. Hence, aid flows may diminish during periods of economic
stringency in the donor country, and this may seriously affect the
long term planning of projects.
Many aid projects tend to remove decision-making from local
government control, and this can result in dispersed, unmanageable
and possibly contradictory development policies. For example, the
large rural development projects of the mid-seventies (such as the
Thaba Bosiu, Khomokhoana, and the Thaba Tseka Mountain Development
projects) were largely autonomous of government control and indepen¬
dent of ongoing government programmes. As a result the projects col¬
lapsed at the end of their funding periods with little to show for
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the immense effort and resources that had been expended.
There has been a preponderance of project aid in the total which has
been extended by donor countries. But, concentration on this type of
assistance often results in the implementation of projects which are
not of high priority to the recipient country which leads, in turn,
to a non-optimal allocation of resources for investment. There has
also been the belief, on the part of the Government of Lesotho, that
development occurs chiefly as a result of large injections of capital
and expatriate assistance into projects and programmes. "Programma-
tism" seems to dominate thinking on rural development policies with
the emphasis on officially provided services and initiatives. A nar¬
row and rigid view of what represents the permissible, and possible,
range of government activities to promote rural development prevails.
The only way to tackle problems is to run programmes; departments are
allotted responsibility, staff are appointed, aid projects are
approved, and sets of prescribed services are provided. This
approach clearly excludes mobilisation strategies or any contribution
from rural households. In this respect aid policies merely serve the
interest of government bureaucrats and aid personnel at the expense
of the rural poor.
Recurrent Budget Costs and the Repayment Burden
It has already been shown, in the analysis of Lesotho's economy, how
aid has substantial hidden costs in the form of recurrent budget
expenditure on maintenance and running costs of capital projects.
The increased flows of aid to Lesotho have meant ever larger
recurrent budgetary commitments. In recent years, these have been
offset through the increased remittances from migrant earnings, but,
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as these decline, the consequences of the recurrent costs of non¬
productive project aid are likely to become more apparent.
It should be noted, further, that direct capital grants form only a
proportion of aid and that low interest loans often form a not incon¬
siderable part of these agreements. The debt service problem has
been debated at virtually every international gathering convened dur¬
ing the past decade to discuss the economic problems of the Third
World. In this respect, the term "aid" is a misnomer, a metaphor
which is used conveniently by the donor countries to conceal the
costs and consequences of aid to the recipient countries.
AID AND IDEOLOGY
These negative effects of the aid process require us to treat with
caution the rhetoric of aid policy pronouncements which purport to
demonstrate the commitment of donor countries to assisting the rural
poor. It is when the costs of aid and the interests of donor coun¬
tries are revealed that the ideological nature of these pronounce¬
ments become apparent.
The manner in which aid policies conceal the costs of aid to Third
World countries, and mask the economic interests of donor countries,
is one aspect of the ideological character of aid. There is another
aspect which has become evident in the case study of Lesotho, and
which may be generalised to other poor, agrarian nations; it is the
extent to which ideological concerns, paradoxically, are transformed
into rural development programmes whose objectives are to introduce
"appropriate technologies" to meet the basic needs of the rural poor.
It may be argued that these programmes merely legitimate the aid pro-
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cess and disguise the economic interests which are the predominant
feature of international aid. It remains the case, nevertheless,
that the ideological character of the notions incorporated in aid
policies play an important role in directing technological change in
these poorer Third World nations.
The clearest effect of this phenomenon is, perhaps, observed in the
choice of technologies in rural development programmes. The choice
of new technologies in these projects has not, in general, been
skewed towards imported capital-intensive technologies, and there
have been few direct benefits for donor countries in the form of
export orders or foreign policy gains. Procurement tying regulations
have often been waived and it is noticeable that vehicles and equip¬
ment for rural development projects have been supplied from a variety
of sources. For example, the Canadian funded Thaba Tseka Project
included equipment manufactured in the USA, the United Kingdom, Ger¬
many and Japan. But equipment purchases were never a significant
expenditure in these projects, and the prevailing ideology of
appropriate technology allowed, for example, the creation of the
Rural Technology Unit, a local research and development institution
committed to the innovation and local manufacture of technologies
appropriate to the needs and environment of rural Lesotho.
The paradoxical way in which ideological concerns are transformed
into rural development programmes also affects the adoption of new
technologies by rural households. The effect is altogether more com¬
plex than that of the choice of technology. It has been noted that
technical assistance in aid-directed rural development programmes
takes the form, chiefly, of technical knowledge transferred by aid
personnel rather than the financing of capital projects or machinery.
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The largest single budgetary item in the rural development projects
which have been examined in this thesis, has consistently been on
expatriate technical personnel. Processes of technological change,
therefore, have been directed by foreign aid project staff who have
transmitted technical knowledge from their Western scientific and
technical education, training and experience into the rural environ¬
ment of Third World countries. Before discussing the way in which
the ideological interests structure the adoption of programmes of
technological change in rural development, it is necessary to look
more closely at the relationship between knowledge, ideology and
interests.
Ideology, Interests and Knowledge
As a concept, ideology relies primarily on the idea of distortion.
Beliefs which are ideologically determined are commonly held to be
distorted in some way. Equally, it is impossible to conceive of this
distortion unless there is a clear conception of how non-distorted
knowledge is possible. In order to explore the implications of
ideology it is necessary, therefore, to establish some idea of how
knowledge is formed and what constitutes valid knowledge. This
brings us to the complex and vast field of epistemology, and it is
clearly beyond the scope of this thesis to embark on a detailed dis¬
cussion of the theory of knowledge. It is sufficient here to distin¬
guish between two main conceptions of knowledge (1).
One view of knowledge is that it is a product of contemplation by
(1) This distinction has been made by Barnes (1977) and this sec¬
tion will draw heavily on his work and that of the "Edinburgh
School" in the sociology of knowledge and science.
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disinterested individuals passively perceiving some aspect of real¬
ity, and generating representations which directly and unproblemati-
cally reflect reality. Everyday epistemological notions appear to be
thoroughly permeated with this view of knowledge. The metaphor "see¬
ing" is commonly equated with understanding, and learning and passive
visual apprehension are regarded as analogous. It is then argued
that there can be only one true and valid system of knowledge which
corresponds to reality. The main problem with this view is that
there is no independent way of checking whether an individual's pas¬
sively received perception of the world matches reality in any objec¬
tive sense.
There is another view which regards knowledge as essentially social,
and part of the culture which is transmitted from generation to gen¬
eration (2). It accepts observation as a typical kind of learning,
but insists that visualisation and depiction are not passive but
active and socially mediated processes. Knowledge is produced by
interacting social groups engaged in particular activities and is
evaluated communally rather than by individual judgements. Its gen¬
eration may be understood with reference to the social and cultural
context in which it arises and its maintenance is not just a matter
of how it relates to reality but also of how it relates to the objec¬
tives and interests a society possesses by virtue of its historical
development. This is the view put forward by Barnes, who argues
that:
"Representations are actively manufactured renderings of
their referents, produced from available cultural
resources. The particular forms of construction adopted
(2) This view is represented, for example, in the works of Marx,
Lukacs, and Mannheim and has been developed by Barnes (1974) and
Bloor (1976).
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reflect the predictive or other technical cognitive func¬
tions the representation is required to perform when pro¬
cedures are carried out, competences executed, or tech¬
niques applied. Why such functions are initially required
of the representation is generally intelligible, directly
or indirectly, in terms of the objectives of some social
group" [Barnes (1977), p 6],
Knowledge arises out of our encounters with reality and is continu¬
ally subject to feed-back correction from these encounters, as
failure of prediction and control occur. Barnes argues that:
"
knowledge generally is primarily instrumental, in
the sense that it is generated and evaluated in a way that
is pre-organised by an interest in prediction and control,
and normative, in the sense that it is sustained by a com¬
munal consensus which is decided, and not a rational neces¬
sity" [ibid., p 18,19].
He defines all knowledge as accepted belief and publicly available,
shared representations. Belief, here, should not be taken to be
individualistic or idiosyncratic fantasy, but a socially sustained
consensus. Belief counts as knowledge in a manner which is indepen¬
dent of any historical assessment we might care to make of its
rational justifiability, scientific status, or philosophic worth.
All accepted beliefs are treated equally and symmetrically, rather
than measured against an ideal of true or rational knowledge which is
transcendentally sustained.
It is clear that these two theories of knowledge result in very dif¬
ferent conceptions of ideology. In the first view, ideological and
non-ideological knowledge correspond to the philosophically based
distinction between false belief and true knowledge. Ideologically
determined knowledge occurs when perceptions of "the way the world
is" are distorted by illegitimate concerns. Beliefs are held to be
ideologically determined if they are created, accepted or sustained
only because they are related to particular social interests. Valid
knowledge, on the other hand, is independent of social interests and
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thus not amenable to explanation in terms of the society in which it
is generated and sustained. It has conventionally been held that
only false or irrational beliefs are considered in need of causal
explanation. Social causation applied to rational beliefs is seen
as a contradiction as it somehow maligns their very rationality.
Barnes is unsympathetic to the proposed opposition between causation
and rationality. Without an independent criterion of truth this view
breaks down and makes way for a symmetrical treatment of "true" and
"false" beliefs alike.
Once it is accepted that all knowledge is socially determined, an
alternative conception of ideology is clearly necessary. It is pos¬
sible, instead, to distinguish between ideological and non-
ideological representations in terms of the different kinds of
interests which inform each position. It is then argued that
interests operate in all knowledge, but that they are of two distinct
kinds. One is the overt interest in prediction and control, dis¬
cussed above; the other type is a covert interest in rationalisation
and persuasion. Barnes argues:
"Hence, wherever knowledge is ideologically determined
there is a disguise or concealment of an interest which
generates or sustains the knowledge This gives us a
basis for the definition of ideological determination.
Knowledge or culture is ideologically determined in so far
as it is created, accepted or sustained by concealed,
unacknowledged, illegitimate interests"[ibid., p 33].
In particular contexts, beliefs may meaningfully be treated as ideo¬
logically determined, or even be called "ideologies", to the extent
that concealed interests are thought to influence the people who sus¬
tain and propagate them. But we must guard against regarding such
descriptions as references to the intrinsic properties of particular
beliefs or knowledge. There is no explicit, objective set of rules
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or procedures by which the influence of concealed interests upon
thought and belief can be established. The identification of ideol¬
ogy is always context-specific rather than universal. Similarly,
beliefs exposed as ideologically inspired are not necessarily ideo¬
logical in all contexts. This is possible because all knowledge is
rarely informed by legitimising and persuasive interests alone.
Instead, such interests subtly interact with knowledge committed to
an interest in prediction and control.
We should be cautious in advancing a necessary relationship between
an ideology and a particular social class or group. The argument
that there is a relationship between the representations of a group
and that group's position in the social structure does not entail the
necessity of predicting the content of the knowledge of a particular
situated group. This follows from the perspective of knowledge as a
resource, capable of being adapted to fulfil diverse ends. What is
far more likely is that, by virtue of a group's position in the
social structure, they will be predisposed towards the selection of
certain sets of representations to serve as resources. The cultural
resources available at any specific time are always the result of a
complex historical development. The force behind selection is con¬
tained in the conception of interest. It is when these interests are
unacknowledged and concealed that we can refer to knowledge as being
ideological.
Technical Assistance and the Adoption of New Technologies
The above framework may be usefully employed to understand more fully
the effect of ideology in the aid process. It is clear that many
concepts embodied in aid policies do constitute ideologies, in the
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sense that they conceal unacknowledged interests. These interests
are predominant in structuring the design of aid programmes and we
have noted how, in global terms, very little aid is actually directed
towards the poor in spite of aid policy statements which stress the
importance of doing just that. Instead, the aid process functions
largely as an adjunct to the political and economic interests of
donor countries.
The ideological character of aid policy is further demonstrated with
reference to the concealed interests of Third World ruling elites.
In the discussion on rural development programmes in Lesotho it was
noted how government elites have assimilated and manipulated concepts
in aid policies both to maximise the receipts of aid and to mask
their positions of privilege and power which are maintained at the
expense of the rural poor. World Bank policy statements indicating
the importance of development aid being directed towards:
"a strategy designed to improve the economic and social
life of....the rural poor" [World Bank (1975a), p3],
are matched by Government of Lesotho pronouncements that:
"....a major proportion of development expenditure
will....be focussed on the rural poor.... [and] alternative
technologies with differing implications for the number of
jobs created and the share of wages will be analysed"
[TFYDP, pp 51,52].
In the same way, the government has adopted the concept of
integrated, decentralised rural development which involves "bottom-
up" planning. Although most of the rural development programmes in
Lesotho incorporated these objectives, rural people were consistently
denied control of aid resources and any say in the design and opera¬
tion of rural development programmes.
We have argued, however, that the ideological character of these aid
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policies requires that they at least be seen to be implemented. Cri¬
ticism of the way the aid process serves the economic interests of
donor countries, and the privileged position of government elites in
the Third World, may be deflected when rural development programmes
can be cited which include among their objectives the introduction of
"appropriate technologies" to meet the basic needs of the poor. To
the extent that these ideological notions are transformed into actual
programmes, the aid process becomes, paradoxically, the vehicle for
the introduction of new technologies directed towards the rural poor.
We have also noted the importance of the transfer of technical
knowledge by aid personnel in these programmes and its effect on
technological change. These processes may be seen more clearly when
knowledge is understood as accepted belief and publicly available,
shared representations. There is little doubt that in some aspects
of aid programmes in Lesotho, aid policies have become resources
which have been employed by sections of the aid community in the
design and implementation of rural development programmes. These
groups have been serious in their intent to introduce programmes
which would improve the material welfare of the rural poor. Some aid
personnel have valued and identified with such policies as decentral¬
ised and integrated rural development, "bottom-up" planning, assis¬
tance to the poorest and the adoption of appropriate technologies
which are simple, low-cost, employment generating and compatible with
the environment. These concerns were evident, for example, in the
project management of Phase II of the Thaba Tseka Project and the
creation of the Rural Technology Unit. These interests are, perhaps,
institutionalised mostly in some of the smaller non-governmental aid
agencies, such as Plenty. Nevertheless, they are also evident in the
official aid agencies, amongst groups which, for example, have links
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with communities concerned with appropriate technology in the donor
countries. This aspect was demonstrated in the case of the solar
energy project where the work of the American consultants was
informed by their experience with community-based experimentation
with alternative energy technologies in the US. Indeed, it has been
partly due to pressures from groups such as these that aid agencies
have thought it necessary to justify and legitimise aid with these
ideological notions.
It should be recalled that in the discussion on ideology it was
argued that beliefs exposed as ideologically inspired are not neces¬
sarily ideological in all contexts. Ideological concerns are not
intrinsic properties of particular beliefs, and knowledge has the
character of a resource communally exploited in the achievement of
whatever interests actors decide. It is this feature of knowledge
which partly explains the ironic and contradictory nature of aid pro¬
grammes. Different social groups within the aid community have dif¬
ferent interests. Concepts and notions incorporated in aid policies
might be ideological in terms of the concealed economic interests of
dominant groups, but legitimate in terms of those groups who seek
overtly to use this knowledge as a resource in the programmes in
which they are involved. The complex nature of these effects should
not be underestimated, and these two aspects of the effect of aid
policies on the nature of the technologies introduced in poor
agrarian nations are not always easily distinguishable. Each pro¬
gramme and situation has to be examined individually in order to
analyse the nature of the interests which inform the knowledge util¬
ised by different groups in the aid process.
The role of ideology and knowledge in technological change has been
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emphasised in order to explain the problems involved in the adoption
and dissemination of new technologies. Implicit in much of the dis¬
cussion in the case study on Lesotho, has been the contention that
the vexed problem of why new technologies introduced in rural
development programmes have not been adopted by rural households, may
be understood, partly, in terms of the constraints imposed by the
regional political-economy, and partly through an examination of the
interaction of Western technical knowledge, transferred by aid pro¬
grammes, with the knowledge and practices of rural households. In
the discussion of ideology, interests and knowledge we came to the
view, commonly held in the sociology of knowledge and developed more
recently by Barnes, that knowledge is essentially social; that it is
a part of culture and that its generation and maintenance is related
to the objectives and interests a society possesses by virtue of its
historical development. The point of departure of Barnes from the
traditional sociology of knowledge (represented, for example, by the
work of Mannheim) is the argument that all knowledge should be under¬
stood in this way, including the nature of scientific knowledge
itself. This position clearly has implications for technical assis¬
tance programmes which have transferred Western scientific and techn¬
ical knowledge to rural environments whose historical and cultural
development has been vastly different from that of the donor coun¬
tries.
It is an unfortunate fact that so much of the development literature
either ignores any explicit discussion of the role of science and
knowledge, or assumes uncritically that Western scientific and techn¬
ical knowledge is universally valid, superior and therefore of direct
relevance to rural households in Third World countries. For example,
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Dickinson has argued that:
" while acknowledging the universality of the laws of
science, we must extend consideration of the application of
our scientific knowledge to a wider range of situations
than is encompassed by the experience limited to our own
society" [Dickinson (1975), p 218].
The implication is clear: while technologies to fit different situa¬
tions in Third World countries must be developed, the suitability of
Western scientific knowledge itself, as a resource for different cul¬
tures, remains unquestioned (3). Science has long been viewed as the
most certain and most rational form of knowledge we have. Philoso¬
phers since the seventeenth century have been concerned to develop an
ideal depiction of science as objective and these efforts have cul¬
minated in the formulation of hypothetical-deductive methodologies as
characterising the distinctive scientific method [Popper (1959)].
But from a sociological point of view it is clear that, in practice,
scientists in different disciplines do not adhere to the same metho¬
dological rules. Scientific theory, far from being universal, is
culture-specific (4). Criteria of rationality and objectivity in
Western science are not necessarily of relevance to beliefs which are
held in other cultures. The study of different societies or cul¬
tures, therefore, has to reject the view that the world is intelligi¬
ble in terms of one set of true, or uniquely reasonable beliefs and a
wide range of causes of error and distortion. The "given" of the raw
experience of reality does not translate naturally and unproblemati-
(3) The implication that technology is merely applied science is
also questionable. See Chapter Two.
(4) This view of science has been supported with reference to a
number of detailed case studies. There is strong empirical con¬
tent to much of the work of the "Edinburgh School" in the sociolo¬
gy of science. Shapin ( 1982), for example, has produced
some studies pd qgiMwhy which have demonstrated
the interactive relationship between science and the wider cul¬
ture.
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cally into one independent language of observation. All knowledge
and accepted belief has to be treated symmetrically.
It is not intended here to discuss extensively this view of science;
this has been done by Barnes (1974) and Bloor (1976). It is suffi¬
cient to point out that, if this conception of knowledge and science
is accepted, then it is possible to explain the failures of technical
assistance programmes partly in terms of the problems of transferring
knowledge which has arisen and developed in one particular social
situation to another whose history, culture and socially accepted
beliefs are very different. It is clear that the great majority of
the aid community have been unaware of the assumptions implicit in
technical assistance programmes. Our examination of colonial and
post-independence rural development programmes has pointed to the way
in which technical personnel, in their descriptions and evaluations
of Basotho agricultural practice, frequently imply a comparative
image of European agricultural practice. There have been repeated
references in rural development project documents to the Basotho not
being "genuine agriculturalists" or "serious farmers". These reports
never define explicitly what constitutes "genuine" or "serious" farm¬
ing but the implication is clear that their assessments are based on
an uncritical acceptance of the universal validity of Western agri-
cul tural knowledge. However, it has been argued in this chapter that
the generation of knowledge may be understood with reference to the
social and cultural context in which it arises, and its maintenance
is, in part, related to the objectives and interests society possesses
by virtue of its historical development. Within this perspective,
the knowledge transmitted by foreign technical personnel may not
always be relevant to the current social and cultural situation of
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the Basotho.
Furthermore, the failure, or rather, the reluctance of the Basotho to
abandon or modify traditional forms of agricultural knowledge may be
attributed, in part, to the interests which inform that knowledge.
These interests have themselves been a response to an historical
development, quite different to that of the donor countries, whereby
the Basotho have experienced the effect of their growing dependence
on migrant labour as a result of a century of economic dominance by
imperial and mining capital in the sub-continent. These issues
become more complex where non-agricultural technologies and knowledge
is concerned and where Basotho decisions to adopt technological
change are less affected by economic interests. We have argued, for
example, that the reluctance of the Basotho to adopt the new techno¬
logies introduced by the solar energy project (particul arly in the
village trial where solar ovens were offered free of charge) must be
attributable, in part, to the way in which the design of the technol¬
ogy was undertaken wholly within the framework of aid personnel's
notions of what constituted an appropriate energy technology, and
that the categories of knowledge implicit in the technology did not
correspond with those valued and accepted by Basotho rural house¬
holds.
The case study material for this thesis does not allow these argu¬
ments to be developed any further and any conclusions must neces¬
sarily remain at this general explanatory level. No thesis can hope
to be exhaustive. Its value and originality, though, may lie in
adopting new approaches to problems and pointing to areas in need of
further research.
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A proper understanding of technical change must be grounded in an
appreciation of the full spectrum of culture and economy. The out¬
sider seeking to achieve this must move as close as possible to the
perceptions, beliefs, knowledge systems and practices of the society
in question and compare them with his own. The comparative studies
of Mary Douglas (1966) and Robin Horton (1967) of pre-literate
societies and Western science were amongst the first in this vein
(5). It should be remembered, though, that Sesotho culture is a com¬
plex assemblage of traditional pre-literate and Western knowledge
systems, and is continually evolving as a result of the involvement
of the Basotho in the regional economy. The conclusions of this
thesis point to the need for further studies, perhaps by anthropolo¬
gists who may be able to achieve a more profound understanding of
alien culture than that achieved through the informal experience of
the writer in his field work. An awareness of some cross-cul tural
empathy in the study of Third World science and economy is no substi¬
tute for the intensive study of alien communities and culture which
is the hallmark of the discipline of anthropology. The relatively
recent development of economic anthropology might also be of value
here to the extent that it undertakes detailed empirical studies
rather than sterile debates in grandiose theory. Any study of the
interaction between the knowledge and culture of agrarian Third World
societies and the intervention of international technical assistance
programmes must, ultimately, be grounded in a political economy
framework which makes clear the dominant material and economic
interests and the way these have shaped culture, knowledge systems
(5) Drawing on this work, Barnes (1973) has suggested that one way
of comparing belief systems is to study the manner in which dif¬
ferent cultures treat anomaly.
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and the adoption of those new technologies which make feasible the
meeting of material needs and welfare.
SUMMARY CONCLUSION
At the start of this thesis, two broad questions were posed with
regard to technological change in rural development in Third World
countries; which factors govern, firstly, the choice and, secondly,
the adoption of new technologies.
There have been two strands of analysis evident in our attempt to
answer these questions. The first has relied on a political economy
approach, and a broad structural explanation of the history of tech¬
nological change in Lesotho, within the regional economy of southern
Africa, has been offered. The second approach has concentrated on
the nature and significance of the knowledge which has been incor¬
porated in aid programmes and its interaction with the existing
knowledge systems of agrarian societies.
In dealing with the questions of the choice and adoption of new tech¬
nologies within a political economy framework, it has been argued
that the penetration of colonial and mercantile capital in southern
Africa transformed traditional agricultural production such that it
became oriented more and more towards exchange values by making the
satisfaction of needs and subsistence more dependent on the sale,
rather than the immediate use, of the product. The Basotho were
drawn into commodity production, first through the sale of agricul¬
tural produce, and then, after the establishment of mining capital,
through the sale of labour power in the mines of South Africa. At
the same time, the land available to the Basotho was reduced, yet the
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labour migration system still forced them to remain dependent on
domestic agricultural production. It has been argued that this dual
dependence of the Basotho on migrant labour and subsistence agricul¬
ture has had a profound effect on their attitudes towards technologi¬
cal change and innovation in domestic production. The new intensive
pattern of settled agriculture required a transformation of tradi¬
tional agricultural knowledge and techniques comparable to the intro¬
duction of the plough in the mid-nineteenth century, but the Basotho,
because of the pervasive migrant labour system, have not been forced,
indeed, they have not perceived it necessary, to adopt new technolo¬
gies which would improve agricultural production.
Discussion of the aid process, the second key factor structuring
technological change in rural development, has been extended in this
chapter to examine the relationships between aid policies, ideology,
and the transfer of technical knowledge. The approach has been to
indicate both the importance and the nature of the effect of aid as a
vehicle for technological change in poor agrarian nations. By point¬
ing to the economic costs implicit in the aid process, the ideologi¬
cal character of aid policies, which purport to demonstrate a concern
for the rural poor while concealing economic interests, has been
demonstrated. But, because the ideologies of integrated rural
development, basic needs, and appropriate technology have so per¬
meated aid policy documents and pronouncements of the 1970s, these
emphases have, in certain cases, paradoxically influenced the design
of aid projects. In the case of Lesotho, the significance of this
effect has been noted, not only for the choice, but also for the
adoption and dissemination, of technologies introduced through rural
development programmes. The latter process has involved the complex
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question of the interaction between Western scientific and technical
knowledge and traditional Basotho practices and beliefs.
It might appear, at first sight, that the political economy approach
and the emphasis given to the transfer of knowledge in aid pro¬
grammes, are disconnected and disparate forms of analysis. Reliance
on the power of knowledge and ideas and their significance in under¬
standing social change leads easily to various forms of philosophical"
idealism which would contradict the materialist underpinnings of the
political economy framework used in our analysis of the structure of
Lesotho's economy and its historical development. Political economy,
grounded in the historical materialism first propounded by Marx and
Engels, rejects any notion of history which grants a determining role
to the ideas which men hold in explaining their actions and social
change in general. However, it should be clear that the view of
knowledge which has been adopted in this thesis would also imply a
rejection of idealism. Knowledge has been linked to interests and it
is the active pursuit of interests which brings about social change
and determines the fate of ideas. Technological change arises not
because men are determined by new ideas, but because they actively
deploy their knowledge in a new context as a resource to further
their interests. Although there is a school of thought within polit¬
ical economy which asserts that the course of social change may be
mechanically predicted from objective material laws inherent in the
economic "base" of society, it is also clear that Marx devoted some
attention to the significance of knowledge in social and technologi¬
cal change (6). Production is necessarily the accomplishment of cog¬
nitive, knowledgeable, socialised groups of men and women and their
(6) See for example the German Ideology by Marx and Engels (1970).
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actions are, in the long term, directed towards the fulfillment of
needs and the furthering of interests. How activity can fulfill a
need or further an interest is decided upon the basis of knowledge.
Knowledge is a resource in activity and not a direct determinant of
it, and no account of technological and social change is acceptable
which denies this role.
Finally, it remains the case that poor agrarian societies face
increasingly severe hardships which are likely to deteriorate as the
international distribution of economic power remains unreformed,
populations increase and natural resources are depleted.
Yes, most rural development programmes have been failures, often
through their insensitivity to the fact that traditional practices of
Third World rural households are based on centuries of experience of
survival under difficult conditions, and their ignorance of the con¬
cern of villagers when adopting a new technology that it not only
offers a benefit over existing practices, but also a risk not signi¬
ficantly greater than those associated with these practices. But
rural development programmes aimed at introducing technological
change and material improvement in poor agrarian societies will fail
less often, perhaps, when they begin to take the knowledge systems of
these societies at least as seriously as they take Western science.
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APPENDIX II
CAPITAL AND FOOD AID TO LESOTHO
- 3 97 -
[1] CAPITAL ASSISTANCE TO LESOTHO
Source of Assistance and Projects Commitments for 1979 and beyond
$ mill ion
United Kingdom
Basic Agricultural Services 2.15
Intensive Horticultural Production .25
Woodlots project .70
South East Woodlot Programme 1.27
Intensive Arable Area Conservation 1.27
Lesotho Agricultural College Phase IV .25
Mountain Livestock development Prog. 2.9
National Pig Breeding Herd .22
Fisheries Development .28
Mechanical Assistance to Food Tracks 1.23
Telecommunications 1.43
Offices, District Markets 1.71
Orthophoto Mapping 1.39
Employment Opportunity Project 1.41
Village Water Supplies .85
Rural Clinics .76
National University of Lesotho 1.19
Primary Schools 1.27
Survey Office Phase II .25
20.76
Canada
Lesotho Airways, Aircraft and training 2.13
Low Income Housing Development 2.91
National University of Lesotho 2.55
Thaba Tseka Phase I 5.31




National Teacher Training College .06
Institute of Extra-Mural Studies .09
New Qacha's Nek Hospital .49
1.73
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Source of Assistance and Projects Commitments for 1979 and beyond
$ millions
Federal Republic of Germany
Commodity Aid (oil supply) 8.35
Lesotho Freight Services 1.7




Mafeteng - Tsoloane Road 1.5
Medicines 2.13
Lesotho Dispensary Assoc. .63
4.25
Sweden
Labour Intensive Constr. Unit .81
Switzerland
Village Water Supply .68
Morija Nurses Training School .08
.76
United States
Instructional Materials Resource Centre 2.9









Roma - Semonkong, Leribe - Oxbow Road Study
Development Health Services
Maseru Water Supply













Arab Bank for Economic Development on Africa
Maseru International Airport





Lesotho Housing Corporation 1.4
European Economic Community












Source of Assistance and Projects Commitments for 1979 and beyond
$ millions







Source of Assistance and Projects Commitments for 1979 and beyond
$ mi 11 ions
Catholic Relief Services
CRS Food and Nutrition Programme 6.90
Warehousing Grant .12
• 7.02
Save the Children Fund
Unitarian Service Committee of Canada
Primary School Feeding 1.31
World Food Programme
Primary School Feeding 1.99
Institutional Feeding .37
Food for Work 2.29
Mountain Emergency Food Reserve .65
National Strategic Reserve of Wheat 1.64
6.94
Source: UNDP (1980), pp 39-42.
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